





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
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
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WRITINGS
OF
JOHN QUINCY ADAMS

WRITINGS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS

TO JOHN ADAMS

ST. PETERSBURG, 2 January, 1814.

MY DEAR SIR:

The last letters I have had the pleasure of receiving from you are those of 1 and 2 July, and excepting them and others of the same period from my mother and brother I have nothing from America dated later than June. The communications are nearly annihilated, and but for the return of the gentlemen who came out here on the extraordinary mission and that of their companions, I should be deprived of all means of transmitting a letter to my friends.

The *Neptune*, the vessel in which these gentlemen came, and which they ordered in the beginning of November to go and wait for them at Gothenburg, has effected her passage to that port. Mr. Gallatin, who to this day has received information of the decision of the Senate upon his nomination to this mission only through the medium of a newspaper, intends leaving this place in the course of eight or ten days. He has received a letter from one of his relations in Geneva, proposing to meet him in Switzerland, and I believe contemplates commencing his journey in that direction. You will easily judge from your intimate knowledge of the usual course of official transactions of the situation in which he personally and his colleagues have been placed, with the certain information now nearly three months since received of the vote in Senate upon the nomination, and without any authentic communication of the fact. As neither Mr.

Bayard nor myself have received our commissions under the appointment *with advice and consent*, Mr. Gallatin's powers to act are still precisely the same as our own; and if the mediation had been accepted and the negotiation in progress, we should have been thrown into a dilemma not a little awkward and embarrassing. The British government, however, peremptorily refused to treat with the United States under the mediation of Russia, or as they expressed it, under any mediation. This determination they communicated to the Emperor Alexander at his headquarters, and from the nature of the occupations which have occupied his time and absorbed his attention no official communication has yet been made to us of this event.¹ Mr. Gallatin, on receiving intelligence of the issue of his nomination in the Senate, determined not to wait for official dispatches announcing it; but as he has no other means of returning to the United States than by the *Neptune*, and as we have been daily expecting the information from this government which will authorize the departure of Mr. Bayard, he has been waiting hitherto, until the state of the roads and the advancement of the season have induced him to conclude upon his departure without longer delay.²

The British government through an indirect channel have offered to treat with the American envoys directly, either at Gothenburg or in England, and *intimated* to them an invitation to London for that purpose. As we have no powers to treat otherwise than under the mediation, we could not accept this invitation, but Mr. Gallatin and Mr. Bayard propose to avail themselves of it to stop in England on their

¹ Cathcart communicated the refusal of the British government to the Russian government September 25, 1813.

² On the next day, January 3, Gallatin proposed to go near the Emperor's headquarters at Töplitz, and ask his intentions on the British proposals, a measure discouraged by Adams. See Adams, *Memoirs*, January 3, 1814.

return home, and to ascertain in a manner involving no responsibility what the views of the British government are in relation to a peace with the United States. These views have, indeed, been made known to us in a manner sufficiently intelligible to leave me little expectation that my colleagues will find a favorable opportunity for bringing an accommodation to a successful issue; but the desire of our country and of our government is so strong for peace that no honorable opportunity for attempting to accomplish it ought to be neglected.

As the military and political revolutions in the north of Europe have now opened a communication from this country to England by the way of Holland, Mr. Gallatin and Mr. Bayard intend to take that course instead of going to Gothenburg. They propose ordering the *Neptune* to Falmouth, and going by land themselves to Amsterdam. The packets already pass between Helvoetsluys and Harwich, and will furnish them the means of conveyance to England. As Mr. Gallatin takes his departure first, he will make his visit to Switzerland, and meet Mr. Bayard again in Holland.

Mr. Payne Todd,¹ Mrs. Madison's son, and Colonel Milligan,² who came out with Mr. Bayard, are going through Sweden to Gothenburg, there to embark for England, intending to wait for the arrival of other gentlemen there, and it is by them that I now have the opportunity of writing to you.

.
¹ John Payne Todd, son of John Todd, of Philadelphia, and "Dolly" Payne.

² George Milligan.

TO R. G. BEASLEY

ST. PETERSBURG, 4 January, 1814.

SIR:

I have to acknowledge the receipt of your favors of 22 October, 5 and 19 November, with their enclosures, and to thank you for them. The intelligence contained in the last is of a pleasing nature, though less favorable than reports which had been for some days circulating here upon the authority of later accounts in English newspapers. We had been flattered with expectations that the issue of General Proctor's campaign had been more decisive than General Harrison's dispatch now warrants us in believing, and that Sir James L. Yeo's insulting charge against his enemy of want of spirit had been answered more effectually than by his seeking refuge in port from the pursuit of that same enemy, and suffering his transports of troops and convoys to be taken almost before his face, without attempting to protect them.

I know not upon what foundation any expectation can be entertained in England of a speedy peace with the United States. There is nothing in the English mode of carrying on the war, and certainly nothing in their mode of meeting the pacific overtures on our part, that has any tendency to promote the return of peace. If they think the battle of Leipzig, or even the dismemberment or partition of France, will settle our question with them, they will find themselves mistaken. If they have convinced themselves, as they have labored to convince others, that we wage this war as allies of Napoleon, they must find time to awaken from their delusion. One of their poets remarks that a man may repeat a tale so often as at last to credit his own lie. Some such

operation must have taken place in their minds to make them consider us at this day as allies of Napoleon. . . .

I am, etc.

TO ABIGAIL ADAMS

ST. PETERSBURG, 17 January, 1814.

I expected that Mr. Gallatin or Mr. Bayard would have been the bearer of the last letter that I wrote you, which was the close of the last year; but it was taken by Mr. Todd, who with Colonel Milligan, Mr. Bayard's private secretary, left this city about ten days since bound to England by the way of Sweden. Mr. Gallatin's intention now is to go in a week or ten days, but he takes his direction through Germany to Holland. Perhaps he may go by the way of the Emperor Alexander's headquarters. He has already taken leave at court ¹ and has his passports. Mr. Bayard has not, but they will probably go together. Mr. Gallatin goes upon the information he has received of the vote of the Senate upon his nomination, although he is yet without any official communication of the fact. Mr. Bayard waits, because we have not yet received from this government any official notification that the Emperor's offer of mediation has been rejected by the British cabinet. His patience is however so nearly exhausted that he intends to ask an audience to take leave of the Empress mother and for his passports, in time to take his departure with Mr. Gallatin in the course of the next week.² It will be yet many months before they can reach the United States. Their journey to Holland will scarcely be performed in less than six weeks. Their purpose is to go from thence to England where Mr.

¹ On the 13th—the Russian New Year.

² He took leave on the 23d.

Bayard at least will wait for advices from our government. They will scarcely get home before midsummer, and it may be as long before you will receive this letter. I have no prospect, however, of a shorter or of so safe a means of conveyance, and as I learn the cartels between the United States and England are entirely stopped, I know not how I shall find opportunities of writing to you hereafter. Hitherto the occasions for transmitting the monthly letter have never failed, and I can but hope that some new opening will present itself to accomplish the same effect in future.

Your letter of 14 July is still the latest date that I have directly from the United States. The only intelligence that we receive from home is that which comes to us in the English newspapers; and how much of that is falsehood or misrepresentation we infer not only from the general character of all paragraph-news in the British prints, but from the lies which they have told about ourselves. Some time ago they stated that the American envoys had asked to go to the Emperor Alexander's headquarters and had been refused—the Emperor alleging that there were no suitable accommodations for their Excellencies. Since then they have asserted that Lord Walpole had declared to this government that the British ministry, having rejected their mediation, would be well pleased that the American envoys should be dismissed, and that he was instructed to say so. Both these paragraphs are totally unfounded. We have good reason to conclude that almost all their news from America is equally distorted from the truth. They have not been able however to suppress the event of the naval action upon Lake Erie. I have not seen Commodore Perry's account of that affair; but it has been published in the English papers and Sir George Prevost's letter announcing it to his government contains a circumstance certainly not intended by

him to honor his enemy, but to which the annals of English naval glory will not readily furnish a parallel. He says that he has the knowledge of the facts only from the American Commodore's dispatch, published in the American papers; that he himself has no official report of it and can expect none for a very long time, the British commander and all his officers having been either killed or so disabled that there was not one left to tell the tale.

This same Sir G. Prevost and Sir James L. Yeo, the British Commodore on Lake Ontario, in their official reports have charged Commodore Chauncey's squadron with want of spirit. I believe it to be a mere hectoring bravado on the part of Yeo, and I pray as fervently as Sir George himself that Yeo may have had his opportunity of meeting Chauncey, and not the opportunity of running away from it. We have the account of Proctor's retreat and a report that his whole force, excepting himself and about fifty of his men, had been destroyed or taken. But of this hitherto no official confirmation.

From the style and tone of Sir G. Prevost's dispatches I suspect he has very much exaggerated the forces of Generals Wilkinson, Hampton, and Harrison opposed against him. If he has not, they ought before this to have given a very good account of him and his province. But experience has taught me to distrust our land operations, and I wait with an anxiety predominating over my hopes the further accounts that must soon be received concerning them.

One of the advantages which we may derive from this war (and from so great an evil we ought to extract all the good we possibly can) is that of acquiring military skill, discipline, and experience. No nation can enjoy freedom and independence without being always prepared to defend them by force of arms. Our military incapacity when this

war commenced was so great that a few more years of peace would have extinguished every spark of martial ardor among us. All our first attempts upon Canada were but sources of humiliation to us.¹ The performances of the year just now elapsed so far as we know them have certainly been less disgraceful and in some particulars have been highly honorable, there is yet much room and much occasion for improvement. God grant that it may not be lost.

If I fill the pages of my letters to you with *American news* it will indicate to you the subject nearest to my heart. The great scenes of action in Europe are now so remote from this country that the knowledge of them will reach the United States nearly as soon as we receive it here. After all the bloody tragedies which have been acting on the face of Europe these two and twenty years, France is to receive the law and constitution from the most inveterate of her enemies. She abused her power of prosperity to such excess that she has not a friend left to support her in the reverse of her fortune. What the present coalition will do with her

¹ "I was really in hopes, and I do not yet despair of the object, that this war would be the means of obtaining by conquest or *cession* the provinces of Canada. Not that I am ambitious for the extension of territory, but of security. I believe a permanent peace cannot be maintained with the northern savages so long as a European power holds the possession and government of those provinces. That was the opinion of Britain when we were colonists, and that was also then the opinion of our ancestors. If we obtain the Canadas, they will afford a pledge on the part of the British government to preserve peace with us, by subjecting their West India islands to a greater degree of dependence on the United States for breadstuffs and lumber than if they held those provinces. The annual exports of Canada for several years in the single article of wheat averaged half a million of bushels, a portion of which no doubt was raised in the United States. Whilst Britain holds the Canadas, it will be difficult for the United States at any time, however necessary, to enforce an embargo or non-importation law. I had therefore rather purchase the Canadas of Britain than not have them. We want them and sooner or later they must and will be annexed to us." *William Plumer to John Quincy Adams*, January 24, 1814. Ms.

is yet very uncertain, but there is no question in my mind that they will do with her what they please.

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TO THOMAS BOYLSTON ADAMS

ST. PETERSBURG, 24 January, 1814.

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You will know long before this letter can reach you that the Prince of Orange has returned to Holland, where instead of resuming the title of Stadtholder, he has taken that of "Sovereign Prince of the United Netherlands." The old constitution of States General, States of the Provinces, and Sovereign Cities, has therefore been totally abandoned. The Prince in one of his proclamations says they shall have a constitution, and a previous proclamation by a sort of Revolutionary Committee of his friends, says that it is to be prescribed by him. The English government have sent troops there to support him, and according to common report his son, the Hereditary Prince of Orange, who has distinguished himself in Portugal and Spain under Lord Wellington, is to be the husband of the future Queen of England.

I am informed that one of the first acts of the government formed under the Prince's authority was an informal notification to Mr. Bourne that his functions as Consul General of the United States had ceased. The same notification was given to Mr. Forbes at Hamburg when that city was incorporated as a part of the French Empire, and it may be principally a matter of form, or an expedient to obtain a recognition of the new government. There is certainly among the people of Holland no disposition unfriendly to

America, and I can suppose none in the Prince. But what his engagements with England may be time only can disclose. All the other allies of England have remained neutral to her war with America. There may be motives, and among them the strongest will be the clear, manifest and important interest of Holland to remain neutral, for prompting the British government to deny the Hollanders the benefit of neutrality. By the measures with which the Prince commences his career connected with the proposed marriage, it may be the project in England to make Holland hereafter an appendage to the British Empire in form as well as substance. Perhaps they will discover that Holland is an *alluvion* of Hanover, a hint which they may take from their friend the *Ruler of France*. To whatever disposition they may adopt Holland must be, as she has been ever since the *first year of Batavian Liberty* (with which you were so well acquainted), altogether passive.

The events of the last two years opened a new prospect to all Europe, and have discovered the glassy substance of the colossal power of France. Had that power been acquired by wisdom, it might have been consolidated by time and the most ordinary portion of prudence. The Emperor Napoleon says that he was never seduced by prosperity; but when he comes to be judged impartially by posterity that will not be their sentence. His fortune will be among the wonders of the age in which he has lived. His military talent and genius will place him high in the rank of great captains; but his intemperate passion, his presumptuous insolence, and his Spanish and Russian wars, will reduce him very nearly to the level of ordinary men. At all events he will be one of the standing examples of human vicissitude, ranged not among the Alexanders, Cæsars, and Charlemagnes, but among the Hannibals, Pompeys, and Charles

the 12th. I believe his romance is drawing towards its close and that he will soon cease even to yield a pretext for the war against France. England alone will be "afraid of the gunpowder Percy though he should be dead."

By the return of Mr. Gallatin and Mr. Bayard you will have ascertained, what I suppose you have already sufficient reason to expect, that *we* are to have no peace with England by the means of a mediation.¹ These gentlemen intend to touch in England upon their return home. If there is any prospect of obtaining peace by a direct negotiation they will have the opportunity of promoting it; but the successes of the British in their other wars have not been calculated to prepare them for the termination of that with America. . . .

TO ROBERT FULTON

ST. PETERSBURG, 29 January, 1814.

SIR:

I have now the pleasure of inclosing to you a translation of a rescript from the Emperor, addressed to the Minister of the Interior, directing him to issue the patent for your steam boats. It was sent me by Count Romanzoff, with a request that I would give him notice for the information of the Minister of the Interior, of the person empowered by you to carry the design into execution here. I answered the Count that I was authorized by your letter of 19 June, 1813, to take out the patent in your behalf, and was ready upon the delivery of it to me to pay on your account the 1500 rubles required conformably to the rescript; that I could not

¹ See Gallatin's letter to Count Romanzoff, 13/25 January, 1814, in Adams, *Writings of Gallatin*, I. 598. He and Bayard left St. Petersburg January 25, and reached Amsterdam March 4.

name the person who would be charged with the execution of the plan here by you, as your letter had only mentioned your intention of sending your chief engineer here for the purpose; that if the Minister of the Interior thought a more formal power than that in your letter to me indispensable for the delivery of the patent, he might keep it in his hands until I could inform you of its being ready for delivery to you or your agent duly authorized. I afterwards saw the Minister of the Interior himself, who told me that he should not hesitate to deliver the patent to me upon the authority given by your letter to me to receive it, but that the patent itself could not be completed without a *specification* and a *model* of your boat. Of course it will remain with him until you can furnish these, and I acquiesced the more readily in this arrangement as it occasions no loss of time to you. In sending here your engineer for the construction of the first boat you will be enabled at the same time to transmit the model and specification, as well as the regular power to take out the patent in your name. I am etc.

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE

No. 128.

[JAMES MONROE]

ST. PETERSBURG, 5 February, 1814.

SIR:

In a separate letter I have informed you of the interview which I had on the 1st instant with the Chancellor, Count Romanzoff, at his request, of the dispatch from Count Lieven ¹ which he showed me, of the note which I wrote him

¹ No. 260, November 26/December 5, 1813. See Adams, *Memoirs*, February 1, 1814.

the next morning, asking for a copy of that dispatch or a particular statement of its contents, and of his answer to my note which as you will observe complies with neither of my requests, but refers me to you for the purport of Lord Castlereagh's letter to you, of which I had not said a word in my note to him. I think a more particular account of this interview due to the President for his information; but must request that it may not be made public for several considerations, and chiefly for the consequences which its publicity might draw personally upon the Chancellor in a country where there is no shelter for the subject from the displeasure of his sovereign.

The Count had requested me to call upon him at nine o'clock in the evening and at his own private house, to which he had removed at the close of the year from the hotel belonging to the Emperor, and assigned by him for the residence of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. He apologized to me for having sent to me to come to him at undue hours, and observed to me that as he was on the point of *abdicating*, he had thought it best to continue to the last in his habits of frankness and confidence with me, and that he could do no better than to show me the dispatch itself which he had received the day before from Count Lieven, which was brought with a multitude of other packets by a courier from the Emperor's headquarters, but without a line upon the subject either from the Emperor or from Count Nesselrode.

The dispatch contained a very distinct allusion to the refusal by Great Britain of the Emperor's mediation. From the long silence of the Emperor, and from the caution with which the Count had avoided any written communication of this fact to us, I suspected that he would neither give me a copy of the dispatch, nor a statement of its contents in

writing. I therefore purposely forbore asking him verbally for the copy, because it was only by asking it in writing that I could have a written answer, which would better ascertain whether the withholding of this communication by the Russian government was the effect merely of neglect or of design.¹

It was apparent from the tenor of the Count's conversation that a mere dismissal from the Emperor's service was not his principal apprehension. He had had recent and repeated assurances of the regard and affection of the Emperor in his own hand, and which I have seen; but they have not altogether tranquillized his mind. He told me that in sending to the Emperor the treaty of peace with Persia, he had taken that opportunity to renew the request which he had already previously made that he might be permitted to resign his office. That the Emperor in answering his letter had expressed himself highly satisfied with the Persian peace, and fully sensible of the importance of that transaction, and had concluded by saying that there was at the close of the Count's letter an idea to which he, the Emperor, could not reconcile himself.

Upon which, said the Count, I have replied and insisted upon resigning. I have recalled to the Emperor's recollection that when after the peace of Tilsit, with which I had nothing to do, he laid his commands upon me to take the Department of Foreign Affairs, I urged him to excuse me from a situation which I felt to be above my powers. That he persisted in his commands, and told me that he had already two wars upon his hands, with Turkey and with Persia, and had just contracted the engagement of commencing two others, with Sweden and with England. I have observed that these four wars, being now all terminated, had

¹ For Lord Walpole's statement, see Adams, *Memoirs*, April 2, 1814; and that of Romanzoff, in *Ib.*, April 23.

brought my administration to a natural conclusion, and that the peace with Persia, being the last transaction relating to them, furnished him with a suitable occasion to dismiss me *with kindness*. That I have in fact nothing to do. The Emperor when he left this place chose to correspond with me, directly and exclusively. But he has contracted new engagements. He not only commands his own armies, but he oversees and superintends the interests of the allies. All his time is absorbed; insensibly he has dropped the habit of writing to me altogether, and I can get no answers from headquarters upon business of any kind. The emperor is always intending to write me tomorrow, or the next day, and here the term fixed for exchanging the ratifications of the peace with Persia is past, and I have not received them. Multitudes of letters come from headquarters saying that on this, that and the other affair the orders will be sent me in two or three days, and the orders never come. In the meantime I am chained down here. I cannot sleep out of St. Petersburg. I cannot give my time to my private concerns; I cannot visit my estates, as I earnestly desire to do. To be Chancellor of the Empire for the sake of signing passports and giving answers about law suits is not worth while. I have therefore left the hotel of the foreign department and removed to my own house, expecting hourly the Emperor's answer to my last request, which might indeed have been already here, but not more than four or five days ago, and prepared as a kinswoman of mine,¹ turned of eighty, told me once she was determined to do after two years more, *to turn over a new leaf in my life*. I am not so old as she was, but I am more infirm in health, and at sixty shall without waiting two years more turn over my new leaf. I can say that my heart is American, and were it not for my age and infirmities, I would now certainly go to that country; but as it is, I wish only to retire to bless the Emperor for his past favors and to wish him all future happiness and prosperity.

It was not the first time that the Count had suggested

¹ It was his grandmother.

that the idea of going himself to America was floating in his mind. He had mentioned it before, both to Mr. Gallatin and Mr. Bayard, and, considered in connection with his remark that he had solicited of the Emperor to dismiss him *with kindness*, I have imagined that among his anticipations in his present situation he may expect that his dismissal may be accompanied with a *permission to travel*, in which case there is not a spot in all Europe where he could set his foot, with a hope of finding a friendly reception or a comfortable residence. The Count is a sincere and genuine Russian patriot. Of the statesmen with whom it has been my fortune to have political relations, I never knew one who carried into public life more of the principles and sentiments of spotless private honor. His integrity is irreproachable; but his enemies are numerous and inveterate in proportion to the importance and elevation of the station he has held. A powerful and implacable English influence, political and commercial, has been incessantly working against him, exasperated by the well-founded opinion that he has been a steady and able adversary to the British maritime tyranny, and that he has been the principal instrument in rescuing his country from the commercial servitude to which the English had reduced the Russians in their own cities. Among his own countrymen the very sunshine of imperial favor, the very radiance of his own integrity, has been brewing the tempest that now blackens over his head. The connections of this country with France, although completely formed before he came into office, are all ascribed to him; the compliances which were so long continued to avert the war are imputed solely to his counsels, and the unfortunate issue of those connections and compliances in the unjust and frantic war which France finally waged against this country, have accumulated upon him a

degree of popular odium, like that which from precisely similar sources burst upon the head of John De Witt in Holland in 1672. From popular excesses the Count here has nothing to fear. But he may know that about the person of the Emperor efforts will not be wanting to deprive him of more than his place. The advice to journey into a foreign country may be a middle term upon which the Emperor's will may settle, between a dismissal *with kindness* and an act of rigor more uncongenial to his personal character, but to which he may be urged. All Europe is either in alliance or at war with the Emperor. Into the countries of his enemies the Count could not go; in those of his allies the Count would find enmities and resentments against him as bitter as those he would leave behind him at home. It is only in America that he could hope to find an asylum from the persecutions which will be the reward of his virtues and of his services to his country.

In my letter to you, No. 118 of 8 September last, I mentioned to you the French, Russian and German translations which I had procured to be made of the President's message and the report of the Committee of Foreign Relations, containing our manifesto on the declaration of war against Great Britain, upon the Count's promise that they should be published here in the same gazettes which had published the English Regent's manifesto of 9 January, 1813, and that I had consented to the postponement of the publication at the Count's request on the arrival of Messrs. Gallatin and Bayard here, and upon conciliatory principles. At this interview I reminded the Count of his promise and claimed its fulfilment. He said that he thought that upon this new proposal from Lord Castlereagh for a direct negotiation the same motive for avoiding any publication of an irritating nature still continued. I answered that I had originally

asked and he had promised this publication only as the counterpart to that of the English manifesto in the same papers. He said that if I absolutely insisted upon it, they should be published; but that he knew it would be imputed entirely to him. I replied that placing it upon the footing of a personal favor to him, I would press the subject no farther; but that I hoped I should see no further publication of English statements injurious to my country in the Russian gazettes. He said he would accept my forbearance on the ground upon which I placed it, of a personal favor to him, and the more readily, because Lord Walpole had already reproached him for a publication in the gazettes relative to the American mission, and that there should be, so far as depended upon him, no publication on the subject of our war which could be offensive to us. In the Count's situation I could ask no more of him. I have no doubt that the publication now of those papers would aggravate the peril of his condition, and it would probably be of no service to our cause.¹ I am etc.

TO JOHN ADAMS

ST. PETERSBURG, 17 February, 1814.

MY DEAR SIR:

There are still here a small number of Americans who came to this country upon commercial pursuits and who after bringing their affairs to a conclusion successively take their departure to return home, and thereby afford us opportunities of writing to our friends. One of them is Mr. Hurd ²

¹ Cf. Adams, *Memoirs*, February 1, 1814. On the 23d Adams received the circular letter from Count Romanzoff announcing his temporary inability to conduct the duties of the Department of Foreign Affairs.

² John R. Hurd.

of Boston, who goes to Gothenburg there to embark directly for the United States, and by whom I propose to send this letter.

I wrote to you by Mr. Gallatin and Mr. Bayard, who left this city the 25th of last month, and to my dear mother by Mr. Harris, who followed them on the 9th instant. As they intended to travel not very rapidly Mr. Harris expected to overtake them by the time they reach Berlin. Their object is to go to Amsterdam and thence to England, where they expect to receive a new commission and powers to treat of peace with the British government *directly*. Since their departure I have additional reason for expecting that such new powers will be transmitted to them, knowing that Lord Castlereagh has written to the American Secretary of State making the formal proposition of such a negotiation.¹ Whether I shall be associated in this new commission or not is to me extremely doubtful. I have a multitude of very substantial reasons for wishing I may not be, and only one for an inclination to the contrary. My negative reasons are not of a nature to be committed to paper. My positive reason is, because the voyage to England would be just so much performed of my voyage to the United States, and because it would make my return home as certain, as direct and as early as I could desire. From your letters which were brought me by Mr. Gallatin I perceived you had been informed of a subsequent destination which was intended for me had the mediation terminated in a peace. As however it has scarcely resulted even in a negotiation, other circum-

¹ "Since I wrote you by Mr. Harris, Lord Walpole has told me that Lord Castlereagh's letter to Mr. Monroe, he believed, was written in consequence of what *he* had communicated to Castlereagh, after his arrival here. If so, it must have been, according to the information in Count Lieven's dispatch, about the beginning of December, and not in October, as was supposed in London." *To Albert Gallatin*, February 18, 1814. Ms.

stances will naturally lead to other views. That in the present situation of Europe, or rather in that which must infallibly and very shortly be the situation of Europe, a peace between the United States and Great Britain may be concluded, I have little doubt. A general peace, at least something which will pass under that name, is highly probable in the course of a few months. According to all present appearances the catastrophe of the French Revolution is at hand. The Bourbons will at last be restored, not as the Stuarts were in England by the spontaneous and irresistible voice of the nation, but by the dictates of a foreign coalition. But the allied powers in conferring this blessing upon France will claim the reward of their generosity, and be specially careful to reduce her within dimensions which will carry with them what they may consider as a guaranty of future tranquillity, and in their solicitude to effect this as well as in the distribution of the spoils of conquest the seeds of further wars will in every probability be thickly disseminated. That a peace, however, of some kind will very soon take place is not to be doubted, from the total inability now manifested by France to resist the invasion of the allied armies. The allies proclaim to the world that they are waging war not against France but against Napoleon Bonaparte, and the French people are as willing to believe them as the other nations of Europe were to believe the Jacobins when they promised liberty, equality and fraternity to every people, and declared war against individual kings and princes. The throne of Napoleon was built upon his fields of battle. Its only solid basis was victory. So long as he was victorious the French nation was submissive, but with his fortune all his ties upon them have dissolved. If it were possible for any conqueror to possess a hold upon the *affections* of mankind, it would be an exception to a general rule, and of all

conquerors he is the last who would be entitled to it. In the real moment of distress it was not to be expected that the French people would make any effort or sacrifice for his sake. That they will make none is perfectly ascertained, and the wisdom of a woman may perhaps not be necessary to persuade them to deal with him as the Israelites of Abel dealt with Sheba the son of Bichri, and to propitiate their invaders by throwing over to them his head. At the dissolution of his government France will be in the hands of the allies, and their intention is undoubtedly to restore the Bourbons, who must of course subscribe to any terms which may be required of them. Peace therefore cannot be remote, and a peace in Europe will leave the war between us and England without any object but an abstract principle to contend for. Neither of the parties will be disposed to continue the war upon such a point, and the predisposition to peace which will really influence both I hope and believe will make the peace not very difficult to be accomplished. The object for which the war was declared was removed at the very time when the declaration was made. I do not believe it possible now to make a peace which shall settle the point upon which the war has been continued. It seems to me, and I indulge the idea with pleasure, that the new and unexpected prospect opening to Europe will take away great part of the *interest* which Great Britain has in the question. She will neither have the need of such a navy, nor the means of maintaining it, as will constantly supply the temptation to recruit for it by such an odious practice as that of impressment upon the seamen of a foreign power. But I see no probability that she will yield the principle, and as to the modifications to render it palatable to us, if the government of the United States are of my opinion, they will not suffer their negotiators to listen for a moment to any modification

whatsoever; because any modification, be it what it will, must involve a concession of the principle on our part. I would sooner look forward to the chance of ten successive wars, to be carried on ten times more weakly than we have the present one, than concede one particle of our principle by a treaty stipulation. The only way of coming to terms of peace with England therefore at this time, which I suppose practicable and in any degree admissible, is to leave the question just where it was, saying nothing about it. But I know such a peace would not satisfy the people of America, and I have no desire to be instrumental in concluding it. If our land warriors had displayed a career of glory, equal to that of our naval heroes, we should be warranted in demanding more even after all the changes that have happened in Europe. If we can obtain more by continuing the war, we are in duty bound to continue it. At this distance, and with the communications interrupted as they are, I am incompetent to decide this question. It must be settled at home, and may the spirit of wisdom inspire the determination! . . .

TO ABIGAIL ADAMS

ST. PETERSBURG, 30 March, 1814.

Since I wrote you last, 1 February, I have had no opportunity of putting a letter even on its way to reach you when it should please heaven. The ordinary intercourse between this country and England by the way of Gothenburg has been suspended from the 24th of December until this day by the freezing of the harbors, and there are now 22 mails due from London. The same cause has prevented travellers from hence going in that direction, and I now write you

without any immediate prospect of a conveyance for my letter, but in adherence to the rule of suffering no month to pass without renewing at least the token of my affection and duty.

Your letter of 14 July, 1813, is still the last date that I have received from Quincy or from any part of the United States, but by the means of newspapers we have some very recent accounts from America. By private letters too from England which have found their way through Holland, and by others from Holland, we have learnt the acceptance by the President of the United States of the proposal made by the British government to treat for peace at Gothenburg, and the appointment of four American commissioners for the negotiation. I am informed that a Mr. Strong ¹ has arrived in England, charged with dispatches for the two of the commissioners now in Europe, and that he was proceeding as speedily as possible to Gothenburg, for which place he has the appointment of consul. But I have not heard from Mr. Strong himself, and Gothenburg will probably be still for a week to come inaccessible on the waterside. Mr. Bayard I trust will receive the dispatches in Holland and from thence may communicate them to me.

I feel an inclination almost irresistible to give my father the whole budget of my feelings and opinions upon this new effort to reconcile two countries which seem incapable of living either at peace or at war with each other. But mindful of an admonition in one of his last letters, I must reserve my thoughts until they can be imparted without restraint, in the freedom of direct conversation. I may simply add that I expect to have this pleasure before the close of the year. Whatever may be the issue of the intended conferences at Gothenburg, I hope and believe they

¹ Nathaniel W. Strong.

will not spin out beyond the bounds of the ensuing summer; and at all events I conclude it is not the President's intention that I should return to this place. If left to my own option I certainly shall not. After five winters passed at St. Petersburg, I have no wish to try in my own person, or to expose my family to the experience of this climate any longer. There is not at present nor is there likely to be in future any object of public concernment which could occupy me here in a manner satisfactory to myself or useful to my country. Many other considerations will combine to draw me home, and if the negotiation at Gothenburg terminates as I have every reason to believe it will, I flatter myself that it will be the means of restoring us to our friends and country before the next New Year's day.

We are given to understand that Mr. Gallatin is not included in the new commission, which to me is a subject of regret. Before his arrival here my personal acquaintance with him was so slight that I could scarcely say I knew him otherwise than as a public man. From the relations in which we were placed together here, his character, and especially his talents, gained ground upon my opinion. His desire to accomplish the peace was sincere and ardent. I had several opportunities of observing his quickness of understanding, his sagacity and penetration, and the soundness of his judgment.¹ I should have relied very much upon him had the negotiation taken any serious effect, and shall be sorry not to have the benefit of his assistance in that of which the

¹ "I will ever retain a grateful sense of yours and Mrs. Adams's civilities and kindness at St. Petersburg; but I fear that bad health and worse spirits made me still more dull than usual and prevented my showing what I felt on the occasion. Permit me to add that I am happy to have made your acquaintance and to have learned how to appreciate your merit. Present me affectionately to Mrs. Adams and also to Mr. and Mrs. Smith; and accept the assurance of my sincere respect and consideration." *Albert Gallatin to John Quincy Adams*, March 6, 1814. Ms.

prospect is before us. Of the two new colleagues said to be joined with us at present I know Mr. Clay by having served with him one session in the Senate, and Mr. Russell ¹ by a frequent and very agreeable correspondence with him while he was chargé d'affaires in France and in England. With what feelings, dispositions or instructions those gentlemen will come, I can only infer from their sentiments as they have been heretofore made public and from conjecture. Of the three former commissioners I should probably have been the first to stop in the career of concession to secure the main object of the mission. The newcomers, if they have had no change in their opinions since I had last an opportunity of knowing them, will be of sterner stuff than myself.²

¹ Jonathan Russell (1771-1832).

² "Mr. Clay, the late speaker of the House and Mr. Russell will be the bearers of this letter. They will carry to you all the intelligence respecting the affairs of our nation which may be necessary for you to know, and that with more accuracy than I can relate them. The appointment of Mr. Clay in lieu of Mr. Gallatin is not a more popular measure with a certain set in this quarter than that of Mr. Gallatin; and the inviting of Mr. Russell in the commission is said by the *croakers* [to be] designed to defeat the whole negotiation, which I have not a doubt many wish for." *Abigail Adams to John Quincy Adams*, February 5, 1814. Ms. "The last appointment of Mr. Clay and Russell gave much discontent to the federal party here, who were sure it was done to defeat the negotiation, and in great urbanity towards you, declared that the interests of the United States would be much safer in the single hands of Mr. Adams than in all the rest of the ministers. I know the party well, and with all their professions, they would make no scruple to sacrifice Mr. Adams, as you have before experienced, and as your father before you has done, if any measure you should agree to come in opposition to their views of interest or ambition. I forgive them. They have been amply rewarded for their blindness, their ingratitude, and grasping ambition, and their unbounded thirst for gain. Their humiliation has been manifest to the world by the loss of their consequence and weight in the Union. Long, long will it be, if ever they recover again their former consequence. And to this cause may be ascribed their wish to separate and dissolve the Union. I speak not of all those who style themselves federalists, but of those designated by the Junto." *Ib.*, May 1, 1814. Ms. In the *Life and Correspondence of Rufus King*, V. 321, Armstrong is given as authority for the statement that Daschkoff, Gallatin and Girard were intriguing to have Gallatin appointed

From the continual claim of unexpected and unexampled success which has been attending the British cause both in arms and in negotiation from the hour that their war with us commenced, we have anything to anticipate but a spirit of concession in them. They have little to boast of in the progress of their war with us hitherto, but the chances of war have all turned up prizes to them everywhere else. France, after having been twenty years the dictatress of Europe, has now in the course of two campaigns been brought completely at the feet of those enemies whom she had so often vanquished and so long oppressed. Six weeks ago an allied army of at least three hundred thousand men was within two days easy march of Paris, and by the latest accounts received from thence was again within the same distance, or nearer. In the interval they had met with some opposition which occasioned a momentary check upon their operations and a short retreat to concentrate their forces. There is little reason to doubt that they are at this moment in possession of Paris, and that the Empire of Napoleon is in the Paradise of Fools. While the allies were in the heart of France, a negotiation as hypocritical and as fallacious as the Congress of Prague, was affected to be opened at Châtillon, without any intention perhaps on any side, certainly not the side of the allies, that it should result in a peace.¹ Their object is in giving peace to France to make her at the same time a present of the Bourbons; but even in the extremity to which France is reduced there have been very few and trifling manifestations of a disposition in any part of her people to receive them.

to Russia; Russell for Sweden might give one vote in the Senate against Gallatin; and Clay had been named as third commissioner, but was displaced for Gallatin. On the influences at work for Russell's appointment, see *Ib.*, 328-330.

¹ A conference of the allied sovereigns opened at Châtillon-sur-Seine, February 5.

As I am in daily expectation of receiving the order to repair to Gothenburg, I may possibly be there as soon as this letter, or be obliged to take it on there with me. It is now of the whole year the worst time for undertaking the journey, and the passage of the Gulf between this and Sweden will probably for some weeks be impracticable. It is however very doubtful whether I shall be able to go before the breaking up of the ice, in which case I shall endeavor to get a passage directly by water. But the navigation from hence is very seldom open before the first of June. . . .

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE

No. 131.

[JAMES MONROE]

ST. PETERSBURG, 7 April, 1814.

SIR:

On the 31st ultimo Mr. Strong arrived in this city and brought me your favor (triplicate) of 8 January last, and a letter from Mr. Bayard at Amsterdam, enclosing a copy of your joint dispatch of the same 8 January, sent to him and me; and the printed message of the President of 6 January, and documents relating to the proposal of a negotiation for peace at Gothenburg. Mr. Strong informs me that he was also charged with several packets of documents and newspapers from the Department of State which by unavoidable accident were left on board the packet in which he crossed from England to Holland.

I received at the same time and from Mr. Strong a letter from Mr. Beasley dated 1 March, in which there is the following paragraph:

It has been rumored for some days past, but I have not been able to trace it to any satisfactory source, that this government

has come to the determination not to enter upon any negotiation until our government shall have restored to the ordinary state of prisoners of war, all the British officers held in the United States as hostages to answer in their persons for the safety and proper treatment of those prisoners who have been sent to this country for trial. I hope it may not be so, but I should not be surprised at the adoption of any measure calculated to prolong the war with us, especially if there should be an immediate peace on the continent of which there is a fair prospect at present.

A report of the same kind, that the British government had determined not to enter upon this negotiation, had been generally circulated here among the English merchants, and derived some countenance from the fact that so late as the first of March no appointment of British commissioners was known to have been made, although they had been nearly a month before apprized that the President had accepted the Prince Regent's proposal for the negotiation. Under these circumstances it might be questionable whether it was not my duty to delay the execution of the instructions to repair to Gothenburg, until something more certain of the intentions of the British Government should be known. But in considering that the instructions themselves are peremptory, that the wanton violation of good faith in the refusal to carry into effect their own proposal was not to be credited upon mere rumors and surmises, and that if such could be the intention of the British government I might furnish them with a pretext for it by not repairing to the appointed place, I concluded to proceed upon the journey as speedily as possible and by the road most likely to be the shortest at this season of the year. I hope to leave this city in the course of a fortnight, and to be at Gothenburg by the 10th of May.

You will have learnt probably ere this that Mr. Harris

left this place shortly after Messrs. Gallatin and Bayard, and with the intention of accompanying them in their contemplated visit to England.¹ As Mr. Strong informs me that he had no written dispatch for Mr. Harris, I know not whether he has yet been informed that the charge of our affairs here in my absence is to be committed to him. If he has, his arrival here may be hourly expected. I have already written to him under cover to Mr. Bourne to inform him of this arrangement, and urging the expediency of his return hither. He had left a power to transact the ordinary official business of the consulate with Mr. Thomas W. Norman, a citizen of the United States.² But Mr. Norman himself is on the point of departing from this country and, having no power of substitution in his authority from Mr. Harris, both the legation and the consulate will be vacant until that gentleman's return. I am etc.

TO SENATOR WEYDEMEYER ³

The undersigned, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States of America, deeply regretting the indisposition of His Excellency Mr. Weyde-

¹ "I scarcely know what authority to give to Mr. B[ayard] and G[allatin]'s opinions concerning Peace. Without communication with those who only could impart correct information concerning the views of the English government, they could form no better opinion in England than in Russia. Neither of those gentlemen, in the present situation of the two countries, had any business in England. Had they felt upon this point as they ought, they would not have appeared in England, where they are liable on mere suspicion to be confined, or to be sent with ignominy out of the country." *Rufus King to Christopher Gore*, July 11, 1814. *Life and Correspondence of Rufus King*, V. 396.

² See Adams, *Memoirs*, February 1, 1814.

³ Senator, member of the Council of His Imperial Majesty and of the College of Foreign Affairs.

meyer, which deprives him of the honor of conferring with him for the present as he had requested, has now that of addressing to him this official note, to inform him of the orders which he has just received from his government.

His Royal Highness, the Prince Regent of England, having accompanied his refusal of the mediation offered by His Imperial Majesty for terminating the war between the United States and England with a proposal, transmitted to the government of the United States by His Britannic Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to open a negotiation either at Gothenburg in Sweden or at London, to treat directly of peace, the President of the United States has accepted this proposal, and has fixed upon Gothenburg as the place where the conferences are to be held.

The President could not see without strong regret the obstacle to the commencement of a negotiation for peace interposed by the resolutions of the English government, to reject the mediation of a sovereign whose uprightness and impartiality were known to the whole world, and whose offer of mediation had been inspired by the sentiments of the sincerest friendship for both the belligerent parties, of the humanity which so eminently distinguishes the character of His Imperial Majesty, and of attention to the interests of his people which were suffering by this war, and could not but derive advantage from the restoration of peace.

This refusal, having nevertheless taken place, the President of the United States, always animated with the sincere desire so constantly manifested of terminating this war upon conditions of reciprocity consistent with the rights of both parties as sovereign and independent nations, has thought proper to accept the proposal for a direct negotiation. In determining upon this measure it would have been the more satisfactory to the President, if by the communications

from the Envoys Extraordinary of the United States then at the court of His Imperial Majesty, he could have known with certainty that it would be agreeable to the Emperor. But to avoid all delay, and from the known character of the Emperor and the benevolent views with which his mediation had been offered, in no wise doubting that His Majesty would see with satisfaction the concurrence of the United States in an alternative which under existing circumstances afforded the best prospect of obtaining the object for which the Emperor's good offices had been offered, he acceded to the Prince Regent's proposition, and immediately took the measures on the part of the United States for carrying it into effect.

The undersigned feels himself bound on this occasion to observe that the proposal for this direct negotiation was made by a note from His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador, addressed to His Excellency Count Nesselrode at His Imperial Majesty's headquarters at Töplitz, dated the 1st of September of the last year,¹ and that in transmitting to the United States a copy of this note my Lord Castlereagh, His Britannic Majesty's Secretary for Foreign Affairs, declares that the Ambassador, Lord Cathcart, had acquainted him "that the American Commissioners at St. Petersburg had intimated in reply to that overture, that they had no objection to a negotiation at London, and were equally desirous as the British government had declared itself to be, that this business should not be mixed with the affairs of the continent of Europe, but that their powers were limited to negotiate under the mediation of Russia."²

¹ *Cathcart to Nesselrode*, September 1, 1813. *American State Papers*, Foreign Relations, III. 622.

² *Castlereagh to the Secretary of State*, November 4, 1813. *American State Papers*, Foreign Relations, III. 621. "What does Lord Cathcart mean in saying that the

The undersigned remaining alone of the envoys of the United States then at the court of His Imperial Majesty knows not whence the error of my lord Castlereagh upon this subject can have proceeded; but he cannot abstain from declaring that the envoys of the United States never gave to this overture the answer which he has attributed to them. That they never could have given to it any answer whatsoever, inasmuch as it was never communicated to them, and above all, that they never could have manifested the desire that this business should not be mixed with the affairs of the continent of Europe, because they had no knowledge of this declaration of the British government that such was *their* desire, and because there never had been an idea suggested, either in His Imperial Majesty's offer of mediation, or in its acceptance by the President of the United States, of mixing this business with the affairs of the continent of Europe. The undersigned, in his own name and in that of his colleagues, requests that this formal disavowal of an answer ascribed to them which they never gave, may be made known to His Majesty the Emperor.

The President of the United States, having thought fit to name the undersigned one of the envoys on the part of the United States for the proposed negotiation, has directed him to repair for that purpose as soon as possible to Gothenburg, and to leave during his absence from St. Petersburg Mr. Levett Harris charged with the affairs of the United States at His Imperial Majesty's court. Mr. Harris is at this moment absent but his return may be daily expected. The other envoys of the United States for this mission may American plenipotentiaries in reply to an overture (which never was made to them) expressed among other things their reluctance to have American affairs blended with those of the continent? The subject was never to my knowledge even alluded to in conversation. Can you not obtain an explanation or a disavowal?" *Albert Gallatin to John Quincy Adams, March 6, 1814. Ms.*

have arrived already at Gothenburg,¹ and the undersigned is obliged to hasten as much as possible his departure. He will in a few days have the honor of asking of His Excellency Mr. Weydemeyer the passports necessary for his journey, and has now that of requesting him to solicit an audience for him to take leave of Her Imperial Majesty the Empress Mother. He also desires the honor of being presented to Her Imperial Highness the Grand Duchess Ann for the same purpose.

In conclusion the undersigned has the honor to remark to His Excellency Mr. Weydemeyer, that he has the express orders of the President of the United States to make known to the Emperor his sensibility to His Majesty's friendly disposition manifested by the offer of his mediation, his regret at its rejection by the British government, and his desire that in future the greatest confidence and cordiality, and the best understanding may prevail between His Majesty's government and that of the United States.

The undersigned requests his Excellency Mr. Weydemeyer to accept the assurance of his very distinguished consideration.

ST. PETERSBURG, March 26 / April 7, 1814.

¹ Clay and Russell arrived at Gothenburg April 12, after a passage of fifty-six days.

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE

No. 132.

[JAMES MONROE]

ST. PETERSBURG, 15 April, 1814.

SIR:

Immediately after receiving your favors of 8 January by Mr. Strong, I requested an interview with Mr. Weydemeyer, now the official organ of communication with the foreign ministers at this court, with the intention of making known to him the instructions I received, and of testifying to him my surprise at the statement in Lord Castlereagh's letter to you of a supposed answer given by the American envoys at St. Petersburg to the overture for a negotiation at London or Gothenburg, made by Lord Cathcart's note of 1 September to Count Nesselrode at the Emperor's headquarters at Töplitz.

Mr. Weydemeyer was so unwell that he could not see me for several days, and on the 7th instant I addressed to him an official note, of which, and of its translation, I have the honor herewith to enclose copies. After the note was written, and before it was sent, I received notice from Mr. Weydemeyer that he would see me the next day; but he still was so much indisposed that our conference was very short, and consisted on my part chiefly in a recapitulation of the contents of the note, and on his, in the promise that he would immediately dispatch it to the Emperor, and in general assurances of the satisfaction with which His Majesty would receive the testimonials of the friendly dispositions of the American government.

The answer ascribed to the American envoys will doubtless occasion no less surprise to you than it did to my colleagues

and myself, when you are informed that, until after the departure of Messrs. Gallatin and Bayard from this place, we neither had nor could obtain any official information that any such overture as that of Lord Cathcart's note had ever been made. It had been intimated to us through indirect channels that such an offer would be communicated to us; and as early as the month of August, Count Romanzoff had put the question to me, whether we could treat in London, if such a proposal should be made by the British government. In the same informal manner that government had received notice that we had no objection to treat either at London or Gothenburg, but that our powers were limited to treat under the mediation. We also very well knew the aversion which the British Cabinet felt to the idea of having their disputes with America at all connected with the affairs of the continent of Europe; but we had certainly never expressed *our* opinion upon the subject, and in all our transactions with Russia relative to the mediation, nothing about the affairs of Europe had ever been said. Nor did we know that the British government had ever declared their sentiments in relation to that point.

It was apparently the object of the British Cabinet, in rejecting the Russian mediation, to withhold, if possible, from the public eye all evidence, not only of that rejection and of the motives upon which it was founded, but even that the offer had been made. In the first instance they gave no positive answer, but expressed doubts whether the mediation would be accepted in America. In their labors to persuade others they had succeeded to convince themselves that the American government was under French influence, and calculating that the mediation of a sovereign at war with France and in close alliance with them could not be acceptable to the President, they trusted that a refusal

on his part would release them from the necessity of coming to a decision upon the proposal. It was therefore not made at that time formally and in written communications, but merely in personal conferences between the Chancellor and Lord Cathcart here, and between Count Lieven and Lord Castlereagh at London. When it was found not only that the mediation was accepted by the President, but that the envoys from the United States were appointed for the mission, a positive answer to Russia became absolutely necessary, and Count Lieven was told that the question with America involved principles of internal government in Great Britain which were not susceptible of being discussed under any mediation. Lord Cathcart was instructed to explain the matter *verbally* at the Emperor's headquarters, and had a conversation with the Emperor himself upon the subject at *Bautzen*, between the 12th and 20th of May. Still there was nothing written to prove the refusal of the mediation, nor would there perhaps ever have been anything, but for the renewed proposal which the Emperor by Count Romanzoff's advice directed to be made by Count Lieven, the official note of which was sent from hence to Count Lieven, and a copy of which has been transmitted to you by us. Before this note was received by Count Lieven, Lord Castlereagh had learnt that it would come, and *then*, that is about the last of July, Lord Cathcart was instructed to decline the mediation in a written note. This note he presented at *Töplitz* on the 1st of September. So that when Count Lieven received his instructions to renew the offer of mediation, he was told by Lord Castlereagh that it had already been refused, and all the grounds of refusal fully set forth to the Emperor at headquarters. Count Lieven therefore did not present the note according to his instructions, and whatever Lord Cathcart's *verbal* elucidations of the motives of refusal

may have been to the Emperor, he has only referred to, without stating them in the written note. That they were not satisfactory to the Emperor I well know, for I have seen a letter in His Majesty's own hand writing, dated at Töplitz, 8 September O. S., that is twenty days after Lord Cathcart's note, and in express terms *approving completely* Count Romanzoff's instruction to Count Lieven for the renewal of the offer of mediation.

In the policy of suppressing as much as possible, the *evidence* of the refusal to accept the mediation, it cannot now be questioned that the Russian government has either concurred with, or acquiesced in the views of the British. The importance of preserving the reality of harmony between them at the most eventful crisis of their great common cause against France urged alike upon both parties the necessity of preserving the appearances of it in regard to all objects of minor concernment. The flat refusal of the mediation of a prince whose partialities, if he could have been susceptible of entertaining any while performing the office of mediator, must have been all in favor of England, could not but have upon the public opinion of the world an operation in no wise advantageous to the British government. The Emperor on his part might not incline to expose to the world how very little consideration the British had for him beyond the precise points in which his cause was their own. He might be advised that in making public such a signal and groundless mark of distrust on the part of his ally, the sentiment of his dignity would require that he should take some notice of it, which at this time would not be expedient. It might also be admitted that the very proposal in Lord Cathcart's note was of a nature which would have assumed a singular appearance, if communicated by the Russian government to the American envoys. Lord

Cathcart's language to Russia is "We will not negotiate with America *under your mediation*, but we ask your good office to prevail upon America to negotiate with us without it." The delicacy of this procedure towards Russia was I suppose duly reflected upon before Lord Cathcart presented his note; but I acknowledge that when I first read it among the printed documents with the President's message of 6 January, I was not surprised that the Russian government should have declined performing the office of mediator merely to announce that her mediation was refused.

However this may be, certain it is that the note never was communicated to us. We never answered the overture contained in it, because although we received indirect intimations that it would be made, yet it never was actually made. And we never said anything about mixing the affair with those of the continent of Europe, because nothing was ever said to us about it. To the opinion of my colleagues upon this subject I cannot speak; but for myself, I *do not* consider the questions at issue between the United States and Great Britain as questions in which the continent of Europe has no interest—not even the question of impressment. In every naval war waged by Great Britain, it is the interest and the right of her adversary that she should not be permitted to recruit her navy by man-stealing under the name of impressment from neutral merchant vessels. Nor should I have felt at all inclined to indulge the pretension on the part of Britain had it been disclosed to us in the shape of a declaration that her contests with us were nothing to the continent of Europe.

I thought it necessary, therefore, in my note to Mr. Weydemeyer pointedly to disavow the answer which Lord Castle-reagh says he had been informed by Lord Cathcart that we had given to the overture in his note of 1 September. It will

be for Lord Cathcart to explain whence he derived his information. I am etc.

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE

No. 133.

[JAMES MONROE]

ST. PETERSBURG, 25 April, 1814.

SIR:

I propose to leave this city in two or three days for Gothenburg. My intention is to go to Reval and there embark for Stockholm. The passage by the way of Finland is now impracticable, and there are twenty-five English mails known to be at Grislehamn waiting for the possibility of passing the gulf. The harbor of Reval is itself not yet open, and by information which I have obtained from thence will probably not be so before this day week, by which time I hope to be there. I have concluded upon this course as likely to be the shortest to the place of my destination.

I have a letter from Mr. Harris dated 14 March at Amsterdam. He did not then know that the charge of our affairs here was to be left with him, and was expecting to go to England with Mr. Gallatin and Mr. Bayard. I wrote him on the 4th instant under cover to Mr. Bourne, and have since written again under cover to Mr. Beasley, informing him of the President's order concerning him and urging his return hither. It is not probable he can arrive before some time in June.

In the uncertainty whether Mr. Clay or Mr. Russell might arrive in Sweden before me, I thought it a proper mark of respect to the Swedish government to give them notice of

the commission to Gothenburg, and of my intention in pursuance of my instructions to proceed thither. I therefore wrote to Count Engeström, the Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs, with whom I have been long personally acquainted and had already been in correspondence. As my letter went by the mail, and the passage of the Gulf is impracticable, it may perhaps not arrive sooner than myself; but the Swedish commercial agent here will furnish me a passport. . .

I have continued to make the payment and the charge for a Secretary of Legation. I shall do the same for the present quarter, and Mr. Smith with whom I shall leave the papers and seal of the Legation will continue to perform the office of secretary until Mr. Harris's return. He will then embark for Gothenburg, and thence return to the United States. From the time of my own departure from this place I shall be without the assistance of any secretary, upon which I beg leave to submit to your candor and the President's consideration some remarks which I deem not unimportant to the public interest.

For a commission of three or four members, upon a trust so momentous as that of a negotiation for peace between the United States and Great Britain, it is not only expedient, but for the responsibility of each individual member of the Commission indispensable, that he should have a copy of every document relating to the negotiation. There must therefore be not only as many letter books as there are commissioners, but copies must be made in them of many papers *received* as well as of all those which are dispatched. The mere manual labor is more than can be performed by one secretary to the commission, and either he must employ clerks for the work, or each commissioner must make the copies for himself, or by the hand of a private secretary.

In the case of the extraordinary mission here, both these expedients were used. Mr. Gallatin and Mr. Bayard had at first private secretaries, and afterwards Mr. Harris employed a clerk. The result of this is that all the papers of the most confidential nature come to the knowledge of all the persons thus employed.

The salary of an American Minister in Europe will not admit of the expense of supporting a private secretary, in any manner confidential. The employment of a common clerk at daily or monthly wages is not without strong inconveniences from the motives of a breach of trust to which such persons would be accessible. There would be no difficulty in obtaining all the assistance of this kind which could be desired without any expense, and offers to this effect have been made to me; but I know they were founded upon projects of commercial speculation in which use would be made of the *information* thereby to be obtained, and I do not think it ought to be so used. I shall therefore take no secretary with me and shall do as much of the copying as I can myself. But I may be compelled to employ a copying clerk at Gothenburg, and to take such a person for it as I may have the fortune of finding there. I must also request, if I am to return here, that a secretary to this legation may be appointed. I am etc.¹

¹ "The war in Europe at present appears to be at an end. The Bourbons are restored to France and Spain, and the dreams of an universal republic or an universal monarchy have ended in the conquest of France by the allies, and the abdication of Napoleon Bonaparte, against whom the allies have of late professed to make war. It seems to me hardly credible that the allies should very soon discover that there are other objects of contention besides Napoleon, but hitherto all has gone on smoothly since they are in possession of Paris. Napoleon has not only been constitutionally deposed; but he has formally abdicated and renounced all pretensions to the throne of France and Italy. The Bourbons are to receive France, and France is to receive the Bourbons, as presents from the allies; and the allies must necessarily dictate the terms upon which these generous donations are to be

TO ABIGAIL ADAMS

REVAL, 12 May, 1814.

The coalition of Europe against France has at length been crowned with complete success. The annals of the world do not, I believe, furnish an example of such a reverse of fortune as that nation has experienced within the last two years. The interposition of Providence to produce this mighty change has been so signal, so peculiar, so distinct from all human operation, that in ages less addicted to superstition than the present it might have been considered as miraculous. As a judgment of Heaven, it will undoubtedly be considered by all pious minds now and hereafter; and I cannot but indulge the hope that it opens a prospect of at least more tranquillity and security to the civilized part of mankind than they have enjoyed the last half century. France for the last twenty-five years has been the scourge of Europe; in every change of her government she has manifested the same ambitious, domineering, oppressive, and rapacious spirit to all her neighbors. She has now fallen a wretched and helpless victim into their hands, dethroning the sovereign she had chosen, and taking back the

granted. That *all* parties should ultimately be satisfied with the issue may reasonably be doubted. The allies have not yet declared how much of the guaranty which they thought necessary to secure them against the unbridled ambition of Bonaparte, they will hold it prudent to relax in favor of the pacific and unaspiring house of Bourbon. If the paroxysm of generosity holds out to the end, they will soon find another coalition necessary. If, as is far more probable, they finish by availing themselves of their advantages, to impose severe and humiliating terms upon France, besides forfeiting the pledge they have given to the world of moderation and magnanimity, they will leave a germ of rancor and revenge which cannot be long in shooting up again. But for the present the war in Europe is terminated." *To John Adams, May 8, 1814. Ms.*

family she had expelled, at their command; and ready to be dismembered and parcelled out as the resentment or the generosity of her conquerors shall determine. The final result is now universally and in a great degree justly imputable to one man. Had Napoleon Bonaparte, with his extraordinary genius and transcendent military talents, possessed an ordinary portion of judgment or common sense, France might have been for ages the preponderating power in Europe, and he might have transmitted to his posterity the most powerful empire upon earth, and a name to stand by the side of Alexander, Cæsar and Charlemagne, a name surrounded by such a blaze of glory as to blind the eyes of all human kind to the baseness of its origin, and even to the blood with which it would still have been polluted. But if the catastrophe is the work of one man, it was the spirit of the times and of the nation which brought forward that man, and concentrated in his person and character the whole issue of the revolution. "Oh! it is the sport (says Shakespeare) to see the engineer hoist by his own petar." The sufferings of Europe are compensated and avenged in the humiliation of France. It is now to be seen what use the avengers will make of their victory. I place great reliance upon the moderation, equity, and humanity of the Emperor Alexander, and I freely confess I have confidence in nothing else. The allies of the continent must be governed entirely by him, and as his resentments must be sufficiently gratified by the plenitude of his success, and the irretrievable downfall of his enemy, I hope and wish to believe that he has discerned the true path of glory open before him, and that he will prove inaccessible to all the interested views and rancorous passions of his associates. The great danger at the present moment appears to me to be that the policy of crippling France, to guard against her future power, will be

carried too far. Of the dispositions of England there can be no question; of those which will stimulate all the immediate neighbors of France there can be as little doubt; and France can have so little to say or to do for herself, that she begins by taking the sovereign who is to seal her doom, from the hands of her enemies. The real part for the Emperor Alexander now to perform is that of the *umpire* and *arbitrator* of Europe. To fill that part according to the exigency of the times, he must forget that he has been the principal party to the war; he must lay aside all his own passions and resist all the instigations of his co-operators. He must discern the true medium between the excess of liberality which would hazard the advantages of the present opportunity to circumscribe the power of France within bounds consistent with the safety and tranquillity of her neighbors, and the excess of caution which the jealousy of those neighbors, and perhaps his own, would suggest, to secure them at all events, by reducing France to a state of real impotence, and thus leaving her future situation dependent upon their discretion. I have no doubt that the Emperor will see all this in the general principle, and I wait not without anxiety to observe its application to his measures. . . .

TO LOUISA CATHERINE ADAMS

REVAL, May 1/13, 1814.

. . . The oracle of political news here is a Riga gazette, called the *Tushauer*, that is, the *Spectator*. It comes twice a week, and Mr. Rodde has the obliging attention of sending it to me. I find in it news enough—as much as I am desirous to know. The war in France has ended in such a singular manner that I am perfectly at a loss what to think about it.

They say that in the typhoons of the East India seas, there is sometimes an instantaneous transition from a previous hurricane to a total calm. It is the aptest emblem of the present moment. But the calm is as dangerous as the storm, and it is generally very quickly followed by a tempest equally tremendous from the opposite quarter. In neither of these respects do I apprehend that the parallel will hold; but when Napoleon shall be fairly and completely out of the way, and out of the question (which he is long before this) we shall have the opportunity of ascertaining whether the allies have really been thinking they had nothing to do but to crush him, and whether the peace of the world is to be secured by his removal. . . .

STOCKHOLM, May 31, 1814.

. . . It is not yet known here that there has been any appointment in England of commissioners to meet those of the United States. Mr. Gallatin and Bayard, instead of coming to Gothenburg, have remained in England. The proposal has been made, somewhere, to remove the seat of the negotiations to Holland, and although I do not approve of this step, it may have been carried so far that I shall be under the necessity of acquiescing in it. If it should be so, possibly Mr. Clay, Mr. Russell and myself will go by water in the *John Adams*, from Gothenburg to Amsterdam. If on the other hand, as is my earnest wish, we should finally meet the British commissioners at Gothenburg, I fully expect to return to you, by water from Gothenburg, and hope to accomplish the voyage and be with you at latest by the first of September. . . .

STOCKHOLM, June 2, 1814.

. . . The English mail of May 13 arrived here yesterday. The British government have appointed commissioners

to meet us—Admiral Lord Gambier, Mr. Adams, and Mr. Goulbourn.¹ It was expected that a proposition would be made from the English side, to change the place of the conferences, and meet in Holland. My colleagues were prepared to accede to this proposal upon condition that it should be made from the other side, and I expect that on arriving at Gothenburg I shall find it all so settled as to have no alternative left but to go on.² As it was all done without consulting me, I trust I shall not be answerable for it. I dislike it for a multitude of reasons, to speak in the New England styles, *too tedious to mention*; but in matters of much more importance I shall cheerfully sacrifice any personal conveniences and any opinion as far as my sense of the public interest will admit, to the accommodation and inclinations of my colleagues. . . .

The letters from England say that there is a most extraordinary stagnation there of all commerce; no demand from anywhere either of colonial produce or their manufactures; exchanges all against them, and all going down. What will perhaps surprise you is, that if we had asked to go to England it would not have been allowed; because it was not wished that we should be so near to certain visitors³ expected there. This I believe is “more strange than true.” . . .

¹ Their instructions were not given until July 28, and are printed in *Letters and Despatches of Lord Castlereagh*, X. 67.

² See Adams, *Memoirs*, June I, 1814.

³ Emperor Alexander.

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE

No. 134.

[JAMES MONROE]

STOCKHOLM, 28 May, 1814.

SIR:

On the 28th of last month I left St. Petersburg and proceeded to Reval, where I embarked in a merchant vessel bound to this place. After much detention by adverse winds and by the ice with which the Gulf of Finland is yet obstructed, I landed here on Wednesday the 25th instant.¹ Upon my arrival I found that of the five commissioners Mr. Clay alone was at Gothenburg. That Mr. Gallatin and Mr. Bayard have remained in England and have written to propose a removal of the place of negotiation from Gothenburg to Holland or to London. That Mr. Clay and Mr. Russell have conditionally consented to the removal to Holland, and that the reply of Mr. Gallatin and Mr. Bayard has not yet been received here, but is expected by the first mail from England.²

In reflecting upon the instructions to the mission and upon the proposal of removing to Holland the seat of the conferences, which has probably proceeded too far to be revoked, I have concluded not without hesitation to go on to Gothenburg. For the motives to this hesitation I beg leave to refer you to my letter of 22 November, 1813, and to the evidence upon which my opinion there expressed was founded, which evidence was transmitted to you by the same conveyance with my letter. As there is no alteration in the principle of our instructions, and I have no reason to believe that there

¹ The incidents of the journey are given in Adams, *Memoirs*.

² See Adams, *Writings of Gallatin*, I. 606, 608.

has been any alteration, at least any favorable alteration in the dispositions of the British government, I cannot entertain a doubt that our conferences, wherever held, will be arrested at the threshold by an utter impossibility of agreeing upon the basis of negotiation. Under these circumstances I should have thought it my duty to return forthwith to my post at St. Petersburg, but for the hope that we shall receive before the conferences can commence new instructions upon which the conclusion of a peace may become possible.

Mr. Russell and myself intend leaving this place in two or three days for Gothenburg, where I shall take the earliest opportunity of writing you again. In the meantime I remain etc.

TO LOUISA CATHERINE ADAMS

United States Corvette *John Adams*
BELOW MINGO, Sunday, 12 June, 1814.

. . . The servant ¹ whom I took with me from St. Petersburg has left me, and is a serious loss. I offered to take him with me, but he had no inclination to go so far from Sweden and Russia; and he objected that he could not be very useful to me in a country where he would be a total stranger, and ignorant of the language. This was very true, and for the same reason I have deferred engaging another man until we come to some landing. But Mr. Hughes,² the Secretary of the Legation, had left a Norwegian boy, and Mr. Shaler³ (an attaché) an Otaheitean, to go on the ship, and they are to serve me instead of a *valet de chambre* until

¹ Axel Gabriel Gahbroos.

² Christopher Hughes (1786-1849.)

³ William Shaler, afterwards in the consular service.

we come to the place of meeting. I had a very urgent and even importunate solicitation yesterday morning from a Frenchman, whose great desire was to go to America, and I believe I should have taken him but for his extraordinary talents. For he assured me that he was one of the greatest coiffeurs that ever was bred at Paris; that he had dressed the head of the Crown Prince and of all the royal family at Stockholm; that he could make one a wig that it would be a pleasure to wear; and besides that he had a most uncommon talent *pour la danse*. He had been four years in this country, but the climate did not agree with his health, and he must say, there was no encouragement or reward for talents in Sweden. The man appeared really distressed, and I was more than half inclined to take him upon trust, until he disclosed his skill *pour la danse*, and menaced me with a wig. . . .

The officers of this ship are by no means of this class [non-combatants]. Captain Angus¹ was with Truxtun when they took the *Vengeance* and distinguished himself last summer in the war upon the Lakes of Canada. The first lieutenant, Yarnall, was Perry's first lieutenant in the glorious victory on Lake Erie; and the second lieutenant, Cooper, was in the *Hornet* when she sunk the *Peacock*, and on board that vessel at the time of the catastrophe. There are on board the ship fourteen midshipmen. Captain Angus assures me that we have now in the navy seventy officers, regularly bred and perfectly competent to the command of a ship; if they had the ships I have no doubt but that in less than seven years they would form seven times seventy, prepared to meet on equal terms any captain in the British navy. . . .

¹ Samuel Angus (1784-1840), of the *John Adams*.

TO LOUISA CATHERINE ADAMS

GHENT, June 25, 1814.

. . . You are sufficiently acquainted with my disposition to know that it was some, and not inconsiderable gratification to my feelings to find myself the first here. It was unavoidable that some of us should wait a few days for the others; and I am very sure there was not one member of the commission so anxious to avoid waiting as I was to avoid being waited for. Even my detention at Reval, so mortifying and vexatious to myself, has not for one hour delayed the movements of my colleagues, nor retarded the time of our meeting at this place. One consequence it has however had, which I deeply regret. I have told you heretofore that Colonel Milligan was sent by Mr. Bayard as a special messenger to Gothenburg to propose the alteration of the place, and that Messrs. Clay and Russell consented to it, upon condition that the proposition should come in form from the English side. It was accordingly so made and accepted, and I found myself destined to Ghent instead of Gothenburg, without having had any voice in the question. Had I not been so unfortunately detained at Reval, I should have been at Gothenburg when Colonel Milligan arrived there upon his embassy, and in that case none of us would ever have come to Ghent. For myself, at least, I answer. I never would have consented to come here. If a majority of my colleagues had concluded upon the measure, I would have returned immediately to St. Petersburg, and left them to conclude the peace as they saw fit. At this hour I should have been with you. If in consequence of my adhesion to Gothenburg, the conclusion had been to meet there, I have no doubt that at this moment the whole business would have

been finished. We could have been all assembled before the first of this month, and what we have to do could not have taken three weeks of time. I should now have been on my way to join you. I still believe, as I wrote you from Stockholm, that we shall not all be here sooner than the middle of July. The change of plan has thus wasted nearly two months, and in my full conviction, to no useful purpose whatever. . . .

My aversion to this new arrangement arises, however, from considerations solely and exclusively of the public interest. For myself I must acknowledge that my second voyage and journey has been far more agreeable than the first. It was in the first place more expeditious. I received the notification to come here, within thirty miles of Stockholm, and that day three weeks I was on the spot. I had been nearly six weeks in going from St. Petersburg there, certainly not half the distance. It was also in all its circumstances more pleasant. The voyage from Gothenburg to the Texel was like a party of pleasure—a large, comfortable and fast sailing ship, excellent fare and agreeable company. From the Texel to this place the roads are all good, and the country at this season is one continual garden. We have all the time been approaching to the summer, while the summer has been approaching us. The weather has been exactly such as a traveller could wish for—not so cold as to be uncomfortable, nor so warm as to be oppressive, to the horses or to ourselves. I have revisited a country endeared to me by many pleasing recollections of all the early stages of my life—of infancy, youth, and manhood. I found it in all its charm precisely the same that I had first seen it; precisely the same that I had last left it. Sweden since I saw it before has changed, greatly changed; and by no means for the better. It was then, though a poor, ap-

parently a happy country. It is now a picture of misery. But if there is anything upon earth that presents an image of permanency, it is the face of Holland. The only change that I could perceive in it is an improvement. The cities and the country around them have, I think, an appearance rather more animated and flourishing than I ever witnessed heretofore. Their connection with France has infused into them a small portion of the French activity and vivacity. In this country the change has been much greater. Antwerp; when I first saw it, was a desolation, a mournful monument of opulence in the last stage of decay. It is now again what it had once been, a beautiful and prospering city. But an English garrison in possession of the place, and English commissaries daily expected to carry away in triumph one-third of the formidable fleet floating on the river, and to demolish all the ships on the stocks, the precious hopes of futurity, a present fearful foreboding of what Antwerp will soon be again. The fate of Belgium is yet undecided. Austria, Prussia, Holland, France and England, all covet its possession, and the prospect now is that the gold of England will turn the scales. The Netherlands will be a British province. . . .

TO LOUISA CATHERINE ADAMS

GHENT, June 28, 1814.

. . . When I told you in my last letter that I had found nothing changed in Holland, I had forgotten the visit which I made at Amsterdam to the venerable old Stad-house, which has been metamorphosed first into a royal, and now into a sovereign-princely palace. I took no pleasure in the transformation, and wished they would turn it back again

into a Stad-house. The upper floor has become a formal gallery of pictures, and has a number of excellent paintings of the Dutch school. Some of the best are large historical pieces which belonged to the city of Amsterdam, and have always been there. The royal apartments are on the lower floor, furnished with elegance, but with not much splendor. They are now appropriated to the use of the Sovereign Prince and his family, when at Amsterdam. Their residence for the present, however, is at the Hague, and will doubtless continue there. The traces of the Napoleon family have been removed as fully as the convenience of the moment would admit. There was a large full-length portrait of the Emperor in one of the rooms: the place where it stood is yet marked out by the different color of the damask wainscoting which was covered by its frame, and thus protected from fading. There is one of the fashionable timepieces with a bronze figure of him standing by its side; but as his name was not under it, and it could be recognized only by the resemblance, it was a good economical principle not to lose a handsome piece of furniture for a trifle, and the spectator is not bound to know that the figure is the image of Bonaparte. A square of window-glass within the walls of the palace still bears the inscription written with a diamond "Vive Louis Napoléon Roi de Hollande"; but to remove it would cost a new square of glass, and why should that expense be incurred? It is the happiness of that country, and has saved them perhaps from many a calamity, that all their political enthusiasm during the convulsions from which Europe is emerging has been invariably kept subordinate to the steady manners and national spirit of good husbandry. I have heard them *talk* like their neighbors of liberty, of equality, of fraternity, and of independence. I have seen them change the orange for the three-colored cockade, and

the three-colored again for the orange. They have had since my remembrance a stadtholder and States General, a National Convention, a Grand Pensionary, a king of the Napoleon manufacture; have been travestied into a province of France, and have lastly got a Sovereign Prince. All these changes have been effected successively, without bloodshed, without internal convulsion, without violence. They have stretched and have shrunk like the piece of india rubber that you use in drawing; but throughout all their changes, the sober, cautious, thrifty character of the nation has invariably maintained its ascendancy, and of all Europe they are unquestionably the people who have suffered the least from the hurricane of its late revolution. The willow has weathered by bending to every gale as it shifted, the storm which has prostrated the sturdiest oaks

dont la tête aux lieux étoient prochaine
et dont les pieds touchoient à l'Empire des morts.

The evening before we left Amsterdam I went to the French theatre. In the interval between the plays, the orchestra struck up a Dutch air. There was a gentleman sitting by me, whose eyes brightened at the sound, and he told me that it was a national air. Some few persons clapped their hands, but he observed that the first enthusiasm had somewhat cooled down. Immediately afterwards they played "God Save the King." There was no clapping of hands. I turned to my friend and asked him, if that too was a national air? He hung his head and said, No! . . .¹

¹ "Here we have listeners and lookers-on in abundance. Never in my life did I find myself surrounded by so much curiosity." *To Abigail Adams*, June 30, 1814. Ms.

TO LOUISA CATHERINE ADAMS

GHENT, July 2, 1814.

. . . The Emperor Alexander may now be truly called the darling of the human race. Concerning him, and him alone, I have heard but one voice since I left his capital; not only in his own dominions, not only here and in Holland, but even in Sweden, where it was least to be expected that a Russian sovereign should be a favorite. In France, perhaps, his popularity is at the highest. Even those who at heart do not thank him for the present he has made them cannot deny his moderation, his humanity, his magnanimity. Of all the allies he was the one who had been the most wantonly and cruelly outraged. Of all the allies he was the only one who took no dishonorable revenge, who advanced no extravagant pretensions.

It is well understood that he alone protected Paris from the rapacity of those who had marched with Napoleon, and shared the plunder of Moscow. He has redeemed his pledge to the world. He has shown himself as great by his forbearance and modesty in prosperity as by his firmness in the hour of his own trial. But the Ethiopians have not changed their hue, nor the leopards their spots. They are already wrangling about the spoils; and we hear people talking as familiarly about the *guerre de partage*, as if it was already commenced. . . .

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE

No. 135.

[JAMES MONROE]

GHENT, 3 July, 1814.

SIR:

On the 2nd of June I left Stockholm, and on the 6th arrived at Gothenburg. I met on the road Mr. Connell, who had been dispatched by Mr. Clay to give Mr. Russell and me information of the change of the place of negotiation which had been proposed by the British government, and assented to by Mr. Bayard and Mr. Gallatin on the part of the American ministers. Instead of some place in Holland which had been previously intimated as the wish of the British government, they had finally fixed upon this city, the effect of which as we have now reason to believe will be to remove us from neutral territory to a place occupied by a British garrison.

There are as yet no British troops here, but they are at Antwerp and Brussels, and are expected here in the course of a few days. In proposing this place as a substitute for one unequivocally neutral, it appears to me it was incumbent on the British government to give notice to the American ministers of the change in the condition of the place, which it must have been at that time contemplated by them to make.

Mr. Clay had determined to come from Gothenburg by land, and had left that city before I arrived there. Mr. Russell was detained a few days longer at Stockholm, but reached Gothenburg on the 10th of June. The next day we embarked on board of the *John Adams*, and on the 18th landed at the Helder. From thence we came by land to this

city, where we arrived on the 24th.¹ Mr. Bayard was here on the 27th, and Mr. Clay on the 28th. Mr. Gallatin comes from London by way of Paris and we expect him here tomorrow. . . .

TO LEVETT HARRIS

Ghent, 9 July, 1814.

DEAR SIR:

Mr. Gallatin on his arrival ² here delivered me your favor from London of 21 June, and I had previously received in Sweden that of 8 May. I had delayed answering this one because I was not authorized to communicate officially with Count Nesselrode, and because I knew the Emperor would before his arrival in London have been apprised through the regular channel, the Department of Foreign Affairs, of your charge at St. Petersburg. I had notified it in an official communication to Mr. Weydemeyer on the 7th of April, and Mr. Weydemeyer had assured me that my note should be immediately transmitted to the Emperor.

¹ I have been most *unnaturally* occupied; for I have accomplished two voyages by sea, and two journies by land. Have crossed the Gulf of Finland and Baltic from Reval to Stockholm, and the North Sea from Gothenburg to the Texel. Have traversed the Kingdom of Sweden and the *sovereign principedom* of the Netherlands; and here I am in the city of Charles the 5th waiting with my four colleagues, until it shall please the mistress of the world, as she now fancies herself, to send her deputies for the purpose, as she imagines, of receiving our submission.

"Submission, however, thus much I can assure you, is neither our temper, nor that of our masters. The only question that can possibly arise among us is, how far we can abandon the claim which we have upon our adversary for concession upon her part. And with this disposition on both sides at the very opening of conferences, I am well assured the work to which we have been called, that of conciliating British and American pretensions, will be found *more unnatural* than your and my wandering life." To John Adams, July 7, 1814. Ms.

² July 7.

I learnt with much pleasure that Mr. Gallatin and you obtained of the Emperor a private audience in London,¹ and that he retains unimpaired his friendly sentiments and dispositions towards the United States. I am not surprised that the Emperor should inquire *pourquoi Gand? et pourquoi Gothenburg?* but these questions can be answered only by the British government. Both the places were proposed by them, and both barely acquiesced in on our part. We should much have preferred treating at St. Petersburg. But our own government, with good reason as I believe, determined that it should *not* be at London. Not that I imagine that the place of negotiation will have the weight of a straw upon its result. The questions at issue between the United States and Great Britain, my dear sir, and the temper prevailing on both sides, you may rely upon it, are not to be affected by such insignificant incidents as the place where the conferences are to be held, or the official documents interchanged. Your information upon this subject, from authority however *high*,² *must be* erroneous. Queen Mab's thimble would have been a fire-bucket to extinguish the flames of Moscow, just as important as the place where we should meet the British commissioners was to the issue of the negotiation. But the President of the United States *felt*, and it was a feeling worthy of the Chief Magistrate of an independent and spirited people, that the metropolis of our enemy was not a suitable place to be substituted for the capital of a common friend and impartial mediator. Nor do I precisely think with you that the selection of Ghent was a judicious choice on the part of the British government. Their motives for the choice are indeed obvious enough. They mani-

¹ June 18. See James Gallatin, *Diary*, 24.

² Harris had spoken of Count Munster, the friend and companion of the Prince Regent.

fest at once a fear of the American commissioners, and a distrust of all their own allies, obviously excessive, and which a profound policy would have been cautious not to disclose. The Crown Prince of Sweden and the Sovereign Prince of the Netherlands may say *pourquoi Gand?* as pointedly as the Emperor Alexander, and the question conveys the bitterest of sarcasms upon the selection made by the Regent's ministers. . . .

TO LOUISA CATHERINE ADAMS

GHENT, July 12, 1814.

MY DEAR WIFE,

When I told you in my last letter that the *whole* American mission extraordinary was here, I ought to have excepted Mr. Carroll and Mr. Todd, who are still lingering at Paris. Mr. Carroll is attached to the mission as private secretary to Mr. Clay, and Mr. Todd is of this legation, as he was of the former, a *gentilhomme d'ambassade*, quite independent in his movements, and very naturally thinking Paris a more agreeable residence than Ghent; notwithstanding the *bon mot* of Charles the 5th, which the good people of this city delight to repeat, that he would put Paris into his *glove*.

We are all in perfect good understanding and good humor with one another, and fully determined if we stay here long enough to make a removal from the inn where we all lodge expedient, to take one house and live together. All the attachés are now upon such a footing of independence that some of them may perhaps leave us and return home in the *John Adams*. I think it more probable, however, that they will await the issue, which I still think will not be long delayed. Scarcely an hour passes without accumulating evi-

dence to my mind that our antagonists are fully resolved not to make peace this time, notwithstanding which, I live in hope, and trust in God. I must at the same time acknowledge that none of my colleagues agree with me in opinion that our stay here will be short. They calculate upon three or four months at least, and incline even to the prospect of passing the winter here, which I hold to be utterly impossible. I mention it to you now, because it was since I wrote you last that the first idea has been suggested, and because if upon the arrival of the British commissioners there should be a rational ground for the belief that we shall pass the winter here, I shall then propose to you to take your passage in the first good vessel bound from Cronstadt to Amsterdam or Rotterdam, to break up altogether our establishment at St. Petersburg, and to come with Charles and join me here. We should then have it at our option in the spring to return to St. Petersburg or to America. I am, however, so far from entertaining any expectation of wintering here, that I only speak of it now, that if such should eventually be the result, the notice may not come too suddenly upon you. I shall not leave you an hour in suspense, after having anything ascertained upon which I myself can depend.

We continue to have a constant supply of American visitors, but as, after all, Ghent is not the most fascinating place for a long residence, many of our countrymen seem to come here only to see how we look, and take their departure for elsewhere. Mr. Edwards and Mr. Howland are already gone to Paris, but have been succeeded by two others, whose names I have not discovered, but who are undoubtedly Yankeys. We have now here Captain Jones¹ of the *Neptune*, with young Nicholson and Dr. Lawton. Mr. Russell's son George, too, found his school at Amsterdam so

¹ Lloyd Jones.

tiresome that he has prevailed upon his father to let him come here. I remember what a Dutch school at Amsterdam was thirty-four years ago enough to sympathize with George; but he appears to me so fine a boy, and to be at an age when time is so important, and instruction so vital to his hereafter, that I think his danger is of finding his father too indulgent. . . .

Captains Angus and Jones, and the other commissioners now here, dined with us yesterday, and to my no small mortification Mr. Bayard remembered and toasted *the day*.¹ It was however, done by him with so good a disposition that I took it as kindly as it was meant. He has uniformly been since our arrival here in the most friendly humor, and we appear all to be animated with the same desire of *harmonizing* together. . . .

TO LOUISA CATHERINE ADAMS

GHENT, July 15, 1814.

MY DEAR WIFE,

The stream of high and mighty travellers from London through this place has been incessant since the passage of the Emperor Alexander. The two sons of the King of Prussia, and his brothers, the Princes Henry and William, the second son of the Sovereign Prince of the Netherlands, Count Nesselrode, and lastly Field Marshal Prince Blücher, have all been successively here. Most of them have stopped either to dine or to pass the night at the house where we lodge, but I have not had the fortune to see any one of them. The King of Prussia and the Duchess of Oldenburg went directly from Calais to Paris. The Prince of Orange, who

¹ His birthday. He was forty-seven years of age.

was to have married the Princess Charlotte of Wales, landed at Helvoetsluys and went on immediately to the Hague. The marriage, you know, is broken off, and according to the newspapers the Prince was treated in England with very little respect. The rupture however is ascribed principally to the lady herself, who is said to have been so averse to going out of the Kingdom that she insisted upon making an article of the contract of marriage that she should not. And the Prince having consented to this, she then required that he should also subject himself to the same interdiction. It is probable that she was resolved to raise obstacles more perseveringly than he was prepared to remove them. And there were other considerations of a political nature, which might contribute to the separation of these royal lovers. The project of uniting this country with Holland, under the authority of the Sovereign Prince was perhaps connected with that of the marriage, and is likely to be dissolved with it. In the new combinations of European politics arising from the restoration of the Bourbons and the dismemberment of France, England is apparently tending to the policy of a close alliance with Austria, and will eventually restore this country to her. The late allies are understood to be not very cordially affected towards one another, and there is much talk of a new war, but I believe it to be without foundation. . . .

TO ALEXANDER HILL EVERETT

GHENT, July 16, 1814.

. . . I mentioned in my last letter to you that I had received and read with *poetical* pleasure your brother's [Edward] $\phi \beta \kappa$ poem,¹ though I had not been equally gratified by

¹ *American Poets*, 1812.

its *political* complexion. I have learnt since then, from my mother, that he has assumed the arduous and honorable task of succeeding our lamented friend Buckminster; an occasion upon which he might emphatically say "who is sufficient for these things?" I have the satisfaction of being one of the proprietors in that Church, and I look forward with pleasure to the period when, with my family, I shall be an habitual attendant upon his administration. I will not promise to agree with him in politics, nor even in religious doctrine; but there is one, and that the most essential point, upon which I am confident we shall never disagree—I mean Christian charity.

I regret that with your letter I had not the pleasure of receiving the copy of your address to the Charitable Fire Society,¹ and I have heard from other quarters of certain political speculations of yours, which I have more than one reason for wishing to see. As your design of entering upon the field of public discussion has been carried into execution, and as American principles are the foundation of the system to which you have pledged your exertions, you will not doubt the interest which I shall take in every step of your career. Notwithstanding the inauspicious appearances of the present moment, I humbly trust in God, that American principles will ultimately prevail in our country. But should it be otherwise in the inscrutable decrees of divine providence, should the greatness and prosperity to which the continuance of the Union cannot possibly fail of exalting our native country, be deemed too great for mortal man to attain; should we be destined to crumble into the vile and miserable fragments of a great power, petty, paltry principalities or republics, the tools of a common enemy's malice and envy, and drenching ourselves age after age in

¹ Delivered May 28, 1813, and printed for the Society.

one another's blood; far preferable should I deem it to fall in the cause of Union and glory, than to triumph in that of dismemberment, disgrace and impotence. As Christians, whatever befalls us or our fellow men we must submit to the will of heaven; but in *that* case I should be tempted to say with Lucan, "Victrix causa dis placuit, sed victa Catoni." . . .

TO LOUISA CATHERINE ADAMS

GHENT, July 19, 1814.

. . . We have contracted to take a house, where the five members of the mission, and the Secretary, Mr. Hughes, will all reside together. We engage it for one month, and it is to be furnished ready for us to go into next Saturday. This has been a negotiation of some delicacy; for although, as I wrote you, we had all agreed as it were *par acclamation* to live together, yet when it came to the arrangement of details, we soon found that one had one thing to which he attached a particular interest, and another another, and it was not so easy to find a contractor who would accommodate himself to five distinct and separate humors. It is one of your French universalists who has finally undertaken to provide for us. He keeps a shop of perfumery, and of millinery, and of prints and drawings; and he has on hand a stock of handsome second hand furniture. But then he was brought up a cook, and he is to supply our table to our satisfaction; and he is a marchand de vin, and will serve us with the best liquors that are to be found in the city. This was the article that stuck hardest in the passage; for one of us, and I know you will suspect it was I, was afraid that he would pass off upon us bad wine, and make us pay for

it as if it was the best. The bargain was very nearly broken off upon the question whether we should be obliged to take wine from him, or, if we supply ourselves from elsewhere, to pay him one franc a bottle for drawing the cork. We finally came to a compromise, and are to begin by taking wine from him. But they must be at his peril such as we shall relish; for if not, we shall look further, and draw the corks without paying him any tax or tribute for it at all. . . .

TO LOUISA CATHERINE ADAMS

Ghent, July 22, 1814.

. . . If the change of place of negotiation had been, as was first suggested, to the Hague, it would certainly have been personally to me, considering only the circumstance of individual accommodation, far more agreeable than either Gothenburg or Ghent. Ghent is to us all a more agreeable residence than I think Gothenburg would have been. The great and essential objection which there was in my mind was the great and unnecessary *delay*, which I knew it must occasion. I suppose this was really the precise object of the enemy in proposing the change. He wanted a pretext for delay, and I would not have allowed it. He began by talking of the Hague, and he finished by giving us Ghent. The change of the place gave him two months, and now he still *delays* without even offering a pretext. The hostility of the Little Lord ¹ is a mere sympathy. It is like the whispering gallery at St. Paul's. You whisper on one side of the dome, and the listener at the other side hears the sound. Lord Castlereagh whispers at Paris or London, and more than echoes talk along the walls of the *maison Demidoff*. If we

¹ Sir William Schaw Cathcart (1755-1853), the British ambassador to Russia.

had stuck to Gothenburg as I would have done, this paltry shuffling would long before this have been at an end. The true negotiators, as his Lordship said, were the bayonets from Bordeaux. It is with them that our country must treat, and it is by disposing properly of them that she can alone produce a pacific disposition in England.

What you have heard of the character and temper of Mr. Clay coincides exactly with all the experience I have had of them hitherto;¹ but the other report of a public breach and misunderstanding between two other gentlemen is altogether unfounded. So far from it that we now lodge all together in one house, and have a common table among ourselves; that we have engaged, as I wrote you before, a house, where we shall still lodge and dine together, and that there is on all sides a perfect good humor and understanding. The junior attachés, who were last year in Russia, appear to me both much improved. They are, I believe, both wholly independent of their former *patrons*, and can therefore have no collisions with them. Their pretensions are not so *saliant* as they were, and their deportment is consequently more pleasing. The Colonel is not only reconciled to the *Chevalier* [Bayard], but more assiduous to him than ever. The Chevalier himself is entirely *another man*, with good health, good spirits, good humor, always reasonable, and almost always as you have seen him in his most amiable moments. Whether there was something baleful in the waters of the Neva, I know not; but our last year's visitors, all here, seem of another and a much better world.

When I wrote you that I hoped to be with you by the first of September, it was on the supposition that we should do

¹ "Mr. Clay, I understand, is one of the most amiable and finest temper'd men in the world, and I am told you will be delighted with him. Young Lewis is lavish in his praise." *Louisa Catherine Adams to John Quincy Adams, June 10, 1814. Ms.*

our business at Gothenburg. I can no longer entertain such a hope. You know the situation in which we are now here, and the promise we had that the other party should be here to meet us in the first days of this month. I am aware how painful it will be to you to be left so long in suspense, whether I can go to you, or you are to come to me, and only ask you to recollect that sharing all your anxieties in this respect, I have the further mortification of feeling the same tardiness of our adversaries as a purposed insult upon our country. . . .

TO LOUISA CATHERINE ADAMS

GHENT, July 29, 1814.

. . . There was last week, on the 20th, a debate in the House of Commons, in which notice was taken of the delays of the British government relating to the negotiation with America. Mr. Whitbread asked Lord Castlereagh, "Whether the persons sent to Gothenburg from the American government were quite forgotten by His Majesty's Ministers, or whether any one had been appointed to treat with them?" His Lordship answered that persons had been appointed to treat with them. The report of the rest of the debate on the subject, whether purposely or by the blunders of the reporter, is so expressed that it is impossible to make sense of it. The substance however is, that Mr. Whitbread stated as the general impression in public that there was not that alacrity in the British government to meet the overtures from America which he thought it important should be manifested. Lord Castlereagh answered that there was no disposition on the part of England to delay the negotiations with America; that the departure of the British

commissioners had been regulated so that they might find the American mission all assembled here, but that *by his last advices from Paris, Mr. Gallatin was still there*. Now, my dear friend, we have the most substantial reason for knowing that besides all the London newspapers which had announced Mr. Gallatin's departure from Paris the 4th of this month, Lord Castlereagh had special and precise information that he had been here at Ghent, a full fortnight, on the day of that debate. So much for Lord Castlereagh's candor. But the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Vansittart, in the same debate was more ingenuous; for he said "that the war with America was not likely to terminate speedily, and might lead to a considerable scale of expense." Mr. Canning some time before in another debate had enjoined upon the ministry not to make peace without depriving America of her right to the fisheries; and one of the Lords of Admiralty is reported to have said in the same House of Commons, that the war with America would now be continued to accomplish the *deposition of Mr. Madison*. An article in the *Courier*, the ministerial paper, of the 22d, countenances the same idea. It states that the federalists in America are about taking a high tone; that they will address Congress for the removal of Mr. Madison, preparatory to his impeachment; on the ground that England will never make peace with him. . . .¹

¹ "Further communications from America inform us, that the Federal party assume a very high and decided tone. Addresses to Congress are to be set on foot throughout all the eastern states for the removal of Mr. Madison from office, preparatory to his impeachment. It is represented that he has displayed the most notorious incapacity; that he has deceived and misled his countrymen by gross misrepresentations; that he has abused their confidence by secret collusion with the late Tyrant of France; and that no fair and honourable terms of peace can be expected from Great Britain, so long as she is to treat with a person from whom she has received such unprovoked insults, and such deliberate proofs of injustice." *The Courier*, July 22, 1814.

TO LOUISA CATHERINE ADAMS

GHENT, August 1, 1814.

Yesterday was the day of our removal from the Hôtel des Pays-Bas, on the Place d'Armes, to our own house in the Rue des Champs. Among the important consequences of this revolution, it has produced that of a state of separation between the primary members of the mission and the attachés. Those gentlemen found they could accommodate themselves with lodgings more to their taste, and as the principle of their attachment is independence, they have followed their humor without any interference or dissatisfaction on our part. We should have been gratified to have had Mr. Hughes with us, but his inclination did not precisely correspond with ours; or rather, after a choice of apartments to accommodate five principals, the chambers that were left were not so inviting as others that were to be found in the city. I regret the loss of his society; for he is lively and good-humored, smart at a repartee, and a thorough punster, theory and practice. He has not forgiven us, and I have the most to answer for in the offense, for calling him before he thinks it was necessary from Paris, and he has a project of making another excursion, while there is not much to do. He tells me that his brother-in-law, our old friend, J. S. Smith, is to be married this summer to Miss Nicholas.¹

Mr. Dallas intended to have gone in the *John Adams*, and still so intends, if another passport is obtained. Mr. Galatin is very anxious that Mr. Todd should also return by the same vessel; but Todd likes Paris, perhaps as much as Mr. Hughes, and feels no obligation to yield obedience to

¹ Caryanne, daughter of Wilson Cary Nicholas. She died in 1832.

the summons of departure from it. Hughes (and it is a good sample of his wit) always calls him Monsieur TOAD.

Mr. Hughes has this day a letter from Mr. Beasley mentioning that the departure of the British commissioners would probably be postponed until after the great fête, which takes place on this day.¹ If we were but sure they would come then, we should not have much longer to wait. They are making and circulating all sorts of reports to account for these delays. Among the rest they pretend that we ourselves had proposed that further time should be taken, that we might receive new instructions from our government. This is not true.

I believe I have suggested the true cause of their waiting. They have taken measures to strike a great blow in America, and they wish to have the advantage of the panic which they suppose it will excite. Among the rumors of the time I have heard that they intended not to treat with us, until the Congress which is to meet at Vienna. That, you know, was to have been on this day, and was afterwards postponed to the first of October. Lord Castlereagh lately promised the English nation a long, profound, unsuspecting peace in Europe, which is certainly more than will be realized. The peace will be neither profound nor unsuspecting, but it may very possibly be long; that is, it may last several years. As to the talk of a new war in October, I hold it to be perfectly absurd. The Congress at Vienna will prevent a war if there is now a prospect of one; and the policy of England now and then will be to use all her influence to prevent it. . . .

¹ The "grand jubilee," being the centenary of the accession of the House of Brunswick to the English throne and the anniversary of the battle of the Nile.

TO LOUISA CATHERINE ADAMS

GHENT, August 5, 1814.

. . . I know not who it was who so positively assured you that there were to be no British commissioners appointed to meet us; but it must have been somebody deep in the secrets of the British Cabinet. I wrote you on the 2d of June from Stockholm that British commissioners were appointed and gave you their names. Lord Castlereagh on the 20th of July told the House of Commons that commissioners were appointed, though the Chancellor of the Exchequer gave at the same time a broad hint that it was not intended they should make peace. Now for something nearer at hand. We have a letter from Mr. Beasley, dated 29 July, this day week. He says he has just seen Mr. Hamilton, under secretary of state for foreign affairs, who informed him that the British commissioners had kissed the Prince Regent's hand the day before, and that they would certainly leave London for Ghent in all this week. Mr. Hamilton, to be sure, had before written to Mr. Irving that they would leave London on or about the first of July; but the ceremony of taking leave of the Regent looks more as if they were in earnest. I now confidently expect them within a week from this day.

I was almost as much gratified with your account of the entertainment at Pavlowski as if I had been one of the party myself. You do not mention the occasion of it, but I find upon recurring to the calendar that it was the Grand Duke Nicholas' birthday. I congratulate you upon your having got so well through the day, and rejoice that you have had that occasion for enlivening your summer. The Emperor has, I presume, before this reached St. Petersburg, and now

will be the time for fêtes and rejoicings. The newspapers say that he has declined accepting the title that was offered him of *the Blessed*, and has referred it to posterity to erect a monument in honor of him, if he deserve it. This answer is so conformable to his character that I believe it to be in substance true, and it is among the strongest proofs that he deserves both the title and the monument. It shows a mind unsubdued by prosperity, as it had already proved itself superior to adversity. It indicates a just estimate of the honors that can be conferred upon an absolute sovereign by his co-temporaries, and of those which may be conferred by prosperity.

Mr. Beasley has sent us some of the latest American papers that have been received; they are to the 20th of June, and exhibit no indication of the intentions announced by the British gazettes on the part of the federalists to address Congress for the removal and impeachment of Mr. Madison. Quite the contrary. The New York election has given a great accession of strength to the government of the United States; and the Massachusetts governor and legislature are *retreating* and boast of their *forbearance*. There has been a new *religious festival* in Boston ¹ upon the fall of Bonaparte and the restoration of the Bourbons. The State House and a few private houses were illuminated, but the *Chronicle* says it did not take; that it was only a *solemn festival*, for they could not get so much as a shout from the boys in the streets. That they asked for what the State House was illuminated? and some said it was because Bonaparte had been bribed with 6 millions to give up France to the English; and others said it was because Governor Strong was chosen instead of

¹ June 15. The resolutions are given in *Boston Gazette*, June 16, but do not answer to the description in this letter. The *Chronicle* did not print them, but the reference may be to the London *Chronicle*.

Samuel Dexter. At this same religious festival several resolutions were proposed by Mr. Gore, about as wise as the festival itself. One of them is merely a lamentation that on account of the war, they cannot express as they wish they could their admiration of a certain hero who must be *nameless*. There is a speech made in the Senate of Massachusetts by a Mr. Holmes,¹ in which he bears down upon the junto as Perry did upon the British on Lake Erie. There has been nothing like it for many years. The federal papers say that Mr. Otis upheld to it with a torrent of eloquence, but they have not yet published his speech. That of Holmes is entire in the *Chronicle* of 20 June, and its main points are too stubborn for Otis's torrent to overwhelm. It appears that Otis must have resigned his seat as a judge, by his being again in the Senate. . . .

We begin to be weary, not of one another, but of our bargain for the house. You will not be surprised at this when I tell you that our landlord is Mr. *Lannuyer*. We find him as tiresome as his name. I shall complain as little as possible, but shall perhaps at the close of the month return to the *Hôtel des Pays-Bas*. . . .²

¹ John Holmes, of York.

² "We have the satisfaction of living in perfect harmony; the discontents of our domestic arrangements are all with our landlord, and none with one another. Even he gives us better satisfaction than he did. Mr. Hughes and the private secretaries all dine with us every day. One of our troubles you must know was that this house was *haunted*, and its ill-fame in this respect was so notorious, that the servants and the children of our party were very seriously alarmed before, and when we first came in. The perturbed spirits have all forsaken the house since we entered it, and we hope they are *laid* for ever." *To Louisa Catherine Adams*, August 12, 1814. Ms.

TO LOUISA CATHERINE ADAMS

GHENT, August 9, 1814.

. . . The British commissioners arrived here on Saturday evening the 6th inst., and yesterday we had our first conference with them. Their manner is polite and conciliatory. Their professions both with regard to their government and themselves, liberal, and highly pacific. But they have not changed the opinion which I have constantly had of the result. Of the prospects you may judge with more certainty from the speech of the Speaker of the British House of Commons, than from the professions of the commissioners. Last week the session of Parliament closed. The Regent in his speech said that he regretted the continuance of the war with the United States; that notwithstanding the *unprovoked* oppression upon their part, he was willing to make peace on terms honorable to both nations; but that in the meantime the war would be carried on with increased vigor. But the Speaker undertook to dictate terms in his speech, and roundly declared that the House of Commons could never consent to terminate the war *but by the establishment of the maritime rights of Great Britain*. You will now receive in the most exclusive confidence whatever I shall write you on this subject. Say not a word of it to any human being, until the result shall be publicly known. At present I do not think that the negotiation will be of long continuance. At the same time I cannot yet speak on the subject with perfect certainty.

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE ¹

No. 2.

[JAMES MONROE]

GHENT, August 11, 1814.

SIR,

The British Commissioners arrived in this city on Saturday evening the 6th inst. They are Admiral Lord Gambier, Henry Goulburn, Esq., and Dr. William Adams.² The day after their arrival Mr. Baker, the secretary to their commission called upon one of us (Mr. Bayard) and notified to us that event, with the proposal from them to meet us the day succeeding at one o'clock afternoon, at their lodgings. We were of opinion that unless they should think fit to hold

¹ A draft by Adams of a dispatch to be signed by the commission. The dispatch sent is dated August 12, and is printed in *American State Papers*, Foreign Relations, III. 705. On August 9 Adams was charged to prepare the draft of a dispatch to the Secretary of State on the two conferences with the British plenipotentiaries. This draft was taken by the other commissioners. Bayard prepared an entire new draft, which was substituted for that of Adams, but was found to be so imperfect that Gallatin drew up a new paper, finally accepted with some amendments. Adams, *Memoirs*, August 9-17, 1814. The words in italics were underscored probably by members of the commission questioning the propriety of using them.

² "The British commissioners are said to be personally men of moderate principles and their deportment has hitherto been of a conciliatory character. Lord Gambier was in Boston in the year 1770, when his uncle commanded there. He was himself then a boy, but he recollected having seen my father at that time. Dr. Adams is an admiralty lawyer. His family, he told me, some generations ago came from Pembroke-shire in Wales; but has for many years been settled in the county of Essex. I think we have neither Essex kindred, nor Welsh blood in our pedigree. His arms are a red cross. Ours I think are no other than the stripes and stars." *To Abigail Adams*, August 18, 1814. Ms. Gallatin was not "impressed with the British" commissioners, as "men who have not made any mark and have no influence or weight, . . . but puppets of Lords Castlereagh and Liverpool." He "felt quite capable of dealing with them." *Diary of James Gallatin*, 28.

the first conference at our dwelling house, it would be more expedient to hold it at a third place. The option of either was offered them, and they assented to the proposal of meeting at a third place. We met accordingly at one o'clock on Monday the 8th inst. and on the proposal of the British commissioners agreed to hold the future conferences at each other's houses alternately, and until they shall have taken a house, entirely at ours.¹

We have the honor to enclose herewith copies of the full powers produced by them at the first conference, and of the protocol of the first and second conferences as ultimately agreed to by mutual consent. They opened the subject of our meetings by assurance that the British government had a sincere and earnest desire that the negotiation might terminate in the conclusion of a solid and honorable peace; and particularly that no events which had occurred since the first proposal for this negotiation had produced *the slightest* alteration either in the pacific dispositions of Great Britain, or in the terms upon which she would be willing to concur in restoring to both countries the blessings of peace.

These professions were answered by us, for our government and ourselves, with expressions of reciprocal earnestness and sincerity in the desire of accomplishing a peace, and of the satisfaction with which we received those they had addressed to us. With regard to the first point stated by them as a proper subject for discussion, that of impressment and allegiance, *they intimated* that the British government did not propose this, as one which they were *desirous* of discussing; but that in adverting to the origin of the war, it was one which they could not overlook, among those which they supposed likely to arise.²

¹ This paragraph, except the first sentence, was struck out.

² "In submitting this as the first topic we stated that we had no intention of offer-

The principal stress of their instructions appeared to have been concentrated upon the second point—the Indian pacification and boundary. Their statement of it in the first instance was in terms not conveying altogether the full import of its meaning. The motive which they appeared to impress upon our minds as that of the British government in this proposal, was fidelity to the interests of their Indian allies; a *generous* reluctance at concluding a peace with the United States, leaving their auxiliaries unprotected from the resentments of a more powerful *enemy*, and a desire by the establishment of a definite boundary for the Indians to lay the foundation of a *permanent* peace, not only to the Indians, but between the United States and Great Britain.

They expressly disclaimed any intention of Great Britain to demand an acquisition of territory for herself. But upon being questioned, *whether it was understood* as an effect of the proposed Indian boundary that the United States and the Indians would be precluded from the right they have hitherto exercised of making amicable treaties between them, without the consent of Great Britain; whether for example the United States would be restricted from purchasing and they from selling their lands; it was first answered by one ¹ of the commissioners that the Indians would not be restricted from selling their lands, but the United States would be restricted from purchasing them; and on reflection another ² of the commissioners observed that it was intended that the Indian territories should be a barrier between the British possessions and those of the United States; that both Great Britain

ing any specific proposition on this subject. We did it because the subject had been put forward by the American government in such a manner as led us to suppose that they would make it a principal topic of discussion." *British Commissioners to Lord Castlereagh, August 9, 1814. Ms.*

¹ Goulburn.

² William Adams.

and the United States should be restricted from purchasing their land, but that the Indians would not be restricted from selling them to a third party.

On the point respecting the fisheries they stated that this was regarded by their government as an object of minor importance. That it was not intended to deny the right of the Americans to the fisheries generally; but with regard to the right of fishing within the limits of their jurisdiction, and of landing and drying fish upon their territories, which had been conceded by the treaties of peace heretofore, those privileges would not be renewed without an equivalent.

They manifested some desire to be informed even at the first meeting whether the American commissioners were instructed to treat with them upon these several points, and they requested us to present to them such further points as we might be instructed by our government to offer for discussion. They assented however to the desire expressed on our part to consult together among ourselves, previous to answering them in relation to the points presented by them, or to stating those which we should offer on our part. This was done at the second conference, and in the interval between the two we received the originals of your letters of 25 and 27 June, the duplicates of which have since then also come to our hands.

At the second meeting ¹ after answering that with regard to the two points of the Indian pacification and boundary, and the fisheries, we were not instructed to *discuss them*, we observed that as they had not been objects of controversy between the two governments heretofore, but were points entirely new, to which no allusion had even been made by Lord Castlereagh in his letter to you proposing this negotiation, it could not be expected that they should have been

¹ August 9.

anticipated by the government of the United States. That it was a matter of course that our instructions should be confined to the subjects of difference in which the war originated, and to the topics of discussion known by our government to exist. That as to peace with the Indians, we considered that as an inevitable consequence of peace with Great Britain; that the United States would have neither interest nor motive for continuing the war against the Indians separately. That commissioners had already been appointed by the American government to treat of peace with them, and that *very* possibly it might before this have been *concluded*. That the policy of the United States towards the Indians was the most liberal of that pursued by any nation. That our laws interdicted the purchase of lands from them by any individual, and that every precaution was taken to prevent the frauds upon them which had heretofore been practised by others. *We remarked* that this proposition to give them a distinct boundary different from the boundary already existing, a boundary to be defined by a treaty between the United States and Great Britain, was not only new, it was unexampled. No such treaty had been made by Great Britain, either before or since the American Revolution. No such treaty had to our knowledge ever been made by any other European power.

In reply to the remark that no allusion had been made to these new and extraordinary points in Lord Castlereagh's letter to you, it was said that it could not be supposed that Lord Castlereagh, in a letter merely proposing a negotiation, should have enumerated the topics which might be proper for discussion in the course, since those would naturally be determined by the events which had subsequently occurred. And this remark was made by the same gentleman,¹ who

¹ Goulburn.

had the day before assured us, *with sufficient solemnity of manner*, that no events which had taken place since the proposal of the negotiation had in *the slightest* degree altered the pacific dispositions of the British government, or the terms upon which she would be willing to conclude the peace.

Upon the observation from us that the proposition for an Indian boundary was unexampled in the practice of civilized nations, it was answered, that the Indians must in some sort be considered as *sovereigns*, since treaties were concluded with them both by Great Britain and the United States. To which we replied by marking the obvious distinction between *making treaties WITH them*, and a treaty between two civilized nations defining a boundary *FOR them*.

We informed the British commissioners, that we wished to receive from them a statement of the views and objects of Great Britain upon all the points, and expressed our readiness to discuss *them all*. They inquired, whether, if they should enter further upon discussion, and particularly on the point respecting the Indian boundary, we could expect that it would terminate by some provisional arrangement which we could conclude subject to the ratification of our government.

We said that as any arrangement to which we could agree upon the subject must be without specific authority from our government, it was not possible for us previous to discussion to decide whether an article on the subject could be formed which would be mutually satisfactory, and to which we should think ourselves, under our discretionary powers, justified in acceding. [The difficulty that we felt we stated in its full force *from a principle* of perfect candour. They would perceive that nothing could be easier for us than to admit that an article might be formed which we would provisionally sign, and yet to break off upon the

details of any article which we *might discuss*.]¹ That our motive in asking the discussion was, that even if no arrangement could be agreed to upon this point which was prescribed to them as the *sine qua non* of a treaty, the government of the United States might be possessed of the entire and precise intentions of that of Great Britain upon it; and the British government be fully apprised of all the objections on the part of the United States to any such arrangement. That if unfortunately the present negotiation must be broken off upon this preliminary, the two governments might be aware of each other's views, and enabled to judge of the expediency of a renewal of the negotiation.

The British commissioners objected that it would be wasting time upon an unprofitable discussion, unless we could give them the expectation that we should ultimately agree to an article on this subject. *They proposed* an adjournment of an hour that we might have an opportunity of consulting between ourselves, whether we could give them this pledge of a possible assent on our part to their proposal. We needed no time for such consultation, as there was no hesitation upon the mind of any one of us with regard to it, and we declined *the adjournment*. They then proposed to suspend the conferences until they could consult their own government on the state of things. They sent off a special messenger the same evening, and we are now waiting for the result.²

¹ The words in brackets were struck out.

² "Under these circumstances it would be satisfactory to us to be furnished with instructions of the most specific kind how far His Majesty's Government would be disposed to accept of a provisional article as to an Indian boundary, subject to [the] very dubious contingency of its ratification by the President of the United States; and also whether His Majesty's Government would wish the negotiations to proceed upon any and what points in the event of no provisional article of this kind being agreed to, which latter contingency, unless specific instructions are received

It was agreed upon their proposition that a report should be drawn up of the proceedings at these two meetings, by each party, and that we should meet the next day to compare and collate them together, and from the two form a final protocol agreed to on both sides. The paper marked (C) ¹ is a copy of the report thus drawn up on our part. We inclose it to make known to you the passages, to the introduction of which the British commissioners at this third meeting objected. Their objections to some of the passages were that they appeared rather to be argumentative, and that the object of the protocol was to contain a mere statement of facts. *But* they also objected to the insertion of the fact, that they had declared the conferences suspended, until they could obtain further instructions from their government. Such was nevertheless the fact, and the return of their messenger may perhaps disclose the motive of their reluctance to its appearing on the record.

We have the honor, etc.

TO LOUISA CATHERINE ADAMS

Ghent, August 16, 1814.

American news presses upon us with an interest still increasing and which will soon be but too powerful. It is impossible that the summer should pass over without bringing intelligence which will make our hearts ache; though I hope and trust that nothing will or can happen that will break the from the United States, appear to us by no means unlikely to happen." *British Commissioners to Lord Castlereagh*, August 9, 1814. Ms. See also Goulburn to Earl Bathurst, August 9, 1814, in Wellington, *Supplementary Despatches, Correspondence and Memoranda*, IX. 178. Castlereagh gave further instructions on August 14. They are in *Letters and Despatches of Lord Castlereagh*, X. 86.

¹ Printed in *American State Papers*, Foreign Relations, III. 708.

spirit of our nation. We are but just now receiving the accounts of the arrival of the reinforcements sent out in the spring. Those of their operations must soon follow. In Canada we have done nothing, while the superiority of force was unquestionably on our side! What are we to expect when an overwhelming superiority will be on that of the enemy? We are catching at the straws of such trifles as the affairs of Sandy Creek and Niagara, while the blow hangs over us which we are told is to lay us prostrate at the mercy of our foe. God forbid! But either that, or a latent energy must be brought forth, of which we have as yet manifested no sign.

We had last Friday all the Americans in the city to dine with us. We sat down to table twenty-two. The next morning Captain Angus and Mr. Connell left the town. The Captain returns to his ship, which is to sail on the 25th inst. Connell could not obtain passage in her, nor any other person, but those expressly named, or charged with dispatches. The morning they went away, Captain Angus said to Mr. Shaler, "Well, I am going home and what shall I say? The people will all be crowding about me for news—what shall I tell them?" Says Shaler, tell them that the day before you left Ghent you dined with the commissioners and all the Americans in the place, and that at the dinner Mr. A[dams] gave for a toast "Lawrence's last words." Why, says Angus, "Do you think he meant anything by it?" "Tell them the fact," says Shaler, "and leave them to judge of that." It is true that Mr. A. did give the toast, but it is very strange that Shaler should have noticed and recollected it! If he had meant anything, was it not much more probable that it would have been instantly felt by Captain Angus, himself a naval officer, than by a non-combatant landsman? Angus did however finally sus-

pect that Mr. A. meant something. What is your opinion? . . .

The ministerial English papers still tell us we are not to have peace. An expedition said to be of 14,000 men is fitting out, to sail by the first of September, bound to America. Lord Hill ¹ has the command of it, and at a dinner last week promised the company that he would humble the Yankees, and reduce them immediately to submission. . . .

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE

No. 137.

[JAMES MONROE]

GHENT, 17 August, 1814.

SIR:

I have had the honor of receiving the duplicate of your favor of 2 May, 1814, and the original of that of 23 June, the former purporting to inclose a copy of a proclamation of Admiral Cochrane declaring the whole American coast to be in a state of blockade. But the copy of the proclamation was not inclosed. I have transmitted to Mr. Harris a copy of the letter, together with one of the proclamation as it appeared in the American newspapers, requesting him to present the subject to the attention of the Russian government. Mr. Harris arrived at St. Petersburg on the 17th of July.

It is no pleasing part of my duty to state to you my conviction that neither this nor any other remonstrance against the maritime outrages of Great Britain will find, or be able to rouse, either in Russia, or in any other European state, a spirit of resistance against the British pretensions or prac-

¹ Rowland Hill, first Viscount Hill (1772-1842).

tices. All the great powers of Europe are dependent upon the good will of the British government for the attainment of objects more important in their estimation than any thing connected with the maritime questions. They have all tacitly, if not formally, stipulated not to bring any of those questions into the discussions at the Congress of Vienna which is to be held in October, ultimately to settle the new balance of Europe. Mr. Gallatin had an audience of the Emperor Alexander at London, an account of which will be transmitted to you, and from which you will perceive that, although regretting the disregard unequivocally manifested by the British government to his repeated offers of mediation, and to his wishes for peace between Great Britain and the United States, he candidly expressed his intention to take no further active part in urging the settlement of their differences. Sweden is not only destitute of all means of asserting any maritime or neutral rights against the pretensions of Britain, but it is by the assistance of Britain alone that she can expect to accomplish the conquest of Norway. Holland is so far from possessing the means even of remonstrating against the British maritime code, that her merchants without a murmur submit to purchase from the British Ambassador at the Hague a license to send a ship to any of their own colonies. Such is the ordinance prescribed to them by their own sovereign prince, and with which they think it no derogation to their national honor and independence to comply. France and Spain are yet equally dependent upon the will of England for their intercourse with their colonies; none of those either of France or Holland have been restored to them. There is even no immediate prospect of their restoration. In the arrangements with Holland the British government has explicitly avowed the policy of loading the trade of the Dutch to their colonies with burthens

equal to those under which the English are obliged to carry on the same commerce. It is probable that this principle, of suffering no other nation to carry on commerce less burthened with duties and charges than their own, will henceforth be an essential feature of the English policy, and I consider it as one of their motives for continuing the war with us upon which they are undoubtedly determined.

The dispatches from you to the joint mission which I had been so long and so anxiously expecting, were received by us on the day of our first conference with the British commissioners.¹ They were of the utmost importance, inasmuch as without them it would have been impossible for us to proceed one step in the negotiation upon the points on which the war originated. But you will see by our dispatches that the British commissioners at the first conference formally and in the most peremptory manner placed the war and the negotiation upon a ground entirely new. They appeared to mention the subject of impressment, with which they connected their doctrine of unalienable allegiance, as a point which they supposed we should be desirous of discussing, but which their government would willingly pass over in silence. They spoke of the fisheries also, rather to warn us that we should want an article to secure us in the continuance of the liberties we had enjoyed by the stipulations in the treaties of 1782 and 1783, than to signify that they had any wish to bring the subject into discussion. But from the first moment they declared that the including of the Indians in the peace, and the settling of an Indian boundary line, was made by the British government a *sine qua non* to the conclusion of a treaty; and they attempted at the very first meeting to entangle us in the alternative of conceding the principle or of breaking off the negotiation. At the second,

¹ August 8.

after they were informed that we had no instructions authorizing us to treat with them on this point, they urged us to the admission that we might agree to an article conceding the principle, if they would open the discussion, and upon our declining to make any such engagement, they instantly proposed a suspension of the conferences until they should consult their government.

So far as the intentions of the British government can be collected from the newspapers it would appear that they calculate upon an immediate rupture of this negotiation.¹ They have been taking up more than one hundred transports for the conveyance of troops, and are stated to want more. This object is a particular expedition, probably against New Orleans, to be commanded by Lord Hill. They are to be ready to sail from Cork on the first of September, and their commander at a late dinner informed his table companions that he was going to humble the Yankees, and reduce them immediately to terms of peace glorious to Great Britain.

¹ This was also Gallatin's view. James Gallatin, *Diary*, 29. "But upon the practicability of prosecuting the negotiation with any utility in the present imperfect state of the instructions of which the American negotiators avow themselves to be in possession, the whole seems to turn upon the point you have so properly suggested: viz. whether the Commissioners will or will not take upon themselves to sign a provisional agreement upon the points on which they have no instruction. If they decline this, the British government sees no advantage in prosecuting the discussions further, until the American negotiators shall have received instructions upon these points. If on the contrary upon a candid explanation of the principles upon which Great Britain is prepared to treat on these subjects, they are willing upon their own responsibility to sign a provisional agreement, the negotiation may proceed, and the treaty when concluded may be sent with the British ratification to America, to be at once exchanged, if the American government shall think fit to confirm the act of their Commissioners. The British government cannot better evince their cordial desire for peace than by placing the negotiation upon this issue." *Castlereagh to the British Commissioners*, August 14, 1814.

The Sovereign Prince of the Netherlands has provisionally taken possession of the Belgic provinces, and by a proclamation issued at Bruxelles has signified to the people of this country that they are ultimately to be united with Holland under his government. In this arrangement the inclinations of the people have been as little consulted as in the transfer of Norway to Sweden. There is no destination which could be given to the inhabitants of Belgium to which they would be so averse as that of being annexed to Holland. France is also said to be strongly dissatisfied with this event, and France begins to show symptoms of recovering her voice in the general affairs of Europe. There are many rumors of approaching war which, if not altogether unfounded, will probably be dispelled by the negotiations at the Congress of Vienna. The interest of all the European powers except France is peace; and although France has a strong interest and a stronger passion for an immediate renewal of the Continental war, her fear of England with the undoubted bias of the present government will at least for some time control the spirit of the nation and especially of the army.

I am etc.

TO LOUISA CATHERINE ADAMS

Ghent, August 19, 1814.

. . . Since I wrote you last we have neither seen nor heard from the British commissioners. After the second conference they sent off a messenger to London, to inquire of their government whether they should have anything more to say to us. Their messenger returned the evening before last, but we have not a word from them yet. The conferences have now been ten days suspended, and I may

say to you it is by no means clear that they will be renewed. On our part we have never occasioned or asked the delay of an hour. Between the first and the second conference we received dispatches from the Secretary of State, which Mr. Gallatin, Mr. Hughes and myself sat up until one the next morning to decypher. This encroached something upon my hour of retirement, which is now regularly at 9 o'clock. Hitherto we have had no evenings. We dine all together at four, and sit usually at table until six. We then disperse to our several amusements and avocations. Mine is a solitary walk of two or three hours—solitary, because I find none of the other gentlemen disposed to join me in it, particularly at that hour. They frequent the coffee houses, the Reading Rooms, and the billiard tables. Between eight and nine I return from my walk, and immediately betake myself to bed. I rise usually about five in the morning, and from that time until dinner am closely engaged in writing or in other business. We breakfast separately, each in his own chamber, and meet almost every day for an hour or two between breakfast and dinner. We are not troublesome to one another, and if our landlord was not quite so anxious as he is to fatten upon us too fast, we should live with as much satisfaction as I believe would be possible at Bachelor's Hall. We pay him a very liberal and generous price; but he was to furnish the house completely and elegantly, which he has not done; and as for the boarding part we give him a fixed price by the head and the day; he requires a scolding once or twice a week to make him provide us with tolerable fare.

If, as it would appear by the preparations for the Man Mountain (Lord Hill)'s expedition, the British government mean to break us up before the first of September, our residence here will not extend beyond the month for which we

positively took the house, and which has already more than half elapsed; but as the autumn advances and the nights lengthen if we are to stay here we shall find changes in our condition, which to me particularly will be no improvement of it. I find myself already compelled to abridge my walk after dinner, and shall soon be obliged to give it up altogether. I hope we shall have no winter evenings to dispose of. . . .

TO LOUISA CATHERINE ADAMS

Ghent, August 23, 1814.

We had last Friday, after my letter of that day to you was closed, a conference with the British commissioners at their request, which will probably be the last. Lord Castlereagh himself had arrived here the night before, and left this place on his way to Bruxelles the day after. We did not see him,¹ but at the conference it is scarcely a figure of speech to say that we felt him. Our opponents were not only charged fourfold with obnoxious substance, they threw off much of the suavity of form which they had observed before.² After they had opened upon us their new battery from England, and answered some questions put on our part, I told them, and we all agreed on our side that our proceedings were now sufficiently matured for us to be ready to receive from them a written communication. They promised it to us without

¹ "During my stay of the greater part of two days at Ghent I did not see any of the American Commissioners. They did not call upon or desire to see me, and I thought my originating an interview would be considered objectionable and awkward by our own Commissioners." *Castlereagh to the Earl of Liverpool*, August 28, 1814. Wellington, *Supplementary Despatches*, IX. 192. Yet James Gallatin reports that Castlereagh saw Gallatin, and the son was present at the interview. *Diary*, 30.

² See *Gallatin to Monroe*, August 20, 1814, in Adams, *Writings of Gallatin*, I. 637.

delay, and sent it the next morning.¹ We shall send our answer in a day or two, and I believe we shall need to wait no longer than for their reply. That may be sent to us in an hour, or it may be delayed a week; the difference of which will depend upon its length or its laconism. Everything here has proceeded precisely as I had expected. It is not possible that we should be detained beyond the last of this month, unless it be for the arrangement of our papers.

Messrs. Bayard, Clay and Gallatin expect to return this autumn to America. But their project now is to order the *Neptune* round to Cherburg, Brest, or L'Orient; and to go there by land to embark. They will thus have the opportunity of visiting Paris again. They suppose that by this arrangement they may yet sail as early as the first of October; but it is much more likely they will not get away before the first of November. Then an American coast in December will be very disagreeable. Some of them will run a great risk of passing another winter in Europe.

Messrs. Delprat and Todd arrived here together on Saturday. Todd was to have gone in the *John Adams*, but on reaching this city he received a letter from his mother [Mrs. Madison], urging him at all events not to stay longer in Europe than Mr. Gallatin. Todd's argument is that in compliance with his mother's request, he must stay in Europe *as long* as Mr. Gallatin, so he has postponed his voyage until the departure of the *Neptune*, and talks of

¹ "We accordingly made on this subject also [a revision of the frontier] an explicit communication to the American plenipotentiaries at a conference which took place on the 19th inst., at which the American plenipotentiaries confined themselves to requiring from us mere explanations upon some incidental points connected with the subject of our verbal communications to them. In conformity with a wish expressed by them to receive a written statement on the subject we addressed to them the note of which a copy is inclosed." *British Commissioners to Lord Castlereagh*, August 26, 1814. Ms. The note was dated August 19.

returning immediately to Paris. He has a very important motive to this step, for an oculist there has promised him, if he will put himself for a few weeks under his hands, he will make him look straight. He had also after all the misfortune to fail of being presented. Mr. Crawford had an audience, and delivered his credentials last Tuesday. Todd was to have been presented at the same time, but the *Introduceur des Ambassadeurs* forgot to send him notice in time, so that he was disappointed.

Colonel Milligan has just returned from an excursion of two days with Mr. Hughes to Antwerp. The Colonel is going upon a visit to his relations in Scotland, with the intention however of returning wherever the *Neptune* may be in time to go by her. This place continues to be the thoroughfare of all the Americans in Europe. They come and look at us, and are off in such rapid succession that sometimes I hear nothing of them until they are gone. Mr. Joseph Russell departs this day for Paris. He desires me to remember him with his most particular respects to you.

We are not confined exclusively to visitors from our country. Last Friday our old friend de Cabre came and spent the evening with us. He is going as Secretary of the French legation to Copenhagen, and came round by this city, twelve leagues out of his way, merely for the pleasure of seeing us, and especially his intimate friend Hughes. If besides that he came to reconnoitre, we know nothing of it. I put him one or two prying questions, but he was as ignorant as a simpleton. He knew nothing. . . .¹

¹ On the 23d, the Commissioners met at a dinner given by the Intendant of the city, and Goulburn reported on the same day: "It is evident from their conversation that they do not mean to continue the negotiations at present. Mr. Clay, whom I sat next to at dinner, gave me clearly to understand that they had decided upon a reference to America for instructions, and that they conceived our propositions equivalent to a demand for the cession of Boston or New York; and

ANSWER TO THE BRITISH COMMISSIONERS ¹

[August 24, 1814.]

The undersigned Ministers plenipotentiary and extraordinary from the United States of America have given to the official note which they have had the honor of receiving

after dinner Mr. Bayard took me aside and requested that I would permit him to have a little private and confidential conversation. Upon my expressing my readiness to hear whatever he might like to say to me, he began a very long speech by saying that the present negotiation could not end in peace, and that he was desirous of privately stating (before we separated) what Great Britain did not appear to understand, viz. that by proposing terms like those which had been offered we were not only ruining all prospects of peace, but were sacrificing the party of which he was a member to their political adversaries. He went into a long discussion upon the views and objects of the several parties in America, the grounds upon which they had hitherto proceeded, and the effect which a hostile or conciliatory disposition on our part might have upon them. He inculcated how much it was for our interest to support the Federalists, and that to make peace was the only method of supporting them effectually; that we had nothing to fear for Canada if peace were made, be the terms what they might; that there would have been no difficulty about allegiance, impressment, etc.; but that our present demands were what America never could or would accede to. This was the general tenor of his conversation, to which I did not think it necessary to make much reply, and which I only mention to you in order to let you know at the earliest moment that the negotiation is not likely now to continue." *Goulburn to Earl Bathurst*, August 23, 1814. Wellington, *Supplementary Despatches*, IX. 190. Castlereagh found a difficulty in making concessions "under present circumstances upon the chance of such a body containing all the varieties of American party agreeing amongst themselves to any measure of responsibility, and further, upon the imperfect security that if they did so it would be approved at home." *To the Earl of Liverpool*, August 28, 1814. *Ib.*, 193.

¹ A draft by Adams. For the paper as sent see *American State Papers*, Foreign Relations, III. 711. This draft was considered on August 21. "I found, as usual, that the draft was not satisfactory to my colleagues. On the general view of the subject we are unanimous, but in my exposition of it, one objects to the form and another to the substance of almost every paragraph. Mr. Gallatin is for striking out any expression that may be offensive to the feelings of the adverse party. Mr. Clay is displeased with figurative language, which he thinks improper for a

from His Britannic Majesty's Commissioners, the deliberate attention which the importance of the contents required, and have now that of transmitting to them their answer on the several points to which it refers.

They would present to the consideration of the British Commissioners that in Lord Castlereagh's letter to the American Secretary of State, dated on the 4th of November last, and proposing the present negotiation, his Lordship pledges the faith of the British government, that they were "willing to enter into discussion with the government of America, for the conciliatory adjustment of the differences subsisting between the States, with an earnest desire on their part to bring them to a favorable issue, upon principles of *perfect reciprocity* not inconsistent with the established maxims of public law, and with the maritime rights of the British empire."

It will doubtless be within the recollection of His Britannic Majesty's Commissioners, that at the first conference which the undersigned had the honor of holding with them they gave on the part of their government to the undersigned the most explicit assurances that no events which have occurred since the first proposal for this negotiation, had in any manner varied either the disposition and desire of the British government that it might terminate in a peace

state paper. Mr. Russell, agreeing in the objections of the two other gentlemen, will be further for amending the construction of every sentence; and Mr. Bayard, even when agreeing to say precisely the same thing, chooses to say it only in his own language. It was considered by all the gentlemen that what I had written was too long, and with too much argument about the Indians." On the 23d "about one-half of my draft was agreed to be struck out;" and on the 24th, after hours of "sifting, erasing, patching, and amending, until we were all wearied, though none of us was yet satisfied with amendment," Adams believed his matter made one-fifth of the accepted paper, and almost all he had written on the law of nations as applied to the Indians and European settlements in America had been omitted. Adams, *Memoirs*, August 21-24, 1814.

honorable to both parties, or the terms upon which they would be willing to conclude it.

These remarks the undersigned trust will suffice to relieve the British government from the surprise which their Commissioners have been instructed to express that the American government had not provided the undersigned with instructions, authorizing them to treat with British commissioners for the interests or pretensions of Indians situated within the boundaries of the United States.

The undersigned might justly ask in what established maxim of public law the British government have found the right of one civilized nation to interfere with the concerns of the Indians included within the territories of another? If Great Britain considers the Indians as her subjects, what established maxim of public law will warrant her in extending her claim to their allegiance to tribes inhabiting the territory of the United States? If she considers them as independent nations, where is her authority to treat for them, or to bind them by her engagements? The Commissioners of His Britannic Majesty have produced to the undersigned their full powers to treat on the part of Great Britain. But they have not yet done them the honor to communicate to them their Indian full powers.

The undersigned are persuaded that they will not be contradicted in the assertion that no maxim of public law has hitherto been more universally established among the powers of Europe, possessing territories in America; and particularly none to which Great Britain has more uniformly and inflexibly adhered, than that of suffering no interposition of a foreign power, in the relations between the sovereign of the territory and the Indians situated upon it.

The proposition to constitute the Indian tribes into neutral and independent nations to serve as a barrier be-

tween the dominions of two European powers is not indeed without example. It was proposed by France in the abortive negotiation which preceded the peace of 1763, and rejected by an administration to which the British nation is accustomed to look back with pride and veneration.

The undersigned deem it proper further to observe that independent of the insuperable objections which may render such a proposition inadmissible on the part of the United States, they could not assent to it without injustice toward the Indians themselves. In precluding perpetually the Indians from the right of selling their lands, they would deprive them of a privilege of the highest importance and advantage to them. It cannot be unknown to the British government that the principal if not the only value of lands to the Indian state of society is their property as hunting grounds. That in the unavoidable, and surely not to be regretted, progress of a population increasing with unexampled rapidity, and of the civilized settlements consequent upon it, the mere approximation of cultivated fields, of villages and of cities, necessarily diminishes and by degrees annihilates the only quality of the adjoining deserts, which makes them subject of Indian occupancy. The unequivocal interest of the Indians there is to cede, for a valuable consideration the remnant of that right, which from the nature of things he must shortly cease to enjoy; to retire from the forest which has already been deserted by his prey, [into remote recesses of the wilderness where]¹ and to yield for a liberal compensation to the hand of tillage the soil which can no longer yield to him, either the pleasures, the profits, or the substance of the chase. Such a liberal

¹ These words appear to have been added, but break the continuity of the sentence.

compensation is provided for them by the system of legislation adopted by the United States in their relations with all the Indian tribes within their territories. Under this system, the undersigned have already had the honor of informing the British Commissioners, that an uninterrupted peace had subsisted between the people of the United States and all the Indian tribes within their limits, for a longer period of time than ever had been known since the first settlement of North America. Nor would that peace have been interrupted to this day, had not the British government drawn some of the Indians, and compelled others, to take their side in the war. With those Indians the United States, as the undersigned have already declared, have neither interest nor inclination to continue the war. They have nothing to ask of them but peace. Commissioners on the part of the United States have been appointed to conclude it with them, and the pacification may before this have been accomplished. To a provisional article, similar to what has been stipulated in former treaties, engaging that the Indians within the territories of either party shall be restrained from committing hostilities against the citizens, subjects, dominions, or Indians of the other, the undersigned might assent, subject to the ratification of their government, as proposed by the British Commissioners, but under the color of giving to perhaps 20,000 Indians, and the tribes for which this provision is proposed to be made cannot much exceed that number, the rights of sovereignty, attributable only to civilized nations, and a boundary not asked or consented to by themselves, to surrender both the rights of sovereignty and of soil, over nearly one-third of the territorial dominions of the United States, the undersigned are so far from being instructed or authorized by their government, that they assure the British Commissioners it will never be conceded

by the United States, so long as they are in a condition to contest the last badge of submission to a conqueror.

The undersigned may be permitted further to suggest in reference to the motive assigned by the British government for this proposal of a permanent Indian boundary, that nothing could be so ill-adapted to the purpose which it would be intended to accomplish. To place a number of wandering Indian hunters, comparatively so small and insignificant, in a state of nominal independence, on the borders of a free and civilized nation, chiefly of British descent, whose settlements *must* correspond with their increasing numbers, and whose numbers must increase in proportions unknown before in human annals, would be not only to expose both the parties to those incessant and fatal collisions, to which the unsettled relations between men in the civilized and the savage state must always be liable, but it must ultimately be to produce the total destruction of that party which such a project professes to protect. Were it possible for Great Britain at this moment to extort from the United States a concession so pernicious and so degrading, can she imagine that the growing multitudes of the American people would long endure the shackles which the humiliating condition would impose upon them? Can she believe that the swarming myriads of her own children, in the process of converting the western wilderness to a powerful empire, could long be cramped or arrested by a treaty stipulation confining whole regions of territory to a few scattered hordes of savages, whose numbers to the end of ages would not amount to the population of one considerable city? Were the boundary to remain even inviolable on the part of the United States, it is neither in the right nor in the power of Great Britain to secure it from transgression by the Indians themselves. Incessant wars between the Indians and the borderers would

be the inevitable result, and of these wars all former experience and all rational forecast concur to prove that cruel and inhuman as their operations would be to the American settlers, they could only terminate in the total destruction of their savage foes.

As little are the undersigned instructed or empowered to accede to the propositions of the British government in relation to the military command of the western lakes. If they have found the proposal of an Indian boundary wholly incompatible with every established maxim of public law, they are no less at a loss to discover by what rule of perfect reciprocity the United States can be required to renounce their equal right of maintaining a naval force upon those lakes, and of fortifying their own shores, while Great Britain reserves exclusively the corresponding rights to herself. That in point of military preparation, the British possessions in North America ever have been, or in any time of peace are ever likely to be in a condition to be termed with propriety the weaker power in comparison with the United States, the undersigned believe to be incorrect in point of fact. In regard to the fortification of the shore, and to the forces actually kept on foot upon those frontiers, they believe the superiority to have always been, and on the return of peace again likely to be on the side of Great Britain. If the relative strength of the parties were a substantial ground for requiring that the strongest should dismantle the forts upon her shores, strike forever her military flag upon the lakes, and lay her whole frontier bare and defenceless in the presence of her armed and fortified neighbor, that proposal should have come in due consistency with the fact, not from Great Britain to the United States, but from the United States to Great Britain. The undersigned may safely appeal to the bosoms of His Britannic Majesty's Commis-

sioners for the feelings with which not only in regard to the interests, but to the honor of their nation, they would have received such a proposal.

The undersigned further perceive that under the alleged purpose of opening a direct communication between two of the British provinces in America, the British government require a cession of territory forming a part of one of the states of the American union, and that without purpose specifically alleged, they propose to draw the future boundary line westward, not like the present boundary from the Lake of the Woods, but from Lake Superior. It must be perfectly immaterial to the United States whether the object of the British government in demanding the dismemberment of the United States is to acquire territory as such, or for purposes less liable in the eyes of the world to be ascribed to the rapacity of ambition.¹ Whatever the motive may be, and with whatever consistency views of conquest may be disclaimed, while demanding a cession of territory more extensive than the whole island of Great Britain, the duty marked out for the undersigned is the same. They have no authority to cede one inch of the territory of the United States, and to no stipulation to that effect will they subscribe.

The undersigned deem it proper here to notice an intimation apparently held out towards the close of the note of the British Commissioners as an amicable warning to themselves. They are informed that unless they will, without even referring to their government, sign a provisional article on a point concerning which they had expressly declared they were not instructed, and to which they trust they have proved it was impossible they should be impowered to accede, the British government "cannot be precluded by

¹ See *Russell to Clay*, October 15, 1815, in *Mass. Hist. Soc. Proceedings*, XLIV. 313.

anything that has passed from varying the terms at present proposed, in such a manner as the state of the war at the time of resuming the conferences may in their judgment render advisable." The undersigned are well aware that the British government cannot be precluded from varying the terms proposed by themselves, whenever they think proper; but they remind the British Commissioners that at the very second day of their meetings with the undersigned, they themselves found it advisable not to proceed in the conferences, until they should have recurred for fresh instructions to their own government. That a reference of plenipotentiaries to their government upon points which could not have been foreseen, and in all respects of the most extraordinary complexion, will justly warrant the other party in varying the terms proposed by herself, the undersigned can by no means admit. They believe it to be as contrary to the usage of pacific negotiation as it is to the spirit and purpose of peace. If by this admonition the British government intended to disclose the suspicion that the undersigned were seeking pretexts for delay, they trust that the explicit nature of the present communication will remove every such impression. If the object was to operate upon the fears of the undersigned, to induce them by a menace to sign in violation of their instructions the provisional disgrace of their country, they flatter themselves the British government will not be surprised to find them unprepared to purchase even the present moderation of Great Britain by treachery to their liberty and their country.

It is well known to Great Britain and to the world that the present war owed neither its origin nor its continuance to any desire of conquest on the part of the United States; that on the contrary its causes were, etc.¹

¹ The Ms. ends thus abruptly. The British Commissioners drew up a proposed

TO LOUISA CATHERINE ADAMS

GHENT, August 26, 1814.

. . . These embarrassments [irregularities in post office], however, will not be much longer troublesome to either of us. There is no prospect, I might almost say, no possibility, that I should be here to receive your answer to

reply to the American note of August 24, and sent it to Castlereagh. It is printed in Wellington, *Supplementary Despatches*, IX. 194. Castlereagh, however, believed the reply to be made of such importance that it should be made under the instructions of the Cabinet, and sent the papers to the Earl of Liverpool, who wrote to the Duke of Wellington, September 2: "We had prepared an answer to the note of the American Commissioners before we received Castlereagh's letter, and very much in the spirit of the memorandum which he sent us. Copies of these papers shall be transmitted to you in a few days. Our Commissioners had certainly taken an erroneous view of the line to be adopted. It is very material to throw the rupture of the negotiation, if it is to take place, upon the Americans, and not to allow them to say that we have brought forward points as ultimate which were only brought forward for discussion, and at the desire of the American Commissioners themselves.

"The American note is a most impudent one, and, as to all its reasoning, capable of an irresistible answer, which, if it should be necessary to publish, will, I am persuaded, have its proper effect in America." *Ib.*, 212.

Liverpool also wrote to Castlereagh on the same date: "If the negotiation had been allowed to break off upon the two notes already presented, or upon such an answer as they were disposed to return, I am satisfied the war would have become quite popular in America. I was the more surprised at this circumstance as I never read a paper more easy to answer, as to its reasonings, than the paper of the American Commissioners. . . . We have avoided as much as possible committing ourselves on anything which is likely to create embarrassment hereafter; and our reasoning on the subject of the avowed intentions of the American government to conquer and annex Canada can hardly fail to make a considerable impression on the reasonable people in the United States.

"We cannot expect that the negotiation will proceed at present, but I think it not unlikely, after our note has been delivered in, that the American Commissioners will propose to refer the subject to their government. In that case the negotiation may be adjourned till the answer is received, and we shall know the result of the campaign before it can be resumed.

this letter, unless detained by accident or some other cause not to be foreseen. I fully expect that the negotiation here will be terminated before the first of next month. I believe it to be substantially terminated already. . . .

With the house itself we are now so well satisfied that we should certainly keep it for another month if we had any prospect of staying so long here. Our landlord now gives us tolerable satisfaction, and we continue to harmonize perfectly well with one another. This harmony most happily extends to our public concerns no less than to our private relations. We have had much and free deliberation; but with regard to the great principles of our proceedings have been constantly unanimous. Yesterday we sent our answer to the British note, and shall, as we expect, have nothing more to write to our adverse party on the substance of our business. The forms of parting will be all that remains after their reply. Of this, however, I cannot speak positively until their reply comes. We might have had that now, for it might be a card *pour prendre congé*. But as they could not well send us that until after the dinner to which they have invited us tomorrow, they may perhaps be waiting to get that over. As however we have given them some reasoning to dispose of, they may perhaps furnish us with some of the same commodity in return. In that case we shall find it necessary to rejoin and may be kept here a week longer. From what has already passed it is impossible that the negotiation should succeed. . . .

We have no news from America of any importance since the taking of Fort Erie and the affair at Niagara. That was

"If our commander does his duty, I am persuaded we shall have acquired by our arms every point on the Canadian frontier which we ought to insist on keeping."

The Cabinet draft of a reply to the American Commissioners, dated September 1, is in Wellington, *Supplementary Despatches*, IX. 245.

a brilliant action upon our side, but, as usual, not followed up by any thing else. When our landsmen have struck one lucky blow, they seem to think they have conquered the world, and have nothing left to do but to slumber upon their laurels. The English accounts from Halifax are to 1 August—nothing worth telling. Could I but hope the same for the next six months, how many heart-aches I should be spared! It is a painful process that I am going through; but it is some consolation that the part I am doomed to perform in the prolongation of this tragedy has never required an instant of hesitation with respect to the path pointed out by my duty, and that in this respect there has not been a shadow of difference of opinion between any one of my colleagues and me. . . .

TO WILLIAM HARRIS CRAWFORD

GHENT, 29 August, 1814.

DEAR SIR:

I scarcely know how to apologize to you for having yet to reply to your favor of 12 July, which was received by me on the 16th. The simple fact has been that being without the assistance of a secretary, and having to dispatch by the *John Adams* the return of nearly a year's correspondence from our own country, I postponed from day to day the reply due to you, merely because it could at any day be transmitted, until several weeks have elapsed leaving the duty still to be performed.

I have been the less scrupulous in performing it sooner, because I have known that some of our colleagues were more punctual, and particularly that our excellent friend Mr. Clay had kept you well informed of the progress of our negotiation. The result has been such as was to be expected.

It is natural we should feel, and we do all feel, a deep disappointment at the failure of this attempt to restore to our country the blessings of peace; especially as by changing the grounds upon which the war is to be continued, Great Britain has opened to us the alternative of a long, expensive, sanguinary war, or of submission to disgraceful conditions and sacrifices little short of independence itself. It is the crisis which must try the temper of our country. If the dangers which now hang over our heads should intimidate our people into the spirit of concession, if the temper of compounding for sacrifices should manifest itself in any strength there will be nothing left us worth defending. But if our countrymen are not all bastards, if there is a drop of the blood flowing in their veins that carried their fathers through the Revolutionary war, the prolongation of hostilities will only be to secure ultimately to us a more glorious triumph. I have not so ill opinion of them as to believe they will succumb immediately in the struggle before them; but I wish the real statesmen among us may form, what I fear few of them have yet formed, a true estimate of our condition. I wish them to look all our dangers in the face and to their full extent. The rupture of this negotiation not only frustrates all hope of peace for the present year, but at least also for the next. All the present preparations in England are calculated for operation the next campaign. The forces they have sent out already, and those they are about to dispatch are so large, and composed of such troops that they *must* in the first instance make powerful impressions and obtain brilliant successes. The actual state of things both in Europe and America, as well as the experience of our former war, prove this to as full demonstration as if the official accounts were already published in the *London Gazette*. The spirit that is prepared for disaster is least

likely to be broken down by it when it comes. We must not flatter ourselves with delusive estimates of our dangers, and we must expect to pass through the career of British triumph and exultation at our calamities, before we can lead them to the result that they bring our enemy no nearer to his object than his defeats.

Mr. Russell and myself have received an instruction of the same tenor from the Secretary of State, to make a representation against Cochrane's proclamation of blockade of 25 April last. I suppose you must have received a similar instruction. It would be gratifying and perhaps useful for us to know, whether this is the case; and, if so, whether you have done anything under the instruction; and generally what are the views of this subject entertained at the present court of France.

You are informed that we have rejected the preliminary *sine qua non* to which the adverse party has adhered. We are only waiting for their official reply and shall not remain here beyond a week or ten days. I am etc.¹

¹ "I am inclined to think that the calm which now prevails in Europe will be of short duration. The existence of combustible materials has never been so general as at the present moment. The result of the conferences at Vienna is more likely to kindle than to extinguish the smothered flame. The deranged state of the finances of all the continental powers calls for peace, but the impulse which the turbulent spirits of these nations have received with the last two years will strongly impel them to war. The different pretensions of the parties to the territory recovered by their joint efforts, from France and in Italy, will not be easily reconciled. The provisional governments established in the most of those countries will, by the time that the Congress at Vienna shall have finished its labors, have greatly contributed to the discontents already existing there. Perhaps the best security for the peace of Europe will be found in the disaffection of the French troops, and the general apprehension or rather horror, of further revolutions. I believe the Emperor Napoleon is much more popular now, in France, than he has been for several years past. The total extinction of the liberty of the press, which still continues to exist, will prevent the monarch from knowing or even suspecting, the increasing popularity of the late occupant of his throne." *Crawford to John Quincy Adams, July 12, 1814. Ms.*

TO LOUISA CATHERINE ADAMS

GHENT, August 30, 1814.

. . . I should therefore from the commencement of the ensuing month write you only once a week, if I had the prospect of remaining here; but we shall all have evacuated this place by the 15th. We are in hourly expectation of receiving the reply of the British plenipotentiaries to our notes in answer to them, and we already know that it will contain a refusal to continue the negotiation.¹ I have not yet ultimately fixed either the manner of my return to St. Petersburg, whether by land or by water, or if by land the road by which I shall travel. . . . If I lengthen the journey upon my return, it will assuredly not be for amusement, or to gratify my personal curiosity. . . .

We dined last Saturday² with the British plenipotentiaries, and were entertained as courteously as was to be expected. There was no other company but ourselves. Mrs. Goulburn was the only lady present, and was agreeable;

¹ "We have some days since [on the 31st] informed the Americans that we had deemed it necessary to refer our answer to the government previous to sending it to them; and although they pressed for the earliest possible answer, yet they had nothing to say to this communication. Some one or other of them have called daily since to know if we had got an answer. Indeed, their only anxiety appears to get back to America. Whenever we meet them they always enter into unofficial discussions, much of the same nature as the conversation with which Mr. Bayard indulged me; but we have given no encouragement to such conversations, thinking that they are liable to much misrepresentation; and cannot lead to any good purpose. All that I think I have learnt from them is this: that Mr. Adams is a very bad arguer, and that the Federalists are quite as inveterate enemies to us as the Madisonians. Those who know anything of America or Americans probably knew this before." *Goulburn to Earl Bathurst*, September 2, 1814. Wellington, *Supplementary Despatches*, IX. 217. He had talked with Adams on the previous day. *Memoirs*, III. 24.

² August 27.

or, to speak more properly, very studious not to give offense. I thought her handsomer than I had the day we had dined at the Intendant's. There was a sufficient labor of attention to us to show that they all meant to be well-bred, but the success was not always equal to the effort. By some unaccountable singularity, all the little occasional asperities that have occurred in our intercourse with the other party have been between the *Chevalier* [Bayard] and the Doctors Commons lawyer [Adams]. This personage has pretensions to wit, and wishes to pass himself off for a sayer of good things. The Chevalier, who is a sportsman, was speaking of a fowling piece on a new construction, price fifty guineas, which was primed with one grain of fulminating powder. The Doctor thought that no fowling price could be good for any thing that cost more than five guineas. He hinted to the Chevalier that his fifty guineas musket was a *gimcrack*—a philosophical whimsey, better for shooting a *problem* than a *partridge*; and he was [as] liberal of his sarcasms upon *philosophy* as he could have been, if delivering a dissertation upon gun-boats and dry-docks. The choice of the person upon whom this blunderbuss of law discharged its volley of ridicule against philosophy diverted us all, and you may judge how much it delighted our colleague of the Treasury [Gallatin.] The Chevalier pronounces our namesake to be a man of no breeding. . . .

TO GEORGE JOY

GHENT, 31 August, 1814.

SIR:

Your favors of 9, 12, and 26 August, have been duly received by me, and although I am sensible that an intercourse by which valuable information is communicated on one side while nothing is given in return cannot with a good grace be requested, I still reply to your letters in the hope that your mundanism will overlook the disadvantages of the compact, and make allowances for the reserve which official duty may sometimes command, and official gravity sometimes affect. I know not anything that would give me greater pleasure than your making a fortune by a peace, unless it were to make the peace that should make your fortune; but for the prospects and adventures of the negotiation I must yet refer my correspondents in England to the *Courier* and the *Morning Chronicle*; or, if they are lovers of neutrality, to the *Times*, which as *Times* go I seldom see, but which may be none the worse informed for that.

The solicitude which I manifested in a former letter, that your opinions might not be mistaken for ours, arose not merely from the possibility that such an error might arise, but from the fact that on a point to which you had referred, they were not the same. I have now seen the gentleman with whom you had the correspondence and the conversation prior to his departure, and have had the opportunity of forming my own opinion of his suavity and of his rigor.¹ If we should not ultimately part the best friends in the world, I shall use my best endeavors that we may not part foes, either politically or individually.

¹ Dr. William Adams.

The rise of cottons and tobacco on the 26th doubtless had a cause, and I am obliged to you for the information of the effect. But you know the Royal Exchange is the very focus of great effects from little causes. I am etc.

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE

No. 139.

[JAMES MONROE]

Ghent, 5 September, 1814.

SIR:

On the 25th ultimo we sent in to the British plenipotentiaries an answer to their note, and have every reason to expect that before this day the negotiation would have been terminated. Two days afterwards Mr. Bayard was explicitly told in a conversation with Mr. Goulburn that their reply would be sent to us without delay, and that they should have no occasion previous to sending it for any further reference to their government. On Wednesday, the 31st, Mr. Baker called upon Mr. Gallatin with an apology for a delay of a very few days, the British Plenipotentiaries having concluded, in consideration of the great importance of the thing, to send their note to England for the approbation of their government before they transmitted it to us. The next morning I had a conversation with Mr. Goulburn which convinced me that the sole object of this reference was to give a greater appearance of deliberation and solemnity to the rupture.¹

¹ "I confess that I have little hopes of its producing any change in the decision of the American plenipotentiaries. Many things have, ever since the commencement of the negotiation, shown that their government had no real intention of making peace, but had acceded to the proposal of negotiating with the sole view

Some of the particulars of this conversation render it in my mind sufficiently interesting for the substance of it to be reported to you.¹ I began it by expressing some satisfaction at having learnt their reference to their government, as it tended to encourage the hope that they would *reconsider* some part of their proposals to the United States. He did not think it probable, and in the whole tenor of his discourse I perceived a spirit of inflexible adherence to the terms which we have rejected;² but, under the cover of a personal deportment sufficiently courteous, a rancorous animosity against America which disclosed there was nothing like peace at the heart.

The great argument to which he continually recurred in support of the Indian boundary and the exclusive military possession of the Lakes by the British, was the necessity of them for the security of Canada. The American government, he said, had manifested the intention and the determination of conquering Canada.

And *excepting you* (said he) I believe it was the astonishment of the whole world that Canada had not been conquered at the very outset of the war. Nothing could have saved it but the excellent of deriving from the negotiations some means of reconciling the people of America to the continuance of war. The Indian boundary appears to them calculated to answer this object, and their desire of negotiating is therefore at an end." *Goulburn to Earl Bathurst*, September 5, 1814. *Wellington, Supplementary Despatches*, IX. 221.

¹ See also Adams, *Memoirs*, September 1, 1814.

² "He gave me every reason to believe that it [the answer] would vary nothing from their former communications. In that case the delay will only be until the return of their messenger. To say the truth, we ought to wish there may be no variation. Success is out of the question, and it is impossible that we should fail in a more advantageous manner than as the matter now stands. And I have an inexpressible reluctance at being kept, to be turned off with the news upon which they are reckoning from America." *To Louisa Catherine Adams*, September 2, 1814. Ms.

dispositions and military arrangements of the Governor who commanded there. We were then not prepared for an attack upon that province with such an overwhelming force. But now we have had time to send reinforcements, and I do not think you will conquer it. In order, however, to guard against the same thing in future it is necessary to make a barrier against the American settlements, upon which neither party shall be permitted to encroach. The Indians are but a secondary object. As the allies of Great Britain she must include them in the peace, as in making peace with other powers she included Portugal as her ally. But when the boundary is once defined it is immaterial whether the Indians are upon it or not. Let it be a desert. But we shall know that you cannot come upon us to attack us, without crossing it. The stipulation to maintain no armed force on the Lakes is for the same purpose—the security of Canada. I can see nothing dishonorable or humiliating in it. The United States can never be in any danger of invasion from Canada. The disproportion of force is too great. But Canada must always be in the most imminent danger of invasion from the United States, unless guarded by some such stipulations as are now demanded. It can be nothing to the United States to agree not to arm upon the Lakes, since they never had actually done it before the present war. Why should they object to disarming there where they had never before had a gun floating.

I answered that the conquest of Canada had never been an object of the war on the part of the United States. It has been invaded by us in consequence of the war, as they themselves had invaded many parts of the United States. It was an effect and not a cause of the war. I thought with him that we should not *now* conquer it. But I had no doubt we should, and that at no very distant period, if any such terms as they now required should ever be submitted to by us. The American government, I said, never had declared the intention of conquering Canada. He referred to General

Hull's proclamation. I answered that the American government was not responsible for that. It was no uncommon thing for commanding officers to issue proclamations which were disavowed by their government, of which a very recent example had occurred in a proclamation of Admiral Cochrane. He said that the American government had not disavowed Hull's proclamation, and that the British government had not disavowed any proclamation of Admiral Cochrane's. I replied that the American government had never been called upon either to avow or disavow Hull's proclamation, but I had seen in a printed statement of the debates in the House of Commons that Lord Castlereagh had been called upon to say whether Admiral Cochrane's proclamation had been authorized or not, and had answered that it was not. He said that Lord Castlereagh had been asked whether a proclamation of Admiral Cochrane's, *encouraging the negroes to revolt*, had been authorized by the government, and had answered in the negative; that is, that no proclamation encouraging the negroes to revolt had been authorized. But the proclamation of Admiral Cochrane referred to gave no such encouragement, there was not a word about negroes in it. It merely offered employment or a settlement in the British colonies to such persons as might be disposed to leave the United States. I asked him what was the import of the term *free* used in the proclamation in connection with the offer of settlements? He answered the question with some hesitation, but admitted that it might be understood as having reference to slaves. I admitted on my part that the word "negroes" was not in the proclamation, but remarked that he must be as sensible as I was that it could have reference only to them. That certainly no person in America could mistake its meaning. It was unquestionably intended for the negroes, and corresponded

sufficiently with the practice of others of their naval officers. It was known that some of them, under similar inducements, had taken away blacks who had afterwards been sold in the West India islands. Upon this Mr. Goulburn, with an evident struggle to suppress a feeling of strong irritation, said, "*that* he could undertake to deny in the most unqualified terms; the character of British naval officers was universally known, their generosity and humanity could never be contested; and besides that since the act of Parliament of 1811, the act of selling any man for a slave, unless real slaves, from one British island to another, was felony without benefit of clergy. I replied that without contesting the character of any class of people generally, it was certain there would be in all classes individuals capable of committing actions of which others would be ashamed. That at a great distance from the eye and control of the government, acts were often done with impunity, which would be severely punished nearer home. That the facts I had stated to him were among the objects which we were instructed to present for consideration, if the negotiation should proceed, and he might in that case find it more susceptible of proof than he was aware. He thought it impossible, but that it was one of those charges against their officers, of which there were many, originating only in the spirit of hostility and totally destitute of foundation.

With respect to the Indian allies, I remarked that there was no analogy between them and the case of Portugal. The peace would of itself include all the Indians included within the British limits; but the stipulation which might be necessary for the protection of Indians situated within the boundaries of the United States who had taken the British side in the war, was rather in the nature of an amnesty than of a provision for allies. It resembled more the

case of subjects who in cases of invasion took part with the invader, as had sometimes happened to Great Britain in Ireland. He insisted that the Indians must be considered as independent nations, for that we ourselves made treaties with them and acknowledged boundaries of their territories. I said that wherever they *would* form settlements and cultivate lands, their possessions were undoubtedly to be respected, and always were respected by the United States. That some of them had become civilized in a considerable degree; the Cherokees, for example, who had permanent habitations and a state of property like our own. But the greater part of the Indians never could be prevailed upon to adopt this mode of life. Their habits, and attachments, and prejudices were so averse to any settlement that they could not reconcile themselves to any other condition than that of wandering hunters. It was impossible for such people ever to be said to have possessions. Their only right upon land was a right to use it as hunting grounds; and when those lands where they hunted became necessary or convenient for the purposes of settlement, the system adopted by the United States was by amicable arrangement with them to compensate them for renouncing the right of hunting upon them, and for removing to remoter regions better suited to their purposes and mode of life. This system of the United States was an improvement upon the former practice of all European nations, including the British. The original settlers of New England had set the first example of this liberality towards the Indians, which was afterwards followed by the founder of Pennsylvania. Between it and taking the lands for nothing, or exterminating the Indians who had used them, there was no alternative. To condemn vast regions of territory to perpetual barrenness and solitude, that a few hundred savages might find wild beasts to hunt

upon it, was a species of game law that a nation descended from Britons would never endure. It was as incompatible with the moral as with the physical nature of things. If Great Britain meant to preclude forever the people of the United States from settling and cultivating those territories, she must not think of doing it by a treaty. She must formally undertake and accomplish their utter extermination. If the government of the United States should ever submit to such a stipulation, which I hoped they would not, all its force, and all that of Britain combined with it, would not suffice to carry it long into execution. It was opposing a feather to a torrent. The population of the United States in 1810 passed seven millions. At this hour it undoubtedly passed eight. As it continued to increase in such proportions, was it in human experience or in human power to check its progress by a bond of paper, purporting to exclude posterity from the natural means of subsistence which they would derive from the cultivation of the soil? Such a treaty, instead of closing the old sources of dissension, would only open new ones. A war thus finished would immediately be followed by another, and Great Britain would ultimately find that she must substitute the project of exterminating the whole American people, to that of opposing against them her barrier of savages. The proposal of dooming a large extent of lands, naturally fertile, to be forever desert by compact, would be a violation of the laws of nature and of nations, as recognized by the most distinguished writers on public law. It would be an outrage upon Providence, which gave the earth to man for cultivation, and made the tillage of the ground the condition of his nature and the law of his existence. "What (said Mr. Goulburn), is it then in the inevitable nature of things that the United States must conquer Canada?" "No." "But what security then can Great

Britain have for her possession of it?" "If Great Britain does not think a liberal and amicable course of policy towards America would be the best security, as it certainly would, she must rely upon her general strength, upon the superiority of her power in other parts of her relations with America, upon the power which she has upon another element to indemnify herself by sudden impression upon American interests, more defenceless against her superiority than Canada against ours, and in their amount far more valuable than Canada ever was or ever will be." He said that Great Britain had no intention to carry on a war either of extermination or of conquest, but recurred again to our superior force, and to the necessity of providing against it. He added that in Canada they never took any of the Indian lands, and even the government (meaning the provincial government) was prohibited from granting them. That there were among the Indians very civilized people; there was particularly one man whom he knew, Norton, who commanded some of the Indians engaged on the British side in the war, and who was a very intelligent and well informed man. But the removing the Indians from their lands to others was one of the very things of which Great Britain complained. That it drove them over into their provinces, and made them annoy and encroach upon the Indians within their limits. This was a new idea to me. I told him I had never heard any complaint of that kind before, and I supposed that a remedy for it would very easily be found. He made no reply, and seemed as if in the pressure for an argument he had advanced more than he was inclined to maintain. It was the same with regard to the proposal that we should keep no armed force on or near the lakes of Canada. He did not admit that there was anything humiliating to the United States or unusual in it, but he evaded repeatedly answering.

the question how he or the English nation would feel if the proposition were made to them of binding themselves by such a stipulation. I finally said that if he did not feel that there was anything dishonorable to the party submitting to such terms, it was not a subject susceptible of argument. I could assure him that we and our nation would feel it to be such. That such stipulations were indeed often extorted from the weakness of a vanquished enemy; but they were always felt to be dishonorable and had certainly occasioned more wars than they had ever prevented. It was true, as he had said, the United States had never prior to the war had an armed naval force upon the Lakes. I thought it infinitely probable that if Great Britain had said nothing upon the subject in the negotiation, the United States would not have retained a naval force there after the restoration of the peace. It was more than I could say that this anxiety manifested by Great Britain to disarm them would not operate as a warning to them to keep a competent portion of the force now created, even during peace, and whether his government, by advancing the proposal to dismantle, will not eventually fix the purpose of the United States to remain always armed even upon the lakes.

The whole of this conversation was on both sides perfectly cool and temperate in the manner, though sometimes very earnest on mine, and sometimes with a hurry of reply and an embarrassment of expression on his, indicating an effort to control the disclosure of feelings under strong excitement. The most remarkable instance of this was upon the intimation from me, that some of their naval officers had enticed away numbers of our black people, who had afterwards been sold in the West India islands. I stated the fact on the authority of your instructions to the present joint mission of 28 January last, and persisted in asserting it, on the as-

surance that there is proof of it in possession of the Department of State. In the present state of public opinion in England respecting the traffic of slaves, I was well aware of the impression which the mere statement would make upon Mr. Goulburn. The rupture of this negotiation will render it unnecessary for us to possess the proof which it was your intention at the date of your instructions of 28th January to furnish us, but at any future attempt to treat for peace it will be important to produce it, and I would even suggest the expediency of giving as much publicity as possible to it in Europe, while the war continues.

The avowal of Admiral Cochrane's proclamation, and the explanation of Lord Castlereagh's disavowal of it in the House of Commons, were remarkable as examples of the kind of reasoning to which the British government is willing to resort. Whether the distinction taken in this case really belonged to Lord Castlereagh, or whether erroneously ascribed to him by Mr. Goulburn, I cannot say; but Mr. Goulburn was present in the House of Commons when the debate referred to took place.

The strangest feature in the general complexion of his discourse was the inflexible adherence to the proposed Indian boundary line. But the pretext upon which this proposition had in the first instance been placed, the pacification with the Indians and their future security, was almost abandoned—avowed to be a secondary and very subordinate object. The security of Canada was now substituted as the prominent motive. But the great and real one, though not of a nature ever to be acknowledged, was occasionally discernible through all its veils. This was no other than a profound and rankling jealousy at the rapid increase of population and of settlements in the United States, an impotent longing to thwart their progress and to stunt their

growth. With this temper prevailing in the British councils, it is not in the hour of their success that we can expect to obtain a peace upon terms of equal justice or of reciprocity.

I am etc.

TO LOUISA CATHERINE ADAMS

Ghent, September 9, 1814.

. . . We this day send in to the other party our second note, which places us precisely where we were at the first. If *they* hold to their original ground, they may dismiss themselves and us from all further official intercourse to-morrow morning. My only reason for doubting whether they will do so now is that they did not take that step before. We certainly not only considered the whole business at an end then, but none of us had an idea of being here at this day. I wrote you that after what passed, what we had reason to expect from them was a card P. P. C. Instead of that they sent us a note of sixteen folio pages, still hammering upon the old anvil, and putting it upon us to take leave of them. As we are inclined not to be behindhand with them either in civility or in prolixity, we return them a note of equal dimensions, and still leaving the "to be or not to be" at their option. If they choose to play this game of chicanery they may, I know not how long. But if they will take no for an answer, we shall be released in two or three days.

We are still perfectly unanimous, and if we had not the run of luck so infernally against us, I should not despair of ultimate success. As it is we shall unquestionably make a better case for the public, on both sides of the Atlantic, than our adversaries. We are in the first place severe judges upon one another, and setting aside your correspondent,

every one of his four associates is, to say the least, a match for the brightest of our opponents. You wrote me at one time a current English report that there was to be but one commissioner appointed to meet us—one British negotiator being fully competent to meet five Americans. I wished the report might be true; for whether the result was to be success or failure, the lower the rate at which the adversary estimated our talents, the greater advantage he would give us in the argument over himself. His contempt, however, was a mere bravado. Instead of one commissioner he appointed three, and I believe in such cases as this, supposing the average of talents to be the same, a commission of three members will always be able to meet with at least equal advantage a commission of five. They are certainly not mean men, who have been opposed to us; but for extent and copiousness of information, for sagacity and shrewdness of comprehension, for vivacity of intellect, and fertility of resource, there is certainly not among them a man equal to Mr. Gallatin. I doubt whether there is among them a man of the powers of the Chevalier. In all our transactions hitherto we have been much indebted to the ability of both these gentlemen for the ascendancy in point of argument which we have constantly maintained over our antagonists. . . .

We had here the other day a Mr. Van Havert, a son-in-law of Mr. Stier, and brother-in-law to Mrs. Calvert, of whom you have heard, and whom you perhaps know. Mr. Van Havert lived some years at Alexandria, and he told me that if he had met me in the street he should have known me from my resemblance to my father. On the other hand the ex-gardener, of whom I wrote you the other day, said to me of our sons, "George, Sir, is a *fine, tall, stout* boy; but as for John, Sir, he is the very picture of you."

ANSWER TO THE BRITISH COMMISSIONERS ¹

[September 9, 1814.]

The undersigned Ministers plenipotentiary and extraordinary from the United States of America have had the honor of receiving the note of his Britannic Majesty's plenipotentiaries of the 4th inst.

If in the tone or the substance of the former note of the undersigned the British Commissioners have perceived no ² disposition on the part of the American government for a discussion of some of the propositions advanced in the first note which the undersigned had the honor of receiving from them, they will please to ascribe it to the nature of the

¹ A draft by Adams. The note sent is in *American State Papers*, Foreign Relations, III. 715. The British note, dated September 4, was delivered to the American Commissioners on the 5th. "Mr. Bayard pronounced it a very stupid production. Mr. Clay was for answering it by a note of half a page. I neither thought it stupid nor proper to be answered in half a page." Gallatin proposed to make an analysis of the contents and note what required an answer. On the following day (6th) Gallatin produced his notes and it was agreed he should draft a reply conformably. Bayard appeared willing to concede something on the Indian question, but Clay and Adams were for admitting no stipulations about the Indians in a treaty with England. Adams wished to show that the floating commerce of the United States, subject to seizure by the naval superiority of Great Britain, was a sufficient pledge for the security of Canada against sudden invasion; and also that the employment of Indians was contrary to the laws of war. This latter point was rejected, but on the 7th was again urged, and Adams prepared a statement of it for consideration. Receiving Gallatin's draft, with the suggestions of Bayard and Clay, Adams "struck out the greatest part of my own previous draft, preferring that of Mr. Gallatin upon the same points. On the main question, relative to the Indian boundary, I made a new draft of several paragraphs, comprising the principal ideas of them all, and introducing an additional view of the subject of my own. I had also prepared a paragraph concerning the employment of savages. . . . My new paragraph respecting Indian rights was adopted without much alteration. That against the employment of savages was fully adopted in substance, but with a multitude of amendments." Adams, *Memoirs*, September 5-8, 1814.

² For the word "no" Gallatin inserted "little proof of any."

propositions themselves; to their incompatibility with the assurances in Lord Castlereagh's letter to the American Secretary of State, proposing their negotiation, and with the solemn assurances of the British plenipotentiaries themselves to the undersigned, at their first conference with them.

Of the frankness with which the British plenipotentiaries now represent themselves to have disclosed all the objects of their government while those of the American government are stated to have been withheld, a sufficient elucidation may be formed in the facts, that the British plenipotentiaries have hitherto declined all discussion even of the points proposed by themselves, unless the undersigned would be prepared to sign a provisional article upon a subject concerning which they had from the first declared themselves to be without instructions and upon a basis unexampled in the negotiations of civilized states, and which they have shown to be inadmissible. That one of the most objectionable demands of the British government was never disclosed until the third conference, after the points suggested for discussion on both sides had been reciprocally submitted for consideration. That upon the inquiry whether this new proposition was considered also as a *sine qua non* of a treaty, the undersigned were answered that one *sine qua non* at a time was enough, and when they had disposed of that already given them, it would be time enough to talk of another.¹

If the undersigned had proposed to the British plenipotentiaries, as an indispensable preliminary to all discussion, the admission of a principle contrary to the most established maxims of public law, and with which the United States under the pretence of including Indian allies in the peace, would have annexed entire provinces to their dominions,

¹ This paragraph has been struck out.

the reproach of being actuated by a spirit of aggrandizement might justly have been advanced against them; to the assertion that the declared policy of the American government has been to make the war a part of a system of conquest and aggrandizement the undersigned oppose the most pointed denial of its truth; and they are willing to leave it to the judgment of an impartial world to decide with what propriety the charge proceeds from a state demanding an extensive cession of territory, to a state making no such demand.¹

The undersigned repeat what they have already had the honor explicitly to declare to the British plenipotentiaries; that they have no authority to treat with them for the interests of Indians inhabiting within the boundaries of the United States. That the question of their boundary is a question exclusively between the United States and themselves, with which Great Britain has no concern. That the undersigned will therefore subscribe to no provisional article upon the subject. That they will not refer it to the consideration of their government; first, because the British Commissioners have warned them that if they do, the British government will not hold itself bound to abide by the terms which they now offer, but will vary them at their pleasure; and secondly because they know that their government would instantaneously reject the proposal. That they will subscribe to no article renouncing the right of the United States to maintain fortifications on their own shores, or that of maintaining a naval force on those lakes, where such a force has been during the war so efficaciously felt. And finally that they have no authority to cede any part of the territory of the United States.¹

If the Governor General of Canada has made to the In-

¹ This paragraph has been struck out.

dians under the protection of the United States, to seduce them to betray the duties of their obligations, and to violate their treaties, any promises of British protection, it is for his government to fulfil those promises at their own expense, and not at that of the United States.¹ But the employment of savages, whose known rule of warfare is the indiscriminate torture and butchery of women, children, and prisoners, is itself a departure from the principles of humanity observed between all civilized and Christian nations even in war. [Great Britain herself employs them only in her wars against the United States and] ² the United States have constantly protested and still protest against it as an unjustifiable aggravation of the barbarities and horrors of war. Of the peculiar atrocities of the Indian warfare, the allies of Great Britain in whose behalf she now demands sacrifices from the United States have during the present war shown many deplorable examples; among them, the massacre of wounded prisoners in cold blood, and the refusal of the rites of burial to the dead, under the eyes of British officers, who could only plead their inability to control those savage auxiliaries, have been repeated and are notorious to the world. The United States have with extreme reluctance been compelled to resort on their part to the same mode of warfare thus practiced against them.³ The United States might at all times have employed the same kind of force against Great Britain, and to a greater extent than it was in her power to employ it against them; but from their reluctance to resort to means so abhorrent to the natural feelings of humanity, they abstained from the use of them, until

¹ This sentence was altered in arrangement without changing the sense, but the whole was finally struck out.

² Words in brackets were struck out.

³ This sentence was struck out, and the sentence following substituted for it.

compelled to the alternative of employing themselves Indians who would otherwise have been drawn into the ranks of their enemies. But the undersigned, in suggesting to the British Commissioners the propriety of an article by which Great Britain and the United States should reciprocally stipulate, never hereafter, if they should again be at war, to employ savages in it believe [that it would readily meet the approbation and ratification of their government, and]¹ that it would be infinitely more honorable to the humanity and Christian temper of both parties, more advantageous to the Indians themselves, and more adapted to secure the permanent peace, tranquillity, and progress of civilization, than the boundary proposed by the British Commissioners.

If the United States had now asserted that the Indians within their boundaries who have acknowledged the United States as their only protectors, were their subjects, living only at sufferance on their lands, far from being the first in making that assertion they would only have followed the example of the principles, uniformly and invariably asserted in substance, and frequently avowed in express terms by the British government itself. What was the meaning of all the colonial charters granted by the British monarchs from that of Virginia by Elizabeth to that of Georgia by the immediate predecessor of the present king, if the Indians were the sovereigns and possessors² of the lands bestowed by those charters? What was the meaning of that article in the treaty of Utrecht, by which the Five Nations were described in terms, as *subject to the dominion* of Great Britain? Or of that treaty with the Cherokees, by which it was declared that the king of Great Britain granted them the

¹ This clause was struck out.

² For this word Gallatin substituted "proprietors."

privilege to live where they pleased, if those subjects were independent sovereigns, and these tenants at the license of the British King were the rightful lords of the lands where he granted them permission to live? What was the meaning of that proclamation of his present Britannic Majesty, issued in 1763, declaring all purchases of lands from Indians null and void unless made by treaties held under the sanction of his Majesty's government, if the Indians had the right to sell their lands to whom they pleased? In formally protesting against this system, it is not against a novel pretension of the American government, it is against the most solemn acts of their own sovereigns, against the royal proclamations, charters and treaties of Great Britain for more than two centuries, from the first settlement of North America to the present day, that the British plenipotentiaries protest. What is the meaning of the boundary lines of American territory in all the treaties of Great Britain with other European powers having American possessions, in her treaty of peace with the United States of 1785: nay, what is the meaning of the northwestern boundary line now proposed by the British Commissioners themselves, if it is the rightful possession and sovereignty of independent Indians, of which those boundaries dispose? ¹

From the rigor of this system, however, as practised by Great Britain and all the other European powers in America, the humane and liberal policy of the United States has voluntarily relaxed. A celebrated writer on the laws of nations, to whose authority British jurists have taken particular satisfaction in appealing, after stating in the most explicit

¹ Gallatin added the following: "Is it indeed necessary to ask whether Great Britain ever has permitted, or would permit, any foreign nation, or without her consent any of her subjects, to acquire lands from the Indians, in the territories of the Hudson Bay Company, or in Canada?"

manner the legitimacy of colonial settlements in America, to the exclusion of all rights of uncivilized Indian tribes, has taken occasion to praise the moderation of the first settlers of New England, and of the founder of Pennsylvania, in having purchased of the Indians the lands they resolved to cultivate, notwithstanding their being furnished with a charter from their sovereign. It is this example which the United States, since they became by their independence the sovereigns of the territory, have adopted and organized into a political system. Under that system the Indians residing within the United States are so far independent that they live under their own customs and not under the laws of the United States; that their rights upon the lands where they inhabit or hunt, are secured to them by boundaries defined in amicable treaties between the United States and themselves, and that whenever those boundaries are varied it is also by amicable ¹ treaties, by which they receive from the United States ample compensation for every right they have to the lands ceded by them. They are so far dependent as not to have the right to dispose of their lands to any private persons, nor to any power other than the United States, and to be under their protection alone, and not under that of any other power. Whether called subjects, or by whatever name designated, such is the relation between them and the United States. [These principles have been uniformly recognized by the Indians themselves, not only by the treaty of Greenville, but by all the other treaties between the United States and the Indian tribes.] ² Is it indeed necessary, etc.

¹ Gallatin inserted the words "and voluntary."

² This sentence was struck out, and Gallatin substituted the following: "That relation is neither asserted now for the first time; nor did it originate with the treaty of Greenville. These principles have been uniformly recognized by the Indians

These stipulations by the Indians to sell their lands only to the United States do not prove that without them they would have the right to sell them to others. The utmost that they can contend to show would be a claim by them to such a right, never acknowledged by the United States. It is indeed a novel process of reasoning to consider [the renunciation of a claim as a proof of a right] ¹ a disclaimer as the proof of a right.²

An Indian boundary and the exclusive military possession of the lakes could after all prove but futile and ineffectual securities to Great Britain for the permanent defense of Canada against the great and growing preponderancy of the United States, on that particular point of her possessions. But no sudden invasion of Canada by the United States could be made without leaving on their Atlantic shores and on the ocean, exposed to the great superiority of British force, a mass of American property tenfold ³ more valuable than Canada [ever was or ever can be.] In her relative superior force [over all the rest of the globe] ⁴ to that of the United States, ⁵ Great Britain may find a pledge infinitely ⁶ more efficacious for the safety of a single vulnerable point, than in stipulations, ruinous to the interests and degrading to the honor of America.⁷

themselves, not only by that treaty, but in all the other previous as well as subsequent treaties between them and the United States."

¹ The words were set aside for what follows.

² The whole paragraph was struck out.

³ The word "far" is substituted for "tenfold."

⁴ Words in brackets were struck out.

⁵ Gallatin added "in every other quarter."

⁶ Gallatin substituted the word "much" for "infinitely."

⁷ Bathurst and Liverpool exchanged opinions on the American note of September 9, and agreed in the *absolute necessity* of including the Indians in the treaty of peace, and insisting that they be restored to all the rights and privileges which they had enjoyed before the war. They also believed in the expediency of giving in an

TO ABIGAIL ADAMS

GHENT, 10 September, 1814.

When I wrote you my last letter, a press copy of which is inclosed, I had little or no expectation that I should at this day still be here. The *John Adams* sailed from the Texel with Mr. Dallas ¹ on board, the 28th of August, and has, I hope, by this time half performed her passage. It is one of those singular incidents which occurs occasionally in real life, and which would be thought too improbable for a fictitious narrative, that while she was going out by one passage, Mr. Smith ² and his family were entering from Cronstadt by another. They are now at Amsterdam, and I have written to him to come with them here. They will be near the *Neptune*, now at Antwerp, in which they must embark if they return to America, which will in my opinion be the most advisable for them. We are still expecting every day, and indeed every hour, the formal notice of the termination of our business here; but while we do remain Mr. Smith's assistance will be most useful to me; for at the very moment of all my life when I most needed the service of a secretary, I have been deprived of it, and since the British plenipotentiaries have been here, my whole time ultimatum respecting the boundary before ascertaining that the American Commissioners would agree to the British propositions respecting the Indians. Liverpool wrote, September 11: "I confess I cannot believe that with the prospect of bankruptcy before them, the American government would not wish to make peace, if they can make it upon terms which would not give a triumph to their enemies. I am strongly inclined from all I hear to believe that a bankruptcy would be the result of their continuing the war for another year; but we must recollect that if the ground upon which the negotiation terminated were popular, a bankruptcy would, for a time at least, greatly add to their military means. The war would then be rendered a war of despair, in which all private rights and interests would be sacrificed to the public cause." Wellington, *Supplementary Despatches*, IX. 240.

¹ George Mifflin Dallas.

² William Steuben Smith.

has been altogether inadequate to the writing and copying which was and will be indispensable. If Mr. Smith concludes to go back to Russia, they must return as they came, by water. There is a vessel at Amsterdam to sail between the 16th and 30th of this month for Cronstadt, in which we may perhaps all embark. But it is already very late for a passage up the Baltic, and if we should be detained here three weeks longer it will be impossible.

It would appear that the failure of the negotiations here will be unexpected to all parties in the United States, and a disappointment particularly to the friends of the government. But whoever imagined that it would be defeated by the appointment of Mr. Clay and Mr. Russell mistook altogether the views and wishes of those gentlemen. We have all been equally anxious for the success of the mission, and all equally determined to reject the bases proposed to us by the British ministers. They have entirely changed the objects of the war, and begun by requiring of us, as a preliminary to all discussion of what had been the points in controversy, concessions which with one voice and without hesitation we refused. In the course to be pursued by us there has not been the slightest diversity of opinion between us, and as the unfortunate circumstances under which we were called to treat have rendered it impossible that the peace should be made, we have had the only satisfaction which could be found in missing the great object, that of having constantly harmonized among ourselves.

Before the *John Adams* sailed we had explicitly rejected in writing the proposal, without the admission of which the British ministers had declared that their government was resolved not to conclude a peace. We supposed therefore that in reply they would have notified to us that the conferences and the negotiation were at an end. They chose,

however, after taking time to send a message to London, to reply in a long note so ambiguous in its tenor, as to leave it doubtful whether they meant to abandon their indispensable preliminary, or to adhere to it, and attempting to put upon us in this state of equivocation the responsibility of breaking off the conferences. We have answered this by a note equally long, adhering to our rejection of their preliminary, but renewing the offer and repeating the wish to negotiate upon all the differences which had existed between the two countries before they had brought their new pretensions. This note we sent them yesterday, and left them again to declare the negotiation at an end. I should have expected this declaration in the course of this day, had not their last note evidently shown that, although determined not to conclude the peace, they are not indifferent to the object of putting upon us the responsibility of the rupture. This being their policy, they may, if they think proper, protract the discussion some time longer. Their government have been studiously procrastinating the whole negotiation with the view to avail themselves of the great successes which are to follow the operations of their reinforcements in America. It is already known that those destined for Canada have arrived, and they have been some time expecting news of the effect of their offensive operations. They may possibly reserve their dismissal of us for the first intelligence of a victory in America.

We have not only had the happiness of harmonizing together among ourselves upon the objects of our public ministry, but we have lived together on the most friendly social footing. When we first assembled we all had lodgings at the same hotel and had a common table among ourselves. After we had been there a few weeks we engaged by the month a large house, in which we are all accommodated with apart-

ments, and where we compose only one family. The secretaries connected with the mission have apartments in the neighborhood and dine with us every day. We have a considerable acquaintance and as much society as we wish with the principal inhabitants of the city, and we have been visited by numbers of our countrymen attracted hither by purposes of interest or of curiosity. This last circumstance has been the occasion however of some inconvenience to us and of rumors in England which, if they were well founded, would not be to our advantage.

At the time when Mr. Dallas was dispatched, some measures, which it became necessary to some of my colleagues to take preparatory to their return to America, indicated their immediate departure. Colonel Milligan, who had been Mr. Bayard's private secretary, took that moment to go to visit some relations in Scotland, and was accompanied by one of our American visitors, named Creighton, to London and Liverpool. On their arrival very large speculations in cotton and tobacco were made, founded on reports that the negotiation at Ghent was broken off, and many particulars with a mixture of truth and of misstatement appeared in the English newspapers of what had passed between the British and American plenipotentiaries. The report which arose from all this in England was that the American ministers were speculating for themselves on the event of the negotiation. I hope that Milligan has not descended to such a despicable practice himself. I am fully convinced that not one of my colleagues has sullied his fair fame by participation in such a sordid transaction; but at all events I am sure you will need no protestation or denial from me to "show there was *one* who held it in disdain."¹

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¹ "I dare say you will recollect the conversation which I once had with you, in

TO LAFAYETTE

GHENT, 11 September, 1814.

MY DEAR SIR:

Mr. Connell brought me your very obliging favor of the 10th instant. I beg you to accept my thanks for the kind

which I expressed to you my sense of the extreme impropriety of connecting any commercial speculation of private interest with the business of this negotiation. An incident has recently occurred very strongly confirming me in the sentiments I had entertained on that subject. Immediately after the departure of Mr. Dallas, Colonel [George] Milligan very suddenly went off to Scotland, accompanied, as far as London and Liverpool, by an American named Creighton, who had been some time here, and had received from the mission the usual attentions of civility. Their arrival at London and at Liverpool was the signal for universal speculations in American articles, on the reported rupture of the negotiations, and of statements in the newspapers, not altogether correct, but with a mixture of facts which could only have been divulged by them. Creighton is known to have been very deep in those speculations; and if Milligan was not, the indiscretion of his conduct, by thus going to England, even without a passport, has not only involved him in the suspicion of participation in them himself, but has implicated the whole American mission in the same suspicion, a procedure for which so far as concerns myself, I do not thank him." *To Levett Harris*, September 11, 1814. Ms.

"There has been a considerable sensation on Change today owing to a report that the Conferences at Ghent are broken off. Whether true or not can be no news to you, tho' the effect may be. There were strong buyers and large purchasers of cotton and tobacco, ten per cent above yesterday's prices, so that the knowing ones suspect that if there be nothing fresh from Ghent, there must have been some unfavorable decision here on something received before." *George Joy to John Quincy Adams*, August 26, 1814. Ms.

"There have indeed been many extraordinary reports here within the last few days which have occasioned an extraordinary rise on tobacco and cotton, both in this market and that of Liverpool. Besides what was stated to have come from Ghent, it was said last week that persons applying at the Foreign Office to have letters sent to the British Commissioners had been told that they were expected in London early this week; and that Mr. Vansittart had told a mutual friend of his and Lord Gambier, that his lordship was expected to return to England immediately. These reports, while they served to advance the prices of American produce, have had the effect of lowering the funds. Today, however, they are a little better,

expression of your wish to have seen me at Paris before my return to St. Petersburg. The pleasure of meeting you once more, after so long and so eventful an interval since I had last the happiness of seeing you, is the greatest among many strong inducements I should have for visiting that city, could it accord with other views which will probably render a more direct return to Russia necessary to me. I shall also particularly regret missing the opportunity of seeing again my very worthy friend, Mr. Victor de Tracy, and of forming a personal acquaintance with his respectable family. I shall always feel myself under obligations to his father and to you, for having furnished me the occasion of rendering him the feeble service that was in my power, and which I lamented not having been able to make more effectual, as they themselves would have wished. Will you please to present my most particular regards to Mr. Victor de Tracy, for whose personal character I entertain the highest esteem?

Our prospects here have varied only by the postponement of a termination which a fair, not to say a generous, enemy would have notified to us more than a fortnight since. Our country must now rekindle in defence of her rights with that ardor which you witnessed and shared in the days of our Revolution. If the spirit of genuine liberty and of youthful heroism which then sympathized with us in Europe is extinct, we must maintain our cause self-supported, until the selfish statesmen of the European continent shall discover that our cause is their own, and the most crafty shall join us to share with us the honor of a defence which we shall otherwise have exclusively to ourselves.

Mr. Smith whom I expect here in one or two days will be and on the other hand the prices of American produce are on the decline." *R. G. Beasley to John Quincy Adams, September 6, 1814. Ms.*

much flattered by your obliging regards. He will probably return with my colleagues to America.

Accept etc.

TO LOUISA CATHERINE ADAMS

GHEENT, September 13, 1814.

. . . I cannot yet revoke the advice to you, not to direct any more letters to me here. We are still in precisely the same predicament as when I wrote you last. We have no reply to the note we sent on Friday; so I suppose they mean to give us another dissertation of sixteen pages, and I am now not without suspicions that it will be like the last, giving up in one sentence what they adhere to in another, scolding like an old woman, insulting in one paragraph and compliant in another, and as to everything in the shape of argument *battant la campagne*.¹

Never was anything more explicit than their conference with us the day Lord Castlereagh was here, and their note dated on the same day. "Will you, or will you not?" was the word. Never was anything more explicit than our answer, "We will not," and off we sent Mr. Dallas. If there had been anything in them like fair dealing, they ought to have dismissed us the next day. The second day after, Mr. Goulburn told Mr. Bayard that we should have their reply without delay, and they should have no occasion to consult their government. Four days later they sent Mr. Baker to tell us they had thought best upon reflection to

¹ The American note of September 9 was sent to London, where the draft of a reply was prepared and dispatched to Ghent September 16. This draft, printed in Wellington *Supplementary Despatches*, IX. 263, will be found in the form sent to the American Commissioners, in *American State Papers*, Foreign Relations, III. 717.

send a messenger to London. Eleven days after our note had been sent came their reply, such as I have described it, abandoning and at the same time adhering to the terms which we had rejected with disdain; with a conclusion asking if we choose to take it upon ourselves to break off. We have rejoined, that we do not wish to break off, but we say *no* to their terms, without which they began by telling us that they would break off. As they have been five days deliberating upon what they shall now say, I conclude that they will finally give us the ball back again, and still contrive to make delay. For we have no reason to hope they will retreat an inch from their ground, and we shall never concede one of Mr. Hynam's measures, the thirty-six thousandth part of an inch of it to them. . . . The delay since our first answer has been according to all appearances an afterthought of their government, unexpected to themselves. I say all this to you chiefly for the purpose of showing you as precisely as it is seen by myself, the prospect with regard to the time of my departure. If the British government intend to make delay, it is in their power. By their proceedings for the last fortnight we are warranted in suspecting that they do intend delay. The next note from their ministers must either terminate our business or more clearly disclose their views. . . .¹

¹ "There is, however, too much reason to apprehend, notwithstanding the hope expressed to you in my last, that the maritime question will for the present be suffered to repose: for as you justly observe the contracting parties at Vienna, with the exception of the one which pays the *pots cassés*, are likely to be too much occupied with the division of their spoils to think for the present of new wars. And there is evidently at this moment no sovereign in Europe on whom we can count, or whose professions rather are in the least encouraging to us, except the Emperor of Russia. And in relation to His I. M. it is lamentable to add that all my late conversations with the Chancellor have left me little hope that in the conferences at Vienna the question of the maritime abuses of our enemy would be agitated." *Levett Harris to John Quincy Adams*, September 9/21, 1814. Ms.

TO GEORGE JOY

GHENT, 13th September, 1814.

SIR:

If your affairs should call you to this place previous to my departure from it, I shall be very happy to see you. If the motive of conversing with me would be inducement sufficient for you to take this city in your way to or from elsewhere, it would afford me much gratification; but to be perfectly candid with you, if any views of commercial speculation or private interest should be mingled in any manner with the purpose of your visit, I should prefer waiting for a moment more propitious to the opportunity of an interview.

For *one* I can speak but for myself. I do not scruple to say that I *have* been annoyed, not by the numbers of our countrymen, but by the abuse some of them have made of the access which their characters as our countrymen gave them to our house. The *principle* upon which I declined communicating information even of an indifferent nature to you has prescribed to me the same reserve towards all others. If it has not prevented stock jobbing and Jew-brokering tricks upon the Royal Exchange, it has at least preserved me from being in any manner accessory to them. By informing you of the time of my departure from this place I

"I do most cordially wish that your anticipations of the probable restoration to influence of a great statesman [Romanzoff], the friend of his country and of ours, may be realized. But whether in or out of power, I beg you whenever you may have the occasion to see him, to offer him the assurance of my respectful remembrance. Of all confidants of princes with whom I have ever been in official or personal relations, he is the man who has left upon my mind the deepest impression of sound judgment, of honorable principles, and of truly courteous deportment. Whatever his future destiny or my own may be, these will be the sentiments that I shall ever retain of him." To *Levett Harris*, September 11, 1814. Ms.

should not disclose a state secret, but I should not even deserve the compliment which Hotspur makes to his wife's powers of retention in expressing his belief that

she will not utter what she does not know.

I do most heartily rejoice at seeing the Canadian general order declaring the release of all the hostages on both sides who had been the victims of the *lex talionis*. And would to God that all other *objections* would be removed as successfully as those to that convention have been! I trust we shall see no embowelling for the encouragement of *Patriotism*.

I am etc.

TO WILLIAM HARRIS CRAWFORD

Ghent, 14 September, 1814.

DEAR SIR:

Your favor of the 6th instant was received by me on the 11th. Mine of the 29th ultimo had been the same length of time reaching you. I know not how it happens that the post takes five days in passing between this place and Paris. Travellers come and go easily in two days.

I tender you many thanks for the copy of your note. If it be the leading policy of the French government to maintain a system of neutrality in the war between the United States and Great Britain,¹ it might naturally be expected that France would manifest some appearance of adhering

¹ "The leading policy of this government is to preserve a strict neutrality, if it is possible; if *this cannot be done the departure from that policy will be against us*. The national feeling is *decidedly in our favor*. It is impossible to foresee what influence *this fact will have upon the government*. The arrogance of our enemy will operate powerfully in aid of this national feeling." William H. Crawford to John Quincy Adams, September 6, 1814. Ms. The italics represent cypher.

to the *rights* of neutrality. In exacting that France and all the allies should abandon all retrospective consideration of the British practices upon the ocean during the late war, I cannot imagine that the British government has bespoken the acquiescence of them all to her future operations. If France is prepared to adopt as the ruling maxim of her policy that she is never again to have war with England, she may now look on coolly while the British paper blockade cuts off all her commerce as a neutral state with us. But if she and Russia now formally abandon all pretension to maritime rights, they will certainly give us a very substantial reason for not being very solicitous about them hereafter, when the violations of them may be not so convenient to themselves.

We have not yet the cards to take leave from the British plenipotentiaries. There is some reason for expecting they will come next week. I trust you will duly appreciate the paragraphs in the English newspapers which ascribe delay to *us*, and prate about their demanding answers from us within twenty-four hours. The rupture in fact took place on the 25th ultimo, when we sent them our answer to their first note. Everything that they have done since (and how long they may thus amuse themselves and the world, I know not) has been arrant trifling, or to use a vulgar phrase of your neighborhood *de la poudre aux moineaux*. . . .

I am highly gratified at the view taken by you of our future prospects in the struggle which we are called upon to pass through, and if your spirit animates the general mass of our countrymen, we have nothing to fear with respect to the final issue of the war. For my own part I cannot imagine a possible state of the world for futurity in which the United States shall not be a great naval and military power. Between that and the dissolution of the Union there is no alternative. I fear it is also certain that we never shall lay

the foundation of a great military power but in a time of war. It must be forced upon us. And as we have begun and made some progress in it already, I doubt whether we shall ever have again so favorable an opportunity for accommodating our permanent political system to it as the present. If we could even now make a peace eligible in itself, we should come out of the war with a tarnished military reputation upon the land, which would injure our national character more than years of war. The only temper that honors a nation is that which rises in proportion to the pressure upon it. It is to their conduct in the crisis now impending that our posterity hereafter will look back with pride or with shame, and I trust our enemies will find our country in the day of trial true to herself.

I take the liberty of inclosing a letter for General Lafayette, and remain etc.

TO LOUISA CATHERINE ADAMS

GHENT, September 16, 1814.

. . . Mr. Goulburn was still more explicit with Mr. Clay. He told him that they had sent our last note to England the same evening that they had received it, and expected the answer on Monday or Tuesday next, which he had no doubt would be that we must *fight it out*. Now as they will not give us our dismissal until they have given us their dinner, I calculate upon Tuesday as the day when we shall agree to part. . . .

It is remarkable that the British plenipotentiaries, who in the case of our former note had first answered it, and then sent their answer to England for approbation, have now sent our note itself, without undertaking to answer it them-

selves. If the British government wish further delay, it is in their power to make it as they did before. In that case their next note will require another answer from us, and perhaps another messenger to England before the conclusion. So that I cannot yet predict with perfect certainty the day of my departure.

There has been in the English ministerial and opposition papers some *sparring* upon the question whether the negotiation at Ghent was or was not broken off. The *Times* says that nobody knows, and nobody but the traders cares anything about it. Our British friends appear to be a little nettled at certain hints in the *Morning Chronicle*, that irritating language had been used at one of our conferences, and that their former dinner to us was for the purpose of *making it up*. The last part of this statement is not correct, and there is a mistake of the day with regard to the first part. Irritating things were one day said by them, and our notes have undoubtedly contained expressions irritating to them; but ours were necessary and theirs were not. On neither side has there been, or will there be, any apology for them. . . .¹

¹ "From what I have seen of the American ministers and what has passed between us, I do not believe that they will, under the present circumstances of the war (they say they will not under any circumstances), consent to the definition of a permanent boundary to the Indian territory within their limits. I believe that our proposition to this effect is even more offensive to them than that for the military occupation of the Lakes. They have sought opportunities of stating it as inadmissible; and it was only yesterday [at a dinner given by the Americans. See Adams, *Memoirs*, III. 35] that Mr. Clay stated his belief that even if America were to accede to our proposition, and if the Eastern States were cordially to unite with Great Britain in endeavouring to enforce it, their united efforts would be inadequate to restrain that part of the American population which is to the westward of the Alleghany from encroaching upon the Indian territory and gradually expelling the aboriginal inhabitants. Their objection to our proposition is not founded upon its requiring a cession of territory already settled by American citizens, but upon its invading the right which they claim to extend their population over the

TO LOUISA CATHERINE ADAMS

GHENT, September 23, 1814.

. . . Since Tuesday we have been most assiduously engaged in preparing a reply to the last note we have received,¹ which I think will not be sent before next Monday. It is the opinion of Mr. Gallatin that this will be our last communication, and I should expect so myself, if I had not been twice before disappointed in the same expectation. Hitherto all the proceedings of the other party have been calculated to make delay, and to avoid the rupture of the negotiation for the present. They first assumed the tone of dictating a preliminary which we immediately rejected. Then they sent us sixteen pages revoking their first proposal and at the same time insisting upon it. Now they have changed its form, absolutely departed from one portion of it, and expressly declared they will not depart from the other. In every change of their position, we are obliged to change, that we may still front them. We have yielded nothing,

whole of the unsettled country. Under these circumstances, I do not deem it possible to conclude a *good peace* now, as I cannot consider that a good peace which would leave the Indians to a dependence on the *liberal policy* of the United States. . . .

"In the conversations which I have had with Mr. Clay and Mr. Bayard . . . I have been fortunate enough to state to them what you think might have been stated with advantage; but as they proceed upon the principle that Canada never has been in any danger and can never be endangered by the United States unless we force them to become a military nation; they consider the mere conclusion of a peace to be the only security which is necessary. Our national feeling respecting the abandonment of the Indians and the aggrandizing spirit of America draws nothing from them but an expression of regret at the existence of such a feeling, and a statement of the much stronger countervailing feeling on the part of America." *Goulburn to Earl Bathurst*, September 16, 1814. *Wellington, Supplementary Despatches*, IX. 266.

¹ Adams, *Memoirs*, September 20, 1814.

but every new attack we are obliged to meet with a new defence. From the first instant we saw (most of us at least) that there was nothing to be done, but I did not see that they might keep us here as long as they pleased, and that they felt a wish to keep us here. Although Mr. Gallatin may therefore judge more correctly than I do, I incline to the belief that this will not be our last note; that when we send it, there will be another reference to England, and that at the end of ten days more we shall have another note to answer.

There are letters from England saying that one of the clerks in the British department of foreign affairs has been dismissed from office, for having divulged some facts respecting the proposals made by the British government at the Ghent negotiation. That it was further reported that the note in answer to the first written communication from the British to the American ministers was very different from what had been expected; that it was a very able and spirited state paper, and that the Privy Council had been assembled two successive days to deliberate upon its contents. I give you this news as I received it, even with the mention of the able and spirited state paper, because so small a part of it was of my composition, that I can draw no vanity for any credit to which it may be considered as entitled. I should in fact have presented a very different paper, and I am conscious with all due humility that the paper sent was much more able than the one I had drawn; perhaps too it was more spirited, for it had not so much of the irritating language, which the *Morning Chronicle* pretends has been used on both sides, and for which it asserts we had a special meeting mutually to apologize. . . .

I now despair of getting away from this place before we shall be overwhelmed with these humiliations. They may,

however, determine the British government to break us up a little sooner. Thus we really now stand. We may be dismissed in twenty-four hours after we send our next note, and we may be kept here three months longer, I cannot say amused, but insulted with one insolent and insidious proposal after another, without having it in our power to break off with the indignation which we feel. . . .¹

TO LOUISA CATHERINE ADAMS

GHENT, September 27, 1814.

. . . It appears to me to be the policy of the British government to keep the American war as an object to continue or to close, according to the events which may occur in Europe or in America. If so they will neither make peace, nor break off the negotiation, and the circumstances may be such as to detain us here the whole winter. Yesterday we sent the answer to the third note of the British plenipotentiaries, as I wrote you last Friday I expected we should.² Observe that our conferences have been suspended ever since the 19th of last month—nearly six weeks; and that all we have during that interval been discussing is merely preliminary, whether we shall or shall not treat at all upon the former differences between the two nations. We have not

¹ Bathurst intimated to Goulburn the very strong opinion which prevailed in England against an unsatisfactory peace with America. In using this intimation Goulburn found Gallatin alone of the American Commissioners "in any degree sensible, and this perhaps arises from his being less like an American than any of his colleagues." What pleased Goulburn more was the discovery of an alleged falsehood on the part of the Americans. The point is immaterial save as it confirmed Goulburn that the real object of the war was not maritime rights, but the conquest of Canada. *Goulburn to Bathurst*, September 23, 1814. *Wellington, Supplementary Despatches*, IX. 278.

² Printed in *American State Papers*, Foreign Relations, III. 719.

yet come to the real objects of negotiation. Mr. Gallatin now inclines to the opinion that this will not be our last communication. I have suggested a proposal to which my colleagues have assented, and in our present note it has been made.¹ They think it will be accepted, and if it is, the negotiation will proceed, and the conferences probably be resumed. If it is not accepted, I hope it will at least bring us to a point which will prevent further dilatory proceedings. We are still unanimous in the grounds we take. Our adversaries have hitherto taken ten days to answer each of our notes, and we have answered each of theirs in five. But in truth we have to deal not only with the three plenipotentiaries, one of whom was amply sufficient for five American negotiators, but with the whole British Privy Council, who have taken cognizance of every one of our communications, and have prescribed the answer to them. Our joint notes have hitherto been principally composed by Mr. Gallatin and myself, the other gentlemen altering, erasing, amending, and adding to what we write, as they think proper. We then in a general meeting adapt together the several parts of each draft to be retained, discard what is thought proper to be rejected, criticise and retouch until we are all weary of our conduct, and then have the fair copy drawn off to be sent to the Chartreux, the residence of the British plenipotentiaries.

In this process about seven-eighths of what I write, and one-half of what Mr. Gallatin writes is struck out. The reason of the difference is that his composition is argumentative, and mine is declamatory. He is always perfectly cool,

¹ "I also made the proposal of offering to the British an article including the Indians in the nature of an amnesty; for which I thought we should be warranted by our instruction to endeavor to obtain an amnesty for the Canadians who have taken part with us." Adams, *Memoirs*, September 20 and 23, 1814.

and I, in the judgment of my colleagues, am often more than temperately warm. The style of the papers we receive is bitter as the quintessence of wormwood—arrogant, dictatorial, insulting—and we pocket it all with the composure of the Athenian who said to his adversary, “Strike, but hear!” Now in all this tranquillity of endurance I fully acquiesce, because it may be more politic to suppress than to exhibit our just indignation. But when I first write I indulge my own feelings, well knowing that the castigation my draft has to pass through will strip it of all its inflammable matter. It happens sometimes also that I have views of the subject in discussion not acceptable to some of my colleagues, and not deemed important by others. There is much more verbal criticism used with me too, than with any other member of the mission, and even if you had been inclined to gratify me with a compliment upon my talent at writing, I have it too continually disproved by the successive demolition of almost every sentence I write here, to permit myself to be elated by your partiality. The result of all this is, that the *tone* of all our papers is much more tame than I should make it, if I were alone, and yet the English gazettes pretend that we have taken it high and spirited. On the other hand I am thought sometimes to go too far in concession; to give the adversary advantages in the argument which might be inconvenient, and to speak of the British *nation* in terms which might gratify their pride. All such passages are inexorably excluded. All this winnowing and sifting would be of the highest advantage to myself, if I was at the improving period of life. At present I consider its principal advantage to be that it effectually guards against the ill-effect of my indiscretions.¹ Mr. Gallatin keeps and increases his influence over us all. It would have been an

¹ Adams, *Memoirs*, September 23, 1814.

irreparable loss if our country had been deprived of the benefit of his talents in this negotiation. . . .¹

TO LOUISA CATHERINE ADAMS

Ghent, October 4, 1814.

. . . When this comes to your hands the contents of my letter of 16 August will probably be no longer in your recollection, but as you keep the file, turn to it, with the remembrance that on that very day, 16 August, the whole of Cochrane's fleet assembled in the Chesapeake for the expedition against Washington; and that on the ninth day afterwards, the Capitol, the President's House, the public offices, and the navy yard were destroyed.² Remember too

¹ "The British plenipotentiaries have again sent our note to England, as we supposed they would. They expect the answer next Monday or Tuesday. Their tour of duty appears to be much easier than ours. For since the conference of 9 August they have had little or nothing else to do than to seal up and open dispatches. The extent of their authority is to perform the service of a post-office between us and the British Privy Council. If they get the news of their troops having taken Washington or Baltimore before they transmit to us their next note they may perhaps undertake to dismiss us. If not they may prepare for us materials for another note. I wrote you that they did not accept our invitation for a tea party last evening, but went to Antwerp, I suppose purposely to avoid it." *To Louisa Catherine Adams*, September 30, 1814. Ms.

² On the 23d, Liverpool could write to Castlereagh: "The forces under Sir Alexander Cochrane and General Ross were most actively employed upon the coast of the United States, creating the greatest degree of alarm and rendering the government very unpopular. We may hope, therefore, that if the American government should prove themselves so unreasonable as to reject our proposals as they have been now modified, they will not long be permitted to administer the affairs of the country, particularly as their military efforts have in no way corresponded with the high tone in which they attempt to negotiate." Wellington, *Supplementary Despatches*, IX. 279. On September 27 Bathurst gave intelligence of "a signal success" — the "destruction of the American flotilla, and the capture and occupation for a time of the city of Washington." An "Extraordinary Gazette" was issued on the same day.

that this was only the beginning of sorrows; the lightest of a succession of calamities through which our country must pass, and by which all the infirmities and all the energies of its character will be brought to light.

In itself the misfortune at Washington is a trifle. The loss of lives amounts scarcely to the numbers every day sacrificed in a skirmish between two regiments of soldiers. The loss of property cannot exceed the expenses of one month of war. The removal of the seat of government necessitated by the event may prove a great benefit rather than a disadvantage to the nation. The weakness manifested in the defense of Washington is the circumstance calculated to excite the greatest concern, and is the more to be lamented as its causes may be expected to operate on other occasions, and

"I can assure you that these considerations will make no difference in our anxious desire to put an end to the war if it can be done consistently with our honour, and upon such terms as we are fairly entitled to expect. The notes of our commissioners at Ghent will, I think, sufficiently prove the moderation of our views. I am satisfied that if peace is made on the conditions we have proposed, we shall be very much abused for it in this country; but I feel too strongly the inconvenience of a continuance of the war not to make me desirous of concluding it at the expense of some popularity; and it is a satisfaction to reflect that our military success will at least divest the peace of anything which could affect our national character. . . . In any conversation which you may have with the King of France or with his Ministers, you will not fail to advert to this circumstance, and to do justice to the moderation with which we are disposed to act towards them [the United States]." *Liverpool to the Duke of Wellington*, September 27, 1814. Wellington, *Supplementary Despatches*, IX. 290. To Castlereagh he added, "I fear the Emperor of Russia is half an American; and it would be very desirable to do away any prejudice which may exist in his mind, or in that of Count Nesselrode, on this subject." *Ib.*, 291. Wellington, finding that the military successes of the British in the United States "were canvassed in a very unfair manner in the public newspapers, and had increased the ill temper and rudeness" shown to British in Paris, did inform the French Minister of the state of the negotiation at Ghent. "Monsieur de Jaucourt expressed great disgust at the state of the daily press at Paris at present; and assured me that what had been published on the subject of our operations in America had made no impression on the King's mind." *Wellington to Castlereagh*, October 4, 1814. *Ib.*, 314.

to produce other effects still more disastrous. There is perhaps no use in foreseeing calamities which it is not in our power either to prevent or to remedy; but on this occasion I find myself less affected by what has happened in consequence of the state of preparation to which I had formed my mind in looking forward to what it was but too obvious *must* happen . . .

In the present state of things the only circumstance within our power is to have our minds generally prepared for anything that may happen. But the misfortune that may befall us will probably not be that which we foresee. Let me however say, because it may afford you some relief and consolation, that the personal dangers of our particular friends and relations are much less than they were before this last event. Washington may be henceforth considered as the place of the United States the most secure from an attack of the enemy. Boston is still exposed and our property there may share the fate of the Capitol.¹ But in the perils of the country I scarcely think it worth a thought what may befall my individual interests. Our children and other relations near Boston are in no danger but that which menaces the whole country; and Cochrane's proclamation will not I imagine produce any other effect against us than to tempt perhaps some hundreds of negroes to run away from their masters.

If I could correctly judge of the effect upon the feelings of our nation of this transaction by those which it has produced among the Americans we have here, I should look upon it as a blessing rather than a calamity. The sentiment

¹ "Our old friend, Mr. R. B. Forbes, has just been to visit me. He is come to Petersburg on his way to Ghent, and expects to return to America. He says Boston is become intolerable to live in; that his family are most of them high Essex Junto, and that it is hardly possible to walk in the streets without getting into quarrels. This is a delightful picture of our town!" *Louisa Catherine Adams to John Quincy Adams*, September 13, 1814. Ms.

is the same among us all. It is profound, anxious, and true to the honor and interest of our country. It is a sentiment which if generally felt by the people of the United States will rouse them to exertion. Let that effect be produced and they have as a people nothing to fear from the power of Great Britain. If it cannot be produced they are not fit to bear the character of an independent nation, and have nothing better to do than to take the oath of allegiance to the maniac [George III]. Congress were to assemble on the 19th of September. From this time until mid-winter every breeze will bring us tidings fraught with the deepest interest to our hearts. In the severe visitation of a chastening providence I will not abandon the hope that its mercies will be mingled with its judgments.

We have not yet received the reply of the British plenipotentiaries, or rather of the British Privy Council, to our last note. As the time has now come for which they have been trifling and equivocating those six months to keep up what one of their own newspapers calls the idle and hopeless farce of this negotiation, I wish that the impression of their success upon them may be to fix the determination of breaking it up. There can be no possible advantage to us in continuing it any longer. . . .

TO WILLIAM HARRIS CRAWFORD

GHENT, 5 October, 1814.

MY DEAR SIR:

Mr. Boyd arrived here on the 29th ultimo with his dispatches, and with your letters of the 25th to the mission, and to Mr. Gallatin and myself. After his arrival I received your two favors of the 24th by the post.

The important news from America is just beginning to come in. Since Mr. Boyd's arrival, we have had successively the accounts of the abortive attack on Fort Erie of 15th August, and of the *too successful* attack on Washington of the 24th and 25th. The trial of our national spirit anticipated in my letter of 29 August had even then commenced by that vandalic exploit. Its result has illustrated in colors much too glaring the remark I then made, that our statesmen appeared not to have formed a just estimate of our condition.

I have never for an instant believed that peace would be practicable by the negotiation here. Mr. Clay is the only one among us who has occasionally entertained hopes that it might be. The proceedings of the British government since the delivery of their first *sine qua non* have sometimes strongly countenanced Mr. Clay's opinion, and the deference I have for his judgment leads me to distrust in this case my own. I believe the sole object of Britain in protracting our stay here is to impose both upon America and upon Europe, while she may glut all her vindictive passions and bring us to terms of unconditional submission.

We shall probably in the course of a few days make you a joint and confidential communication upon this subject. The purposes of our enemy have undoubtedly a relation to France and to other European powers, and it may be expedient to put them upon their guard against the British misrepresentations, of which they make this "idle and hopeless farce" the instrument for views not less hostile to them than to us.¹ I am etc.

¹ "I have in some of my letters said, that if any reliance could be placed upon the sincerity of the British ministry, a peace is not impracticable. This declaration was made before I knew their last ultimatum. That paper strengthens this conjectural opinion; but still I agree with you that peace is an improbable result. I have no confidence in their sincerity. If they make peace upon the basis now proposed, it will be because they have been wholly disappointed in the result of the

TO LOUISA CATHERINE ADAMS

GHENT, October 7, 1814.

. . . The newspapers contain a great variety of details respecting the fall of Washington and the destruction of buildings and of property, public and private, effected by the enemy. The whole transaction is much more disgraceful to the British than it is injurious to us. The destruction of the Capitol, the President's house, the public offices, and many private houses is contrary to all the usages of civilized nations, and is without example even in the wars that have been waged during the French Revolution. There is scarcely a metropolis in Europe that has not been taken in the course of the last twenty years. There is not a single instance in all that time of public buildings like those being destroyed. The army of Napoleon did indeed blow up the Kremlin at Moscow, but that was a fortified castle, and even thus the

campaign. It has afforded me the most heartfelt satisfaction to find myself mistaken. The campaign has been much more successful than I had anticipated. The aspect of affairs now is highly consolatory and encouraging. . . . Admitting that the objects for which the war is to be prosecuted may embrace concessions which will be gratifying to the [British] national pride and beneficial to their naval superiority, yet it cannot fail to occur to the thinking part of the nation that these concessions, if obtained, must be temporary in their enjoyment. They must be sensible that the moment is rapidly approaching when the shackles which force may have imposed, will by force be broken. That it is indeed possible that this period may arrive even before they have derived any benefit from it. For it is only when she is belligerent that these concessions will be useful to her. Should she therefore remain twenty years at peace, she will have prosecuted this war for the advancement of objects, which the greatest possible success could alone give her, and eventually derive no benefit from them. In that time we shall be able in conjunction with her adversary to shake off the unequal and hard conditions which she may have imposed upon us. For myself, I agree entirely with you, that we shall have a good peace, if the war is prosecuted a year or two longer." *William H. Crawford to John Quincy Adams, October 26, 1814. Ms.*

act has ever been and ever will be stigmatized as one of the most infamous of his deeds.

It has indeed been conformable to the uniform experience of mankind that no wars are so cruel and unrelenting as civil wars; and unfortunately every war between Britain and America must and will be a civil war, or at least will bear most of its peculiar characters. The ties of society between the two nations are far more numerous than between any two other nations upon earth. They are almost as numerous as if they continued to be what even in our day they have been, under the same government. But whenever these ties are burst asunder by war, the conflicting passions of the parties are multiplied and exasperated in the same proportion. In the moral as well as the physical world the principles of repulsion are exactly proportioned to those of attraction. We must therefore expect that the excesses of war committed by the British against us will be more outrageous than those they are guilty of against any other people, and we must be neither surprised nor dejected at finding them to be so. The same British officers who boast in their dispatches of having blown up the legislative hall of Congress and the dwelling house of the President, would have been ashamed of the act instead of glorying in it, had it been done in any European city. The exultation at this event in England is just such as to prove that the passions of malice and envy and revenge, which prompted their military and naval officers to this exploit are prevailing universally throughout the nation. The *Times* and the *Courier* rave and foam at the mouth about it. The *Morning Chronicle*, to justify the destruction of the Capitol and other public buildings, calls it a mitigated retaliation for some private houses burnt by our troops in Canada. But Lewiston, Frenchtown, Havre de Grace, Hampton, and many other

scenes of British barbarism and brutality preceded any irregular act of that nature on our part. The first example of every savage feature in the war has been shown by the British. The feelings excited by such atrocities among our people could not be restrained: they retaliated, and now the British retaliate upon retaliation. In this contest of ferocious and relentless fury we shall ultimately fall short of the British, because we have not so much of the tiger in our composition. A very strong evidence of this has been shown in the history of the destruction of Washington. It seems that after having effected their purpose, the terror of the British was so great of being cut off in their retreat, and their flight was so precipitate, that they left their own dead unburied on the fields, and their own wounded as prisoners at the mercy of the very people whose public edifices and private habitations they had been consuming by fire. If those wounded prisoners have not been gibbeted on the trees between Bladensburg and Washington, to fatten the region kites, and to swing as memorials of British valor and humanity, it has not been because the provocation to such treatment was insufficient, but because it belongs to our national character to relent into mercy towards a vanquished and defenceless enemy. . . .

TO LOUISA CATHERINE ADAMS

GHENT, October 11, 1814.

. . . And now, the chances are of our being confined here, if not the whole winter, at least several weeks and probably months longer. On Saturday [8] evening came a note of fifteen pages again, hot from the British Privy Council; for the plenipotentiaries have no other duty as it would

seem to perform than that of engrossing clerks. This note is in the same domineering and insulting style as all those that have preceded it, but it contains much more show of argument, falsehoods less liable to immediate and glaring exposure, misrepresentations more sheltered from instant detection, and sophistry generally more plausible than they had thought it worth while to take the trouble of putting into the former notes. The essential part of it is, however, that they have abandoned almost every thing of their previous demands which made it impossible for us to listen to them, and have now offered as their ultimatum an article of a totally different description.¹ You can conceive with what kind of grace they retreat from nine-tenths of their ground when you know that they take care to hint that *at this stage of the war*, their concession must be taken for magnanimity.

What we shall do with this article I cannot yet pronounce; but the prospect is that we shall have many other points to discuss, and as their object of wasting time has now become manifest beyond all possible doubt, there is less appearance than at any former period of the immediate and abrupt termination of our business. The accounts from America and the progress of affairs in Europe have hitherto flowed in a copious and uninterrupted stream favorable to their policy in the conduct of this negotiation. That such would be the course of events it was impossible to foresee. My own expectation was that in the exultation and insolence of their success they would have broken it off upon the grounds first taken by them in such a peremptory manner, and which we decisively rejected. It appears, however, that

¹ Bathurst sent to the British Commissioners, October 5, a "projet" of an article on Indian pacification. His accompanying instructions are in *Letters and Despatches of Lord Castlereagh*, X. 148. See *American State Papers*, Foreign Relations, III. 721.

the British ministers have not shared in all the delusions of their populace in regard to their late achievement at Washington. They are perfectly aware that as *injury* to us it scarcely deserves to be named as an important occurrence of war; that as national *humiliation* its tendency is to unite all parties in our country against them, to exasperate all the passions of our people, and to create that very energy of defence which it so effectually proved to be wanting. They were so much elated by the event that they had their *Gazette* accounts of it translated into all the principal languages and transmitted to every part of Europe; but the sensation produced by it upon the continent, so far as we have had the opportunity of remarking it, has been by no means creditable to them—the destruction of public buildings of no character connected with war, that of private dwelling houses, the robbery of private property, and the precipitate flight of their troops leaving their wounded officers and men at the mercy of the people whom they had so cruelly outraged, tells by no means to their glory. Here we have heard but one sentiment expressed upon the subject—that of unqualified detestation. But here the English are universally hated; the people dare not indeed openly avow their sentiments, but we hear them—“curses not loud but deep.” In France the public sentiment has been more openly expressed. In two of the daily journals of Paris ¹ remarks equally forcible and just upon the atrocious character of this transaction have been published, and even in some of the London newspapers and magazines a feeble and timid expostulation has appeared against deeds paralleled only by the most execrable barbarities of the French revolutionary fury, or by the Goths and Vandals of antiquity. A de-

¹ *Journal des Débats*, reprinted in the *Courier*, October 6, and the *Journal de Paris*, reprinted in the *Courier*, October 10.

fence as despicable as the actions it attempts to justify has been brought forward in one of the English newspapers;¹ and its only artifice is to diminish the infamy by depreciating the importance of this vaunted exploit. They are compelled to urge how small and insignificant the distinction was which they could accomplish to ward off the shame of having destroyed everything in their power. The Capitol, they now say was only *an unfinished building*; the President's house was properly demolished because *the scoundrel* Madison had lived in it, and to be sure they could not be blamed for having destroyed a navy yard. Let them lay this flattering unction to their soul. The ruins of the Capitol and other public buildings at Washington will remain monuments of British barbarism, beyond the reach of British destruction, when nothing of their oppressive power will be left but the memory of how much it was abused. . . .

TO LOUISA CATHERINE ADAMS

GHENT, October 14, 1814.

. . . We this day send our answer to the fourth note from the British plenipotentiaries: the note, as I have told you, is by far the most labored, the best written, and the most deserving of a complete and solid answer, of any one that we have received from them. The peculiarity of its character is, that in giving up almost every thing for which they have contended as a preliminary, they finally insist upon some thing that I am very unwilling to yield, and they dwell with bitterness and at great length upon unfounded and most insidious charges against the American government. I have acquiesced in the determination of my col-

¹ The *Courier*, October 6, 1814.

leagues to yield on the particular point now required by the British as their *ultimatum*.¹ They think we concede by it little or nothing. I think the concession so great that I should have been prepared to break off rather than give it up. But the ground upon which I differ from them the most is, that they are for giving the go-by to all the offensive and insulting part of the British note; for not replying at all to much of it, and for giving a feeble and hesitating answer to the remainder. My principle would have been to meet every one of their charges directly in the face; to report upon them without hesitation, both of which we might do with the strictest truth and justice; and to maintain as we have done hitherto a tone as peremptory as theirs. All this we might have done, and yet finally have conceded the point upon which the continuation of the negotiation now hinges. But the other policy has been thought more advisable. In making the concession it is thought best to consider and represent it as a trifle, or indeed as nothing at all; and that it may have its full effect of conciliation, it is concluded to say very little upon the other topics in the note, to decline all discussion that would lengthen our answer, and above all to avoid every thing having a tendency to irritate. I submit to this decision; but I think it will not be long before we discover that our enemy is not of a temper to be propitiated either by yielding or by shrinking; and my greatest concern is that when we have once began to yield and to shrink, there is no knowing where and when we shall be again prepared to make a stand. I sacrifice however the more readily my opinion to that of my colleagues in this case, because they are unanimous in theirs, and because they promise me not only that they will not yield anything of essential importance hereafter, but that they will both parry and

¹ The pacification of the Indians.

thrust, if it finally comes to a rupture, with as much earnestness, and with more vigor than I should wish them to do now.

It must indeed have been for some of my own sins or for those of my country, that I have been placed here to treat with the injustice and insolence of Britain, under a succession of such news as every breeze is wafting from America. When Napoleon took Moscow Alexander declared to the world, that he would drain the last dregs of the cup of bitterness, rather than subscribe to a peace dishonorable to his Empire. We have told the British government that we will, if necessary, imitate this illustrious example. They have taken our Capitol. They have destroyed its public, and many of its private buildings, and the information is brought to us at one of the critical moments of the negotiation. This is the point of time at which we are required to bind or to break. We have chosen to bind. Not so did Alexander. May we be more fortunate in our imitation of his example hereafter.

The taking of Washington, to use an expression of Boyd's, has *started our timbers*. Lawrence's last words, which you tell me you did not know, were "*Don't give up the ship.*" The ship was given up, not by him, but in consequence of his mortal wound. It was in the agony of death, when all sense and sentiment of the fatal reality were fled, that his heroic soul took wing for eternity, still dwelling on the image of his duty to his country, still cheering his companions to the defence of their trust. Now you can judge whether there was any meaning in the toast, when it was given. Oh! if every American were a Lawrence; what should we have to fear from all the malice backed by all the power of Britain?

The feeling of the outrage upon the laws of war at Wash-

ington will be deep and lasting. The Chevalier says it ought never to be forgotten. That it should make every American take his children to the altar, and swear them to eternal hatred of England. I do not go so far in the theory as the Chevalier; but I am charmed to find him on this occasion American to the quick. The day before yesterday we had a *tête-à-tête* after dinner over a bottle of Chambertin, till ten o'clock at night. He was perfectly friendly and confidential. He reasoned with all the clearness and all the energy of his mind. I heartily concurred with all his principles. I could not resist his persuasions with regard to the point upon which we were laboring. I finally came down to the prevailing sentiment of the mission. God grant that its result may be an honorable peace.

At all events it will probably detain us several weeks longer, for you know that we are in substance yet to *begin* the negotiation. Hitherto we have only been discussing whether we should treat at all. May it please God to forgive our enemies, and to turn their hearts!

TO LOUISA CATHERINE ADAMS

GHENT, October 18, 1814.

. . . In the meantime we continue to be watching the movements of the political weathercock in the British Cabinet. Our note, which as I wrote you, was sent to the plenipotentiaries last Friday, was dispatched by them the next day to England. We cannot expect a reply to it before next Monday, and I have now no hopes that it will finish our business. We must drink the cup of bitterness to the dregs. The chances are about even that we shall pass half the winter here, or at least until all the great arrangements

at Vienna shall be completed. The Congress of Vienna I have no doubt will prolong the general peace in Europe, but if it is to finish in six weeks all its business, it may be questioned whether it will settle this continent very firmly on its new foundations. There is some fermentation yet in France, where in the midst of grave deliberations about the liberty of the press, half a dozen printers of pamphlets have just been arrested. The author of one of those pamphlets is Carnot,¹ who would also have been arrested, but for the fear of producing too strong a sensation. On the other hand, Mr. Chateaubriand has become a government writer, and there is a long article composed by him published in the *Journal des Débats*, and now circulating over Europe,² on the happiness of France since the restoration of the Bourbons. He proposes that Louis le Désiré should be called Louis le Sage. It is rather early to pronounce him so emphatically wise, but in the acts of his government hitherto there has generally been a character of discretion well suited to his situation. Bonaparte had made a strong and energetic government so odious by the excess to which he carried it, that Louis has only to discern how far it may be relaxed, and where he must stop, that it may not degenerate into the opposite vice of weakness. This appears to be precisely the object of his endeavors, and although many of his measures must under this system be experimental, and many of his experiments unsuccessful, he has yet undertaken nothing which could have a serious effect in shaking the stability of his authority; and when he has found himself running foul of the public opinion, he has always prudently and seasonably yielded to it.

The great difficulty for him will be to manage the army,

¹ *Mémoire adressé au Roi*, 1814.

² *De Buonaparte et des Bourbons*, 1814.

and to check their martial propensity. They have been deeply humiliated without being humbled. They have all the pride of their former successes, with the galling sensation of their late disasters. They look with a longing eye to their former chief, who is now but a shadow; and unfortunately for the Bourbons there is no other leader who has any ascendancy over them, and who could draw their tottering allegiance to himself. The king has pursued the policy of his own interest, by showering his favors upon the marshals, without suffering himself to be infected by their passion for war. . . .

TO WILLIAM HARRIS CRAWFORD

GHENT, 18 October, 1814.

DEAR SIR:

I had the pleasure of writing to you on the 5th instant, since which Mr. Gallatin has received your favor of the 6th, forwarded from Lille by Mr. Baker, who was detained there by illness. Mr. Boyd will be the bearer of this.

Since I wrote you last, the negotiation here has apparently taken a turn which induces a postponement of the joint communication which I then gave you reason to expect. I am convinced with you that Great Britain keeps this negotiation open to further views of policy which she is promoting at Vienna; but I think she has the further object of availing herself of the impression she expects to make in America during the present campaign, and of the terrors she is holding out for the next.¹ As our remaining here must have a tendency to countenance weakness and indecision on the

¹ See *Bathurst to the British Commissioners*, October 18, 1814, in *Letters and Despatches of Lord Castlereagh*, X. 168.

other side of the Atlantic, I sincerely regret that the negotiation has not yet been brought to a close. But to close it has not been in our power. That is to say, there has never been a moment when we should have been justified in breaking it off, or could have shown to the world the real policy of Great Britain. By referring every communication from us to their government before they replied to it the British plenipotentiaries have done their part to consume time, and by varying their propositions upon every answer from us their government have done the same. We have at length accepted their article, and asked them for their projet of a treaty. We expect their reply on Monday or Tuesday next. The present aspect is of a continuance of the negotiation, and we are not warranted in saying to France or Russia, that we believe nothing will come of it. We are all ready enough to indulge hopes, but I see no reason for changing the belief that we have constantly entertained. My only apprehension from delay is that the firmness of our councils at home may not be kept up to the tone which has characterized them heretofore. If they stand the test we shall have no peace now, but a very good one hereafter. I am etc.

TO LOUISA CATHERINE ADAMS

GHENT, October 25, 1814.

. . . On Saturday last [22] we received from the British Commissioners a note ¹ more distinctly marked than any of those that had preceded it, with the intention of wasting time, without coming to any result. We sent them our answer to it yesterday.² We have again endeavored to

¹ Printed in *American State Papers*, Foreign Relations, III. 724.

² *Ib.*, 725.

bring them to a serious discussion of the objects in controversy between the two countries; but their government (for they do nothing themselves but sign and transmit papers) have apparently no other aim but to protract the negotiation. Since the late news from America they have totally changed their grounds; they now come forward with new inadmissible pretensions. We have rejected them as explicitly as we did those they first advanced, and we have told them that further negotiation will be useless if they persist in them. Our note of yesterday, I suppose like all the rest, will go to England for an answer,¹ but I do not expect that it will yet produce any thing decisive. The chance of peace is in my opinion more desperate than ever, for it is now ascertained that they will raise their demands upon every petty success that they obtain in America, and it is but too certain that they must yet obtain many, far greater and more important than those hitherto known. While they are sporting with us here, they are continually sending reinforcements and new expeditions to America. I do not and will not believe that the spirit of my countrymen will be subdued by anything that the British forces can accomplish; but they must go through the trial, and be prepared at least for another year of desolating war. . . .

¹ It was sent to London on the day of receipt, "for the information of His Majesty's Government, requesting at the same time their directions for our future proceedings." *British Commissioners to Castlereagh*, October 24, 1814. Ms.

TO ABIGAIL ADAMS

GHENT, 25 October, 1814. Tuesday

MY BELOVED MOTHER:

This is the day of jubilee! the fiftieth year since your marriage is completed! By the blessing of Heaven my dear father can look back to all the succession of years since that time with the conscious recollection that it was a happy day. The same pleasing remembrance I flatter myself is yours; and may that gracious being who has hitherto conducted you together through all the vicissitudes of an eventful life still watch over you! Still reserve for you many years of health and comfort and of mutual happiness! . . .

It is much to be lamented that such earnest and sanguine expectations of peace have been entertained in America from the present negotiation. The desire of peace, though in itself proper and laudable, was unfortunately in the circumstances of our country and of the times the greatest obstacle to its own object. It has been considered by our enemies that we were or should be prepared to make any sacrifice, even of our Union and independence, to obtain it. This is not the spirit that will secure peace to us. Peace is to be obtained only as it was after the war of our Revolution, by manifesting the determination to defend ourselves to the last extremity. It is not by capitulations like those of Nantucket and of Washington county in the state of Massachusetts, and of Alexandria, that we shall obtain peace. The capitulation of Alexandria is so inexpressibly shameful, that people here who would gladly be friends of our country ask us whether it is not a forgery of our enemies, and whether there really existed Americans base enough to subscribe to such terms? They say that the infamy of submitting to them was greater than that of exacting them.

Of peace there is at present no prospect whatever. The British government have sufficiently disclosed their intention of reducing again to subjection as large a portion of the United States as they can occupy. They have taken possession of our territory as far as Penobscot river, and now they make no scruple of demanding it.

But it does not appear to be their intention to break up this negotiation. They keep us here, raising one extravagant and insulting pretension after another, ready to insist upon or to recede from it according as they may find their interest to dictate, or the circumstances to warrant; and here we are reasoning and expostulating with them, entreating them to consent to a peace, and above all dreading to break off the negotiation, because Peace, Peace, is the cry of our country, and because we cannot endure the idea of disappointing it.

While we have the miniature of a Congress here for the affairs of England with the United States, there is a great one at Vienna which is to settle the future destinies of Europe. There, too, England appears inclined to take the lead and direction of all affairs; but it is probable that France also will have something to say in those arrangements. The Prince of Talleyrand, the French Ambassador there, has stated in a memorial, that as France has consented to be reduced to her dimensions of 1792, it is but justice on her part to expect that the other great European powers will follow her example. This declaration appears to have been quite unexpected, and to have given rise to so many new ideas among the assembled potentates and ambassadors that it has been agreed to postpone the opening of the Congress until the first of November.¹

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¹ In commenting upon a letter of John Quincy Adams to his father, of October 27, Madison wrote: "Our enemy knowing that he has peace in his own hands, specu-

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE

No. 142.

[JAMES MONROE]

GHENT, 25 October, 1814.

SIR:

Since the departure of the *John Adams*, we have had no safe opportunity for transmitting dispatches to you, and this has probably been owing to the detention of the *Chauncey* by the agent, and as he states under the instruction of her owner.

It will probably be known to you that on the outward passage of this vessel from the United States to Gothenburg, one of her passengers was sent on board a vessel upon the coast of Scotland who did not return, but was shortly afterwards landed in Great Britain. There is reason to believe that after the arrival of the *Chauncey* at Gothenburg, the British consul at that place received an anonymous letter

lates on the fortune of events. Should those be unfavorable, he can at any moment, as he supposes, come to our terms. Should they correspond with his hopes, his demands may be insisted on, or even extended. The point to be decided by our ministers is, whether during the uncertainty of events, a categorical alternative of immediate peace, or a rupture of the negotiation, would not be preferable to a longer acquiescence in the gambling procrastinations of the other party. It may be presumed that they will before this have pushed the negotiations to this point.

"It is very agreeable to find that the superior ability which distinguishes the notes of our Envoys extorts commendation from the most obdurate of their political enemies. And we have the further satisfaction to learn that the cause they are pleading is beginning to overcome the prejudice which misrepresentations had spread over the continent of Europe against it. The British government is neither inattentive to this approaching revolution in the public opinion there, nor blind to its tendency. If it does not find in it a motive to immediate peace, it will infer the necessity of shortening the war by bringing us, the ensuing campaign, what it will consider as a force not to be resisted by us." *Madison to John Adams*, December 7, 1814. *Writings of Madison* (Hunt), VIII. 322.

representing this transaction and circumstances attending it as a violation of the cartel, of which information was of course given by the consul to the British Admiralty. Early in August application was made to the joint mission by a letter from the captain to Mr. Clay, requesting that we would obtain a passport for the vessel to return to the United States. We accordingly asked for the passport by a note to the British plenipotentiaries, desiring that it might be transmitted to the captain of the vessel at Gothenburg, and might include permission to touch at any port of Europe for our dispatches. The passport was immediately granted, though I have heard that a previous solicitation to the same effect through other channels had been rejected.

The vessel arrived at Ostend in the beginning of September, and the captain immediately came here, together with the person who had been landed in England on the passage to Gothenburg. The owner's agent had already come on from Gothenburg, I believe by land. We expected that the vessel would have immediately proceeded to the United States, but found the owner's agent was under instructions which left it doubtful whether she would go at all. After waiting about five weeks and receiving no answer to our applications for passports for other vessels to convey our dispatches, we thought it necessary to ask the agent for the *Chauncey* to return the passport, unless he chose to dispatch the vessel. He then wrote us a letter stating that it would be contrary to his instructions from the owner founded on the agreement with you to send her away, but that being under the necessity to do that, or to return the passport, he placed her at our disposal, and she would be ready to sail at the time mentioned by us which was about this day. The object of this doubtless is to lay a claim for remuneration from the government. But we could have more op-

portunities than we would want to send dispatches without any expense to the government, and should probably have met with no difficulty in obtaining cartels for the purpose, had it not been known that this vessel after being furnished with a passport was detained for objects of individual interest to the owner.

We now send you copies of all our official correspondence with the British plenipotentiaries since the departure of Mr. Dallas. From their first vote of 19 August, transmitted by Mr. Dallas to you, and from our conference with them on the same day which had preceded it, we had supposed it to be the intention of the British government to break off the negotiation immediately. The conversation of their ministers after receiving our answer to that note tended at first to confirm that opinion; but they concluded eventually to refer to their government before they sent us their reply; and when that finally came, it afforded a presumption which everything since has confirmed, that the real object of the British government was neither to conclude peace nor to break off the negotiation, but to delay. Of this policy the advantage was all on their side. They knew that whatever might happen, a peace honorable and advantageous to them might be concluded in one week, should the course of events in Europe or in America render it in their estimate advisable to terminate the war, and they chose to avail themselves of the advantages which the successes of this campaign in America would give them, and of the chances either of permanent tranquillity, or of new troubles in Europe, which might result from the Congress at Vienna.

Although this policy was sufficiently disclosed to us from the time when we received the second note of the British Ministers, we have at the same time perceived that our only practicable expedient for counteracting it would be to break

off the negotiation on our part. We have deemed this unadvisable, because we thought the rupture should not proceed from us, as long as a possibility remained that a just and honorable peace might be concluded, and because it was barely possible that the course of events might fix the intentions of the British government in favor of peace. It will be observed that the *sine qua non*, upon the admission of which they at first placed the continuance of the negotiation was already varied in their second note, most essentially altered in the third, and finally melted down in the fourth into an article which we have agreed in substance to accept.¹ It is also to be noticed that the British plenipotentiaries have not replied to any one of our notes without a previous reference to their government, so that there has been always an interval of eight or ten days between their receipt of a note from us and our receipt of their answer.

After the consumption of so much time upon mere preliminary discussion, when we accepted the articles we

¹ "We owed the acceptance of our Article respecting the Indians to the capture of Washington; and if we had either burnt Baltimore or held Plattsburgh, I believe we should have had peace on the terms which you have sent to us in a month at latest. As things appear to be going on in America, the result of our negotiation may be very different. Indeed if it were not for the want of fuel in Boston, I should be quite in despair." *Goulburn to Earl Bathurst*, October 21, 1814. Wellington, *Supplementary Despatches*, IX. 366. "The American plenipotentiaries have agreed to our Article relative to the Indians. The negotiation is therefore proceeding, and with more prospect of success than has hitherto existed. We shall probably be able to form some decisive judgment on the subject in the course of the next ten days. The capture and destruction of Washington has not united the Americans: quite the contrary. We have gained more credit with them by saving private property than we have lost by the destruction of public works and buildings. Madison clings to office, and I am strongly inclined to think that the best thing for us is that he should remain there. His government must be a weak one, and feeling that it has not the confidence of a great part of the nation, will perhaps be ready to make peace for the purpose of getting out of its difficulties." *Liverpool to Castle-reagh*, October 21, 1814. *Ib.*, 367.

thought it proper to ask for their projet of a treaty, offering immediately afterwards to deliver them ours in return. By their last note, dated on the 21st and delivered to us on the 22nd instant, they not only evade that request, but after having repeatedly disclaimed any views to the acquisition of territory to Great Britain, they now propose to treat upon the basis of *uti possidetis*.¹ And this proposition is made immediately after receiving the accounts of the capture of Washington, and of their having taken possession of all that part of the state of Massachusetts beyond Penobscot River. As we have already declared that we would subscribe no article importing a cession of territory, they must have been aware that we should reject this basis, and can have brought it forward for no other purpose than that of wasting time. In our answer to this note, which was sent yesterday, we have endeavored to bring them to a point, not only by explicitly rejecting the basis of *uti possidetis*, but by reminding them of its inconsistency with their own professions hitherto, and by stating to them that the utility of continuing the negotiation must depend upon their adherence to their principles avowed by those professions. We also renewed the request for an exchange of projets, and as they intimated the idea that there might be an advantage in receiving instead of giving the first draft of a treaty, we have offered to exchange the respective drafts at the same time.²

¹ Authorized by Bathurst, October 20, 1814. *Letters and Despatches of Lord Castlereagh*, X. 172.

² On the American note of the 24th Liverpool wrote to the Duke of Wellington: "The last note of the American Plenipotentiaries puts an end, I think, to any hopes we might have entertained of our being able to bring the war with America at this time to a conclusion.

"We proposed the *uti possidetis* to be the basis of the treaty as to territory, subject, however, to such modifications as might be found on discussion reciprocally advantageous. They are disposed to advance the extravagant doctrine of some of the revolutionary governments of France, viz., that they never will cede any

It is now the general opinion that the Congress at Vienna will terminate in a settlement of the general affairs in Europe, if not to the satisfaction of all the great powers, at least without opposition from any of them. Such is the opinion that I have myself uniformly entertained. All the principal governments, and all the great nations, except France, are most anxiously desirous of peace; and as there is little else to arrange between them besides a distribution of spoils, each one, however eager to grasp at the most it can get, will finally content itself with what it can obtain. In France itself the warlike spirit appears to be gradually subsiding, and will in all probability yield itself to the continual and increasing influence and authority of the government. There is, therefore, little prospect that anything occurring in Europe will inspire the British ministry with a pacific disposition towards America. They are, in fact, continuing to embark troops and to send reinforcements of all kinds for another campaign. It is not for me to judge what may be the effect of the events now so rapidly succeeding one another in our own hemisphere; but our country cannot be too profoundly impressed with the sentiment that it is, under God, upon her own native energies alone that she must rely for peace, Union, and Independence. I am etc.

part of their dominions, even though they shall have been conquered by their enemies. This principle they bring forward during a war in which one of their chief efforts has been to conquer and annex Canada to the United States.

"The doctrine of the American government is a very convenient one: that they will always be ready to keep what they acquire, but never to give up what they lose. I cannot, however, believe that such a doctrine would receive any countenance (especially after all that has passed) in Europe.

"We still think it desirable to gain a little more time before the negotiation is brought to a close; and we shall therefore call upon them to deliver in a full project of all the conditions on which they are ready to make peace, before we enter into discussion on any of the points contained in our last note." Wellington, *Supplementary Despatches*, IX. 385.

TO LOUISA CATHERINE ADAMS

GHENT, October 28, 1814.

We have been very much occupied since I wrote you last in dispatching Mr. Connell, who goes off this morning to Ostend, there to embark in the *Chauncey* for New York. During the same time we have been undergoing another sort of fatigue, which is more tedious and wearisome to me, that of banqueting. On Wednesday ¹ we dined with the British plenipotentiaries. No other company than ourselves, but a Mr. Van Aken, a gentleman of this place, whom we met there once before. Our acquaintance here in consequence of the ball we gave, and of the manner in which we have mingled in society, has become extensive, and as we have associated indiscriminately with all the respectable classes, now as the winter approaches we have the prospect of partaking as much as the gayest of us can wish, in what are called the pleasures of society. The inhabitants of the place of all descriptions show us every civility and attention in their power, and we have not now to learn how much more we enjoy of their favor than our adversaries. We have not like them two sentinels clad in scarlet at our doors. Our guard of honor is the good will of the people. We do not quarter upon them the scarlet coats by the thousands; we levy no contributions of monthly millions upon them to feed the lobsters; and we do not crush their manufactures by crowding upon their markets the competition of ours. The hatred of the English is so universal, and so bitter, that we may attribute no small part of the kindness shown to us to the mere fact of our being the representatives of our enemies. The English ministers live as secluded as if they were monks

¹ October 26. See Adams, *Memoirs*, October 26, 1814.

of the old convent of Chartreux where they reside. Lord Gambier, who appears to me to be an excellent and well meaning man, asked me the day before yesterday, whether we had made any acquaintances here. I said we had. He replied that *theirs* was confined to the Intendant's family. This however is altogether owing to themselves. Little as the people here love their nation, they would be ready enough to associate with them, and to show them civility, if they sought it. But Lord Gambier himself is an elderly man not much suited to shine or to delight in mixed societies. Mr. Goulburn is a very young one, but he has his wife with him, and has so much of my humor, as to think his own family the best company. Both he and Dr. Adams have the English prejudice of disliking everything that is not English, and of taking no pains to conceal their taste. . . . None of them would find much to please them in the companies of this place, nor is there much in any or all of them to give more pleasure than they would receive. . . .

We have no further news since Tuesday from America, excepting the confirmation of the destruction of the British fleet on Lake Champlain, and the consequent retreat of Sir George Prevost. . . . Sir George Prevost, it seems, was advancing to take possession of the new line of boundary which they intend to demand at the peace, and since his defeat the *Courier* says one more effort may be necessary, but that will be the last. All the accounts from England since this affair has been known concur in saying that there will be no peace; but if they do not secure their object by the effort of this campaign they will not be so likely to obtain it by the next. May he in whose hands is the spirit as well as the destiny of nations support us in the struggle we have to go through! . . .¹

¹ "I see little prospect of our negotiations at Ghent ending in peace, and I am

TO LOUISA CATHERINE ADAMS

GHENT, November 4, 1814.

. . . Since that time,¹ facts, more or less material to the issue of the negotiation, have occasionally transpired, but in the English newspapers they are so blended with other statements given with equal confidence and totally destitute of foundation, that the public in England have no real knowledge of the true state of things. You will accordingly find that the accounts both by the newspapers and by the private letters from England will be altogether different from the information you have received and will continue to receive from me. Our occupations and our amusements still furnish a daily paragraph to every gazette, but there is a mixture of truth and of fiction in their narrative, even of particulars which are in their nature of public notoriety. They have not only noted down our excursions of pleasure, and our shipping of baggage on board the *Neptune*, but they have sent me to Bruxelles, while I have not slept out of Ghent since my first arrival in it. They have dispatched Mr. Bay-apprehensive that they may be brought to a conclusion under circumstances which will render it necessary to lay the papers before Parliament, and to call for a vote upon them previous to the Christmas recess. Of this, however, I shall probably be enabled to speak more positively some days hence. The continuance of the American war will entail upon us a prodigious expense, much more than we had any idea of. . . . If we had been at peace with all the world, and the arrangements to be made at Vienna were likely to contain anything very gratifying to the feelings of this country, we might have met the question with some degree of confidence; but as matters now stand, everything that is really valuable will be considered as having been gained before, and we shall be asked whether we can really meet such a charge in addition to all the burthens which the American war will bring upon us." *Liverpool to Castlereagh*, November 2, 1814. Wellington, *Supplementary Despatches*, IX. 401. See Adams, *Memoirs*, May 12, 1815, for the statement of the Duke de Vicence on Castlereagh's desire for peace.

¹ When Creighton and Milligan visited England, and the consequent charges of speculating in cotton and tobacco.

ard to Paris to take the court of France by storm, when he was only gone to Bergen op Zoom, to look at the walls which General Graham intended to storm, and failed. They have sent us, or dreamt of our being sent, like fire-ships loaded with combustibles, to Vienna, to blow up the Congress there, and spread a conflagration of universal war again all over Europe. One day they have prostrated us at the feet of the British plenipotentiaries, repenting in the dust, and crying for mercy; and the next they have seated us on a car of triumph, showering gold around us, and bribing Talleyrand with *beaucoup d'argent* to arm the universe against the maritime rights of old England. All this time we have been proceeding exactly as I have told you: once a fortnight, or thereabouts, receiving from the British Privy Council a note signed by their plenipotentiaries, full of arrogant language and inadmissible demands, which in three or four days we have answered, sometimes with elaborate argument, always with extreme moderation, occasionally with firmness and spirit, and never with unsuitable concession; much less with the port of suitors or the attitude of asking for indulgence. We have attempted neither to storm the court of France, nor to blow up the Congress at Vienna. We have left the powers of the European continent to their own reflections concerning the maritime rights of the British empire, and have been as far from asking of them as they have been from offering us any of their assistance. We see plainly enough that we shall have no peace but by the failure of the British forces in America to accomplish the objects for which they were sent, and by the failure of the British government to give the law to all Europe at Vienna. Should they succeed in America, we shall have no peace, because our country will never submit to the terms they would dictate. Should they succeed in Vienna, we shall have no peace, be-

cause they will prefer war with us, to peace upon any terms. In the meantime they are merely multiplying discussions to keep the negotiation alive, until they shall find it their interest to break off or to conclude. In answer to their last note we shall send them in two or three days, the draft of a treaty. There is little chance of our finishing in any manner within a month, and not much probability before the close of the year. . . .

TO LOUISA CATHERINE ADAMS

GHENT, November 8, 1814.

. . . We have not yet sent our reply to the note which we received on the 31st ulto. from the British plenipotentiaries.¹ We had never before taken so much time to reply; the reason of which delay is that we have been preparing the draft of a treaty to send with the note. This has brought us upon the whole field of this negotiation, and has made it necessary to deliberate and agree among ourselves upon many thorny points of discussion. It has not in this state of things been perfectly easy to bring our own minds to the point of cordial unanimity; but our deliberations have been cool, moderate, mutually conciliatory, and I think will result in full harmony. We shall not be ready with the project before Thursday—perhaps not even so soon. While it shall continue to be the policy of the British government to temporize, we cannot force them to decision. Since their last disgraces in America, the spirit of the English nation is evidently more fiercely bent upon the prosecution of the war than it was before. The negotiators from Bordeaux² upon

¹ *American State Papers*, Foreign Relations, III. 726.

² The bayonets of the seasoned troops sent to America from the continent of Europe.

whose success so much reliance was placed having failed, the only conclusion that Mr. Bull's pride will allow him to draw from his disappointment is that there were not enough of them. So he insists upon making another trial and sending more. General Pakenham¹ goes out with a staff to succeed Ross. Prevost and most of the old commanding officers are recalled. A man of high rank is to be sent as commander-in-chief of all the forces. Wellington will, I think, not go yet; but unless he is wiser than I believe him, he will go before the war ends, and then—God speed the *monument* of the women of Great Britain and Ireland! As Wellington began where Cornwallis ended, his American expedition, if he undertakes it, I hope will end him where Cornwallis began—at Yorktown. . . .²

¹ Edward Michael Pakenham (1778-1815). See C. F. Adams, *Studies, Military and Diplomatic, 1775-1865*, 176.

² In expressing a wish that the Duke of Wellington should take command of the British forces in America, Liverpool wrote to Castlereagh, November 4, 1814: "I know he is very anxious for the restoration of peace with America if it can be made upon terms at all honourable. It is a material consideration, likewise, that if we shall be disposed for the sake of peace to give up something of our just pretensions, we can do this more creditably through him than through any other person." Wellington, *Supplementary Despatches*, IX. 405. And to the Duke of Wellington, on the same date: "We cannot, however, conceal from you that great public advantage would arise from your accepting this [American] command. The more we contemplate the character of the American war, the more satisfied we are of the many inconveniences which may grow out of the continuance of it. We desire to bring it to an honourable conclusion; and this object would, in our judgment, be more likely to be attained by vesting you with double powers than by any other arrangement which could be suggested." *Ib.*, 406. Wellington believed that under the existing circumstances the Ministry "cannot at this moment allow me to quit Europe." *Ib.*, 422, 425. On the question hindering the conclusion of a peace he wrote: "In regard to your present negotiations, I confess that I think you have no right from the state of the war to demand any concession from America. Considering everything, it is my opinion that the war has been a most successful one, and highly honourable to the British arms; but from particular circumstances, such as the want of the naval superiority on the Lakes, you have not been able to carry it into the enemy's territory, notwithstanding your military

TO WILLIAM HARRIS CRAWFORD

GHENT, 6th November, 1814.

DEAR SIR:

Mr. Gallatin and myself have received your favor of 25th ultimo, and I have also to acknowledge that of the 26th addressed separately to me. We shall reply jointly to the former, but that gentleman thinks there is no occasion for immediate urgency on the subject, and I rely upon his judgment.

Our negotiation is spinning out, and unless our government brings it to a close, will be a mere chancery suit. Last Monday we received a note eluding for the second time our request for an exchange of projets. They talk of *etiquette*, and of the advantage of receiving the first projet instead of giving it. We shall therefore send them the first projet. But

success, and now undoubted military superiority, and have not even cleared your own territory of the enemy on the point of attack. You cannot then, on any principle of equality in negotiation, claim a cession of territory excepting in exchange for other advantages which you have in your power. . . . Then, if all this reasoning be true, why stipulate for the *uti possidetis*? You can get no territory; indeed the state of your military operations, however creditable, does not entitle you to demand any; and you only afford the Americans a popular and creditable ground which, I believe, their government are looking for, not to break off the negotiations, but to avoid to make peace. If you had territory, as I hope you soon will have New Orleans, I should prefer to insist upon the cession of that province as a separate article than upon the *uti possidetis* as a principle of negotiation." *Ib.*, 426. On the 18th Liverpool could inform Castlereagh: "I think we have determined, if all other points can be satisfactorily settled, not to continue the war for the purpose of obtaining or securing any acquisition of territory. We have been led to this determination by the consideration of the unsatisfactory state of the negotiations at Vienna, and by that of the alarming situation of the interior of France. We have also been obliged to pay serious attention to the state of our finances, and to the difficulties we shall have in continuing the property tax. . . . It has appeared to us desirable to bring the American war if possible to a conclusion." *Ib.*, 438.

what are we to expect from plenipotentiaries who are obliged to send to the Privy Council for objections of etiquette and question who shall give or receive the first draft?

I thought they were waiting for the issue of the campaign in America. But success and defeat there produce the same result upon them. The instant they knew of their achievements at Washington and Penobscot they shifted their ground, rose in their demands, and proposed the basis of *uti possidetis*. When they heard of their defeats at Baltimore and on Lake Champlain, it became indispensable to wipe off the disgrace upon their arms and to prosecute the war upon a larger scale. It is from Vienna and not from America that the balance of peace or of war will preponderate.

I heartily share in all your exultation at our late successes and in all your wishes for the future. If I am lagging in the rear of some of your hopes, it is from a sluggishness in the anticipation of good, for which I have no reason to thank the character of my imagination. Certainly, what you foresee is more probable than what has actually happened. May all your hopes be realized!

We have received a passport for the *Transit*. The *Chauncey* sailed on the first instant. I am etc.

TO LOUISA CATHERINE ADAMS

Ghent, November 11, 1814.

... If we were to credit the present reports from England, our mission here would have the prospect of termination within a very few days. The *Morning Chronicle* of the 2d instant announces that the total rupture of the negotiation at Ghent will be made public within a fortnight from that time. Sir Edward Pakenham, General Gibbs,

and many other officers have embarked and sailed for America in the *Statira* frigate from Portsmouth. All the letters from England concur in stating that the popular sentiment for continuing the war is a perfect frenzy. The *Times* blubbers that all the laurels of Portugal, Spain, and France, have *withered* at Plattsburg, and threatens damnation to the ministry if they dare to make peace with Madison and his faction. We are even told that Master Bull calls for a more vigorous administration to put down the Yankees, and that that model of public and private virtue, Wellesley, is to replace such sneaking prodigals of the nation's blood and treasures as Castlereagh and Liverpool. . . .

Last evening we sent to the British commissioners the answer to their last note, and with it an entire draft of a treaty.¹ As notwithstanding all the news from England, I

¹ Printed in *American State Papers*, Foreign Relations, III. 733. Of this draft of a treaty Goulburn wrote: "The greater part of their project is by far too extravagant to leave any doubt upon our minds as to the mode in which it could be combated; but there is some doubt whether it would be useful to comply with the request of the American Commissioners, and state specifically the reasons which induce us to object more or less to all the articles proposed by them. Such a statement, though not difficult, would be voluminous." *Goulburn to Earl Bathurst*, November 10, 1814. Wellington, *Supplementary Despatches*, IX. 427.

Bathurst wrote to Goulburn of the change of feeling and desire for a treaty, who replied on the 25th: "I need not trouble you with the expression of my sincere regret at the alternative which the government feels itself compelled by the present state of affairs in Europe to adopt with respect to America. You know that I was never much inclined to give way to the Americans; and I am still less inclined to do so after the statement of our demands with which the negotiation opened, and which has in every point of view proved most unfortunate. Believing, however, in the necessity of the measures, you may rely upon our doing our utmost to bring the negotiation to a speedy issue; but I confess I shall be much surprised if the Americans do not, by cavilling and long debate upon every alteration proposed by us, contrive to keep us in suspense for a longer time than under present circumstances is desirable. . . . I had till I came here no idea of the fixed determination which prevails in the breast of every American to extirpate the Indians and appropriate their territory; but I am now sure that there is nothing which the people

do not think their government yet prepared to break off the negotiation, I expect it will be ten days before they send us their reply. We are not aware of anything either in our note or in the treaty we propose, that they may seize upon as the pretext for breaking; but there is enough in both for that object, if they think the time arrived for proclaiming the rupture. We have in the note made a proposal more comprehensive, more liberal, more adapted to ensure peace (in my opinion) than anything that has yet passed in the correspondence on either side. This proposal has been made at my suggestion, and there has been great difficulty in coming to unanimity upon it.¹ My belief is that it is the only principle upon which there is any possibility of peace, and in my view it is calculated to be of great advantage to us, if it should fail, because in the event of a rupture it will be our strongest justification in the eyes of the world. But so different are the views of others, that many ill consequences are expected from it, and if they should ensue, the whole responsibility of the measure will be brought to bear directly upon me. Of this I was fully assured when I presented the proposal, and I am prepared to take all the blame that may ultimately attach to it upon myself. It was, however, readily adopted, and strenuously supported by both my colleagues of the former mission.

As Parliament was to meet on the 8th we may now expect the Regent's speech in a day or two. Lord Castlereagh has not yet returned from Vienna, and we have not yet heard of the opening of the Congress. It was, as you know, post-

of America would so reluctantly abandon as what they are pleased to call their natural right to do so." *Goulburn to Earl Bathurst*, November 25, 1814. Wellington, *Supplementary Despatches*, IX., 452, 454.

¹A proposal to conclude the peace on the footing of the state before the war, applied to all the subjects of dispute between the two countries, leaving all the rest for future and pacific discussion. See Adams, *Memoirs*, November 10, 1814.

poned to the first of this month. The speech will probably give some indication of the aspect of things both at Vienna and at Ghent. If the determination to continue the war in America is settled, it will be disclosed in the speech, and we have rumors that not only the Regent but the Queen have manifested their concurrence with the popular passion for war. It is therefore to be expected that the answer to our draft of a treaty, whether in the shape of a counter-project as we have requested, or by the refusal to send us one, will bring us to some point on which the rupture will turn. They have no hopes of reducing the Yankees to unconditional submission by the events of this campaign. But the news still to come will give them encouragement, and when fully prepared with the ways and means for the next year, they will have no motive to keep us longer lingering here. . . .

TO GEORGE JOY

GHENT, 14 November, 1814.

SIR:

After receiving your favor of 30 September I have been waiting in expectation of the pleasure of seeing you here until yesterday, when yours of the 4th instant was put into my hands. I have a double motive for regretting the delay of your journey upon learning that it has been occasioned by a serious indisposition.

The sentiments expressed by your two correspondents from whose letters you are kind enough to send me extracts are just, in part. Disgusting, however, as the aspect which the war has (not so very lately) assumed must be to every liberal and candid mind, I believe we must consider it as the aspect which all wars between those two parties always

will assume. It is "fraternal rage"—it is civil war. The Capitol, a legislative and judicial palace, a public library and a chapel were blown up, we are told, by way of retaliation. What was Lewiston bombarded for? What was Georgetown, Frederickstown, Frenchtown and Havre de Grace destroyed for? What were the wounded prisoners at the river Raisin butchered in cold blood for? Was it for retaliation? Those things were not indeed translated into all the languages of Europe, and sent by special messengers to every court, and therefore the indignation of mankind has not marked so strongly their feelings as it did to greet the messengers who come to proclaim the destruction of the Capitol—I forbear.

If the full length picture presents the same features as your miniature, the ruin of the Capitol will be a public blessing. But it was once said that they who believed not Moses and the prophets would neither believe one from the dead. My faith is unshaken in the result. Whether the test of the process is to be more or less severe depends not upon us, but upon an overruling power, in whose hands our enemies are but instruments. You see I am something of an optimist, and as such permit me to express the earnest hope that this may find you *well*.

Remaining in the meantime your very humble servant.

TO LEVETT HARRIS

GHENT, 15 November, 1814.

DEAR SIR:

I have just now the pleasure of receiving your favor of 14/26 October, and am happy to learn from yourself the confirmation of your recovery, of which and of your illness I had a few days since been informed by a letter from my wife.

Near the close of the month of August it was our expectation that the negotiation here would have terminated in a very few days. It soon after became apparent that the intention of the British government was to keep it open, and to shape its demands according to the course of events in Europe and in America. This policy still continues to pervade the British Cabinet. Nothing decisive is yet known to them to have occurred either at Vienna, or in the other hemisphere, and accordingly they temporize still. Unless something should happen to fix their wavering pretensions and purposes it will belong to the American government alone to bring our business to a point. This on their part would certainly be an honorable and spirited course of conduct, and I should have no doubt of its being pursued, if the desire of peace were not paramount to every other consideration.

The occurrences of the war in America have been of a diversified nature. Success and defeat have alternately attended the arms of both belligerents, and hitherto have left them nearly where they were at the commencement of the campaign. It has been on our part merely defensive, with the single exception of the taking of Fort Erie with which it began. The battles of Chippewa and of Bridge-water, the defence of Fort Erie on the 15th of August, and the naval action upon Lake Champlain on the 11th of Sep-

tember have redounded to our glory, as much as to our advantage; while the loss of Washington, the capitulations of Alexandria, and of Washington County, Massachusetts, and of Nantucket, have been more disgraceful to us than injurious.

The defence of Baltimore has given us little more to be proud of, than the demonstration against it has afforded to our enemy. Prevost's retreat from Plattsburg has been more disgraceful to them, than honorable to us, and Wellington's veterans, the fire-eater Brisbane¹ and the firebrand Cockburn, have kept the rawest of our militia in countenance by their expertness in the art of running away.

The general issue of the campaign is yet to come, and there is too much reason to apprehend that it will be unfavorable to our side. Left by a concurrence of circumstances unexampled in the annals of the world to struggle alone and friendless against the whole colossal power of Great Britain, fighting in reality against her for the cause of all Europe, with all Europe coldly looking on, basely bound not to raise in our favor a helping hand, secretly wishing us success, and not daring so much as to cheer us in the strife—what could be expected from the first furies of this unequal conflict but disaster and discomfiture to us.² Divided among ourselves, more in passions than interest, with half the nation sold by their prejudice and their ignorance to our enemy, with a feeble and penurious government, with five frigates for a navy and scarcely five efficient regiments for an army, how can it be expected that we should resist the mass of force

¹ Sir Thomas Makedougall-Brisbane (1773–1860).

² "There is a report here that the maritime question was brought forward at the Congress at Vienna by the French plenipotentiaries, but the opposition of the British agents was so pointed and imperious that it was not persisted in nor supported by the other powers." *Levett Harris to John Quincy Adams*, 31 October 12 November, 1814. Ms.

which that gigantic power has collected to crush us at a blow? This too is the moment which she has chosen to break through all the laws of war, acknowledged and respected by civilized nations. Under the false pretence of retaliation Cochrane has formerly declared the determination to destroy and lay waste all the towns on the sea coast which may be assailable. The ordinary horrors of war are mildness and mercy in comparison with what British vengeance and malice have denounced upon us. We must go through it all. I trust in God we shall rise in triumph over it all; but the first shock is the most terrible part of the process, and it is that which we are now enduring. . . .

I am etc.

TO LOUISA CATHERINE ADAMS

GHENT, 15 November, 1814.

. . . There was a concert and *redoute* (meaning thereby a ball) in the evening, which the younger part of our company attended. It is by subscription once a week, on Mondays; alternately a simple concert, and this mixed entertainment of last evening, half concert, and half ball. It began last week with a concert, which I attended and found rather tedious, though it was over about eight o'clock. It consisted almost entirely of the scarlet coated gentry from Hanover and England, who are not more favorites of ours than they are of the inhabitants of the country. They are scarcely ever admitted into the good company of the place in private society, and so they have taken almost exclusive possession of the public places where the only condition of admittance is the payment of money.

The theatrical season has also commenced from the first

of this month. All the boxes of the first and second row are taken by the season; but as a particular consideration in our favor we were admitted to take a box by the month. I say we, though I am not personally included in the arrangement. The regular performances are alternately three and four times a week, and once or twice with the *abonnement suspendu*. The company is, for French players, without exception the worst I ever saw. There is but one tolerable actor, and not one actress in the whole troop. Occasionally they have had one good singer, male, but he had a figure like Sancho Panza, and one female, but she was sixty years old and had lost her teeth. Sometimes they bring out rope dancers and sometimes dancers without ropes, who are rambling about the country, and half fill the houses two or three nights; but the standards of the stage are the veriest histrionic rabble that my eyes ever beheld. Yet they have a very good orchestra of instrumental performers, very decent scenery, and a sufficient variety of it; and a wardrobe of elegant and even magnificent dresses. The only days when they give anything which I think fit to be seen or heard are those when the *abonnement* is suspended. Some of us are very constant attendants. Mr. Gallatin and James never miss. They have become intimately acquainted with the whole troop. All our family have become in a manner domesticated behind the scenes, with a single exception. Who that is you may conjecture. I go to the theatre about once a week, and have found no temptation to go oftener. My evenings, although they are drawing to the season of their greatest length, have as yet seldom hung heavy upon my hands.

We have usually, after sending a note to the British plenipotentiaries, from a week to ten days of leisure. Such has been our state since last Thursday, when we transmitted to

them our project of a treaty. We shall probably not have the reply sooner than next Monday. . . .

The English newspapers to the 10th bring nothing further from America. One great reason that I have for believing that the next news will be bad—very bad—is that most of us are sanguine in the hope that it will be very good. We have had many and signal *unexpected* favors of Providence; but I do not recollect a single instance since the commencement of the war, when we have indulged hopes founded on flattering prospects, that they have not issued in bitter disappointment.

The Regent's speech talks as usual about the unprovoked aggression of America, and her siding with the oppressor of Europe, but says he is negotiating with her for peace; that his disposition is pacific, and that the success will depend on his meeting a similar disposition in the American government.¹ These, as Lord Grenville in the debate observes, are words of course, and he calls upon the ministers to say what the war is continued for? Lord Liverpool brings it out in terms which, equivocal as they are, explain sufficiently to us the policy which I have so often told you they were pursuing. He said, according to the report of the *Courier*, "that particular circumstances might prescribe conditions which in a different situation of affairs it would be impolitic and improper to propose." That is to say, that the terms they intend to prescribe will depend upon the circumstances of the campaign in America, and of their success at the Congress of Vienna. The Regent has therefore mistaken his own disposition. It is not to make peace, but to vary his proposals according to circumstances. This is what his government has done with us. They have changed their grounds in almost every note they have sent us, and have

¹ See *Annual Register*, 1814, 353.

been steady to nothing but the principle of avoiding to pledge themselves to anything—to pledge themselves effectually, I mean,—for they have repeatedly slunk in one note from a demand which they had declared to be indispensable in another, and on the first encouragement of success they brought forward demands totally inadmissible, which they had before solemnly disclaimed.

Lord Grenville and Mr. Whitbread censured the destruction of the Capitol and President's house at Washington. They were told that it was done by way of retaliation. But Admiral Cochrane has made a formal declaration that he shall destroy and lay waste such towns as he may find assailable on the sea coast, having been required by Sir George Prevost to do so, to retaliate for similar destruction committed by the Americans in Canada. Prevost himself at the same time in his expedition to Plattsburg issued a proclamation forbidding every such excess, and declaring that they were not making war upon the American people, but only against their government. Whitbread called upon the ministers to account for the inconsistency between Prevost's proclamation and his alleged requisition to Cochrane; but they gave him no answer. The real cause was that Prevost was entering that part of the country to conquer it, and the government intended to keep it. So they tried there the system of coaxing the people. On the sea coast, which they do not expect to keep, they meant merely to plunder and destroy. The retaliation was nothing but a pretext. . . .

TO WILLIAM HARRIS CRAWFORD

GHENT, 17 November, 1814.

DEAR SIR:

I received yesterday your favor of the 10th instant, which was brought by Mr. Storrow. My expectations with regard to the issue of the campaign in America are colored perhaps more by general reasoning than by reference to the particular state of facts. I cannot suppose it possible that Izard's object was an attack upon Kingston. I take it for granted it was to relieve and reinforce our army at Fort Erie, which by our most recent accounts was in a situation more critical than that of Drummond, and still besieged by him. Among the last rumors from Halifax is that of a successful *sortie* from Fort Erie, and if that report was well founded we might rely more upon the issue of Izard's expedition. My distrust of it arises from the necessity of exact correspondence in the execution of combined operations, and a want of confidence in our military manœuvres upon the land. We have not yet learnt to play the game.

The debates in Parliament upon the Regent's speech have disclosed the system pursued by his government in the negotiation at this place. Lord Liverpool avows without scruple that their demands and propositions are to be regulated by circumstances, and of course while that policy prevails nothing can be concluded. Even when all the preparations are made, and all the funds provided for another campaign. it is not clear that they will find it expedient to break off this negotiation, and it is certain that we shall not break it off without orders from our government. We sent on the 10th instant the projet of a treaty, assuming the basis of *status ante bellum* with regard to the territory, and have

offered in the note sent with it to extend the same principle to all other objects in dispute between the two countries. We have presented articles on the subjects of impressment, blockades, indemnities, exclusion of savage coöperation in future wars, and amnesty. But we have declared ourselves willing to sign a peace placing the two nations precisely as they were at the commencement of the war, and leaving all controversial matter for future and pacific negotiation. I was earnestly desirous that this offer should be made, not from a hope that it would be accepted, for I entertained none; but with the hope that it would take from them the advantage of cavilling at any of our proposed articles, as manifesting no disposition for peace, and compel them to avow for what object they intend to continue the war. We have offered no equivalent for the fisheries. We have considered the rights and liberties connected with them as having formed essential parts of the acknowledgement of our independence. They need no additional stipulation to secure us in the enjoyment of them, and that our government upon these principles had instructed us not to bring them into discussion. This was originally my view of the subject, and the principle on which I thought the rights to the fisheries must be defended, from the moment when we were informed in the first conference they would be contested. The offer of an equivalent was afterwards suggested from a doubt whether the ground I had proposed to take was tenable, and with the intention of relieving it from all contention. I was prepared for either alternative, but I held the one or the other to be indispensable. We finally assumed the principle on which I had originally rested the cause. It is urged, that the principle, if correct, includes the equivalent which it had been contemplated to offer, and I admit that it may. The general basis of the state before the war includes in

substance both, to my mind beyond all doubt. And although I have no hope that this offer will be now accepted, yet if it should, I am not only ready to adhere to it and abide by it in all its consequences, but to sign the treaty with a degree of pleasure which has not yet fallen to my lot in this life. I am very certain that after seven years of war we shall not obtain more, and what heart would continue the war another day, finally to obtain less?

You will have observed that the atrocious manner in which the British are carrying on the war in our country has been a subject of animadversion in Parliament. The ministers placed it on the footing of retaliation. Lord Grenville and Mr. Whitbread censure in the style which Burke described as "above all things afraid of being too much in the right". They are evidently not in possession of the facts which shed the foulest infamy upon the British name in these transactions. We have seen several interesting speculations in the Paris papers on the same subject. Would it not be possible through the same channel to show the falsehood of the pretext of retaliation, or to make the principle recoil upon themselves? You have no doubt the report of the committee made 31 July, 1813, on the spirit and manner in which the war had been waged against us even then. It has occurred to me that a short abstract from that might be presented to the public in Europe, with a reference to dates, which would point the argument of retaliation, such as it is, directly against the enemy. In general, the British have had ever since the commencement of the war such entire possession of all the printing presses in Europe, that its public opinion has been almost exclusively under their guidance. From the access which truth and humanity have obtained in several of the public journals in France in relation to our affairs, it may be inferred that no control unfavorable

to them will be exercised, however unwelcome the real exposition of facts may be across the channel.

It appears that the principles asserted by the French plenipotentiaries at Vienna have made a profound impression, that they have already disconcerted some of the projects of Lord Castlereagh, and that without offering any pretext for hostility from any quarter, they have laid the foundation for the restoration to France of that influence in the affairs of Europe without which this continent would be little more than a British colony. The issue of the Congress at Vienna will undoubtedly be pacific; but if France has taken the attitude ascribed to her by the rumored contents of Talleyrand's memorial, her rival will not long enjoy the dream of dictating her laws to the civilized world. France had lost her place in the family of nations. It was at Vienna that it became her to resume it. We have reason to hope that she did resume it exactly where she ought, and as the place she took was marked at once with dignity and moderation, it is to be presumed it will be maintained with firmness.

I am etc.

TO LOUISA CATHERINE ADAMS

GHENT, 18 November, 1814.

. . . It is the eighth day since we sent our last note to the British plenipotentiaries. Their reply to our communications has not hitherto been delayed beyond ten days, and if no unusual time should be taken for the consideration of our project for a treaty, we may expect their note next Monday. If their government seriously intended to make peace at present, by the proposal which we have made them, and to which I referred in my last letter, it might be con-

cluded in twenty-four hours; but as it will certainly not be accepted, there can as certainly be no peace at this time. Had there been any doubt on this point left upon my mind it would have been removed by the avowal of Lord Liverpool in the debate on the Regent's speech, that their demands and proposals were to rise and fall according to circumstances.

The Congress of Vienna has not exactly corresponded in its arrangements with their intentions, but they have succeeded at it in some of their most important purposes. They will conclude these without any disturbance of a general peace, but probably France will be left dissatisfied with the arrangements, and formally protesting against them. Such is at least said to be the present state of affairs. The great effort of Lord Castlereagh has been to exclude France totally from all influence in the general distribution of spoils of Europe, and even from all interference in the affairs of Germany. The great effort of Talleyrand has been to exercise influence without provoking hostility, to counteract the views of the British government without directly confronting them, and finally to dissolve the league against France under which the Congress first assembled. If the public reports from Vienna may be credited, the address of Talleyrand has hitherto gained ground upon that of his antagonist. There has been undoubtedly a clashing of purposes between them which at one time amounted to a personal misunderstanding. The English story from Vienna is that Talleyrand has shrunk from his pretensions, and smoothed away the difficulties he had raised. The reports here are that the Emperor Alexander has declared himself in favor of the principles asserted by Talleyrand in his famous memorial; that the memorial has produced a profound impression; that Talleyrand distinguishes himself by his activity and talents;

that he has availed himself of the opposition of interests, and has even obtained a reconsideration of certain decisions which had already been agreed to by the other great powers. The first object of France necessarily must have been to untie the knot of all Europe combined against her. This she could not more effectually do than by declaring that she demanded nothing for herself. The next declaration that it was not her intention to oppose by force any of the arrangements which should be made, took from the other powers all pretext for measures of hostility against her; and under the shelter of these two preliminaries, it was impossible that her voice should be heard without effect in the subsequent deliberations of those whose principal object was to share the general plunder among themselves.

Notwithstanding this it is apparent that the affairs of Europe will be settled at Vienna, so much according to English views, and so far against the interests of France, that she will never cordially acquiesce in the settlement. She may perhaps have prevented the projected aggrandizement of the kingdom of Hanover; but the fate of Saxony, of Belgium, and perhaps of Italy, has been fixed without regard to her remonstrances. Britain is engaged in a war which must employ a considerable part of her forces, and increase the embarrassment of her finances. France will be well pleased to see the continuation of this war, and will be watching the favorable moment to redeem herself from the humiliation she is now enduring as well as to recover the relative position from which she has just now been degraded. England must be kept in a continual state of jealousy and alarm, even in the midst of peace, having the constant danger impending over her of war. It is impossible that the Congress of Vienna should settle a permanent basis for the balance of Europe. They will merely distribute the spoils of France,

and open the source of future combinations against their own measures, of which France will be the natural centre and support. . . .

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE

No. 143. . . .

[JAMES MONROE]

Ghent, 20 November, 1814.

SIR:

The *Chauncey* sailed on the first of this month from Ostend, and by her we transmitted to you copies of all the official papers which had passed between the British plenipotentiaries and us. The interval that had elapsed since the departure of the *John Adams* was so long that I am apprehensive you may have thought it unnecessarily protracted. It was owing to the reluctance with which the supercargo of the *Chauncey* came to the determination of proceeding to America, and to the dilatory proceedings of the British Admiralty upon our applications for passports for vessels to convey our dispatches. On the 7th of September we had by a note to the British plenipotentiaries requested them to obtain such a passport for the schooner *Herald*, lying at Amsterdam. There were a number of persons citizens of the United States ¹ who were desirous of returning in that vessel as passengers, and we gave their names with the intimation of a wish that they might be inserted as passengers on the passport. We have not to this day received any answer from the Admiralty upon this application.

When Mr. Boyd arrived here, we immediately addressed a note to the (British) plenipotentiaries asking a passport

¹ Moffatt, Gray, Gookin, Price, Bly, and Williams.

for the *Transit* to return to the United States with our dispatches; at the same time we informed them that you had been obliged to dispatch her without any passport, and sent them copies of your note to Lord Castlereagh, enclosing the duplicates of your letters of 25 and 27 June to us, and of Admiral Cockburn's letter to you, alleging his commander's orders for refusing a passport for a vessel in July, because he judged it sufficient to have given one for another vessel the preceding March; and we intimated to them that their officers had thus to the utmost extent of their power precluded our government from transmitting to us any instructions subsequent to their knowledge of the important changes in the affairs of Europe which had so essential a bearing upon the objects of our negotiation. The circumstance was the more remarkable, because the British plenipotentiaries had in one of their notes made it a subject of reproach to the government of the United States, that they had not furnished us with instructions after being informed of the pacification of Europe. We had, indeed, told them at the conference of the 9th of August that we had then received instructions dated at the close of June. But this had altogether escaped their recollection; so that while Admiral Cockburn was writing you that his superior officer had decided that there was no further occasion for our government to instruct us until they should receive dispatches from us, the British government was taking it for granted that we had received no instructions and was charging it as an indication that the American government was not sincerely disposed to peace.

It was nearly five months after we made this communication asking a passport for the *Transit*, when we received it. The passport requires that she should go in ballast, and with no other passenger than a bearer of dispatches from us. No

answer has been given us, either in relation to Admiral Cockburn's letter to you refusing a cartel, or to your note to Lord Castlereagh, inclosing the duplicates. We received the passport for the *Transit* only the day before the *Chauncey* sailed, so that the length of time between the dispatching of Mr. Dallas and that of Mr. Connell, and of course the long period which you will probably be without advices from us, will have been owing to obstacles independent of our control.

From the nature of the British pretensions and demands as disclosed in the first note from their plenipotentiaries to us, and from the tone with which they were brought forward, both in that note and in the conference of the day on which it is dated, we had concluded that the rupture of the negotiation would immediately ensue, and expected to have been discharged from our attendance at this place before the first of September. The British plenipotentiaries, after receiving our answer to their first note, appeared to entertain the same expectation, and if the sincerity of their conversation can be implicitly trusted, they were not altogether in the secret of their government. It soon became apparent from the course pursued by them, that the intention of the British Cabinet was neither to break off the negotiation nor to conclude the peace. They expected that a powerful impression would be made in America by the armaments, naval and military, which they had sent and were continuing to send. At the same time the result of the Congress at Vienna was a subject of some uncertainty. The expediency of another campaign in America might depend upon its issue. Success in either hemisphere would warrant them in raising their demands at their own discretion. Failure on either, or even on both sides, would still leave them with a certainty of a peace as favorable as they could have any reasonable

pretence to require. They have accordingly confined their plenipotentiaries to the task of wasting time. After spending more than two months upon a preliminary article, which ultimately bore scarcely a feature of its original aspect, they twice successively evaded our request for an interchange of the projet of a treaty. They have at least started it as a point of etiquette, and appear to consider it as an advantage to receive the first draft instead of giving it. We have now endeavored to gratify them in both respects. We have sent them our projet and are now waiting for theirs. In the meantime Lord Liverpool has avowed in the debates on the Regent's speech that their demands and proposals are to be regulated by circumstances, which implies that they are not yet prepared to conclude. One of the latest ministerial papers announces that the negotiation is not to succeed, and that their plenipotentiaries are very shortly to return to England. Of the latter part of their information I much doubt; for although the progress of the negotiations at Vienna daily strengthens the expectation that it will end without any immediate disturbance of the peace of Europe, it does not yet promise a state of permanent tranquillity which would make the policy of continuing at all events the war with America unquestionable.

I have received and shall forward by the *Transit* a packet of dispatches for you from Mr. Harris at St. Petersburg. It doubtless contains copies of the note which he addressed to the Imperial Department of Foreign Affairs in relation to Admiral Cockburn's proclamation of blockade of 25 April last. I know not whether it is to be regretted that Mr. Harris's note was not presented until after the Emperor's departure for Vienna. He writes me that Mr. Weydemeyer at his suggestion had written to Count Nesselrode, requesting him to communicate directly to me the Emperor's answer

on the subject of the note. But I have not heard from the Count.

The popular sentiment throughout Europe has been, and still is, that the United States must sink in the present struggle against the whole power of Great Britain. And such is the British ascendancy over all the governments of Europe, that even where the feelings of the people incline to favor us, they dare not yet unequivocally express them. The late events in America, as far as they are known here, tended to produce some change in this respect. The destruction of the public buildings at Washington has been publicly reprobated in some of the French gazettes, but it has been defended in others. The general effect upon the public opinion has been unfavorable to the English, but the impression of their defeat at Baltimore, and especially of the retreat from Plattsburg, has been much deeper. We shall have no valuable friends in Europe until we have proved that we can defend ourselves without them. There will be friends enough, if we can maintain our own cause by our own resources. . . .

TO LOUISA CATHERINE ADAMS

GHENT, 22 November, 1814.

We have not yet received from the British plenipotentiaries a reply to the note which we sent them on Thursday the 10th inst., but we find some notice of it in the English newspapers. The *Courier*, an evening and ministerial paper, on Monday the 14th, after referring to a paragraph in the gazette of this country, which had stated that nothing was known of the state of the negotiation at Ghent, added that enough however was known in England to ascertain that it

would not succeed, and that the British plenipotentiaries might soon be expected home. The *Morning Chronicle*, an opposition paper, on Tuesday, the 15th, stated that the American ministers had in the course of the preceding week delivered in a long note, which had been received at London on Sunday morning, and that a Cabinet council had immediately been held upon it at the foreign office. It mentions also that there had been reports on Monday that we had received instructions from America by the way of France; but we had rejected the project offered by the British government, and proposed another. The meeting of the Cabinet council on Sunday the 13th has been confirmed by the subsequent papers, and it is probable that a hint was given to the editor of the *Courier* to prepare the expectation of the public for the rupture. It is not true that we have rejected the British project, for we have not yet been able to prevail upon the British Cabinet council to produce any project at all. They have made and retracted, and renewed and varied, distinct propositions upon particular points, but have taken special care to give us no project of a treaty. Nearly three months ago they informed us that on one of the points upon which we had rejected their demands, they should, as soon as we had agreed upon another, have a proposal to make, so fair and moderate and generous, that we could not possibly reject it. We did finally agree a month since upon the other point, since which we have not heard of the fair and generous proposal. They have on the contrary told us in substance that they had no proposal to make about it; and yet I fully expect that if they do give us at least a project of a treaty, we shall find it there. We have now asked them three times for their project. The first time we offered to return them ours immediately after receiving theirs. As they shuffled in their answer, but hinted in a manner as if they were

ashamed of the suggestion, that there was an advantage in receiving the first draft of a treaty instead of giving it, we next offered to exchange the two projects at the same time. They replied by a pretension that they had partly furnished a project because they had told us in substance all they meant to demand; and then again they squinted at the advantage of receiving the first offer, and at some question of *etiquette* which might be in the case. It was too plain that their *advantage* and their *etiquette* were nothing but devices for wasting time; and so we sent them a complete project drawn up in form, with nothing but blanks of time and place to fill to make it a treaty. Had the British plenipotentiaries been sent here honestly to make peace, this is what might and should have been done before the twentieth of August on both sides. The pretended *etiquette* is an absurdity. The negotiation was proposed by the British government. It was the business of the British government to present first, in form as well as in substance, the terms upon which they were willing to conclude the peace. When we were at Berlin, you remember there was a treaty of commerce concluded between the United States and Prussia. The first thing the Prussian ministers did after they were appointed to treat with me was to send me the project of a treaty in form. They never hinted at any question of *etiquette*, and I am very sure this is the first time that such a pretension was ever applied to such an occasion. Some of us expect that we shall now at least bring them to a point; but of this, notwithstanding the threat in the *Courier*, I strongly doubt. They have as yet no information from America decisive as to the issue of the campaign. . . .

I am not surprised that you should have been so much affected by the vandalism at Washington. The disgust which you observe that the course of the British there gave at

St. Petersburg, has been generally felt throughout Europe. The whole transaction has done more injury to them than to us, especially as Baltimore, Plattsburg, Lake Champlain, and Fort Erie have since retrieved part of our loss of character, while they have tended to aggravate their disgrace. By this time I believe that even your *compassionating* friends in Russia begin to suspect that all *America* is not yet conquered. We have yet much to endure and go through; but I trust we shall triumph at the last.

Our dinner to the British plenipotentiaries and Americans on Friday was not remarkably gay, but it passed off with all suitable decorum. Bentzon was extremely diverted with my namesake the Doctor,¹ who told us that he had not been to the play in England these ten years, and described with ecstasies of astonishment and delight the tricks that he had seen performed by an Indian juggler, and the amazing address with which he balanced straws upon his nose. Bentzon declares that these two things taken together have given him the exact measure of the man. . . .

TO ABIGAIL ADAMS

GHENT, 23 November, 1814.

While the eyes and expectations of our country have been so anxiously and so fruitlessly turning towards us for the restoration of that peace for which she so earnestly longs, ours are turned with anxiety equally deep towards her, for those exertions and energies by which alone she will find peace to be obtained. The British government, after exhausting every expedient and every pretext to delay, sent

¹ William Adams.

at last plenipotentiaries to meet us here, with formal full powers to conclude a peace and with orders, as appears by their proceedings, to do nothing more than to transmit our communications to the Cabinet Council in England, and the answers of the Cabinet Council to us. This at least is all that they have done hitherto. They began by making professions the most pacific and conciliatory, together with demands the most extravagant and inadmissible. After contesting two months and more upon mere preliminaries, and abandoning so much of their demands that we found it possible to agree to the rest, they came out with a proposal entirely new, inconsistent with repeated declarations previously made by them, and which we could only reject in the most pointed terms. The principle which the ministry and their adherents in England had assumed was, that the only peace to be made with America was one which should be on the basis of unconditional submission by the Americans. They knew that we were not prepared to subscribe to such terms, but they probably expected we should be at the close of the campaign which they had prepared in America; or at least that their present successes would be sufficiently great to keep the spirits and passions of their people up to the tone of supporting another campaign to secure their triumph. Hitherto the successes, as far as they are known, have been too much balanced to have answered their expectations. That of their attack upon Washington intoxicated them to such a degree that they translated their *Gazette* account of it into all the principal languages and sent it by special messengers all over Europe. That of Sir John Sherbrook's expedition followed immediately after, and in more than one way flattered their dreams of conquest. Their conduct at Washington, however, excited throughout Europe a sentiment very different from that which they had ex-

pected, a sentiment of disgust at the Gothic barbarism of their proceedings; and since then, their failure at Baltimore, their defeat on Lake Champlain, their retreat from Plattsburg, and the sortie of 17 September from Fort Erie, have redeemed some of our disgraces, have aggravated theirs, and now lead them to the anticipation of an issue to the campaign more disastrous to them than I fear the event will realize. My own greatest apprehensions during the whole summer have been for Sackett's Harbor and our naval force on Lake Ontario. There is where I have dreaded the severest blow to us and the misfortune of the most important consequences. My anxiety is far from being removed by the accounts last received. Should the British succeed there, or in any important enterprise in other quarters there will be no possibility of obtaining peace. They have hitherto met with no check of sufficient magnitude to discourage them, and at present much slighter advantages than those upon which they have calculated will satisfy them with regard to the issue of the campaign.

It is a mortifying circumstance to one who feels for the honor and interest of our country to find a British Prime Minister boasting in Parliament, as the Earl of Liverpool has done, that the infamous outrages of their troops in America has been much more vindicated and justified by Americans in American newspapers, than they have in England itself. Still more of humiliation did I feel at his assertion that the people of the district of which they have taken possession, people of the state of Massachusetts, had manifested a disposition to become British subjects. I still indulge the hope that he has magnified into an expression of popular sentiment the baseness and servility of a few individual sycophants, who may have intended merely to save their property from plunder by paying court to the

British commander. Deeply as the sordid spirit of faction has degraded my native state, I will not yet believe that the lofty sentiment of independence has been extinguished in the souls of any considerable portion of my countrymen, or that they have sunk low enough in the scale of creation willingly to become subjects of Great Britain.

The European continent, after having presented for more than twenty years a continual scene of bloodshed, horror and devastation, has by a metamorphosis almost miraculous, been suddenly transformed into a scene of universal peace, though not yet of absolute tranquillity. The Congress assembled at Vienna to distribute the plunder taken from France, to settle the basis of a new balance for Europe, after having twice been postponed, was to have been opened formally on the first of this month. It does not, however, yet appear what sort of a body this Congress will be, or what will be their powers or duties. Several of the sovereigns engaged in the late war, and the principal ministers of others, have been at Vienna concerting their arrangements together these two months. They have formed the real Congress for the dispatch of business, and when they break up there will be nothing of importance left for the other to do. It is already apparent enough that they will settle no permanent system for the future repose of Europe, and perhaps the attempt itself to accomplish such a plan would be chimerical. It is equally evident that they will distribute their spoils without immediately quarrelling among themselves. But as England will be left in undisturbed possession of her dominion of the seas, and as France will be left humiliated, dissatisfied and yet formidable, there can be no doubt that the peace of Europe will be neither solid nor permanent. There will probably be no war during the next year and we shall, of course, according to all present appearances have

again to contend single handed against the whole force of Great Britain through the campaign of 1815. But if we defend ourselves manfully, Britain will at the close of the ensuing year be glad to make peace with us upon terms to which we can subscribe, or she will again have her hands full in Europe.

As to the end of our present negotiation, I perceive no prospect of it until our own government shall think proper to bring it to a close. Hitherto it has been the purpose of the British government to keep it open, and while they have constantly avoided an approach to such conditions as we could agree to, they have with equal care guarded against giving us any solid ground upon which we would have been justified in breaking it off. How far it may suit your policy to keep a sort of permanent Congress together, waiting for the chapter of accidents to bring the two parties to terms upon which they can agree, it is not for me to determine. It is however possible that the British Ministry may adopt a more decisive course when their fiscal arrangements for the next year are completed, or when they have more fully ascertained the issue of the Congress at Vienna.

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TO LEVETT HARRIS

GHENT, 24 November, 1814.

DEAR SIR:

I received yesterday your favor of the 2nd instant, and am gratified in learning that the public sentiment at St. Petersburg so generally and decisively reprobated the conduct of the Vandals at Washington. The same sentiment, so far as I have had the opportunity of being informed, has been

universal throughout Europe, insomuch that even the opposition in both Houses of the British Parliament have avowed their participation in it. The Ministry, like their representative in Russia, attempted to defend it on the pretence of retaliation; but the real cause is the spirit of inveteracy and rancor generally felt by the British nation against America. They never have observed, and never will observe, towards us the ordinary laws of war which they respect in their quarrels with other nations. When the French National Convention issued a decree forbidding their troops to give quarter to British and Hanoverian soldiers, the Duke of York published a proclamation declaring that he would *not* retaliate by the like barbarity. But the Duke of York was then fighting against Frenchmen. The hatred and revenge rankling in the hearts of Britons against the French is deep and deadly, but it is mercy and compassion when compared with their malice against America. As to their pretence of retaliation, if Lewiston, Georgetown, Frederick, Hampton, and numberless minor instances of their atrocities did not give it the lie, a test of its falsehood might be seen in their application of it to their bombardment of the village of Stonington. The officer who executed that act of barbarism was not ashamed to allege as the occasion of it, that it was in retaliation for the *torpedoes* that the town of Stonington had been active in sending out against his Majesty's ships. It appears, however, that the indignation of mankind at this last brutal outrage at Washington has found its way even to the sense of shame yet remaining in the British government; for the ministers in Parliament have declared that orders had been sent to Cochrane no longer to carry into effect his proclamation threatening to destroy and lay waste all the towns on the sea coast that he should find assailable.

Notwithstanding this, I have no expectation that the war

will be waged by them with more humanity than it has been. We must expect and be prepared for more cruel and desolating war from them than from any other portion of mankind. It is by no reliance upon good principles or passions in them that we must defend ourselves against their enmity; it is by energies of every kind on our own part that we must achieve the triumph over it. Their success at Washington and Alexandria is almost as disgraceful to us, I blush to say, as to them. Since then, some events have occurred not less ignominious to them, and which throw a veil over some of our shame. We have indeed little to boast of in the defence of Baltimore, or in the repulse of Prevost at Plattsburg. The battle on Lake Champlain has maintained our naval reputation, and added a new wreath to the glories of our mariners. The sortie at Fort Erie, though less decisive in its character, is distinguished as a military *coup de main*, and the whole campaign on the Niagara frontier has been so creditable to us that we have only to hope it may be terminated with a perseverance of valor and good conduct, and a continuation of good fortune adequate to crown it with complete success.

By Mr. Milligan, who arrived here last evening from London, we are informed that the *Fingal* had arrived there, having left New York the 22nd of October.¹ The *John Adams* arrived at New York the 5th of that month. The dispatches which we sent by Mr. Dallas have been all published by our government, and I suppose you will see them in the English newspapers by the time you receive this letter. This circumstance may perhaps abridge the period of our continuance here.²

¹ Purviance came in this vessel with dispatches for the commissioners from Washington.

² Adams, *Memoirs*, November 24, 1814. "The English newspapers will have

I will be obliged to you to obtain and forward to me a passport for my return to St. Petersburg, as I presume it will be necessary for me on entering Russia. I am not sure that I shall remain here long enough to receive it, but I must take the chance. I am etc.

TO LOUISA CATHERINE ADAMS

Ghent, 25 November, 1814.

. . . The *John Adams* arrived at New York on the 5th of October. Our dispatches by that vessel were communicated to Congress, and *immediately* published, together with the instructions of the government to us. Mr. Monroe writes that they were producing the best effects, by uniting the sentiments of all parties in support of the war. De Grand writes me the same thing. The *Ajax*, the Dutch vessel that

given you full information of the publications which have taken place in America of the first conferences at Ghent. Mr. Madison has acted most scandalously in making this communication at the time he did; and his letter to the Congress, which conveys the papers, contains a gross falsehood. We have no means of knowing what are the instructions which have been transmitted to the American Commissioners by the *Fingal*, but we sent an answer to their last note and projet on Monday [the 21st], and a few days will therefore inform us whether we are likely to have peace, or whether the American government will have advanced new pretensions in consequence of the clamour which they have excited throughout the country on account of the demands brought forward by us in the month of August." *Liverpool to the Duke of Wellington*, November 26, 1814. Wellington, *Supplementary Despatches*, IX. 456. Wellington had written on the same day or even on the 25th, a private note to Gallatin which was delivered on the 28th. The son describes it as "couched in the most friendly terms, assuring father he has brought all his weight to bear to ensure peace. He goes on to say, 'as I gather Mr. Madison as well as Mr. Monroe gave you full power to act, without even consulting your colleagues on points you considered of importance, I now feel that peace is shortly in view. Mr. Goulburn has made grave errors and Lord Castlereagh has read him a sharp lesson.'" *Diary of James Gallatin*, 34.

I have mentioned to you in several former letters, arrived on Monday last, the 21st, after a passage of thirty-four days from Boston, at the Texel. Mr. Bourne at Amsterdam writes me that the accounts brought by her are of the same nature; that there was but one voice upon the British proposals, and that was to spurn them with indignation. What those proposals were I dare say you will have seen when this reaches you, for our letters to the government, and the first note of the British plenipotentiaries to us, the note of which I gave you an account in my letter of 23 August, are now republished at full length in the English newspapers. You will judge after reading it whether I had reason to write you that it was impossible we should be detained here beyond the first of September, unless it were for the arrangement of our papers. The situation of things since then has changed more in appearance than in reality. The British government have withdrawn just so much of their inadmissible demands as would avoid the immediate rupture of the negotiation. They have varied their terms at every communication that has passed between their plenipotentiaries and us. They have abandoned the claims which they had declared indispensable preliminaries, only to bring them forward again, whenever the circumstances of the war might encourage them to insolence, and in my belief they are now delaying their reply to our last note, which they have had upwards of a fortnight, only to receive accounts of success from America, which will countenance them in rejecting our proposal, and assuming to dictate to us new terms of dishonor and submission.

That they will be highly exasperated by the publication of the dispatches we have every reason to expect, from the manner in which it has affected their plenipotentiaries. We met them last evening at the *redoute*, and gave them the

first information of this event. They had not received their papers of Saturday last, and expected their messenger this day. They expressed much astonishment at the publication of dispatches pending a negotiation, and Mr. Goulburn, who is of an irritable nature, could not contain his temper. I knew too well the character of the American government and people to doubt that such dispatches as Dallas carried out would be immediately published, and assuredly the British government have no right to complain of it. Mr. Gallatin thinks they will break off the negotiation upon it, and if they do, it will only relieve us from the humiliation of being kept here in attendance upon their insulting caprices, and insidious tergiversations. We have been here five months, enduring everything, rather than break off while a possibility of peace remained. If they choose to break for an act of our government in which we had no share, the blame will be none of ours, and if that act was merely disclosing to the world the degradation and infamy which under professions of moderation and magnanimity they offered us as their terms of peace, our government will stand justified before heaven and earth for having done it. In our dispatches from the Secretary of State there are two things that have given me the highest gratification. The first is, that we have the entire approbation of the President for the determination we had declared, that we should reject the British proposals. The second is this. You will recollect that in my letter to you of the 11th of this month I informed you that I had obtained, not without difficulty, the unanimous consent of my colleagues to insert in our last note to the British plenipotentiaries a proposal, the only one upon which, as I believed, there was the remotest possibility that we should ultimately obtain peace, and from which we should, as I also hoped, derive great advantage,

even if it should be rejected. The principal objection against it was that it was not authorized, but was even forbidden by our instructions. This I admitted, but urged that we ought to take upon ourselves the responsibility of making it on the full conviction that our government would now approve of it. I told you that I was strenuously supported by both my original colleagues, and finally obtained the acquiescence of the others to make the proposal. In the instructions that we have now received, dated 19 October, we are expressly authorized to make the same identical offer. The heaviest responsibility therefore, that of having trespassed upon our instructions, is already removed. The effects of the measure are yet to be seen. I trust they will, under either issue of the negotiation, be good. . . .

The Massachusetts legislature have appointed twelve delegates to meet others from the rest of the New England states, on the 15th of December, at Hartford in Connecticut, to organize a separate system of defense, and a new confederacy of their own. This is a dangerous measure, but I hope it will not have all the pernicious effects to be apprehended from it. . . .

TO PETER PAUL FRANCIS DE GRAND

Ghent, 27 November, 1814.

I wrote you on the 23rd of July that we had then been here a full month waiting for the appearance of the British commissioners who were to meet us. More than another fortnight passed before they came. Yet this negotiation had been invited by the British government, and I had been by extraordinary circumstances two months in coming from

St. Petersburg while it could not have taken the British plenipotentiaries to arrive here from London at any time more than four days. When they arrived, you are now informed with what professions and with what propositions they commenced the negotiation with us. Since then, and until this day, they have been changing their proposals at every official note they have sent us, without any other apparent object for the present than to avoid both the conclusion of a peace and the rupture of the negotiation. They have been every month sending out to America reinforcements of troops and supplies of every description, and there is every reason to believe that they have calculated, and still calculate, upon crushing all resistance on the part of the United States, and upon reducing them to *unconditional submission*. These are the terms upon which alone the ministerial partisans and gazettes have insisted that peace can be *granted* to America.

They have been hitherto disappointed in their expectations. Their defeat upon Lake Champlain, though important in its consequences, and though one of the most brilliant achievements that have covered our naval heroes with glory, has produced less sensation in England and upon the continent of Europe than might have been expected. The cause of this is that our reputation for sea-fighting is fully established. It has henceforth only to be maintained. It is perfectly understood throughout Europe that upon the water, with equal forces the American flag will generally be victorious over the British. No surprise has anywhere been manifested at this new triumph of American mariners. The British nation has become so familiarized with this kind of *reverse*, as the Regent calls it in his speech, that they no longer feel it as a mortification. Their government, too, in order that the people may have less occasion to reflect upon

disasters, have resorted, I believe for the first time in British annals, to the expedient of withholding from publication their own official accounts of the event. Not a word has to this day appeared in the *Gazette* about the action of the *Wasp* with the *Reindeer*, or with the *Avon*. And although the Ministers have acknowledged in Parliament that they had received dispatches from Sir G. Prevost, dated in October, a month after his retreat from Plattsburg, yet they declared they should publish nothing but the list of killed and wounded, because the official report from their naval commander on the lake had not been received.

The atrocious system of warfare which they have adopted has been one of the means upon which they have relied for breaking down the spirit of the American people. They pretend that they were provoked to it and practised it on the principle of retaliation. But we know that Admiral Cochrane went out with instructions for it from England. But such an universal sentiment of disgust has been manifested at it throughout Europe, that they now say they have sent out new instructions to their Admiral not to persist in it any longer. The great effect of the present campaign, so far as it is yet known, has been to raise our military reputation upon the land. The events on the Niagara frontier have redeemed much of the character which we had lost by the issue of the preceding campaign, and Prevost's retreat from Plattsburg has at least taken from the British all right of deriding us for any of our former discomfitures.

TO LOUISA CATHERINE ADAMS

GHENT, 29 November, 1814.

My letter of Friday last informed you of the arrival of the *Fingal* at Havre, and of the dispatches from the government brought by her that we had received. I should at the same time have told you that the *Ajax*, the Dutch vessel in which Mr. Changuion went to America, arrived on the 21st inst. at the Texel, after a passage of thirty-four days from Boston. I now add by way of episode that the Dutch government have already concluded to recall the said Mr. Changuion, with the intention, as we hear, of sending him to Constantinople. This incident is of no great importance to us, and perhaps it may be accounted for without recurring to the supposition of any foreign influence upon the councils of the Sovereign Prince. The measure of sending him out was a manifestation of a friendly disposition towards us at a critical moment, and as such was estimated by our country. His recall before the crisis has passed may perhaps cancel some part of the obligation which a mere act of national courtesy might be supposed to confer by the circumstances of the moment at which it was performed. But as in the actual state of things our country has the most decisive proof at what value she is to estimate the friendship of *Europe*, so I trust that with the blessing of God she will prove herself competent to her own defense, without needing the aid of that friendship for any part of her support. . . .

The proceedings of the legislature of Massachusetts are the worst feature in our public transactions. I am not surprised at them, because I have known more than ten years the views of the party by which they have been carried, and because I have been nearly as long convinced that this in-

ternal ulcer in our body-politic must and would sooner or later come to its head and break. I have been also fully prepared to see the demon of disunion show himself in his hideous shape, and gradually throw off his disguise in proportion as the dangers and distresses of the country should become imminent and severe. But at this moment how fearfully does this mad and wicked project of national suicide bear upon my heart and mind, when I have the profoundest conviction that if we now fail to obtain peace, it will be owing entirely to this act of the Massachusetts legislature. On Sunday we received a note from the British plenipotentiaries, together with our own project of a treaty, with their remarks and proposals upon it. They have rejected without exception everything that we had demanded on the part of the United States; but they have abandoned everything important that was inadmissible of their own demands. The objects upon which they still insist, and which we cannot yield, are in themselves so trifling and insignificant that neither of the two nations would tolerate a war for them. We have everything but peace in our hands. But in these trifles, in the simple consideration of interest, they have left involved principles to which we cannot accede. They have given up without qualification all demand for a cession of territory, either for the Indians, or for themselves; but they have attempted to secure by an article ambiguously drawn, the possession of perhaps a few hundred acres of land, which we can no more give up, than we could a whole state in our union. There are other points totally unimportant, but implicating our national honor, to which they still adhere. We cannot agree to them, and if they finally persist in requiring it of us, the negotiation must break off. By reducing the controversy between us to points so infinitely small in themselves, but upon which we cannot yield without dis-

grace, it is evident that the British government are now sensible of the difficulty and danger to themselves of continuing the war; and that nothing could induce them to it but the encouragement held out to them by this prospect of the dissolution of our Union. It is remarkable that these remnants of inadmissible claims are pointed against the state of Massachusetts alone, and that we have at present nothing to contend for, but rights peculiarly enjoyed by her and her citizens. We shall maintain them with firmness, and may the great disposer of events and Ruler of Hearts grant that we may maintain them effectually! For the first time I now entertain hope that the British government is inclined to conclude the peace. Whether they have found that the Congress of Vienna has not been so propitious to their supreme ascendancy in Europe as they had expected; or that the prospects of their campaign in America will probably terminate in disappointment; or that on the disclosure of their original demands, their own people are not prepared to squander their blood and treasure for a war of conquest in North America, I cannot determine; but certain it is as the Chancellor of the Exchequer has very significantly said in the House of Commons, that the state of the negotiation in November is quite a different thing from the state of the negotiation in August. We are now in sight of port. Oh! that we may reach it in safety! . . .

On the publication of our dispatches the federalists in Congress came out in the most explicit and decisive manner, declaring their determination to support the war at all hazards and every sacrifice against the new British demands and pretensions. The speeches of Mr. Hanson ¹ and Mr. Oakley ² are reprinted in the English papers. The gov-

¹ Alexander Contee Hanson, of Maryland (1786-1819).

² Thomas Jackson Oakley, of New York (1783-1857).

ernor of Vermont had already published a proclamation in the same spirit. Even the report to the Massachusetts legislature recommending their New England delegation whiningly complains that the enemy did not discriminate in his hostility between the supporters and the opponents of the war.

The state of our finances is very bad. Mr. G. W. Campbell has resigned the office of Secretary of the Treasury, and Mr. Dallas has taken his place.¹ Mr. Monroe has been appointed Secretary of War. The Department of State is not yet filled. The elections for Congress are taking place in several of the states. The changes are, as far as they are known, about equal on both sides. I indulge a hope that the extremities of the times will produce a coalition of parties and an administration combining all the respectable interests of the country. . . .

TO LOUISA CATHERINE ADAMS

Ghent, 2 December, 1814.

. . . The news from America which you must have received since writing this letter of the 6th [November] has been more cheering than the preceding accounts. We have had a series of very important successes, and they have totally changed the face of the war, the expectations of all Europe with regard to its issue, and above all the tone of the British government in the negotiation here. The latest incident, the taking of Sackett's Harbor and of Chauncey's fleet, was not officially confirmed in London last Saturday. There is a bare possibility that it may not be true. If it is, our prospects of peace will be as desperate as ever.

By the observations which you make upon the dispositions of my colleagues, I apprehend I may have expressed myself

¹ Dallas took office, October 6, 1814.

too strongly upon the spirit of concession and the language of conciliation, which I wrote you they carried a little beyond the point where I would have stopped. In the concession to which I finally and most reluctantly agreed, my ideas, as I wrote you, did not exactly correspond with theirs with regard to its extent. We accepted an article presented to us by the British plenipotentiaries as the last word of the British government on the subject. Two of my colleagues at least, perhaps all of them, give to that article a construction much more limited than I do. They were therefore not so averse to accepting it as I was. They thought it amounted to little or nothing. I thought it meant so much that I offered then to reject it even at the hazard of breaking off the negotiation upon it, if they would concur with me. They preferred accepting the article, because they understood the meaning differently from me. Though I have no doubt the British government understand it as I do, yet as my colleagues are all intelligent men, their construction of the article may be the right one, and if so the concession was certainly a mere trifle, and it would have been wrong to risk a rupture by rejecting it. I finally agreed with them in accepting the article, with adopting their opinion of its meaning. It was therefore natural that I should think the concession much greater than they did, and by concurring with them I acquiesced in their judgment rather than adhere inflexibly to my own. As to the notice which it was proper to take of the acrimonious language used in all the British notes, I incline upon cool consideration to the belief that they have acted prudently in retrenching almost all the manifestations of temper which I have inserted in my drafts of papers to be sent as answers to the British plenipotentiaries. Even as it was, the tone as well as the substance of our first note was quite unexpected to the British government, and there has

been no occasion since in which we have faltered from it, excepting in that note accepting the article. I was then for speaking in bolder terms and for a stronger expression of feeling than was thought advisable. My colleagues shared in all my feelings, but thought it best to suppress them. Perhaps if we had yielded to the irritation excited by the British note, we should have only produced irritation in return, and the chance of peace would have been still more unpromising than it is. We are at this moment in the greatest and most trying crisis of the negotiation. Until the note we received from the British plenipotentiaries last Sunday, I never indulged a hope of peace. It was impossible, with the demands which they had successively advanced, and none of which they had explicitly abandoned before. Now they have removed every insuperable obstacle, important in itself, and have hung the issue upon a hair. Yet even while surrendering their great principle upon everything of value, they cling to it upon a grain of sand, and they have attempted by ambiguities of expression to filch from us crumbs and atoms of that which they had first endeavored to extort from us entire. We answered the day before yesterday their note, and asked a conference at their own time and place.¹ They immediately appointed yesterday, noon, at their own house. We went and were with them about three hours. We consented to give up almost everything of what they had objected to, in our proposals; but there were left some points upon which we insisted. They removed one of the greatest remaining difficulties. They definitely rejected one claim upon which we had invited further discussion, and there are still three upon which we could come to no agreement.² It

¹ *American State Papers*, Foreign Relations, III. 741.

² See Adams, *Memoirs*, December 1, 1814; *Mass. Hist. Soc. Proceedings*, XLVIII.

was apparent that they were very desirous of signing the treaty upon the terms they have now offered, but they manifested it in their usual manner by airs of arrogance and intimated threats. In the first note they sent us, which is now published, they gave us notice that if we did not agree without even a reference to our government to their terms, they would not hold themselves bound by their own offers, but would vary their demands according to circumstances. Our answer to that threat was the rejection of their terms, with the information that we had no need of referring to our government concerning them. Their last note contains the same threat—that if we did not accept their offers now, they would not be bound by them hereafter. And yesterday two of the plenipotentiaries told us time after time that they must refer again to their government upon our objections, and that if new pretensions should be raised, they could only say they were now authorized to sign a treaty on the terms they had offered us. Mr. Clay at last told them that we did not doubt but they were ready to sign upon their own terms. I must do Lord Gambier the justice to say that *he* has never in conference practised this resort to the argument of a bully. We know very well that they will not hold themselves bound by their offers at any time, if they have the least encouragement to increase their demands after they are made. We are sure that nothing less than great disappointment both in Europe and America could have brought them down to their present terms, and we are sufficiently apprized that the smallest turn of affairs would make them immediately renew all their most insolent demands, and advance others still more extravagant. We, however, are not altogether such creatures of sunshine and of rain. We must adhere to our principles through good and evil fortune. If the British government really intend to make

peace when their next messenger arrives from Ghent, we may have it upon his return; if not, we shall have in all probability the certainty of a rupture.¹

I shall not have time to answer my dear Charles's letter this day. We are as much oppressed with occupation as we have been at any period since our arrival here. We have nevertheless as much dissipation as we can wish. We have *redoutes* and concerts twice a week, and the French theatre four times. A company of strolling English players came last week, and perform this evening for the fourth and last time. They solicited our permission to advertise themselves as performing *under the patronage of the American ministers*. They were advised that it would be their best expedient to fill the house. We did not, however, comply with their request. . . .

TO LOUISA CATHERINE ADAMS

Ghent, 6 December, 1814.

. . . It is the opinion of all my colleagues that we shall finish here before the close of the year. I think that however doubtful. They are at the same time much more sanguine than I am that we shall sign a peace. The last step of the

¹ "As to the disputed phrase in the 1st Article, I think the Americans mean to yield; but we should be equally obliged to you to tell us whether you think it worth insisting upon, as we may be mistaken in our opinion of the intentions of the Americans. They certainly evinced no anxiety to sign the treaty now. We told them that if they would concede the disputed Article, we were ready to sign immediately; but that if by declining they compelled us to refer home upon that point, we must be understood as not being bound to accede to the Articles already agreed on. This, however, produced no effect, and we therefore await your final instructions." *Goulburn to Earl Bathurst*, December 1, 1814. Wellington, *Supplementary Despatches*, IX. 460. On the same day Liverpool wrote to Castlereagh of the "favourable turn of the negotiations at Ghent."

British government has brought us so near, that if it was made in sincerity we cannot fail to conclude. But independent of the distrust which we ought to have for every act of an enemy who has been carrying on at the same time such a war and such a negotiation, there is something insidious in their last proposals which forbids all confidence in them. They *appear* to abandon the whole of their former inadmissible demands, and under the artifice of ambiguous expressions and of passing over without notice an important part of our preceding note, they cling to objects of no value, but involving principles which we cannot yield with honor. They were so far from being fairly disclosed on the face of their note, that it was only at the conference that we brought out the avowal of them. At the same time the temper of two of the British commissioners ¹ was as acrimonious and inveterate as it has been at any period of the negotiation. It is therefore impossible for me to confide in the smooth promises of the present state of things. An adversary who, after demanding empires as an indispensable preliminary, falls to playing pushpin for straws, deserves anything but confidence. They have also adhered to their professed policy of varying their proposals according to circumstances, and have told us now, as they did when they demanded a surrender of about one-third part of our territory, that if we do not give them what they ask at present, they will hereafter claim more if they dare.

If, upon the return of the messenger they have now dispatched, we have to deal with the same quibbling, equivocating, pettifogging spirit that we have found in all their transactions hitherto, we shall not finish without more references to England, and probably not in the course of the present year. The report of a probability that peace will be made

¹ Goulburn and Adams.

is now much circulated all over England. The prospect at Vienna is certainly not so flattering as had been anticipated. The issue of the campaign in America is yet not ascertained. If the confirmation of the taking of Sacketts Harbor and Chauncey's fleet reaches London before the answer is dispatched to us, we may still have to linger here for months without coming to any conclusion. . . .

The tone of all the English newspapers has changed so much in their notices of American affairs, that the *Times*, the most rancorous and abusive of them all, has published a letter from Canada, saying that if England intends to maintain her dominions in America, she must send out troops not by thousands or tens of thousands, but by hundreds of thousands. . . .

The English strolling Jews are not yet gone. After being refused our *patronage*, they obtained that of Lord Gambier, and play three times again this week. They took our five Napoleons for five tickets, and then to show their loyalty, concluded their play by singing God save the King on the stage. The joke was not so good as it would have been if we had granted them our patronage.

TO LEVETT HARRIS

GHENT, 8 December, 1814.

DEAR SIR:

The popular sentiment throughout Europe is favorable to us in our present contest with Great Britain; and since the publication in America of the instructions to the mission at this place, and of our dispatches that were transmitted by Mr. Dallas, it is manifest to the world that Great Britain

has entirely changed the objects of the war, and carries it on henceforth for purposes of conquest in North America. The maritime questions make no figure in our negotiation, whatever they may do at the Congress of Vienna. I do not credit the report that any of them have been brought forward by the French plenipotentiaries. I suppose you are not ignorant of the stipulation which Great Britain exacted last spring, and to which France was required to accede, and did accede before Louis XVIII left England, that no maritime question should be *discussed* at Vienna. France therefore has upon that question been tongue tied; and notwithstanding all the newspaper rumors it appears that very little respect or regard has been shown by the other powers at Vienna to anything that the French plenipotentiaries have said or written upon other subjects. England openly and avowedly makes the Congress at Vienna a league against France, and at the same time exacts of the French government measures of subserviency which they have not the fortitude to refuse.

We have received instructions from our government, in answer to the dispatches which we had sent by the *John Adams*. You will see in the English newspapers what those dispatches were. The President has entirely approved our determination unanimously to reject the demands upon which alone the British government had declared that they would negotiate. We did reject them, and yet Great Britain did negotiate. The Chancellor of the Exchequer has very truly stated in Parliament that the negotiation in November was a very different thing from the negotiation in August; but you must not lightly credit the rumors now circulated in England that there is a fair prospect of a successful issue to the conferences. Many of the insurmountable obstacles to the conclusion of a peace have been removed; there still

remain, however, enough to disappoint any hopes that we could have derived from the removal of the rest, and we have no reason for confiding that others will not yet be raised; for one of the circumstances under which we have been all along compelled to treat has been a notification, frequently repeated, that our antagonists will hold themselves bound to abide by none of their own terms, unless immediately accepted; and that they will rise in their demands whenever encouraged so to do by success in the war. Nor has this been an empty menace held up *in terrorem*. It has on one occasion been carried into effect, and a new pretension advanced upon the first appearance of success in America, which was again abandoned when the subsequent accounts of disaster had been received.

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TO LOUISA CATHERINE ADAMS

GHENT, 9 December, 1814.

. . . I speak of it as doubtful whether we shall finish here before the spring, because notwithstanding the present complexion of the rumors and prevailing opinions in England, the prospect of peace is very little brighter than it has been at our gloomiest hours. We may now from day to day receive the answer from England to our last proposals and the result of the conference we had with the plenipotentiaries on the first of this month. My belief is that the trying moment will be then. But you have drawn inferences from some of my former letters which make some explanation necessary. There has never been one moment of unnecessary delay on our part. I did upon one occasion offer to my colleagues to stand out upon a point where the British told us

they had spoken their last word. No one of my colleagues concurred with me at that time, and I have told you the reason. They differed from me as to the extent and meaning of the concession. I acquiesced in their judgment. On another occasion we altered a measure upon which a majority had agreed, because one gentleman¹ refused to sign the paper upon the substance of which we had taken a determination. On a third occasion a proposal of my own which had been rejected by my colleagues when first presented, was renewed by me from a deep conviction of its importance, and was finally agreed to by them. It was, as I have written you, not then authorized by our instructions, though fully warranted by those we have since received. In all these transactions you will perceive that the great principle which has prevailed among us all has been that of mutual conciliation and deference to the opinions of one another. If my colleagues had concurred with me in the first instance to which I refer, probably the negotiation would then have broken off. If we are finally to break, it would certainly have been better for us to have broken then. If we finally get a good peace, it will as certainly be better than it would have been to have broken upon that point. As to the second instance, we have now, at a later period, made the proposal to which our colleague then refused to subscribe, and he has now assented to it. With regard to the third I am still persuaded that if we do obtain peace, it will be the effect of that proposal. I ought therefore gratefully to acknowledge that if I have occasionally been under the necessity of sacrificing my opinions to those of my colleagues, they have been equally liberal and indulgent to me. . . .

¹ Clay.

NOTE TO THE BRITISH COMMISSIONERS ¹

December 12, 1814.

The undersigned had flattered themselves that the objects in discussion between his Britannic Majesty's Plenipotentiaries and them had been so far reduced by the principles which had in the course of the negotiation been agreed upon, and by the comparative minuteness of the few remaining interests to be adjusted, that a mutual accommodation upon those few subjects would be facilitated by the means of verbal conferences, rather than by the more formal interchange of official notes. They were induced by this consideration to request the conference of the first instant which led to those of last Saturday and of yesterday. Perceiving, however, that the result of them has been to leave those points unsettled, and that the British plenipotentiaries still require of the undersigned on them concessions which the undersigned are not authorized to yield, they find themselves again reluctantly compelled to state in writing their objections to the only parts of the projected treaty, proposed to them by the British plenipotentiaries, and to which the undersigned have declared their inability to accede.

While they express their deep regret that upon these points the views of the British plenipotentiaries appear to be yet so widely variant from their own, they cannot but indulge the hope that objects of so trivial comparative interest will not be permitted to defeat the important purpose of peace which both governments have so earnestly at heart.

The first of these points relates to the mutual restoration of territory taken by either party from the other during the

¹ The note sent, dated December 14, is in *American State Papers*, Foreign Relations, III. 743. See Adams, *Memoirs*, December 12, 1814.

war. In admitting this principle, which the undersigned had repeatedly declared to be the only one upon which they were authorised to treat, the British plenipotentiaries have proposed an alteration in the article offered by the undersigned, and the effect of which is avowed by the British plenipotentiaries to be, to except from its operation the islands in Passamaquoddy Bay—islands taken by military force since the commencement of this negotiation, and of which contrary to the general principle adopted as the basis of the negotiation it is now professed to be intended by the British government to retain possession.

It was stated by one of the British plenipotentiaries in conference, that this would be no deviation from the admitted principles of the *status ante bellum*; but the undersigned have been unable to comprehend upon what grounds this position was assumed. That the right to those islands is claimed by Great Britain can be no reason for refusing to restore them to the situation in which they were previous to the commencement of the war, since by the mutual agreement of the parties a method is provided for the final adjustment of that claim.

In requiring that these islands should, like all other territory taken during the war, be returned at the peace, the undersigned have no wish to prejudge the question concerning the title to them. They are willing expressly to provide that the restoration shall not be understood to impair or in any manner affect any right which the party restoring may have to the territory restored. But the consent by them that territory taken by military force during the war should be retained after the peace would be equivalent to the admission of a title to that possession in Great Britain which they are not and cannot be authorised by the government of the United States to make. They are authorised to agree to a

suitable provision for the settlement of a disputed right, and the possession will of course follow the decision upon that question. But they cannot agree that possession taken by force during the war should be sanctioned by their consent previous to the decision upon the right.

The objection of the undersigned to the words originally proposed by the British plenipotentiaries, limiting the promise of restoring territory taken during the war to territory belonging to the party from which it was taken, was that they left it in the power of one party to judge whether any portion of territory taken by itself did or did not belong to the other; and that it thereby opened a new door to dispute in the very execution of an article intended to close an old one. This objection having been removed by the offer of the British plenipotentiaries to confine the operation of the exception to the islands above mentioned, the undersigned deem it unnecessary further to notice it.

Should the British government finally adhere to the determination of excepting those islands from the general principle of a mutual restoration of captured territory, the undersigned will be reduced to the alternative of subscribing to a condition without authority from their government, or of terminating the negotiation by their refusal.

The stipulation now proposed by Great Britain as a substitute for the last paragraph of the eighth article as previously proposed by the British plenipotentiaries, appears equally objectionable; as a stipulation merely that the parties will hereafter negotiate concerning the rights in question, it appears unnecessary. Should the parties both be hereafter disposed to such a negotiation, no stipulation can be needed for the purpose. Should either of them be averse to negotiating, the stipulation would be unavailing to the other. The undersigned are not aware what claim Great Britain

can have to the navigation of the Mississippi, unless she found that claim on the article in the peace of 1783. If she finds it on that article, she must admit the claim of the United States to the fisheries within British jurisdiction secured by the same treaty. The United States asks no new article on the subject. The undersigned have offered to accede to a new article confirming both the rights. They have offered to be silent with regard to both. To any stipulation abandoning the right as claimed by the United States they cannot subscribe. The undersigned must here repeat an observation already made by them in conference. That the demand by the British plenipotentiaries for an article to secure to British subjects the navigation of the Mississippi has been made since the undersigned had been assured that the note from the British plenipotentiaries of 21 October contained *all* the demands of Great Britain; and that no trace of it is to be found in that note.

The undersigned have the same remark to make with respect to the two new articles proposed by the British plenipotentiaries. They are both liable to considerable objections. From an earnest desire to comply with any proposition which may be acceptable to the British government, and to which they can accede, the undersigned will agree to the substance of the article to promote the abolition of the slave-trade. The other article appears to the undersigned unnecessary. The courts of the United States will without it be equally open to British subjects; and they reply that without it the British courts will be equally open to citizens of the United States.

TO LOUISA CATHERINE ADAMS

GHENT, 13 December, 1814.

. . . Last Friday the messenger of the British plenipotentiaries returned from London, and they requested a conference for the next morning.¹ It was held at our house and lasted three hours.² We had yesterday another of equal length at theirs; and the result has been as I wrote you on Friday that I expected it would be.³ The negotiation labors at this moment more than it ever has done before. I distrust more and more the sincerity of the British government, who after having formally abandoned everything of the value of a nut-shell in their demands, hold out inflexibly upon the paltriest trifles directly in the face of their general concessions, and seemingly for the purpose of preventing our acceptance of them. You are not mistaken in your conjectures

¹ For the instructions brought by him see *Letters and Despatches of Lord Castlereagh*, X. 214. They favored a peace.

² *American State Papers*, Foreign Relations, III. 743; Adams, *Memoirs*, December 10, 1814. "At a conference today we did our utmost to give effect to your wishes as conveyed to us in the last despatch. What the result will be cannot be known until the Americans have finished their deliberations. They certainly received our propositions with a better grace than usual, and if any judgment can be formed as to their future intentions from their manner at this day's conference, I should conclude that they were not prepared to make a very serious resistance, except perhaps upon that part of the new Article which states the right to the fishery to be derived from the treaty of 1783." *Goulburn to Earl Bathurst*, December 10, 1814. Wellington, *Supplementary Despatches*, IX. 471. Again Wellington wrote about the 10th to Gallatin giving assurance of his support for peace. "Pray do not take offence at what I say. In you I have the greatest confidence. I hear on all sides that your moderation and sense of justice together with your good common sense place you above all the other delegates, not excepting ours. The Emperor Alexander has assured me of this. He says he can place absolute reliance in your word. I have always had the greatest admiration for the country of your birth. You are a foreigner, with all the traditions of one fighting for the peace and welfare of the country of your adoption." *Diary of James Gallatin*, 34.

³ Adams, *Memoirs*, December 12, 1814; *Mass. Hist. Soc. Proceedings*, XLVIII.

that I have suffered much in mind—very little however, from any disagreement with my colleagues. Our harmony has been as cordial as perhaps ever existed between five persons charged with so important and so difficult a trust. But it is the temper in the British notes and in the conferences on the part of two of the British plenipotentiaries which brings mine to the severest of trials. You know all the good and all the evil of my disposition; but you cannot know the violence of the struggle to suppress emotions produced by the provocations of overbearing insolence and narrow understandings. They have, however, been suppressed. But after the last two conferences we are apparently farther from the conclusion than we were before them. The British plenipotentiaries present to us articles sent to them ready drawn from England, and when we ask what they mean, what the object of them is, they answer they cannot tell; the article was sent them from England, we must construe it for ourselves. If we propose the alteration of a word, they must refer it to their government. If we ask for an explanation, they must refer it to their government. It is precisely the French caricature of Lord Malmesbury. “My Lord, I hope your Lordship is well this morning.” . . . “Indeed, Sir, I do not know, but I will send a courier to my Court and inquire.” And thus all we have obtained from the two conferences of three hours each is, another courier to the Court to inquire. We are to send them a note, and they are to dispatch it by a messenger for fresh instructions. I hope the note will go this day; perhaps not until tomorrow. There can be no answer sooner than the 21st, and even then it may be merely matter for more discussion, and more messengers. In the meantime we still keep personally upon eating and drinking terms with them. We are to dine with them this day.

Speaking of English ambassadors in France reminds me of his Grace the Duke of Wellington. It appears that he does not trouble himself to use much ceremony with the French noblesse. He goes to gala dinners in frock and boots, and makes the company wait for him by the hour. Then to apologize for delay he says he has been making a promenade in the Bois de Boulogne. The story goes that Marshal Macdonald told him that if he was fond of that walk, he should be happy to meet him there. But the ladies have given him the best chastisement; they call him *Monsieur le Duc de Vilain ton*. . . .

TO LOUISA CATHERINE ADAMS

GHENT, 16 December, 1814.

MY BEST FRIEND,

This appellation reminds me of an occurrence on Monday last, which I may tell you exactly as it happened, and which will show you the sort of tone which my colleagues observe with me, and I with them. We had been three hours in conference with the British plenipotentiaries, and it had been perhaps the most unpleasant one that we have held with them. We had returned home, and were in session conversing together upon what had been passing in the conference, when Mr. Clay remarked that Mr. Goulburn was a man of much *irritation*. *Irritability*, said I, is the word, Mr. Clay, irritability; and then fixing him with an earnest look, and the tone of voice between seriousness and jest, I added "like somebody else that I know." Clay laughed, and said "Aye, that we do; all know him, and none better than yourself." And Mr. Gallatin, fixing me exactly as I had done Mr. Clay, said emphatically, "that is your *best*

friend." "Agreed," said I, "*but one*"—and we passed on in perfect good humor to another topic. There was, however, truth in the joking on all sides. Of the five members of the American mission the Chevalier has the most perfect control of his temper, the most deliberate coolness; and it is the more meritorious because it is real self-command. His feelings are as quick, and his spirit as high as those of anyone among us; but he certainly has them more under government. I can scarcely express to you how much both he and Mr. Gallatin have risen in my esteem since we have been here, living together. Mr. Gallatin has not quite so constant a supremacy over his own emotions; yet he seldom yields to an ebullition of temper, and recovers from it immediately. He has a faculty, when discussion grows too warm of turning off its edge by a joke, which I envy him more than all his other talents, and he has in his character one of the most extraordinary combinations of stubbornness and of flexibility that I ever met within man. His greatest fault I think to be an ingenuity sometimes intrenching upon ingenuousness.

Our next personage in the sensitive scale is Mr. Russell. As the youngest member of the mission he has taken the least active part in the business, and scarcely any at the conferences with the British plenipotentiaries. He is more solitary and less social in his disposition than the rest of us, and after living with us two months, left us and took separate lodgings for some trifling personal convenience or saving of expense. He nevertheless bears his proportion of all the entertainments that we give. But he has a high sense of his personal dignity, and sometimes takes offense where none is intended to be given. This has never happened upon any circumstance connected with the business of the mission, for he has never entered into the discussions which we have had among ourselves; but we have seen the manifestations

of his temper in the occurrences of social intercourse, as well in our particular circle, as in our relations with the people of the country. There has, however, never been anything like a misunderstanding between him and any of us. In the conduct of our business he has the greatest deference for the opinions of Mr. Clay. The greatest diversities of sentiment and the most animated mutual oppositions have been between this last gentlemen and *your* best friend. They are unquestionably the two members of the mission most under the influence of that irritability which we impute to Mr. Goulburn; and perhaps it would be difficult to say which of them gives way to it the most. Whether Mr. Clay is as conscious of this infirmity as your friend, whether he has made it as much the study of his life to acquire a victory over it, and whether he feels with as much regret after it has passed every occasion when it proves too strong for him; he knows better than I do. There is the same dogmatical, overbearing manner, the same harshness of look and expression, and the same forgetfulness of the courtesies of society in both. An impartial person judging between them I think would say that one has the strongest, and the other the most cultivated understanding; that one has the most ardency, and the other the most experience of mankind; that one has a mind more gifted by nature, and the other a mind less cankered by prejudice. Mr. Clay is by ten years the younger man of the two, and as such has perhaps more claim to indulgence for irritability. Nothing of this weakness has been shown in our conferences with the British plenipotentiaries. From two of them, and particularly from Mr. Goulburn, we have endured much; but I do not recollect that one expression has escaped the lips of anyone of us that we would wish to be recalled.

We dined with them on Tuesday and had a party more

stiff and reserved than on any former occasion. There was at the same time more studious politeness on the part of Mr. Goulburn; as if he too was conscious of his trespass upon decorum in the conference of the preceding day. On Wednesday we sent them our note, in which we have made a step towards the conclusion, to which we have all acceded with the most extreme reluctance. My belief is that it will be lost upon the British government, and that our concession will be of no effect. Our position is now far more painful than it was when we had the immediate prospect of a rupture in August. Then we were sure of the support nearly unanimous of our own country in rejecting demands the most extravagant and absurd. Now we have the appearance of fighting for feathers; and are sure of disapprobation whether we yield them, or prolong the war by persisting in our refusal. From the moment when the British government sunk in their most obnoxious demands and held out upon these rags and tatters of contention, I suspected that they were playing a game of duplicity, and that they struck upon points which they knew we must reject, merely to have the pretext for continuing the war, and for putting upon us the blame of its continuation. Everything that has since happened corroborates this suspicion. Our last note, like all the rest, has been referred to the British government. We shall have the answer about the 21st of this month, and I hope it will be the last occasion for a reference. We are told that there has been a settlement to the satisfaction of all the great powers of the principal objects in discussion at Vienna, and that the armies on the continent are all to be placed immediately on the peace establishment. If this arrangement had been delayed a month longer, it might have made our peace certain. At this moment it may have an unfavorable effect upon the issue of our negotiation.

In the meantime we partake of balls, concerts and plays, as often as we desire. Last Monday evening was one of the mixed entertainments of concert and ball. At the concert they performed "Hail Columbia! Air américain à grand orchestre." So it was announced in the bill of performance. Would you believe, that all the Hanoverian officers, forming no small part of the company, received an order, *from authority*, to leave the hall when that air should be played? This order was probably given to intimidate the managers, and prevent the performance of the air; but not producing that effect, the order was revoked after the concert was begun, and the officers while at the ball received permission to stay and hear the air, which they did. It is singular enough that their general ¹ had sent us his cards but ten days before. . . .

TO LOUISA CATHERINE ADAMS

Ghent, 20 December, 1814.

Our interval of leisure still continues. The British messenger who took our last note to England has not yet returned, but may now be expected from day to day. The policy of protracting and avoiding a conclusion of any kind cannot be much longer continued. If, as we have too much reason to apprehend there has been no sincerity in the late advances from that government towards conciliation, we must by the next instructions to their plenipotentiaries have it ascertained beyond a doubt. In the meantime, whether the leaky vessels are on their side or on ours, so much is known of the apparent state of the negotiation that an opinion has become prevalent in England, France, and Hol-

¹ Baron Charles Alten.

land, that peace will be made. There is in the *Times* newspaper of last Tuesday, the 13th, an editorial article as violent as usual against America, arguing plausibly at least that the British ministry cannot possibly intend to conclude the peace, but stating that the policies in the City had the day before been 30 guineas to return 100 if peace should be signed before the end of the year. Then follows a paragraph which I give you word for word from the paper:

It was even asserted, though without foundation, that the preliminaries had been already digested, and received the signatures of the Commissioners on the 3d instant. *We have however some reason to believe that the speculations on this subject are influenced, in some measure, by secret information, issued for the most unworthy purposes, from the hotel of the American Legation at Ghent. After what has been seen of the total want of principle in American statesmen of the Jeffersonian school, the world would not be much astonished to learn that one of the American negotiators had turned his situation to a profitable account by speculating both at Paris and London on the result of the negotiation.* Certain it is that letters received yesterday from the French capital, relative to the proceedings at Ghent, contain intimations like those which have been circulated here on American authority, viz. that the new proposals of the British will be acceded to, on or before the beginning of the new year, provided that no better terms can ere then be obtained.

It is impossible for me to pronounce against which of the American negotiators this insinuation is pointed; but I have no doubt it was Milligan's return to London that gave rise to the paragraph, and after what has happened it is not uncharitable to suspect that he himself has again been spreading reports of the state of the negotiation, and speculating upon them himself. I do not believe that his principal has debased himself by sharing in this shameful traffic; but the

charge in the *Times* probably refers to him. Milligan's movements have generally been noticed in the newspapers, and he has always passed under the denomination of Mr. Bayard's private secretary. I felt so indignant at Milligan's first expedition to England, and his conduct there, that I expressed my sentiments about it openly and without reserve. Some of his friends thought I had suspected him unjustly; and after his return here assured me how deeply he was mortified at the surmises which had gone abroad concerning him. . . . I hope he will not show his face here again; for if he does, I shall be strongly inclined to treat him according to his deserts. It is to be sure curious enough to see the Chevalier put down as a statesman of the Jeffersonian school, but that is not more unjust than it is to charge upon the Jeffersonian school the baseness of allying private stock-jobbing with public office. That is the vice of the Hamiltonian school; and the most devoted partisans of the British in the United States are those who have always been most deeply stained with that pollution. . . .

TO LOUISA CATHERINE ADAMS

GHENT, 23 December, 1814.

. . . The Englishman who so directly put the question to you at the ball, whether we were likely to make peace, must have had a small opinion of your discretion, or, what is more probable, a very small store of his own. Of such inquiries, however, we have had many—some from total strangers, who came to our house merely to ask the question, and others from acquaintances, friends, and even relations. One of the most amusing inquiries I have had was a very good correspondent of mine, who on our first arrival here wrote me,

offering all the important information that he could collect, and asking of me such information concerning the state of the negotiation *as was not of a nature to be kept secret*, pointing out to me at the same time a channel of conveyance by which it could be transmitted to him with the utmost possible dispatch. Reasonable as this request was, I gave my correspondent to understand that he must get his public news concerning this negotiation from the public journals, and must expect none from me. As he is a man of argument he argued the point in his reply and intimated, though not in an offensive manner, that an affectation of mystery upon subjects which needed no mystery was no mark of diplomatic skill, and no part of diplomatic duty. I knew the observation to be just, understood its application, and was diverted with its ingenuity. But I was inflexible. I insisted upon having all the benefit of the correspondence on my side; that he should give me what information he pleased, and when he should think proper, with the full understanding that he should receive nothing respecting the negotiation from me in return. I have now on file a letter from him containing a number of questions and remarks, to which I shall at my leisure return an answer as mysterious as ever. He flattered me at one time with the prospect of seeing him here in person; but I wrote him, if he had any commercial speculation in view, I should prefer seeing him at some other time and place. Notwithstanding this we may still be favored with a visit from him; but I shall have as little difficulty with himself as I have had with his correspondence.¹

The case is not precisely the same with the inquisitiveness of a particular friend of ours now at Paris. He has assailed Smith and me with questions which neither of us can with propriety answer, and for purposes of his own, for which he

¹ George Joy was the inquirer.

ought not to have expected or asked any sort of communication from us. Nothing would give me greater pleasure than to render him any service in my power consistent with my duty, but I am not pleased to find him have so little regard, or take so little heed to the delicacy of my situation, and to the duties of his own, and it is not without a struggle that I have forborne to express to him my full sense of his indiscretion.

The British messenger returned yesterday morning, and the plenipotentiaries sent us their answer to our last note.¹ We are to have a conference with them at our house this day at noon, and the result of it will ascertain whether they must refer again to their government, or whether we may at last discover a prospect of agreeing upon terms of peace. I have told you candidly our situation since the abandonment by the British government of all the demands which we could have no hesitation in rejecting. They have made it impossible (and therein consists all the skill they have shown in this negotiation) for us to give satisfaction to our country, either by concluding the peace, or by continuing the war. I have been since our last note in a state of peculiar anxiety; for the difference between us and our opponents hinged upon a point on which I had determined not to sign the treaty, even if it should be acceded to by my colleagues. I am not without hopes that the difficulty will be removed this day; and if it is, that we may at least have the consolation of restoring to our country the blessings of peace.

We shall on this supposition all sign the treaty, and I believe it will be ratified in America. But you must expect that we shall all be censured and reproached for it, and none with more bitterness than your nearest friend. We shall,

¹ The instructions, dated December 19, 1814, are in *Letters and Despatches of Lord Castlereagh*, X. 221.

however have the conscious satisfaction of having surrendered no right of the nation, of having secured every important interest; of having yielded nothing which could possibly have been maintained, and of redeeming our union from a situation of unparalleled danger and deep distress. I am also well assured that our enemies, whom peace will I fear not make sincerely our friends, will give as little satisfaction to their nation by the treaty, as we shall to ours. When the terms to which they must at last subscribe are compared with their demands, they will show a falling off, which will leave them less to boast of than to excuse. Indeed, neither party will have cause to exult in the issue, and after the peace is made the sources of dissension will yet be so numerous that it will be hardly less difficult to preserve than it was to obtain. Of the event, however, we must speak as still extremely doubtful. Mr. Bentzon has returned here again from London. He left Dover on the 20th and there saw in the newspapers a proclamation offering a high bounty both for soldiers and for seamen. Every preparation for another campaign continues to be made in England, with as much activity as it could be if there was no negotiation pending, and with such indications how is it possible to believe that the British government sincerely intend to conclude the peace? My next letter will, I hope, give you information upon which more reliance can be placed. . . .¹

¹ The agitation on the property tax increased so far that the ministry feared it would be impossible to carry it in Parliament without an engagement to give it up should the war not be renewed. Liverpool informed Castlereagh, December 23, 1814: "This, as well as other considerations, makes us most anxious to get rid of the American war. I trust our last communication will enable the Commissioners to bring the negotiation to a close. But even if peace is signed, I shall not be surprised if Madison endeavours to play us some trick in the ratification of it. . . . The disposition to separate on the part of the Eastern States may likewise frighten Madison; for if he should refuse to ratify the treaty, we must immediately propose

TO ABIGAIL ADAMS

GHENT, 24th December, 1814.

MY DEAR AND HONORED MOTHER:

A treaty of peace between the United States and Great Britain has this day been signed by the British and American plenipotentiaries at this place. It is to be dispatched tomorrow by Mr. Hughes, the Secretary of the American mission, who is to sail in the *Transit* from Bordeaux. I have not time to write a single private letter excepting this; but I request you to inform my brother that I have received his letter of the 2nd October, brought by Mr. William Wyer to France. I was much disappointed in not receiving either by him, or by the *Ajax*, the second Dutch vessel arrived from Boston, any letter from you. I have none later than that of 1st May.

You know doubtless that heretofore the President intended in case of peace to send me to England. If the treaty should be ratified, I am uncertain whether he will still retain the same intention or not. I have requested to be recalled at all events from the mission to Russia. I shall proceed from this place in a few days to Paris, to be there in readiness to receive the President's orders, and I shall write immediately to my wife requesting her to come and join me there. If we go to England, I beg you to send my sons George and John there to me. After the peace there can be no want of good opportunities for them, and I wish them to embark at the most favorable season for a safe passage. If any other person should be sent to England, I intend to return as soon

to make a separate peace with them, and we have good reason to believe that they would not be indisposed to listen to such a proposal." Wellington, *Supplementary Despatches*, IX. 495.

as possible to America and shall hope before midsummer to see once more my beloved parents.

Of the peace which we have at length concluded it is for our government, our country and the world to judge, It is not such as under more propitious circumstances might have been expected, and to be fairly estimated must be compared not with our desires, but with what the situation of the parties and of the world at and during the negotiation made attainable. We have abandoned no essential right, and if we have left everything open for future controversy, we have at least secured to our country the power at her own option to extinguish the war.¹ I remain etc.

TO JOHN ADAMS

Ghent, 26 December, 1814.

MY DEAR SIR:

Mr. Hughes, the Secretary to the American mission for negotiating peace, was dispatched early this morning with one copy of the treaty signed by the British and American plenipotentiaries the evening before last. It was executed

¹ Liverpool gave to Canning the reasons for desiring peace: the opinion of the Duke of Wellington that there was no vulnerable point in the United States to take and to keep; a better frontier for Canada would be found to be impracticable; the clamor raised over the property tax. "The question, therefore, was whether, under all these circumstances, it was not better to conclude the peace at the present moment, before the impatience of the country on the subject had been manifested at public meetings or by motions in Parliament, provided we could conclude it by obliging the American Commissioners to waive all stipulations whatever on the subject of maritime rights, by fulfilling our engagements to the Indians who were abandoned by the treaty of 1783, and by declining to revive in favour of the United States any of the commercial advantages which they enjoyed under former treaties. As far as I have any means of judging, our decision is generally approved." December 28, 1814. Wellington, *Supplementary Despatches*, IX. 513.

in triplicate to provide against the accidents which might befall any single copy on the passage. Mr. Clay's private secretary, Mr. Carroll, is to go this day with another copy to England, there to embark as speedily as possible. We shall send the third copy by a dispatch vessel which we have ready at Amsterdam, unless she should be locked in by the ice, as from the present severity of the weather we have some reason to apprehend. Mr. Hughes goes to Bordeaux, there to take passage in the *Transit*, the vessel in which Mr. Boyd came to Europe. Mr. Carroll may perhaps go in company with Mr. Baker,¹ the Secretary to the English mission, who is to be the bearer of the treaty with the English ratification. In the hurry of dispatching Mr. Hughes I found it possible to write only one short private letter to my dear mother, and I shall probably have only time to write this one to send by Mr. Carroll. I transmitted, however, by Mr. Hughes a duplicate of my last letter to you dated 27 October, which I still intreat you to answer, *if I am destined to a longer continuance in Europe*, and upon which I ask all the advice and information which it may be in your power to bestow. It relates principally to the subject of the greatest difficulty we have had in the negotiation, and that which of all others is left in the state the most unsatisfactory to us, and particularly to me. It has been now for a full month ascertained that unless new pretensions on the part of Great Britain were advanced a treaty of peace would be signed; but it was not until last Thursday that I ceased to doubt whether it would receive *my* signature. The British plenipotentiaries had declared to us at the outset of the negotiation, that it was not the intention of the British government to grant to the people of the United States in future the liberties of fishing, and drying and curing fish, within the

¹ Anthony St. John Baker.

exclusive British jurisdiction *without an equivalent*. There is, as you must remember, in the third article of the treaty of 1783 a diversity of expression, by which the general fisheries on the Banks are acknowledged as our right, but those fishing privileges within British jurisdiction are termed liberties. The British government consider the latter as franchises forfeited *ipso facto* by the war, and declared they would not grant them anew without an equivalent. Aware that by this principle they too had forfeited their right to navigate the Mississippi, recognized in the same treaty of 1783, they now demanded a new provision to secure it to them again.

We were instructed not to suffer our right to the fisheries to be brought into discussion. We had no authority to admit any discrimination between the first and the last parts of the third article of the treaty of 1783; no power to offer or agree to an equivalent either for the rights or the liberties. I considered both as standing on the same footing, both as the continuance of franchises always enjoyed, and the difference in the expressions only as arising from the operation of our change from the condition of British subjects to that of a sovereign people upon an object in one part of general and in the other of special jurisdiction. The special jurisdiction had been that of our own sovereign; by the Revolution and the treaty of peace it became a foreign, but still remained a special jurisdiction. By the very same instrument in which we thus acknowledged it as a foreign jurisdiction, we reserved to ourselves, with the full assent of its sovereign, and without any limitation of time or of events, the franchise which we had always enjoyed while the jurisdiction had been our own.

It was termed a *liberty*, because it was a freedom to be enjoyed within a special jurisdiction; the fisheries on the Banks

were termed rights, because they were to be enjoyed on the ocean, the common jurisdiction of all nations; but there was nothing in the terms themselves, and nothing in the article or in the treaty, implying an intention or expectation of either of the contracting parties that one more than the other should be liable to forfeiture by a subsequent war. On the maturest deliberation I still hold this argument to be sound, and it is to my mind the only *one* by which our claim to the fisheries within British jurisdiction can be maintained. But after the declaration made by the British government it was not to be expected that they would be converted to this opinion without much discussion, which was forbidden to us, and the results of which must have been very doubtful upon minds at all times inclined, and at this time most peculiarly prone, rather to lean upon power than to listen to reason. We stated the general principles in one of our notes to the British plenipotentiaries, as the ground upon which our government deemed no new stipulation necessary to secure the enjoyment of all our rights and liberties in the fisheries. They did not answer that part of our note; but when they came to ask a stipulation for the right of British subjects to navigate the Mississippi, we objected that by our construction of the treaty of 1783 it was unnecessary. If we admitted their construction of that treaty so as to give them a new right to the navigation, they must give us an equivalent for it. We offered an article recognizing the continuance of the rights on both sides; this offer met however with very great opposition among ourselves, for there were two ¹ of us against making it, and who thought the navigation of the Mississippi incomparably more valuable than the contested part of the fisheries. Not so did the British government think; for they, instead of accepting it, offered us an

¹ Clay and Russell.

article stipulating to negotiate hereafter for an equivalent to be given by Great Britain for the right of navigating the Mississippi, and by the United States for the liberties of the fisheries within British jurisdiction. This was merely to obtain from us the formal admission that both the rights were abrogated by the war. To that admission I was determined not to subscribe. The article was withdrawn last Thursday by the British plenipotentiaries, who accepted our proposal to say nothing in the treaty about either, and to omit the article by which they had agreed that our boundary west from the Lake of the Woods should be the forty-ninth parallel of north latitude. They at the same time referred again to their original declaration that the fisheries within British jurisdiction would not hereafter be granted without an equivalent. It is evident that it must be the subject of a future negotiation; the only thing possible to be done now was to reserve our whole claim unimpaired, and with that I consented to sign the treaty.

We were also obliged to except from the immediate restitution of territory taken during the war the islands in Passamaquoddy Bay. The British claim them as having been before the peace of 1783 within the limits of Nova Scotia, and insisted upon holding them, not as taken during the war but as of right belonging to them. At first they declared their right to be too clear even for discussion; but they finally agreed to refer to commissioners and to a friendly sovereign the title to them, and even to the island of Grand Manan in the Bay of Fundy, which has been since 1724 in their possession. We persisted in demanding that the Passamaquoddy Islands should be included in the general restoration, until they manifested a determination to break off rather than yield the point. Their inflexibility upon two objects exclusively interesting to the state of Massachusetts is a mel-

ancholy comment upon that policy by which Massachusetts has arrayed herself against the government of the Union. Had Massachusetts been true to herself and to the Union, Great Britain would not have dared to hinge the question of peace or war upon Moose Island, or upon the privileges of Massachusetts fishermen. As a citizen of Massachusetts I felt it to be most peculiarly my duty not to abandon any one of her rights, and I would have refused to sign the treaty had any of them been abandoned. But it was impossible to force a stipulation in favor of the fisheries; and for a temporary possession of Moose Island, merely until it should be ascertained whether it belongs to her or not, we could not think of continuing the war. . . .¹ I have great satisfaction in saying that our harmony has been as great and constant as perhaps ever existed between five persons employed together upon so important a trust. Upon almost all the important questions we have been unanimous. I am etc.

TO LOUISA CATHERINE ADAMS

GHENT, 27 December, 1814.

On Saturday last, the sixth of December, the Emperor Alexander's birthday, a treaty of peace and amity was signed by the British and American plenipotentiaries in this city. I had written you the day before that there was to be a conference at 12 o'clock. It lasted three hours, and the result of it was an agreement to meet the next day at the Chartreux, the house where the British plenipoten-

¹ This letter was shown by John Adams to James Lloyd, who had been chosen to the United States Senate in succession to Adams, and he prepared an elaborate statement on the fisheries question. It is printed in *Mass. Hist. Soc. Proceedings*, XLV. 380.

tiaries reside, for the purpose of signing the treaty. This was accordingly done at 6 o'clock in the evening. Mr. Baker, the secretary to the British mission, had a carriage in the yard ready to start for London the moment after the conclusion. He went at 7 o'clock the same evening for Ostend, where there was a vessel in readiness to sail the moment he should arrive there. We have reason to suppose he may have reached London yesterday morning, and that the news of the peace may have been announced in the *Courier* of last evening. In order to give Mr. Baker the opportunity of carrying to his government the first intelligence of the event, we agreed with the British plenipotentiaries that it should not be divulged here until the next day at noon. The secret was kept, I believe, as faithfully as any such secret can be; but it happened that Mr. Bentzon, who as I have written you had returned to this place a few days before from London, happened accidentally to have been invited to dine with us. Our usual dining hour is four o'clock, but it was near seven when we returned from the conference, where he knew we had been. He was watchful of every word said at dinner, and loitered about our separate apartments until 10 o'clock. I do not think he obtained positive knowledge of the fact, but he ascertained enough to satisfy himself, and he went off before midnight. Baker had the start of him about four hours. The conclusion of the treaty was officially communicated by the British plenipotentiaries to the Intendant on Christmas day, the day of all the year most congenial to the proclamation of peace on earth. We received his congratulations the same evening at a large party assembled according to the usage of the country at his house, and an invitation to dine with him on Wednesday, to celebrate the event. We had, however, already engaged the British plenipotentiaries to dine with us on that day.

Mr. Hughes left us at four o'clock yesterday morning, and Mr. Carroll at ten last evening. Three copies of the treaty were executed on each side, to guard against any accident which may befall any single copy on the passage. Mr. Baker is to go out immediately to America with the English ratification. Mr. Hughes goes to Bordeaux, there to embark in the *Transit*, and takes one copy of the treaty. Mr. Carroll goes to England to embark, if it should be agreeable to the British government, in the same vessel with Mr. Baker. If not, by any other opportunity that he can obtain. He has the second copy of the treaty. We intended to have sent the third copy by the *Herald*, but as in all probability she is frozen up at Amsterdam, we shall be obliged to wait for some other occasion. My colleagues all intend to visit Paris, and all, excepting Mr. Russell, London. Mr. Gallatin proposes likewise to go to Geneva. The *Neptune* is to be ordered to Plymouth or Falmouth, and they expect to sail about the first of April, which may very possibly lengthen out to the first of May.

In that interval there will be time to learn from the United States whether the treaty will be ratified, and whether our government will confer any new appointment in Europe upon them, or either of them. There will be at the least missions of London and St. Petersburg to be filled. In my letter to you of the 13th of the month I hinted to you the course that I should take, in case the peace should be made. I have accordingly written to the Secretary of State, that I shall go to Paris, and there wait for the President's orders. Whether he retains the intention of sending me to England or not, I have definitely requested to be recalled from the Russian mission. If the peace should not be ratified in America, we shall have, I doubt not, ample time to return home in the *Neptune*. If ratified, and we do not go to Eng-

land, there can be no scarcity of opportunities for our return to the United States either from France or England. I therefore now write you to break up altogether our establishment at St. Petersburg . . . and to come with Charles to me at Paris, where I shall be impatiently waiting for you. I calculate upon your receiving this letter about the twentieth of January, and I suppose you will not be able to make all the necessary arrangements to leave St. Petersburg sooner than the middle of February. If the season should still be too severe, I wish you to wait until it shall be milder. Take care to engage a good man, and woman servant to come with you. Mr. Harris will procure for you an order for courier horses, and you will travel at your leisure. You will find a very tolerable lodging for the night at any of the post-houses, and Mr. Gallatin and Mr. Bayard from their own experience recommend most earnestly that you travel in no other carriage than a *kibitka*. . . .

TO LOUISA CATHERINE ADAMS

GHENT, 30 December, 1814.

. . . The peace will doubtless enable you to part with mutual looks and feelings of kindness from our English friends and acquaintances. If there has been no sympathy during the war between their joys and sorrows and ours, there will, it is hoped, henceforth be no opposition between them. Indeed, although the peace is not what I should have wished, and although it may acquire no credit in our country to those who made it, I consider the day on which I signed it as the happiest of my life; because it was the day on which I had my share in restoring peace to the world. You know from my letters that during the last ten days previous to

the last note which we received from the British plenipotentiaries, I had the painful prospect of a treaty's being concluded without my signature. A stipulation was proposed to us, to which I had determined not to subscribe. My colleagues would ultimately have admitted it, rather than break off the negotiation. It was at last withdrawn by the British government, and although it left the subject open for a dangerous future controversy, that was impossible for me to prevent. The relief to my mind when the proposed article was withdrawn, was inexpressible. And now, although I am well aware that there are things in the treaty which will give great dissatisfaction in America, and most particularly to my native state of Massachusetts, yet I have the comfort of reflecting that no one right of any sort has been abandoned; and that no reasonable man can hesitate a moment in saying that between such a peace, and the continuance of the war for another year, it was impossible to make a question. The conditions of the treaty will not be published in Europe until its return from America, ratified or rejected; for our government have it at their option to take or to refuse it; and notwithstanding all its faults I confidently expect it will be ratified. I have given to Mr. Harris a summary of its principal terms, and have authorised him to communicate them in confidence to the Russian government. He is also at liberty to communicate them to you; and you may give him and others whom you please the information, that the hostilities are to cease as soon as possible *after the ratification in America*. All captures at sea, after certain dates, according to the distances, are to be restored—twelve days after the ratifications, on the coast of North America; thirty days, in the British and Irish Channels; forty days, in the North Seas and the Baltic; and one hundred and twenty days in the remotest parts of the world.

We hope the American ratification will be given in February, or the beginning of March. The American flag will therefore be one of the first welcomed at Cronstadt and Archangel the ensuing season, and our vessels that have been there war-bound for nearly three years may sail again for their homes with the first favorable breezes and open waters of the approaching year. . . .¹

TO JAMES A. BAYARD, HENRY CLAY AND
JONATHAN RUSSELL

GHENT, 2 January, 1815.

GENTLEMEN:

I have received the letter which you did me the honor to address to me on the 30th ultimo and beg leave to state to you what I understood to have passed relative to the books, maps, other articles and papers, belonging to the mission at their meeting of that day.

I had expressed it as my opinion that *at the termination of the mission* the custody of these effects, particularly of the papers, would devolve upon me, subject to the orders of our government. The principle upon which the opinion is founded is the usage in similar cases, supported by the precedent in the case of the prior joint mission. Under that precedent Mr. Gallatin now holds the whole original papers of communications from the Russian government, and Mr. Bayard the full powers to that mission to treat of peace and commerce with Great Britain which he received from Mr. Gallatin. It is true that the principle was then neither contested nor discussed.

¹ The American plenipotentiaries broke up housekeeping this day, and Gallatin, Bayard and Adams returned to the Hôtel des Pays-Bas.

Mr. Clay, having on a preceding day and at the meeting of the 20th ultimo expressed an opinion that the papers of the present mission ought to be transmitted to the Department of State, and a wish to have them with him for his personal convenience in the *Neptune*, the subject was discussed, a variety of opinions were given, but I did not understand that any vote was taken or any resolution was adopted. I expressed my willingness to deliver all the papers in my possession which should be *specified* to me by a majority of the mission to any person to *be named by them* with authority to give me a receipt for them, and on receiving from him such receipt. I conceived this to be indispensable to my own justification for putting the papers permanently out of my hands. My motive for asking that the *papers* should be specified was that there appeared to me a manifest impropriety that some of them, particularly the full powers and instructions received from the Department of State, should be sent back to that Department, and I had thought that upon the discussion of the 30th ultimo this had been generally admitted. My motive for asking that the person to whom I should deliver the papers should be named was, that many of them being original papers of great importance I could not consistently take upon myself to decide whom the majority of the mission would consider as such.

I understood Mr. Clay to have said at the meeting of the 30th ultimo that he would draw up such a requisition to me, but I expected that the draft to be made by him would, like every other paper hitherto drawn up by any one member of the mission, be submitted to the consideration of all the members before it would be definitely settled, and that I should have an opportunity of stating my objections to the whole or to any part of it. Your letter contains a request totally different from that which I had understood Mr. Clay

to promise that he would draw up, inasmuch as that was to specify both the person to whom I should deliver the papers and the papers to be delivered, and this specifies neither the one nor the other, but under the vague and general terms of "other persons" leaves me doubtful whether it was your intention to include in your request all the papers without exception, or to leave me to the exercise of my own discretion in making the exceptions.

You will perceive, gentlemen, that I cannot consider the paper signed by you and presented to me by Mr. Clay as the act of a majority of the mission, since it was signed without consultation with the whole mission upon its contents, although all the members of the mission were here and might have been consulted. I deem this circumstance so important in point of principle that I have thought it my duty to answer your letter in writing. My objections to a compliance with your request itself I propose to state at a meeting of the members of the mission remaining here. In the meantime I pray you to be assured that, with a full sense of the deference due from me to your opinions, and with an earnest desire to comply as far as the obligations of my duty will permit with the wishes of you all and of every one of you,¹ I am etc.

TO LOUISA CATHERINE ADAMS

Ghent, Hôtel des Pays-Bas, 3 January, 1815.

. . . You perceive that I dwell with delight upon the contemplation of the peace; not that the treaty has been satisfactory to me, or that I flatter myself it will be satisfactory to my country. For the justification of the American negotiators, the present relative situation of the two parties

¹ See Adams, *Memoirs*, January 6, 1815.

to the war, and the state in which the European pacification had left the world, must be duly weighed. We have obtained nothing but peace, and we have made great sacrifices to obtain it. But our honor remains unsullied; our territory remains entire. The peace in word and in deed has been made upon terms of *perfect reciprocity*, and we have surrendered no one right or pretension of our country. This is the fair side of the treaty. Its darkest shade is that it has settled no one subject of dispute between the two nations. It has left open, not only all the controversies which had produced the war; but others not less important which have arisen from the war itself. The treaty would more properly be called an unlimited armistice than a peace, and the day we agreed to sign it, I told my colleagues that it would immortalize the negotiators on both sides, as a masterpiece of diplomacy, by the address with which it avoided the adjustment of any one dispute that had ever existed between the parties. Certain it is, that no other than such a peace could have been made.

We have felt some curiosity to know how the peace would be received in England. Mr. Baker arrived, as we had expected, on Monday the 26th, about two in the afternoon, at London. But owing to the accident which had happened to him on the way between this place and Ostend, he was not the first to announce the news. The stock jobbers (and probably Bentzon) were before him. There had been a report on Saturday that the peace was signed; but on Monday about noon it was circulated as a certainty. The *Courier* of that day in one paragraph mentioned it, and adds that the business done upon the Stock Exchange was immense. The funds rose nearly one per cent. But the government had no information of the event. Then in a second edition, dated 4 o'clock, is another paragraph stating by authority

from government that the peace had been signed on Saturday the 24th. We have not yet seen any *Courier* or *Chronicle* of a later date, but Mr. Goulburn was kind enough to bring me yesterday the *Times* down to Friday last, the 30th. It has abated none of its virulence against America. In announcing on the 27th the "fatal intelligence" of the treaty, it calls upon the nation to rise unanimously and address the Regent against its ratification. It continues every day to Friday pouring forth its lamentations and its execrations; and when despairing of the perfidy that it had recommended, of a refusal to ratify, still resting upon a savage hope that before the ratification can take place in America, the British will take care to inflict some signal stroke of vengeance to redeem their reputation. It states that after the first day of the peace's being known, there was a depression instead of a rise of the funds; and attributes it to an universal belief that the state of affairs at Vienna rendered the prospect of a new European war inevitable, as nothing else could possibly have induced the cabinet to conclude such a peace. This reasoning is probably not altogether unfounded. . . .

We broke up our establishment at the Hotel Lovendeghem, Rue des Champs, last Friday. . . . Yesterday Lord Gambier and Dr. Adams left the city for London. We dined with General Alten and a large party of English and Hanoverian officers. In the evening we went to the concert and redoute parée. It was excessively crowded and the music of the concert was adapted to the celebration of the peace. At one end of the hall there was a transparent inscription: HARMONIE / entre ALBION et COLUMBIA / PAIX de GAND / conclue XXIV Decembre. God save the King and Hail Columbia were part of the performances. The hall was extremely crowded with company, and the notes of peace

gave a double delight to the pleasures of the song and the dance. . . .

The anecdote about Decatur is excellent; but I am not sure that it was not too severe upon Carden. But the trick the English actors played upon us, and that I told you of, was a match for it—taking our money, asking our *patronage*, and then singing,

O Lord our God arise
Scatter his enemies

before our faces. . . .

I presume you will be presented to the Empress mother (and to the Empress if she returns), but let it only be for an *absence* to join me—not a final leave, because I am not yet recalled. If you have an opportunity at the audience, tell their Majesties that I expect to be recalled, and if I should be, how infinitely I shall regret not having it in my power to take leave of them in person, and how ineffaceable the remembrance I shall ever retain of their gracious condescension to us, while at their court.

TO LOUISA CATHERINE ADAMS

GHENT, 6 January, 1815.

There is a newsboy's new year's address, in vulgar doggerel Flemish verse, circulating with many others, but which it seems some of the printers declined publishing. It alludes to the *bon mot* of the Prince de Ligne about the Congress at Vienna "*Le Congrès danse, mais il ne marche pas*," and then recommends to the sovereigns and great ministers assembled at the Austrian capital to turn their eyes towards Ghent, and take a lesson from what has been doing here. That

Lord Gambier and Gallatin were never seen to valse; that Goulburn was never found in a country-dance; that the British and American ambassadors dined at what hour they pleased; but they worked after dinner, and one morning, when nobody expected it, lo, it was found they had made a treaty, and all was settled. Whether the Congress at Vienna have wasted any of their time upon carousels, and sledging parties, and boar-hunting, I am not sufficiently informed to pronounce; but although we have been sober enough in our diversions; it is doing us too much honor to compliment us upon the dispatch with which we have executed our business. If it has taken us six months to make a treaty, merely putting an end to the war between Britain and America, without settling one point of dispute, ten years would by the rule of proportion be a short term for the monarchs and statesmen at Vienna to balance the future destinies of Europe; and after all it is probably from the thorns of their dissensions that we have plucked the rose of peace. . . .¹

TO LEVETT HARRIS

GHENT, 13 January, 1815.

DEAR SIR:

The irregularities in the transmission of letters between this place and St. Petersburg have been so great and so continual that I have ceased altogether inquiring into the causes of them, but I have within these two days had four new evidences of them. The day before yesterday I received at once your two letters of 2/14 and of 9/21 ultimo, and yesterday morning two letters from Mrs. Adams dated the 15th and 16th. My last to you was of 27 December announcing

¹ Bayard and Clay left Ghent early on the morning of January 7.

the signature of the peace, but as it was already known at London you will probably receive the news from thence sooner than by my letters. Whatever the coolness or reserve between the representatives of the United States and Great Britain at St. Petersburg may have been while the war between their two countries was raging, I hope and trust it will disappear upon the return of peace. The English papers state that the Duke of Wellington, who was informed of the signature of the treaty by a courier from the British plenipotentiaries here, immediately wrote a note to Mr. Crawford informing him of the event and called upon him in person the next morning to congratulate him upon it. An example of so much courteousness and liberality (for the authenticity of which I have however as yet no other than newspaper authority) ought to be a precedent for the diplomatic officers of both nations throughout the world, and I dare say the public servants of the United States will everywhere manifest the pleasure which they feel at the restoration of the pacific relations between the two countries by every act of civility towards the British legations which may be proper.

I have not entered into any correspondence with Count Nesselrode since I have been here, because the regular channel of communication between the United States and Russia was through you and the Imperial Department of Foreign Affairs. Count Nesselrode had never been in any manner intimated to me as a Minister with whom I was authorized to communicate, or who was authorized to answer me if I had written to him upon subjects of a public nature. But it was not on my part a mere scruple of etiquette. I was fully satisfied that if it had been the pleasure of the Emperor to take an interest, either in the progress of the negotiation which was committed to us, or in the subject which was

presented to his consideration in your note to Mr. Weydemeyer, such an intimation would have been given to me, either directly from Count Nesselrode, or through you from Mr. Weydemeyer. It never was the intention of our government, and I will now say to you in confidence, it was expressly contrary to my instructions to press upon the Emperor's friendly disposition towards the United States, or to make his friendship in any manner burdensome to himself. Our country was grateful to the Emperor for what he had done, for his offer of mediation, for the candor with which he rejected the false impressions that were attempted to be made upon him by representing us as the allies or the instruments of Napoleon, for the equity of which he judged of our conduct and our motives. It was no part of our policy to trouble him with importunity. And although at one period of our negotiation it was thought expedient that I should make a direct communication to Count Nesselrode, and I had prepared one accordingly, yet upon more mature deliberation the idea was abandoned and at this moment I cannot but feel some satisfaction that our business was conducted to its conclusion without having given so much as a hint of our existence to any one of the sovereigns or ministers of state assembled at Vienna.¹

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TO LOUISA CATHERINE ADAMS

January 10, 1815.

Party violence, Hughes writes, had increased in Congress, and was increasing; and the debates, particularly among the young members, often became personal. I cannot easily imagine anything more violent than a speech of an old ac-

¹ See Adams, *Memoirs*, September 5-7, 1814.

quaintance of yours, Mr. Cyrus King,¹ which the English newspapers have republished, and which has given great satisfaction to the enemies of America. I hope that with the blessing of Providence the peace will contribute to arrest the New England confederation in its absurd and senseless career; but I apprehend the root of the evil lies too deep to be eradicated even by the peace. It is in vulgar and popular prejudice prevailing in each part of the Union against each other; and in the workings of individual ambition graduated upon a small scale, incapable of rising to distinction upon the theatre of the whole union, and aspiring to the sway of a fragment of it.

January 13, 1815.

Mr. Gallatin did not leave this city till yesterday morning. He goes to spend a month at Geneva, and then return to Paris. His son, James, says that he would be pleased with the mission to Russia, but important as that is likely to be, I should be glad to see him in some place where he would render still more useful service to the public. Without disparagement to any other of my late or present colleagues I consider him as having contributed the largest and most important share to the conclusion of the peace, and there has been a more constant concurrence of opinion between him and me upon every point of our deliberations, than perhaps between any two other members of the mission.

January 17, 1815.

Since we quitted the Hotel Lovendeghem our two landlords Lannuier and Deusbon have been selling at public auction our furniture. That operation of itself would not have taken much time, nor have produced much money;

¹ Cyrus King (1772-1817). His speech, delivered December 3, 1814, is in the *Annals of Congress*, 13th Cong., III. 720.

but under the name of effects having belonged to us they have emptied all the upholsterers' shops in the city. The sale has lasted, I believe, a week or ten days; and the good people of the place consider the Congress of Ghent as an epoch of so much importance in the history of their city, that they have given extravagant prices for some of our relics. I am told that an old inkstand, which was used at the conference, was sold for thirty francs, though it was not worth as many sous. Even the furniture from the British hotel was sold at our house, for the sake of putting it in favor. The worst part of the joke was that they put off quantities of bad wine, as if it had been ours. We did not leave a bottle for sale.

TO LOUISA CATHERINE ADAMS

GHENT, 20 January, 1815.

I received yesterday morning yours of 27 December, and readily excuse the omission of a letter on the birthday in the satisfaction of reflecting that you were at that time partaking in the celebration of a day memorable in the annals of Russia, as it will henceforth be memorable in those of our country, and particularly memorable in the days of my life. It is yet for my country to judge how far it is to be considered as a day of joy or of sorrow. I do not apprehend that it, the treaty signed on that day, will be rejected; but that it will be as unpopular in America as it is said to be in England is not improbable, and such is the operation of party spirit that it will be most unpopular in my own state of Massachusetts, where it was most earnestly desired and where the war which it is to terminate is the most obnoxious. I wrote you more than once before the signature that the only remaining obstacles to the conclusion were objects of little value in them-

selves, and in which the people of Massachusetts alone had an interest. They are three small islands at the eastern extremity of the United States, the title to which has been in dispute for several years between Massachusetts and the British province of Nova Scotia; and a liberty to fish on the coast of the British provinces, and to dry and cure fish upon their desert shores. You have seen in the published papers that at the outset of the negotiation the British plenipotentiaries told us that the islands in question were as clearly their town as Northamptonshire, and that their right to them was not even a subject of discussion. They had however been several years prior to the war in our possession, had been recognized as ours by Great Britain herself, in a convention concluded between Lord Hawkesbury and Mr. King in 1803, and had only been taken by an expedition from Halifax this summer. After the British plenipotentiaries had demanded of us about one-third part of the territory of the United States, under the name of an Indian boundary, and had been flatly refused, they fell back upon a demand to keep all that they had taken, that is the eastern countries of Massachusetts to Penobscot River. When beaten off from that ground they made a forlorn hope of those three miserable islands, the whole territory of which is not equal to the ground covered by the city of St. Petersburg, and the whole population of which does not amount to two hundred souls. Small and insignificant as the object was, you will easily conceive, however, that for me, the only native citizen of Massachusetts in the mission, it was impossible to sign a treaty renouncing the right of the state to them. It was finally agreed that all the questions of disputed territory should be referred to commissioners to be appointed by both parties, and, if they cannot agree, to the decision of some friendly sovereign or state. Even then an

attempt was made by the manner in which the article was drawn up to exclude those islands from that reference. They were at last formally and expressly included in the reference, but nothing could prevail upon the British government to restore the possession of them, together with all other territory taken, until the decision should take place upon the title. The question left for us was, should we continue the war, rather than leave the British in possession of these three disputed islands, until it should be decided whether they belonged to them or to us. We concluded not to break off upon that point, and assented to an exception which leaves the intermediate possession to them, unless we should have retaken them before the ratification of the treaty. This sacrifice was a painful one to me, and I yielded to it with great reluctance.

The fishing right stood upon a different foundation. It had been secured to us by a stipulation in the treaty of 1783. The British plenipotentiaries gave us notice, that Great Britain would not *renew* the stipulation without an equivalent. But there was also a stipulation in the treaty of 1783, that the British should enjoy the free navigation of the Mississippi River, a right of which the British plenipotentiaries demanded the renewal. We had no equivalent to give for the fishing liberty, and our instructions forbade us to make it a subject of discussion. We declared to the British plenipotentiaries that our fishing rights and liberties needed no new stipulation. We did not consider them as abrogated by the war, and that they by the same reason needed no stipulation for the navigation of the Mississippi. If, however, they chose to have one they must give an *equivalent* for it. We would consent either to a stipulation confirming the liberties on both sides, or to say nothing in the treaty about either. They then proposed to us an article,

that the parties agreed *to negotiate* hereafter for an equivalent, to be given by Great Britain for the navigation of the Mississippi, and by the United States for the fishing liberties. The only effect of this article would have been the acknowledgment by both sides that both the rights were abrogated, an acknowledgment to which I had fully determined not to subscribe. We rejected it, and the last reference of the British plenipotentiaries to their government was to ascertain whether they should sign the treaty without that article. It was omitted, but with a reference by them to their former declaration that the liberties of the fisheries within their exclusive jurisdiction would not in future be granted without an equivalent. This is the worst feature of the peace, because it leaves the right asserted on one side and denied on the other; so that the moment the fishermen resort again to the fishing grounds within the British jurisdiction they are liable to be forcibly driven from them, and there is a new cause of war. This also is a privilege in which the people of Massachusetts alone have any interest; they have therefore more reason than any other part of the Union to be dissatisfied with the peace, and as a native of the State they have a right to hold me more severely responsible for it than any of my colleagues. On the other hand they had no particular interest in the Indian article. That bears exclusively upon the western and southern states. Its most pernicious feature is the consent that Great Britain should be allowed to treat for them. As however, it only replaced them in the condition they were in before the war; and as the relative strength both of English and of Indians compared with the United States must diminish and dwindle to nothing in time of peace, I hope that article will have no important evil consequence, and I have some reason to believe our acceptance of it has not been disapproved. . . .

TO LOUISA CATHERINE ADAMS

GHENT, 24 January, 1815.

. . . A few days before Messrs. Bayard, Clay and Gallatin left this city, Mr. Van Huffel, a painter, and president of the Société des Beaux Arts, took a fancy to have likenesses of the American ministers, in miniature drawn with a black lead pencil. Those gentlemen all sat to him each an hour or two, and after their departure I went to his house for the same purpose.¹ But after he had begun with his pencil he persuaded himself, and by dint of importunity persuaded me to let him put the figure upon canvas instead of paper; and in oil colors, instead of black lead. It was also understood that the picture was to be not for him, but for me; that is to say, if you think it worth your acceptance for you. The likeness is good, and the picture not a bad one. I leave it here to be finished. . . .

If the rumors from Vienna are well founded, neither the airs of Henri Quatre nor of God save the King will be long favorites at the imperial palace of St. Petersburg. They are sometimes played here at the theatre, at the concerts and redoutes; but neither of them is half so popular as Hail Columbia. You would not easily imagine how this last has become in this city the vaudeville of the day. Soon after our acquaintance with the inhabitants had become considerably extensive, and some of our young men had manifested that they had no partiality for British tunes, the musicians inquired whether we had not some American national air? Oh, yes! there was Hail Columbia! Had any of us got it noted? No. Could anybody sing or play it?

¹ A set of these sketches, being portraits of Adams, Gallatin, Bayard, Clay and Hughes, are in the possession of Mr. Christopher H. Manley, of Baltimore.

This was an embarrassing question. But Peter, Mr. Gallatin's black man, could *whistle* it, and whistle it he did; and one of the musicians of the city noted it down from Peter's whistling; and Hughes then remembered that he could scrape it, *tant bien que mal*, upon the fiddle, and he could sing verses of it when he was alone. And from those elements the tune was made out, and partitioned, and announced as *l'air national des Américains à grand orchestre*, and now it is everywhere played as a counterpart to God save the King. The day we dined at the Intendant's after the peace, his daughter-in-law, Madame d'Hane told Mr. Goulburn that she liked Hail Columbia better than God save the King, which she thought "*trop langoureux*"—Hail Columbia was "*plus gai*." Mr. Goulburn said to her "*cela prouve seulement, Madame, que vous n'êtes pas anglaise*." I was sitting next to Madame d'Hane when this dialogue between her and Mr. Goulburn took place across the table. She is a young and beautiful woman; but to answer your question, she is not the fair lady who according to your cards takes up so much of my attention. *That* fair lady is younger still, and unmarried. I refer you for her name to my letter of the 6th inst.,¹ where you will find that I have not been insensible to the necessity of a reputation for gallantry to the diplomatic character. You must not be jealous of my *Muse*, and as for all the rest of the fair sex of Ghent, your friend, Mr. Gallatin, used to answer them by the assurance that all my affections absent from home were platonic. He one day told me this himself; and I recommended it to him for the future, to pay his court to the ladies for himself, and to leave them, if they had the curiosity to know my character, to find it out in their own way. . . .

¹ Marianne, the twelve-year-old daughter of Mr. Meulemeester. See Adams, *Memoirs*, January 4, 1815.

TO LOUISA CATHERINE ADAMS

BRUXELLES, Hotel de Flandre, 27 January, 1815.

Me voici, at length out of Ghent,¹ though I believe if it had not been for the shame of fixing so many times a day for departure, and still postponing the act, I should have stayed there a fortnight longer. The natural philosophers say that *inertness* is one of the properties of matter by which they understand the aptitude of remaining in whatever situation it is, whether in motion or at rest. Thus they affirm that if a house or a tree were once put in motion, they would continue to move forever, if they were not stopped by some external impediment, and that if anything ever so addicted to motion (Mrs. ———'s tongue for instance) were once set to rest, it would be forever immoveable, unless some external impulse should again give it a start. Whether I have more of *matter* in my composition than my neighbors, I shall not inquire; but of that inertness which when once at rest requires an external impulse to be put in motion, I certainly have my full share. You know how long I have lived in Russia, almost without passing beyond the bounds of St. Petersburg, and now I have been upwards of seven months at Ghent, without making an excursion of a single day to visit any of the neighboring cities. It has been to me one of the labors of Hercules to take my departure, sixteen days after the time that I had fixed; and now that I am safely lodged at Bruxelles, it is highly probable that the five days I had allotted to this place will be extended to ten or fifteen. The attractions of Paris are not an impulsion strong enough to put me in motion. . . .

My letters have informed you time after time of the hos-

¹ He left that city on the morning of January 26, and arrived at Paris, February 4.

pitiable, kind and even affectionate treatment that we all experienced from the inhabitants of Ghent. It was continued to the last, and I left the place with such recollections as I never carried from any other spot in Europe. The interest which the people took in our cause was the source of their attentions to us, and it was the more sensibly felt by me because I had come from and travelled through countries where a very different sentiment prevailed. You have written me, and Mr. Harris writes the same, that our cause has of late had many friends likewise in Russia; but if there had been any before, they had judged it most prudent to keep the secret confined to their own breasts, while the partisans of our adversary proclaimed their partiality on the house tops.¹ Of Sweden, which I had seen in its happier and better days, I would willingly lose the memory of having seen it again. The national character has undergone a revolution more disgusting than that of its government. A close alliance with Russia, a French soldier of fortune supplanting the children of Gustavus Vasa, as hereditary successor to the throne, and the lust of conquest corroding every heart for the acquisition of Norway, had so totally corrupted, perverted and debased every natural Swedish sentiment that

¹ "The sensation produced here by the new order of things is, as you may suppose, great indeed. In the court circle the peace is regretted as being thought premature on our part. It seems wished that we had continued to occupy the enemy another year and to occasion to him a reduction of his influence in Europe. The events at Vienna, known to us as they are but by rumor, sufficiently however evince an irritation which the conduct of Great Britain in the Congress there has excited in more than one great power; and the engines of the British party are at work here to effect changes in the commercial system better adapted to British interests. . . The Russian traders, whose interests have suffered so much from the war, have, many of them, brought me their felicitations in person; and in spite of the captious remarks in the *Times* newspaper of the 27 December, I perceive a feeling of satisfaction very apparent with the English traders here." *Levett Harris to John Quincy Adams*, 7/19 January, 1815. Ms.

there was no room left for any just or generous feeling in favor of America. There was no such feeling to be seen; but short as my stay in that country was, I saw so much of the contrary, of the vilest subserviency to our enemy, that I could only ask myself with astonishment, is this the same people whom I saw in 1782—brave, generous, and warm-hearted, like the king who then reigned over them? Is it the mildewed ear that has spread the blast over a whole nation? No, Sweden is not in its natural state; nor do I believe the present order of things there calculated to be permanent. It is but a breed of barren metal from the iron crown of Bonaparte, and on the fall of that from his brow was struck with the rust under which it will moulder into ashes. . . .

COMMISSION

By JAMES MADISON,—President of the United States of America,

To John Q. Adams—GREETING:

REPOSING especial Trust and Confidence in your Integrity, Prudence and Ability, I have nominated and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate appointed you the said JOHN Q. ADAMS, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States of America at the Court of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland; authorizing you hereby to do and perform all such matters and things as to the said place or office do appertain or as may be duly given you in charge hereafter and the said office to Hold and exercise during the pleasure of the President of the United States for the time being.

IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have caused the seal of the United States to be hereunto affixed.

GIVEN under my hand at the City of Washington the Twenty

Eighth day of February in the year of our Lord one thousand Eight hundred and Fifteen, and of the Independence of the United States the Thirty Ninth.

JAMES MADISON.

By the President,

JAS. MONROE, *Secretary of State.*

TO ABIGAIL ADAMS

PARIS, 21 February, 1815.

MY DEAR MOTHER:

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Three months more would have completed thirty years since I last saw the city of Paris. It was in May, 1785, that I left your house at Auteuil to go and embark at L'Orient for New York. Thirty years is the period upon the average of one generation of the human race. When I departed from the city, its streets, its public walks, its squares, its theatres, swarmed with multitudes of human beings as they do now. And in walking through the streets now they present so nearly the same aspect as they did then, this Rue de Richelieu, where I now lodge, looks so exactly like the Rue de Richelieu where I first alighted with my father in April, 1778, thirty-seven years ago, that my imagination can scarcely realize the fact, that of its inhabitants certainly not one in a hundred, probably not one in a thousand, is the same. That very Hôtel de Valois, where my father had his lodgings, still exists as a public hotel, and a few days ago I had the curiosity to go and look at the apartments which he then had. That house however is no longer what it was, and the chambers and the furniture equally indicate the depredations of time. The Hôtel du Roi, Place du Carrousel, another house in which we lived, has been demolished, and

great changes have been made in the whole of that quarter of the city neighboring upon the Tuileries. I have met here three or four acquaintances of that date—General La Fayette, Count Marbois, and Mr. Le Ray de Chaumont. Madame de Staël I had not the honor of being acquainted with then, but you will certainly recollect her husband, who was Swedish Ambassador here and to whom she was afterwards married. She has now a daughter, shortly to be married,¹ and General La Fayette's children, whom we used to see at his house as infants, have now families of their own nearly grown up. I met them all yesterday at the house of the Count de Tracy, one of whose daughters is married to General La Fayette's son, George. A brother of this lady, Mr. Victor de Tracy, was a major in the French army in the campaign of 1812 and was taken prisoner at the time of the retreat from Moscow. It was some months before his family ascertained where he was, and they found he had been sent to a remote and not very comfortable part of Russia. Count de Tracy and General La Fayette wrote to me requesting me to endeavor to obtain either the exchange of Mr. de Tracy, or the permission for him to return to France upon parole. I found it impossible to obtain either of these favors; but the Emperor Alexander, in consequence of my application, gave orders that Mr. de Tracy should be permitted to come to St. Petersburg and reside there, as Count Romanzoff told me, under my special custody. He came accordingly and spent the last winter at St. Petersburg. He was still there when I left it in April last, but was shortly afterwards released with all the other French prisoners in Russia and returned home. He and his father, and all the family, appreciating their obligations to me more by my intentions and good wishes than by the trifling services

¹ Albertine de Staël, who married the Duke de Broglie (1785-1870.)

which it was in my power to render him, have manifested their sense of it in the most affecting manner. General La Fayette, who resides at La Grange, a country seat about twenty miles from Paris, came last week to the city for the particular purpose of seeing me; and yesterday I had the pleasure of dining with him, and his son and daughter, and their children, at Count de Tracy's, together with the Major, the Countess de l'Aubepin, another sister, her husband and children, and to receive the thanks of the whole of this amiable and respectable family for a good office to one of its worthy members. Count de Tracy was a Senator under the late government, and is now a peer of France. The General is in no public situation. He was always obnoxious to the late Emperor, and it is extraordinary, though perhaps not altogether unaccountable, that the restored family have taken no notice of him.

Count Marbois is likewise a peer of France and first President of the Court of Accounts. I have been several times at his house, and met there his daughter the Duchess of Plaisance. She had this title by her marriage with the Duke Charles de Plaisance, the son of the late arch-treasurer of the Empire, who in the previous consular government was the third consul.

In the autumn of 1812 Madame de Staël was at St. Petersburg, and I then had the honor of becoming acquainted with her. At that time she was among the warmest friends to the cause of the allies against Napoleon, and inclined to favor the British as his principal enemies more than could entirely meet my concurrence. She then gave me an invitation, if I should ever again be in the same city with her to go and see her; of which I have now availed myself, and the more readily, because since the overthrow of Napoleon, and the European peace, she has been among the most distin-

guished friends of our country, and contributed in no small degree to give the tone to the public opinion of France and of Europe, with regard to the vandalism of the British exploit at Washington. She has a son ¹ who, as she says, is *très aimable*, and a beautiful daughter soon to be married to the Duke de Broglie.

I have met here some other and more recent acquaintances of my own countrymen, and Russians, and formed a few new ones. My colleagues, Messrs. Bayard, Clay, and Russell, are here; the two former expect to go in a fortnight or three weeks to London. Mr. Gallatin is still at Geneva, but expected shortly here. We are all waiting for the decision of the American government upon the treaty of peace, and for the subsequent orders which may be transmitted to us.

I have had the honor of being presented to the King and royal family, Monsieur Count D'Artois, his sons, the Dukes D'Angoulême and De Berri, and the Duchess D'Angoulême, the daughter of Louis 16. The King spoke to me in English, and asked if I was related to the celebrated Mr. Adams. I have paid a visit to my father's old friend the Duke de Vau-guyon, but he was ill and sent me an apology for not receiving me, and a promise to call upon me when sufficiently recovered to go abroad.

Among the new acquisitions of Paris since my former acquaintance with it is the famous Museum of the Louvre, which I have visited several times, but in which the collection of pictures, statues and other monuments of sculpture and painting is so vast and extensive that I have not yet been able to examine with attention the tenth part of them. As the Museum is open to the public every day I shall devote much of the leisure I may yet have to visiting it.

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¹ Auguste de Staël.

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE

No. 145.

[JAMES MONROE]

PARIS, 23 February, 1815.

SIR:

Since the departure of Mr. Hughes and Mr. Carroll from Ghent with two copies of the Treaty of Peace, no opportunity has occurred of transmitting a letter to you. Mr. Hughes arrived at Bordeaux on the first of January of the present year, and sailed in the *Transit* a few days after. They did not however get clear of the river Garonne until the 12th. The British government allowed Mr. Carroll to take passage in the corvette *Favourite*, the vessel in which Mr. Baker was dispatched with the Prince Regent's ratification. They sailed on the second of January from Plymouth. A duplicate of the ratification was sent about the same time by Mr. Stewart. We had intended to have sent the third copy of the treaty by the *Herald*, an American schooner lying at Amsterdam, for which we had obtained a passport from the British Admiralty; but she was frozen up in the river just at the time of the signature of the treaty with the prospect of being immovable until spring. We therefore transmitted that copy to Mr. Beasley, with the request that he would forward it to the United States by the first opportunity that might occur. By a letter from him of the 10th instant I learn that he then expected to be favored with such an opportunity in the course of three or four days.

No answer has been communicated to us from the British government to the notification which we gave them, that we had a further full power to negotiate and conclude a treaty of commerce. No answer will probably be given until the

decision of the government of the United States upon the treaty of peace shall have been received. If that should be ratified I do not anticipate any objection from the British side to a negotiation for commerce, and it would seem to be the more expedient to both parties, inasmuch as the treaty of peace has left unadjusted every subject of dispute between the two nations previous to the war, together with others to which the war has given rise, besides those which may arise upon the construction of the treaty itself. If they should consent to this negotiation, they will, it is to be presumed, propose that it should be held at London. Under these circumstances my colleagues have thought it advisable to wait for the arrival of the decision in the United States upon the treaty of peace and the instructions of the President subsequent to that decision. They are now all here with the exception of Mr. Gallatin, who is upon a visit to Geneva, but who is expected here in a few days. Mr. Bayard and Mr. Clay propose to go shortly to London, and the *Neptune*, now at Brest, is to be in readiness to sail on the first of April from thence, or from an English port as may be found most convenient.

As there is no present prospect of a new maritime war in Europe, the collisions of neutral and belligerent rights and pretensions, and the still more irreconcilable right of mariners and pretended rights of impressment, may be suffered to slumber until the occasion shall rise when real interests will again be affected by them. It is doubtful whether Great Britain will ever be under the necessity of making such extraordinary exertions to maintain a naval supremacy in any future European war as she has been in the wars which have just terminated. She has henceforth no rival to her naval power to apprehend in Europe. Whatever the state of things may be in time of peace she has but to raise her

arm to interdict the ocean to every European state. But as she can find no enemy in this hemisphere to oppose her on that field, it will of course cease to be for her the field of glory and even of combat. Her late successes in war by land, as well as her new relations with the continent of Europe, must infallibly continue to increase the proportion of her exertions in that department while the navy and the naval service will continue to decline. That they are upon the decline the uniform experience of the present war with the United States places beyond all question. Whenever she may be next engaged in a European war the great struggle must be expected to take place on land. Her system of blockade will doubtless recur, but the practice of impressment may perhaps not be found necessary. Should a respectable naval force be kept up during the peace by the United States and exhibit them in a state of preparation to contest a blockade of their own coast, I take it for granted that neither impressment nor paper blockades will ever again form a subject of controversy between them and Great Britain. At the same time the conduct of all the maritime powers of Europe under the present pretended blockade of the American coast will release the United States from all obligations of considering the question of blockade in reference to any duty founded upon the rights of the blockaded party.

But the adjustment of the boundaries between the United States and the British provinces in America, the islands in the Bay of Fundy, our rights of fishery within the exclusive British jurisdiction, and the British claim to the navigation of the Mississippi, will be subjects which cannot fail of entering into the discussions of any treaty of commerce to be negotiated. The mode of settlement agreed upon for the boundary question, though accepted by us as a substitute

for that which we had proposed, is far from promising so speedy or so satisfactory a termination. It is scarcely to be expected that in either of the cases referred to two commissioners they will concur in their opinions, and there may be difficulties and inconveniences in the reference to a friendly sovereign or state which were not fully considered when the arrangement was proposed. Who the sovereign or state shall be? In what manner the reference to him shall be made? The certainty of his acceptance of the office and the manner in which he may think proper to decide the questions, may all interpose embarrassments and obstacles to the execution of those articles. On the other hand the exercise of our fishing rights within the British jurisdiction on the American coast may give occasion to immediate collisions of force. I presume that our people will frequent the fishing grounds as heretofore, but from the notice given and repeated by the British plenipotentiaries it is to be expected that this fishing will be broken by force. The only alternative then for the United States will be to protect it by force or to negotiate upon the right. It is probable that the real object of the British government in disputing the right at present, as well as in the adherence to the claim of the islands in Passamaquoddy Bay, is to make them *equivalent* for obtaining the cession of territory necessary for the communication between their provinces of New Brunswick and of Canada.

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TO LEVETT HARRIS

PARIS, 2 March, 1815.

DEAR SIR:

Since I had the pleasure of writing to you on the 5th of last month I have had that of receiving your favors of 19 and 25 January and of 1st of February with their inclosures. There is a French vessel on the point of sailing from Havre for Amelia Island, but to proceed as soon as the blockade of New York shall have been raised to that port. I have sent dispatches to the Secretary of State by Mr. Storrow, one of our countrymen who will go as a passenger in this vessel, and among them have forwarded copies of your correspondence with Mr. Weydemeyer relative to the treaty of peace concluded at Ghent.

There is no doubt as Count Romanzoff remarked to you that the British were closely pressed at Vienna at the moment we signed the peace, and that their difficulties at that Congress together with their disappointments in America presented as a favorable occasion for terminating our war. That occasion it is equally evident was momentary. Neither at any earlier period, nor as I believe at this time, would the same chance have existed. The great objects at the Congress of Vienna are now settled entirely to the satisfaction of Great Britain. What the desire of our government has been upon the treaty we sent them I will not anticipate, but if I would have doubted of the policy on our part of signing as we did and when we did, all such doubts would at this instant be removed. I have invariably believed that the issue of the Congress at Vienna would be pacific, and that the peace in Europe would continue to be general for at least a few years. It is probable that the state of peace itself

will bring upon the British government some embarrassments which may operate to our advantage. And I confess I should just now have felt very awkwardly if by refusing peace upon the terms which we did accept because the English were closely pressed at Vienna, we should now see them as we do completely released from that pressure, and with *carte blanche* from all Europe against America. We had before our departure from Ghent received letters from two ministers of his Majesty the King of Prussia, reclaiming the monument of the Queen which had been taken on its passage from Leghorn to Hamburg by an American privateer. It would have given me great pleasure to have contributed to obtain the restitution of that, as well as of all the boxes belonging to Baron Strogonoff, for whom I entertain a very particular respect. But I have been informed that the vessel was retaken and brought into some port of France. I think Cherbourg or La Rochelle. It is therefore only from the recaptors that the articles in question are to be recovered, and they will doubtless be recoverable even upon the British principles of maritime law.

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INSTRUCTIONS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, March 13th, 1815.

SIR:

The restoration of peace having afforded an opportunity to renew the friendly intercourse with Great Britain, the President availed himself of it without delay, by the appointment of a Minister Plenipotentiary to the British government. Your long and meritorious services induced him with the advice and consent of the Senate, to confer that appointment upon you for which I have the honor to transmit to you a commission and a letter of credence. Of this intention you were some time since advised.

On entering on the duties of this trust, your attention will naturally be drawn to the means of preserving the peace which has been so happily restored, by a termination, so far as it may be practicable, of all causes of future variance. These will form the subject of a more full communication hereafter. I shall confine this letter to some subjects incident to the new state of things which will probably come into discussion in your first interview.

A faithful execution of the treaty recently concluded on both sides cannot fail to have a happy effect on the future relations of the two countries. That the United States will perform with strict fidelity their part you are authorized to give to the British government the most positive assurance. Arrangements have been already made for surrendering those parts of Upper Canada which are occupied by our troops, and to receive in return the posts that are held within our limits by the British forces. This important stipulation, if no obstacle occurs on the part of the British commanders, will be carried into effect in a few weeks. Commissioners will also be appointed for establishing the boundary between the United States and the British provinces according to the treaty, who will be prepared to enter on that duty as soon as the British commissioners arrive. It is hoped that the British government will lose no time in appointing commissioners and sending them out to commence the work.

I regret to have to state that the British commander in the Chesapeake had construed that part of the first article relating to slaves and other property very differently from what appears to be its true import. He places slaves and other private property on the footing of artillery, and contends that none were to be given up except those who were at the time of the ratification in the forts and places where they were originally captured. The absurdity of this construction is too evident to admit the presumption that it will be countenanced by his government, since it would be impossible under it to recover any. The very act of taking the slaves removed them from the places where they were captured. They have in the Tangier Islands and in the vessels stationed in

this Bay many that were taken from the estates on its shores, none of whom could be recovered. It is probable that the same construction will be given by the British commanders along the coast of Southern States, where it is understood many slaves have been taken recently, and are held on islands and on board their vessels within the limit of the United States.

As soon as it is known what course the British commanders will finally pursue in this affair, I will apprise you of it. I transmit to you an act of Congress proposing an abolition of all discriminating duties in the commercial intercourse between the United States and other nations. The British government will, it is presumed, see in this act a disposition in the United States to promote on equal and just conditions an active and advantageous commerce between the two countries. This may lay the foundation of a treaty, but in the mean time it is desirable that the British government should obtain the passage of a similar act by the Parliament.

I transmit to you also a copy of a message from the President to Congress proposing the exclusion by law of all foreign seamen, not already naturalized from the vessels of the United States.

The session was too near its termination at the time of the ratification of the treaty to allow the examination of this subject. It may be expected, however, that it will hereafter be adopted. The object of this regulation need not be explained to you. You will do justice in your communications with the British government to the amicable policy which dictates it.

In the treaty lately concluded at Ghent Great Britain takes a priority over the United States, as is presumed, in both instruments. She does so in that received here, and it is inferred that she does it in that received by her government, from the circumstance that she holds that rank in the ratification of the Prince Regent.

Great Britain takes the first rank as a power and our ministers likewise sign under those of Great Britain. This, though comparatively an inferior object, is not unimportant. It was, there is no

doubt, lost sight of in the very important object of peace. In all other treaties between the United States and other powers the ministers of each party sign in the same line. This was done in the treaty of peace with Great Britain and in the subsequent treaties with her government. In the treaty with France in 1803 the United States took rank in the instrument delivered to this government, which was reciprocated in that delivered to the government of France. In the treaty with Spain in 1795 Mr. Pinckney signed before the Prince of Peace, the United States had rank likewise over Spain in the instrument delivered to them. It is understood that in treaties between all powers this principle of equality is generally, if not invariably, recognized and observed. In the exchange of ratifications it was thought proper to advert to these circumstances that neither this treaty nor those which preceded it might become a precedent, establishing a relation between the United States and Great Britain different from that which exists between them and other powers. As the governments of Europe attach much importance to this circumstance, it is one to which we ought not to continue to be altogether inattentive. It is a mortifying truth that concessions, however generous the motive, seldom produce the desired effect. They more frequently inspire improper pretensions in the opposite party. It may be presumed that Mr. Baker will communicate the substance of my remarks to him on this subject to his government. They were made with that intention. Should a suitable opportunity present itself it may have a good effect that you should explain to the British government the sentiments of the President on it. I have the honor to be with great consideration, sir, your ob. humble servt.

JAS. MONROE.

TO ABIGAIL ADAMS

PARIS, 19 March, 1815.

MY DEAR MOTHER:

Yesterday morning I received the first information of the ratification by the government of the United States of the treaty of peace concluded at Ghent on the 24th of last December. The ratification was received at London last Monday evening, the 13th instant, and the communication of the event by Lord Castlereagh to the Lord Mayor was made about eleven o'clock that night. It was brought by the *Favourite* corvette, the same vessel which had taken the British ratification to the United States. Lord Fitz Roy Somerset, the British Minister at this Court, wrote a letter to Mr. Crawford the evening before last informing him of the event. There had been a rumor in circulation the preceding day that the ratification in America had been refused. It is stated in the English newspapers that the advice of the Senate to the ratification was unanimous, a circumstance which, if authenticated, will be the more gratifying to me, as I had not flattered myself with the hope that it would be so. I have no letters yet from England since the arrival of the *Favourite*, and know not whether she brought dispatches or letters for me or for any of my colleagues. If there are none, doubtless in the course of a few days we shall receive orders or instructions by other opportunities. As the treaty was ratified on the 17th of February, all hostilities upon the American coast were to cease on the first of this month, and this day puts an end to them on the Atlantic coasts of Europe and in the British and Irish channels. Peace upon the ocean will at least for a moment be restored. Whether longer than for a moment will depend upon events of which

I can form no rational and confident anticipation. After all the strange, unforeseen and wonderful vicissitudes which the annals of Europe have exhibited during the last twenty-five years, the turn which affairs have just now taken, and the aspect of the country where I am, are more strange, more astonishing, and more unexpected, than anything that had yet occurred. The sovereigns of Europe were just terminating at Vienna their negotiations. All the objects of important interest which had been in discussion among them had been settled by a convention to which all the great powers were parties. Europe had the prospect of a long and profound peace when, on the first day of this month, Napoleon Bounaparte landed with eleven hundred and forty men and four pieces of cannon at Cannes in the Department of Var, not far from Marseilles. It is five hundred miles distant from Paris, and I am afraid you will think I am sporting with credulity when I assure you that now, at the moment when I am writing, the impression almost universal throughout Paris is, that within six days he will enter this city as a conqueror, without having spent an ounce of gunpowder on his march.

I have not yet brought myself to that belief. I am no longer indeed confident that it is impossible, because the progress that he has undoubtedly made has by the simple fact disproved the correctness of my anticipations. At the first news of his landing I considered it as the last struggle of desperation on his part. I did not believe that he would be joined by five hundred adherents, and fully expected that he would within ten days pay the forfeit of his rashness with his life.

But on the tenth day after his landing he entered Lyons, the second city of France, after a march of two hundred miles. All the troops sent against him had either joined his

standard, or refused to fire upon his troops. At Grenoble, which was surrendered to him without resistance, he found a depot of artillery, arms, and ammunition. The King's brother Count d'Artois, the Duke of Orleans and Marshal Macdonald, who were immediately dispatched from Paris to assemble troops and oppose the invader, arrived at Lyons barely in time to ascertain that the attempt to resist him there would be fruitless, and returned to Paris to see if anything more effectual can be done here. After passing two days at Lyons, Napoleon proceeded on his march, and on Friday last, the 17th, was at Auxerre, not more than one hundred miles from Paris.

In the mean time nothing is seen or heard here but manifestations of attachment and devotion to the King and the House of Bourbon. In the streets, at all the public places, in all the newspapers, one universal sentiment is bursting forth of fidelity to the King, and of abhorrence and execration of this firebrand of civil and foreign war. The two chambers of the legislative body, the principal tribunals of justice, the municipal administrations of the departments and cities, the National Guards, the Marshals, Generals, and officers and garrisons of almost every city in the kingdom, are flocking to the Tuileries with addresses of inviolable attachment to Louis 18 and of their readiness to shed their blood in his cause. If the slightest reliance could be placed upon the most boisterous and unanimous expressions of public feeling, the only conclusion would be that here are twenty-five millions of human beings contending against one highway robber. In private conversation the universal expectation is that Buonaparte will enter Paris as he entered Lyons, without opposition; but that the inevitable consequence will be a foreign and civil war.

Of his proceedings, of the force now with him, and of the

manner in which he has advanced, scarcely anything authentic is known. He has issued several proclamations with great vehemence, but none of which have been suffered to be published. After stating that he landed with only one thousand men, they affirm that he entered Lyons with not more than four thousand five hundred, and that his troops are daily deserting from him in prodigious numbers. On the road between Lyons and this city there have been insurrections of the populace in his favor; but one of the extraordinary features of this romance is, that the cities through which he marches, as soon as he had passed through them, immediately return to the royal authority. This has already happened at Grenoble and at Lyons.

The defection in the troops of the army is unquestionably very great, and if not universal, is scarcely less formidable than if it were. For the government knows not what troops it can trust. The soldiers all cry *Vive le Roi* without hesitation. They permit their officers to pledge them to what they please. They march wherever they are ordered, but not a regiment has yet been found that would fire upon the soldiers of Buonaparte. They will not use their arms against their former fellow soldiers. The vast majority of them are willing to be neutral.

Notwithstanding the general opinion I do not believe that he will enter Paris without bloodshed; nor even that he will reach Paris at all. The government has been collecting a force upon which they can depend, which will meet him before he can arrive here, and the first actual resistance he meets will I think determine his fate. At the same time I must admit that the facts have hitherto turned out so contrary to all my expectations that my confidence in my own judgment is shaken. At all events the week will not pass over without some decisive result. . . . Messrs. Gallatin,

Bayard and Russell are here. Mr. Gallatin goes in a day or two for London. Mr. Clay went last week. Mr. Bayard is confined with a severe indisposition, and has been dangerously ill. Mr. Crawford has also been very unwell but has now recovered.

My wife and son Charles left St. Petersburg on the 12th of February. I have a letter from her of the 5th instant from Berlin. She then expected to be here at the latest by this day, and I am now in hourly expectation of her arrival.

Monday Morning, 20 March, 1815.

The King left the palace of the Tuileries at one o'clock this morning, taking a direction to the northward. Napoleon is expected to enter Paris this day or tomorrow. Yet nothing but unanimity in favor of the Bourbons is discernible. How it will be tomorrow I shall not anticipate. Affectionately yours.

TO JOHN ADAMS

PARIS, 21 March, 1815.

MY DEAR SIR:

I wrote you a short letter by Mr. Storrow, who left this city to embark at Havre for the United States at the end of the last month, and I inclosed with it a file of *Journal des Débats* from the time of my arrival in Paris until then. A fortnight afterwards I received a line from Mr. Storrow at Havre, mentioning that he was still detained there, and offering to take any other dispatches or letters that I might have ready. I had barely time to write to the Secretary of State, and to inclose to you a second file of the newspaper down to the 14th instant. This second file is more interest-

ing than the other, as it contains the first official indications here of a new series of events unfolding itself to the astonishment of mankind. Mr. and Mrs. Smith have concluded to embark at the same port of Havre in the *Fingal*, which has been waiting there only for the news of the American ratification of the Ghent treaty. They are to leave Paris tomorrow, if it be allowed, and with this letter I shall send you a third file of the newspaper which will bring the first part of this new drama to its *dénoûment*. I wrote my mother the day before yesterday a short and very general narrative of the apparition of Napoleon Buonaparte. . . . The night of the same day when I thus wrote, Napoleon slept at Fontainebleau. At one o'clock yesterday morning the King and royal family left the Tuileries, and took the road to Lille. The King issues a proclamation which was only published yesterday morning after his departure, closing the session of the two legislative chambers which he had convoked immediately on being informed of the landing of Napoleon. It convoked them both anew, to meet at a place to be pointed out to them hereafter. It adds that by the defection of a part of the army the enemy had succeeded in approaching the capital, and that although sure of the attachment of the immense majority of the inhabitants of Paris, the King had determined by a temporary retirement to a different part of the kingdom to avoid the calamities which might befall the metropolis by resistance before it. In the course of the morning of yesterday a detachment of Napoleon's advanced guard entered the city amidst the acclamations of the same multitude which has been for the last fortnight making the atmosphere ring with the cries of *Vive le Roy*. They took possession of the Tuileries, where the three-colored flag is now waving in triumph, and last evening the walls of all the public places were covered with the proclamation of Napo-

leon, *par le grâce de Dieu, et les Constitutions, Empereur des Français*, addressed to the people and to the army, pasted over the proclamations scarcely dry of Louis 18, declaring Napoleon Buonaparte a traitor and rebel, and commanding all civil and military authorities, and even every individual citizen, to seize and deliver him to a court martial, to identify his person and apply the penalties of the law. Between ten and eleven o'clock last night, I saw in the garden of the Palais Royal, a huge bonfire of all the proclamations, indignations, execrations, addresses, verses and appeals to the people and army against the Corsican monster and tyrant, which had been loading the columns of the arches the preceding fortnight, and many of which had been stuck up there the same morning, probably by the identical hands which were now with shouts of thunder committing them to the flames.

It was expected that Napoleon himself would have entered the city last evening, but it is said that there is to be a triumphal entry at noon this day.

I had written thus far when the *Journal de l'Empire* of this day was brought in to me. When the allied forces entered Paris this time last year, the *Journal de l'Empire* was in one night metamorphosed into the *Journal des Débats*. On my arrival in Paris I subscribed for it. Last night it underwent the counter metamorphosis, and this morning it is again the *Journal de l'Empire*, though it still bears the *timbre royal*. You will find it in the file, and if you will take the trouble of comparing the contents of the *Journal des Débats* of yesterday, 20 March, with those of the *Journal de l'Empire* of this day, 21 March, you will see an epitome of what is taking place at Paris, and perhaps throughout France. The other public journals do not even think it worth while to change their names.

It appears by this paper that the Emperor Napoleon arrived at the palace of the Tuileries last evening about eight o'clock, and it may give you some idea of the tranquillity with which he entered, that it was not until I received the paper that I knew he was in the city. He entered Grenoble and Lyons about the same time, and in the same manner, with a report circulating that he was not to come until the next day. There may be a particular motive for this. Not more than four or five regiments of troops have entered the city with him, and it is not yet possible to say what the numbers of the troops who have joined him amount to. Thus much however appears to be certain, that on the first day of this month, at the moment of landing, he announced himself to the nation and the army as their Emperor, and that he has been recognized as such by all that portion of both who have come in his presence. That no legitimate and universally acknowledged sovereign ever traversed his dominions with more perfect acquiescence and submission on the part of his subjects than he has found throughout the whole road, or was ever received in his capital with more tranquillity and unresisting obedience. It now remains to be seen whether the partisans of the Bourbons in any other part of the country will manifest at the moment of crisis an attachment more active and more energetic than has been found in their friends at the metropolis.

The newspaper says it is not known what road the family of Bourbon took on leaving Paris, but it is well known that they took the road towards the north. A notification was sent to the accredited foreign ministers that the Court was about to remove to Lille, and inviting them to join it there; with the option however of returning to their own governments. The garrison of Lille has been amongst the most ardent in their protestations of fidelity to the King; but

whether he will trust himself to their hands may be doubted, and if he does, whether it will be safe for him to remain long with them.

At present the prospect is that in a very few weeks all France will be ranged once more under domination of Napoleon. I can scarcely offer a conjecture what part will be taken by the other powers of Europe on this occasion. Napoleon holds out the olive branch to them in the remark that the French must forget that they have been the masters of other nations, but he holds out the sword in the declaration that foreign nations must not be suffered to intermeddle in the affairs of France. At all events the settlement of European affairs at the Congress of Vienna cannot be considered as definitive.

In some of the letters which I received from you last year you made inquiries for certain books which I did not find it possible to procure before my arrival here. I now send you by Mr. Smith the *Timaeus* of Locris and Ocellus Lucanus, with the translations and commentary of the Marquis D'Argens; and I add to them another piece of anti-christianity, of the same translator and commentator, the defence of Paganism by the Apostate Julian. Scaliger's *Prophecy of Enoch* it has been impossible for me to find even here, though I have hunted for it at all the classical shops and stalls of the city.

My wife has not yet arrived, and as she has had ample time to come since she wrote me on the 5th instant from Berlin, I am anxious for her arrival. Since the approach of Napoleon towards Paris vast numbers of foreigners, and many others, have left the city and taken flight in all directions. They have employed all the post horses on the road, so that I am apprehensive my wife may have been detained for want of them. Possibly there may be some momentary

impediment to the passage of travellers at the frontiers. I hope to be relieved from any anxiety before Mr. Smith goes. I am etc.

TO ABIGAIL ADAMS

PARIS, 22 April, 1815.

MY DEAR MOTHER:

Mr. and Mrs. Smith left Paris on the 22d of March, to embark in the *Fingal* at Havre for New York. I wrote to you by them on the 19th. They sailed on the 30th with a fair wind, and having a fine ship and the most favorable season of the year for a voyage to America, I hope they are at this time near the port of their destination. Here the easterly winds have constantly prevailed from the time of their departure. My wife and son Charles arrived here the day after they went away. Mrs. Adams performed the journey from St. Petersburg in forty days, and it has been of essential service to her and Charles' health. She entered France precisely at the time when the revolution was taking place which has overthrown again the family of Bourbons, and witnessed the enthusiasm of the troops and of the people in favor of Napoleon.

Prepared as every person accustomed to reflect upon political events ought to have been for occurrences of an extraordinary nature in France, I must acknowledge that those which have been passing around me have been not only unexpected to me but totally contrary to my most confident expectations. When I first heard of the landing of Napoleon five hundred miles distant from Paris, with eleven hundred men and four pieces of cannon, I considered it as the last struggle of a desperate adventurer, and did not imagine that he would penetrate twenty leagues into the interior of France.

After knowing him to have reached Grenoble, Lyons and even Auxerre, I could not still believe that he would become without bloodshed master of Paris; and at this hour I can scarcely realize that he is the quiet and undisputed sovereign of France. It was impossible not to perceive that the government of the Bourbons was not cordially cherished by the people of France; but the king was generally respected, his administration had been mild and moderate, and so thoroughly had the sentiments of the French nation been misrepresented in the course of the last year that I believed the domination of Napoleon to have been universally detested by them. The facts which I have before my eyes have now brought me to a different conclusion. Although the attachment of the army to Napoleon has been manifested in the most unequivocal manner, there has been scarcely any military agency in his restoration. If the people in any one of the cities through which he passed to come here had been opposed to him, he could not have made his way. If the people of Paris had been seriously averse to his government, the national guards of the city alone would have outnumbered five times all the troops that had then declared in his favor. I wrote you in my last that the cities through which he had passed, immediately after he had left them returned to the royal authority. That was one of the fables circulated by the adherents to the royal cause, which I had the simplicity to believe. It was entirely without foundation. Bordeaux, with the Duchess of Angoulême within its walls animating the partisans of her house to resistance, capitulated to an imperial general with 150 men, before they could approach the city. The Duke d'Angoulême, who of all the royal family alone succeeded in collecting five or six thousand men, prepared to defend the cause by force of arms, was overpowered by the numbers of National Guards who

gathered against him, before any competent number of the regular army could be brought to bear upon him, and was by those National Guards detained as a prisoner, when the commander of the regular troops had already consented to a stipulation that he should be allowed to embark and quit the country. Indeed the sympathy of sentiment between the people and the army is greater in France than in any other country. From the system of conscription as it has been carried into effect, and the wars in which France has been for more than twenty years constantly engaged, the *leading* men of every village in the country are old soldiers who have served under the banners of Napoleon. Men who having passed through their five years of service have been released from the armies and returned to the conditions of civil life. This class of men form a link of association between the army and the people. They are according to their several standings in society the persons who enjoy the highest consideration in their neighborhoods. They give the tone to the opinions and feelings of the rest of the people, and they are as enthusiastically devoted to Napoleon as any part of the existing army. The purchasers of national property are another numerous and powerful class of people attached to him by their interests. Their numbers at the lowest estimate that I have heard made amount to two millions of people. Louis 18 by his declarations previous to his restoration had solemnly promised that none of the sales of this property that had taken place should be invalidated. He had confirmed this promise by an article in the constitutional charter, which he held out as a grant from him to his people; notwithstanding which his own ministers in their official papers, all the public journals under the absolute control of his court, all the princes of his family by their discourses, and even himself by indirect means, were con-

tinually alarming the possessors of that species of property and had staggered its security to such an extent, that since the restoration it had fallen to one quarter part of its saleable value. Besides this all the ancient nobility were asserting anew their claims to the feudal rights which had been so oppressive upon the people, and the priesthood equally favored by the King and court were already clamorous for the reëstablishment of tythes. The persons who had acted the most distinguished parts in the Revolution were excluded from all appointments, and even arbitrarily removed from judicial offices and literary and scientific institutions. The institutions themselves are degraded, the National Institute in its four classes was dissolved, the old academies were restored, and the King undertook of his mere authority to expel from them twenty-two of their numbers, and to appoint other persons in their stead. By this series of measures, and a few instances of arbitrary acts oppressive to individuals, the government of Louis 18 in the short space of two months had rendered itself more odious to the mass of the nation, than all the despotism and tyranny of Napoleon had made him in ten years.

But while the French nation has been thus earnest and thus nearly unanimous in receiving again Napoleon for their sovereign, the allies of the Congress of Vienna have declared that there can be neither peace nor truce with him; that by violating his convention with them (which they had previously violated in all its parts) he had forfeited the only legal title he had to existence, and had delivered himself up to the public vengeance. It is not easy precisely to determine what those high and mighty personages meant by these expressions, and the most charitable manner that I can account for them is to suppose that they had no meaning at all. As Napoleon was at all events not the subject of the

allied sovereigns, they could not mean that he should be punished for his unpardonable offence (the breach of a treaty) by the sentence of their judicial tribunals. As a *sovereign* (and by the very treaty of Fontainebleau to which they refer they had all acknowledged him as such) the only way by which they could punish his offences was by war. It is a new maxim in the law of nations that a sovereign by the breach of a treaty forfeits all legal right to existence; its application might perhaps be found inconvenient to some of the high allies themselves. After all, it is to war that they must resort, and their declaration may import that if in that war they should take him prisoner, they will put him to death without ceremony. They did not imagine that before they could put in execution any threat against him he would be at the head of the whole French nation, with an army of four hundred thousand men to support him. But the worst of their declaration is that it pledges them irrevocably to a new war which may be more dreadful than those from which Europe was just emerging. He has answered them by offering peace, and almost imploring peace of them. There is every probability that his offers will be rejected. They are determined on a second invasion of France. I believe, though with some distrust of my own judgment, that they will meet resistance greater than they expect. Hitherto no hostilities have taken place, but the troops are marching with all possible expedition to the frontiers, and the allied sovereigns are to transfer their Congress at Vienna to their headquarters at Frankfort on the Main.

I received a few days since your favors of the 28 February and 8 March, which arrived at Liverpool and were transmitted to me from London. I am waiting here for the commission to Great Britain, and the instructions of our

government.¹ The state of Mr. Bayard's health will not admit of his going at present to St. Petersburg. His intention still is to return to the United States in the *Neptune*, and he expects to sail in about three weeks or a month from Havre. Mr. Russell is gone to Sweden. Mr. Gallatin and Mr. Clay are in London. Mr. Gallatin must wait for new credentials to the Emperor Napoleon, unless before they arrive Louis 18 should again be restored. Mr. Crawford goes to England next week and intends also to return home in the *Neptune*.

My dutiful and affectionate remembrance to my father and dear friends around you, and believe me as ever faithfully yours.

TO JOHN ADAMS

PARIS, 24 April, 1815.

DEAR SIR:

I wrote you by Mr. Storrow and by Mr. Smith, who left this city with the intention of embarking in different vessels for the United States, but who both actually went in the *Fingal* from Havre. I sent you by them a regular file of the *Journal des Débats* from the time of my arrival here until it was metamorphosed into the *Journal de l'Empire*. Mr. Crawford is now going to England, intending to embark there for America. I avail myself of the opportunity to write you again, and to inclose the file of the *Journal de l'Empire* from the time of Mr. Smith's departure.

I have received your favors of 20 February and 10 March, with the inclosed letter from the President to you, and the

¹ On April 5 he had learned by way of London that Gallatin had been appointed minister to France, Bayard to Russia, and himself to England.

copy of instructions to you in 1779 in relation to the fisheries. As you promise to write me again upon the subject, I hope to receive your letter in time to use to the best advantage the information it will contain. I have heard by letters from England, as well as by yours, of the new mission assigned to me; but I have not received the commission or dispatches of any kind from the government. I am in hourly expectation of their arrival. I have never been charged with a public trust from which there was so little prospect of any satisfactory result, or which presented itself with so little anticipation of anything agreeable to myself or my family. The peace mission had anxieties and inauspicious prospects enough; but the division of responsibilities between five colleagues, the release from the servitude and oppressive expenses of court attendance, and the faculty of living in a reputable manner without rushing into ruin, made them supportable, and the issue having been more fortunate than we could have any reason to hope, above all the consolation of having rendered an acceptable service to our country, has been ample satisfaction and compensation for all the disquietudes with which it was attended. I had indulged the hope that the negotiation with Great Britain immediately subsequent to the peace would still have been under a joint commission. We had in fact separate full powers to negotiate a treaty of commerce. We communicated them to the British government immediately after the signature of the peace, but no answer has been returned to our communication. Towards the close of the month of February Lord Castlereagh was here upon his return from Vienna. Mr. Bayard lodged at the same hotel where he did and had an interview with him. Mr. Clay, who is now in London, had also had an interview with him, and from the opinions expressed by his Lordship it appears that the British

government are not at this time inclined to negotiate a treaty of commerce.

It gives me great satisfaction to find your opinion concurring with mine, that our rights to the fisheries remain precisely as they stood by the treaties of peace in 1782 and 1783, and I hope and trust that our government and country will entertain the same opinion and be prepared to maintain it against all opposition; that the rights will all be immediately exercised by the fishermen, and that if they should be in any manner contested by the British government, they will be supported on our part with all necessary spirit and vigor. We must not flatter ourselves with the belief that the restoration of peace by compact with Great Britain has restored either to her government or people pacific sentiments towards us. By an unparalleled concurrence of circumstances Britain during the year 1814 gave the law to all Europe. After reducing France to a condition scarcely above that of a British colony she wielded the machines of the congress at Vienna according to her good will and pleasure. Lord Castlereagh, since his return to England, has boasted in Parliament, and with great reason, that every object in discussion at Vienna in which Great Britain took any interest had been adjusted entirely to his satisfaction. The King of France had publicly and solemnly declared, that it was, under God, to the councils of the British Prince Regent that he was indebted for his restoration to the throne of his ancestors—a declaration commendable on one hand, as a candid acknowledgment of the truth, but very indiscreet on the other, as fixing the seal of the deepest degradation upon the very people whom he was thus to govern. But what is the situation of a King of France holding his crown as a donation from a British Regent? Louis 18 furnished a deplorable answer to this question. He was in substance

a Vice-Roy under the Duke of Wellington. Since the fall of his government, I have had unequivocal information that one of the first measures of the council of Louis 18 was a serious deliberation, whether he should not declare war against the United States, and make a common cause with England in that quarrel. It was finally determined that such a step would be inexpedient, because it would too violently shock the sentiments of the French nation which were all in our favor. But even after determining to declare a state of neutrality, the instructions to the commanding officers at all the maritime ports were, to show every favor to the British and every partiality against the Americans short of absolute hostility. The applications from the American ministers were slighted and most of them were left unanswered. Those from the British Ambassador, however arrogant and overbearing, were sure of meeting with compliance. Every manifestation of the public sentiment all over the country was directly the reverse. The Americans were everywhere treated with kindness and respect, while the English were loaded with detestation and ridicule. This subserviency of the French to the British court has been one of the great causes of the astonishing facility with which Napoleon has again overthrown the Bourbons, a facility which I can scarcely credit with the demonstration of the fact before my own eyes. The allied sovereigns have declared that there can be neither peace nor truce with Napoleon, and they *appear* to have determined irrevocably to wage anew a common war against France for the sole avowed purpose of *destroying* him. He has offered them peace, and almost implored peace of them; but he is preparing with all possible vigor and activity for the defence of the country against invasion. The great mass of the people and of the army are in his favor. His own measures since

his return have all been calculated for popularity. Those of the Bourbons and of the allies against him have increased his partisans more than anything done by himself. There is a spirit of enthusiasm rising in the nation to support him with which I think the allies, numerous, formidable, and animated as they are, will find it no easy task to contend. I have been so utterly disappointed in all the anticipations I had formed that the Bourbons would have energetic adherents and supporters in France, that I speak with great diffidence in stating the belief that Napoleon will have firmer and more devoted friends. When the myriads of allies enter upon the French territory, he *may* perhaps again be deserted and betrayed. But the symptoms are all of a different character. A very few weeks will suffice to solve the problem.

If Napoleon should be destroyed, and France again restored to the Bourbons, England will again be the dictatress of Europe. It is however scarcely possible to suppose that the Bourbons can ever hold the crown of France, even with the show of independence left them at their last restoration. The army cannot be annihilated with Napoleon. The nation can never endure the dominion of a king appealing to divine right as his only title to the throne; of nobles reclaiming feudal prerogatives, and priests exacting tithes. As his last resource there is an impression here that Napoleon, if the allies make him the pretext of the war, will declare France again a republic, and if the nation will not fight for him, it is yet probable that they will endure every extremity against the Bourbons.

In one of the last newspapers on the file which I inclose, you will find the supplementary constitution, which is now to be presented to the acceptance or rejection of the people. The numbers of the votes returned will indicate to a certain

degree the real dispositions of the nation. The constitution itself approaches nearer to the English model than any of those they have hitherto tried. The legislative bodies have more independence and more power than had been granted to them since the government of the Directory. The popular features introduced in it, and the control under which it places the imperial dignity itself clearly prove that it is not upon a mere military movement that Napoleon now relies for support. He courts the people still more than the soldiers, and in the recent events the impulse has evidently been stronger from the people upon the army than from the army upon the people.

Should Napoleon now maintain his ground the supremacy of England in the affairs of Europe will cease. Cramped and crippled as France is by the dimensions to which the Bourbons had consented to reduce her, under his administration with a few years of peace she will not be a counterpoise to the inordinate influence of Britain, but occupy enough of her attention and anxieties to make it her unequivocal policy to be upon good terms with us. It is in her interest alone that we shall ever find a pledge of her equity and moderation.

My wife and Charles are well and join me in assurances of duty and affection with which I remain ever faithfully yours.

TO THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

[GEORGE WASHINGTON CAMPBELL]

LONDON, 24 April, 1815.

SIR:

The day after I had the honor of writing you last I received the answer of Messrs. Willinks and Van Staphorst to the letter which I had written them communicating your proposals for the sale of the stock which had been sent last summer to Europe. They stated that they believed a sale might be effected at 75 @ 76 per cent and inclosed a calculation to show from the state of the exchange between Amsterdam and this place that it would be equivalent to 90 @ 91 at London.

On receiving a few days after your instructions of 23 May I immediately wrote to them again and also consulted with Mr. Alexander Baring concerning the execution of them. Mr. Baring assured me that the interest payable here on the 1st instant upon the Louisiana loan should at all events be paid, and also the bills which you had authorized the bankers at Amsterdam to draw upon his house for the purpose of discharging the interest payable on the same loan in Holland should be duly paid, though he intimated that this addition to the large advances already due to his house from the United States would not be altogether convenient.

With regard to the immediate disposal at the market price here of a sufficient portion of the certificates to refund the sum of 246,000 dollars to be paid for this interest: the first that the certificates were in the keeping of Mr. Jackson ¹ at Paris and second that they declare the interest upon them

¹ Henry Jackson, United States chargé d'affaires.

expressly to be payable semi-annually at Amsterdam, which Mr. Baring observed would make them utterly unsaleable here. I wrote immediately to Mr. Jackson requesting him to transmit the certificates to me, but have not yet received them or his answer, and suggested to Mr. Baring expedients for a stipulation to be confirmed at the Treasury of the United States that the payment should be made in London. He thought the sale might be most conveniently effected at Amsterdam, and appeared disposed to renew the proposal of taking the whole three millions at 90 per cent, he to effect the sale there, and save the advantage of the exchange by drawing for the proceeds of the sale to this country. Although the exchange at Philadelphia or Baltimore upon London, as quoted by the latest advices from the United States, might render a sale of the certificates here at 90 equivalent to the 95 by which I am limited in your instructions, yet in the uncertainty whether that exchange will continue at the same rate I do not feel myself warranted in accepting the proposals of Mr. Baring. For while subscriptions are making to the loan in the United States at 85, a remittance here of funds received from such subscriptions, even by bills upon which a premium of five per cent should be paid, would be at least as advantageous to the United States as a sale here at 90.

To give you a correct and more particular insight into the nature of Mr. Baring's proposals I requested him to commit them to writing, and have consequently received from him a letter of which I inclose herewith a copy.

I believe it may be assumed as a general principle that the United States will never be able to obtain by a sale of the certificates of their stock in Europe more, and very rarely indeed so much as they can at the corresponding times obtain for them at home. Credit is of so sympathetic

a nature that the demand in Europe will always be regulated by the demand in America. If the communications of the American government with their agents abroad were in point of briskness and dispatch upon a footing with those of private speculation, they might occasionally have the advantages derived from anticipated information which constitute the whole secret and science of European stock jobbing. But in the actual state of these communications I presume the government is constantly many days, and often weeks and months, behind the public newspapers in the receipt of all official intelligence from their agents abroad, as they in their turn are always equally in arrear in the intelligence which they receive from home. Whether any better organization of the official intercourse will be thought expedient must be determined by the government itself.

I am etc.

TO PETER PAUL FRANCIS DE GRAND

PARIS, 28 April, 1815.

DEAR SIR:

I received at Ghent on the 24 November last your favor of 16 October preceding. I was on the 27th writing an answer to it and, as there was until then no prospect that the negotiation upon which we were engaged would terminate in the conclusion of a peace, I was descanting upon the manner in which the British were waging war in America, and upon the course which their government were pursuing in their transaction with us, in a temper which the topics touched upon in your letter and the excitement of the outrage at Washington, as well as of the treatment we had ourselves experienced, had not been calculated to render very amicable.

While I was writing, and before I had finished my letter, a communication was brought to me from the British plenipotentiaries. It was their note of 26 November, which I presume has been published among the documents of the negotiation in America. It was the first opening to the expectation that the British government would eventually accede to our terms—the first dawn of peace that had arisen to our hopes. It produced so immediate an effect upon my disposition that I could not finish my letter to you in the spirit with which it had been commenced. I laid it aside, and as my confidence in the new pacific appearances was not very strong, reserved it for conclusion in case it should ultimately prove to be desirable. The state of uncertainty between hope and distrust continued until the 23rd of December, and on the 24th we signed the treaty. My fragment of a letter to you became then altogether unseasonable. An immediate pressure of official duty then succeeded which left us not a moment for that of our private correspondence. I remained at Ghent for a month subsequent to the conclusion of the treaty, and then came to this city where I am waiting for orders from the government of the United States. Here I received a few days since your favors of 5 and 6 of March, with a duplicate of that of 16 October. They were brought by Mr. Copeland. During the continuance of the war the predominating sentiment of my mind was of regret that it existed. The situation in which we were left by the sudden and wonderful turn of affairs in Europe was so full of danger, and the support given to our enemy by the disaffection of so large a portion of our own countrymen was so disheartening, that, highly as I always estimated the general character of the nation, there were moments when I almost despaired of our issuing honorably from the war. When by the most extraordinary concurrence of circum-

stances Britain became the mistress of Europe, and, at peace with all the rest of the world, pointed the whole force of her empire against us, the most sanguine temper could not have anticipated that precisely then would be the period of our most glorious triumphs. Our naval heroes from the commencement of the war had maintained and increased the honor of the nation, but the campaign of 1814 was necessary to restore the credit of our reputation for the conduct of war upon the land. The effect of the war had been to raise our national character in the opinion of Europe, and I hope it will have the consequence of raising us in the British nation and government; that it will convince them that we are not to be trampled upon with impunity; that, dearly as we love peace, the experiment of *kicking* us into war is not a safe one; and that it is a far wiser policy in them not to drive us to extremities which may be essential, but which cannot fail to bring forth energies which they might flatter themselves we did not possess so long as they should suffer them to lie dormant. Most seriously do I wish that the result of the war may also be instructive to ourselves; that the confidence in our own vigor and resources which its issue is calculated to inspire may be tempered by the full and serious consideration of the deficiencies that it has disclosed; that it will teach us to cherish the defensive strength of a respectable navy, to persevere in the encouragement of our domestic manufactures; that it will lead us to a more vigorous and independent system of finance; and, above all, that it will teach those among us who in the time of the distresses of their country have taken a pride in hanging as a dead weight upon its councils, who have refused their aid to its exertions and have denied even their gratitude and applause to the valiant achievement of its defenders, that they have equally mistaken the true path of honor and patriotism. They have

now full leisure to reflect that without their assistance, without even the trifling boon of their applause, in spite of all their opposition, in spite of their utmost ill-will, and in spite almost of their treason, the nation has issued in face of the whole world in face of its enemy and with its own conscious satisfaction honorably from the war. Their prejudices are indeed so inveterate, their self-conceit is so arrogant, and their views of public affairs are so contracted, that I have little expectation of ever seeing them converted from the error of their ways. I trust, however, that they will find it more difficult than ever to convince the country that all the talents or all the integrity of the nation are in their hands. I perceive in the newspaper brought by Mr. Copeland that some feeble efforts were making by their wise and virtuous party to damp the general joy at the ratification of the treaty, by representing it as a disadvantageous one to us. These efforts are however much more insignificant than I had expected they would be. It is so unusual to find either candor, consistency, or even decency, in the spirit of party, that I fully reckoned upon seeing the same persons, who had been loading the federal presses with groans and execrations at our rejecting the terms first proposed by the British commissioners, turn against the peace itself the moment after it should be published, and proclaim it the disgrace of the nation. I was even far from hoping that the treaty would be unanimously ratified by the Senate. The federal members of that body have done honor to themselves by rising on that occasion above the suggestions of party feelings, and have left them to rankle only in the state legislature of Massachusetts and the gazettes. The Hartford Convention probably did not realize the hopes or expectations of those by whom it was convoked. From the apologetic manner in which its proceedings are defended by one of its members

upon his return, it would seem not to have given satisfaction to its own partisans. The commission afterwards sent by the Massachusetts legislature to propose that the resources of the general government should be placed at the disposal of that of the state was unlucky in arriving at Washington just in time to meet the ratification of the peace.¹ But the precedent may be laid up for a more propitious time. The peace of Ghent, it is to be hoped, will be longer lived than that of Europe, settled by the treaty of Paris on the 30th May, 1814, and which the Congress of Vienna has been dancing all the last winter to consolidate as the basis of the permanent tranquillity of Europe. They had previously by a solemn treaty constituted Napoleon Buonaparte Emperor of the island of Elba. On the first of March last, Louis le Desiré was quietly seated upon his throne in the 20th year of his reign by divine right, and in the first year by the bayonets of the allied armies. The Emperor of Elba lands in France with eleven hundred men and four pieces of cannon. On the twentieth day after his landing he takes possession of the palace of the Tuileries, after a triumphant and unresisted march of two hundred leagues. Louis le Desiré, who had proclaimed the Emperor of Elba a traitor and rebel, and commanded him to be shot without a trial by any court martial that should catch him, escapes only by a rapid flight beyond the French territory from being his prisoner. The Duke of Bourbon capitulates for permission to escape from the Vendée, the Duchess of Angoulême from Bordeaux, and the Duke of Angoulême, after attempting resistance a few days, becomes actually the Emperor of Elba's prisoner, and obtains only from his clemency the permission to quit the

¹ A bill was before the Senate for paying the war claims of Massachusetts, but it was killed in the House of Representatives. The commissioners from Massachusetts were Harrison Gray Otis, Thomas Handasyd Perkins and William Sullivan. See Morison, *Harrison Gray Otis*, II. 161; *Mass. Hist. Soc. Proceedings*, XLVIII.

country. In the mean time the high allies at Vienna solemnly declared that the Emperor of Elba, constituted by themselves, had no longer any legal right to existence, because he had broken the treaty; that there could be neither peace nor truce with him, and that he had delivered himself up to the public vengeance. They have since bound themselves to wage a new joint war, professedly for the sole purpose of accomplishing his destruction; they have refused to listen to his entreaties for peace, and have solemnly stipulated never to treat with him or with any person in his name. This war is now on the eve of blazing. I cannot undertake to foretell its result. . . .

TO GEORGE WILLIAM ERVING

LONDON,¹ 5 June, 1815.

MY DEAR SIR:

I have received your letters of 10 and 22 ultimo, and like the relisher of a feast they have principally served to sharpen my appetite for *more*. There was none for the Duke of Severtino. He has done me the honor to call upon me, and I regretted anew that you declined entrusting to me the pinch of snuff for him. I shall be much obliged to you if you will keep every large bundle of American newspapers that may be directed to me and happen to fall into your hands. I have no doubt of being amply supplied here with that valuable domestic manufacture and, even if I should not, the *Times* and the *Courier*, you know, will make me amends. I found upon my arrival here my two eldest sons fresh from the headquarters of good principals,² and had news enough

¹ Adams left Paris, May 16, and reached London on the 25th.

² Massachusetts.

for one batch by them. Mr. Lee's correspondent should have told him that at the Massachusetts elections *both sides* had lost thousands of votes since the last year. That is, neither party was so sharp set. Perhaps this is a better symptom than any change of men could have been. It is true that the Strong party fell away more than the other. Your favorite, I fancy, will stand no chance next year nor any other. The federal papers of last summer insinuated that he had declared himself in private against the war, and they half promised to take him up if he would come out with an open opposition against it. How say you?

The *Constitution* did take the British sloops of war and arrived with one of them in the United States; the other was retaken. But this action makes no figure in the print shops of London. We have only the *Endymion alone* taking the *President*, and Bonaparte trying to swallow the *world* which Mr. Bull *alone* takes out of his mouth. Lord Castlereagh, however, cheers Mr. Bull with the assurance that he will not really have to perform this service *alone*.

The Austrian Cabinet is so distinguished for good faith and sincerity that you may well rest hopes upon a negotiation in that quarter. If your 1000 guinea bet at Lloyd's depends upon that reed, *gare la marée*. Excuse me from taking a share with you. Adieu, and let me hear from you as often as possible. Truly yours.

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE

No. I.

[JAMES MONROE]

LONDON, June 23, 1815.

SIR:

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I gave immediate notice of my appointment and of my arrival to Lord Castlereagh, the principal Secretary of State for the Department of Foreign Affairs, and requested an interview with him, for which he appointed Monday the 29th ultimo. I then delivered to him a copy of the credential letter to the Prince Regent, who afterwards appointed the 8th of this month, a levee day, to receive it. Lord Castlereagh had intimated to me that if I desired it, a private audience at an earlier day would be granted to me by the Prince to receive the letter of credence, but I did not consider it to be necessary. On the day of the levee Mr. Chester,¹ the assistant Master of the Ceremonies, enquired of me whether I had a letter for the Queen. I informed him that I had not.

He said that such a letter was usual though not indispensable; that it was generally given by courts where there were family connections with this court, and had always been sent by the Republic of Holland. That an audience however would be granted to me by the Queen when she could come to town.

At the meeting with Lord Castlereagh I had some loose conversation with him on the subjects mentioned in your instructions of 13 March, and on some others which had arisen from certain occurrences here.

¹ Robert Chester.

I stated to him that the first object to which my attention was directed in the instructions which I had received from the American government, was the means of preserving the peace which had been so happily restored; that I was authorized to give the most positive assurances that the United States would perform with strict fidelity the engagements contracted on their part, and I presented as tokens of a disposition to proceed still further in the adoption of measures of a conciliatory nature towards Great Britain, the act of Congress for the repeal of the discriminating duties, and the message of the President recommending to Congress the adoption of measures for confining to American seamen the navigation of American vessels; and that although Congress, owing to the shortness of time, had not acted upon that message, its principles would probably be hereafter adopted. I promised to furnish him copies of these papers which I accordingly sent him the next morning.

He said that what had been done by the government of the United States with regard to seamen had given the greater satisfaction here, as an opinion, probably erroneous, had heretofore prevailed that the American government encouraged and invited the service of foreign seamen. That as to the principle he was afraid that there was little prospect of a possibility of coming to an agreement, as we adhered to the right of naturalization for which we contended, and as no government here could possibly abandon the right to the allegiance of British subjects.

I answered that I saw no better prospect than he did of an agreement upon the principle. But it was not the disposition of the American government or nation to apply the force of arms to the maintenance of any mere abstract principle. The number of British seamen naturalized in America was so small that it would be no object of concern

to this government. If British subjects were excluded for the future, there could be no motive for taking men from American vessels. If the practice totally ceased, we should never call upon the British government for any sacrifice of their principle. When the evil ceased to be felt, we should readily deem it to have ceased to exist. He said that there would be every disposition in this government to guard against the possibility of abuse, and that the Admiralty was now occupied in prescribing regulations for the naval officers, which he hoped would prevent all cause of complaint on the part of the United States. He then mentioned the late unfortunate occurrence at Dartmoor prison, and the measures which had been taken by agreement between him and Messrs. Clay and Gallatin on that occasion. I said I had received a copy of the report made by Mr. King and Mr. Larpent after their examination into the transaction, and of the written depositions which had been taken as well on that examination as previously at the Coroner's inquest.¹

That after what had been done I considered the procedure as so far terminated that I was not aware of any further step to be taken by me until I should receive the instructions of my government on the case. From the general impression on my mind by the evidence that I had perused, I regretted that a regular trial of Captain Shortland had not been ordered, and I thought it probable that such would be the opinion of my government. He said that undoubtedly there were cases in which a trial was the best remedy to be resorted to, but there were others in which it was the worst; that a trial, the result of which should be an acquittal, would place the whole affair in a more unpleasant situation than it

¹ See *Charles King to Rufus King*, August 14, 1815, in *Life and Correspondence of Rufus King*, V. 483. The report of King and Francis Seymore Larpent is in the *Boston Patriot*, July 22, 1815.

would be without it; that the evidence was extremely contradictory; that it had been found impossible to trace to any individual the most unjustifiable part of the firing, and that Captain Shortland denied having given the order to fire. I admitted that the evidence was contradictory, but said that from the impression of the whole mass of it upon me, I could not doubt, either that Captain Shortland gave the order to fire, or that under the circumstances of the case it was unnecessary. It was true the result of a trial might be an acquittal, but as it was the regular remedy for a case of this description, the substitution of any other was susceptible of strong objections, and left the officer apparently justified, where I could not but consider his conduct as altogether unjustifiable.

I mentioned the earnest desire of the American government for the full execution of the stipulations in the treaty of Ghent, and that my instructions had expressed the hope of an appointment as soon as possible of the commissioners on the part of this country for proceeding to the settlement of the boundaries. He asked what would be the most convenient season of the year for transacting this business. I said I believed it might be done at any season, but, as the line would be in a high northern latitude, the summer season would probably be most for the personal convenience of the commissioners. He said the appointments would be made with reference to that consideration.

I further observed that the British Admiral stationed in the Chesapeake had declined restoring slaves that he had taken, under a construction of the first article of the treaty which the government of the United States considered erroneous, and which I presumed this government would likewise so consider; that a reference to the original draft of the British projet, and to an alteration proposed by us and as-

sented to by the British plenipotentiaries, would immediately show the incorrectness of this construction.

He said he thought it would be best to refer this matter to the gentlemen who were authorized to confer with us on the subject of a treaty of commerce.

He asked me if Mr. Clay and Mr. Gallatin had communicated to me what had passed between them and this government on that head. I said they had. After inquiring whether I was joined in that commission, he said that the same person had been appointed to treat with us who had concluded with us the treaty of Ghent, and that Mr. Robinson,¹ the Vice President of the Board of Trade, had been added to them. They had already had some conferences with Messrs. Clay and Gallatin, and their powers were now made out and ready for them to proceed in the negotiation.

On the 6th instant I received from Lord Castlereagh a note, informing me that the Prince Regent had appointed the Hon. Charles Bagot his Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the United States.² He was presented to the Prince upon his appointment at the levee on the same day that I had presented my credentials—a circumstance which was remarked by the Prince himself, doubtless with the intention that it should be understood as an evidence of the promptitude with which the British government was disposed to meet the friendly advances of our own. In delivering my credential letter to the Prince at the private audience previous to the levee, I had told him that I fulfilled the commands of my government in expressing the hope that it would be received as a token of the earnest desire of the President not only for the faithful and

¹ Frederick John Robinson, afterwards Earl of Ripon (1782–1859).

² Some of his correspondence is used in Bagot, *George Canning and his Friends* (1909).

punctual observance of all our engagements contracted with Great Britain, but for the adoption of every other measure which might tend to consolidate the peace and friendship and to promote the harmony between the two nations.

The Prince answered me by the most explicit assurances of the friendly disposition of this government towards the United States, and of his own determination punctually to carry into execution all the engagements on the part of Great Britain.

I was requested by Morier,¹ one of the Under Secretaries of State in the foreign department, to call at that office the day after the levee. I complied with that request. He inquired whether I thought there would be any objection on your part to the appointment of the same person as the British commissioner on the fourth and fifth articles of the treaty of Ghent. I said I did not anticipate any objection, especially as we should be under no obligation to appoint the same person upon the two commissions on our part. He told me that Colonel Barclay,² having already been employed on the commission under the treaty of 1794, would be the commissioner on those two articles and would be attended by the same person who was also on that occasion employed as the surveyor. It was intended that they should go out in the July packet. Another person would be appointed the commissioner on the sixth article.

I have etc.

¹ John Philip Morier (1776-1853).

² Thomas Barclay (1753-1830). Rives, *Letters of Thomas Barclay*.

TO WILLEM AND JAN WILLINK

LONDON, 11 July, 1815.

GENTLEMEN:

I duly received your favor of 27th June, enclosing a copy of your letter to Messrs. Gallatin and Bayard of 14 December last. As it was impossible for me to accept the proposal of selling 75 @ 76 per cent at Amsterdam, certificates of stocks which were even then at 91 here, I did not think it advisable immediately to answer your letter. Since then I have received further instructions from the Secretary of the Treasury, authorizing the sale at the market price in London of a certain portion of the stock. But on the very day that I received your letter the exchange which you quote at 9*f.* 10. to the £ sterling had risen to 10, and it has since been at 10*f.* 10. At the same time the price of American stock in this market has risen to 92 and 93, as by the latest accounts from the United States they were rapidly rising there. The Secretary of the Treasury has informed Messrs. Baring and Co. that he has authorized you to draw upon them for the sum necessary to discharge the interest payable in Holland on the first of this month upon the Louisiana loan. And Mr. Baring assures me that your bills for that effect shall be duly paid. To reimburse them it may be necessary to ask of you a power for transferring so much of the stock standing in your names as may be sufficient for that purpose. But as they may, perhaps, undertake the sale of the whole, the instructions for which still remain in force, I shall in that case ask your power for the transfer of the whole. I shall for this and other reasons postpone transmitting to the Secretary of the Treasury the proposals contained in your letter which I am now answering. It would certainly occa-

sion some surprise to him that you should in the present circumstances of the United States, not be able to procure money for them upon more favorable terms, than you could have obtained immediately before the conclusion of the peace at Ghent. It is precisely at the moment of embarrassment which cannot be derived from your extensive credit and your confidence in the stability and resources of the United States.

I am etc.

TO CHRISTOPHER HUGHES

LONDON, 18 July, 1815.

MY DEAR SIR:

A few days after my arrival in this city I received your obliging favor of the 7 May, which was forwarded to me by Mr. White from Falmouth. I was very much gratified by your friendly recollection, and assure you that I retain and shall retain with lively pleasure the remembrance of the cheerfulness and animation which you mingled in the cup of our political bitterness and dullness at Ghent. I had learned, with sympathetic feelings for you, the unexpected detention which you experienced at Bordeaux and in the waters of the Garonne, and am happy to find that you supported with philosophical composure the disappointment of having been anticipated in the communication of the news of peace to our beloved country.

The elements of the American legation at Ghent are now rather singularly dispersed through the world. Mr. Bayard and Colonel Milligan sailed in the *Neptune* (no longer *Neptune* the foul) from Plymouth on the 18 of last month, and will I trust ere this have performed the largest part of their voyage to the United States. Mr. Crawford went with them,

but Mr. Bayard was laboring under so distressing an illness that it is doubtful whether he will ever recover, or even survive the passage. Mr. Clay and Mr. Gallatin, with his son, left this town last week for Liverpool, there to embark for the United States. They have been, with a poor mite of assistance from me, working here upon a commercial convention in which we have stood in great need of the "*fly on the coach wheel*"—that is, of the secretary to the commission. If he had been here, we should have given him employment to his heart's content, if not more. And after all we found it possible to come to agreement only upon five articles, three of which were surplusage—and only for four years. The B[ritish] p[lenipotentiaries] were our old friends, Mr. Goulburn and Mr. Adams, together with Mr. Robinson, the Vice President of the Board of Trade, instead of Lord Gambier; and, by the way, I ought to tell you that Mr. Goulburn retains his old regard for the American secretary and always inquires kindly after him.

Mr. Russell spent about four months in Paris after the conclusion of the business at Ghent and then repaired to his post at Stockholm. I have heard of him, but not from him, since his arrival there. He left his son George at Paris.

Mr. Todd lost his passage in the *Neptune*, first from Havre and afterwards from Plymouth. He goes home from Liverpool, I suppose with Messrs. Clay and Gallatin. They were to sail last Friday or Saturday in the ship *Lorenzo* for New York.

I received a few days since a letter from Mr. Shaler and Commodore Decatur, dated United States ship *Guerriere*, off Cadiz, 13 June, 1815, announcing their appointment as commissioners to *negotiate a peace* with the Dey of Algiers. Two days afterwards I learnt *by the Courier*, that to commence the negotiation they had taken into Carthagea one

Algerine frigate, destroyed another, and were in close pursuit of a third. What part Shaler performed in this specimen of diplomatic skill I have not learned, but like you I am perfectly satisfied that he did his duty very well. How the Dey will be disposed to receive such *overtures* I am quite curious to learn. At least he will not have occasion to question the sufficiency of the full powers of the commissioners. Mr. Canning once sported some very good jokes upon the administration of this country for sending out to America an Admiral for a plenipotentiary, but our government have ordered these things better. As they have taken the Algerines in hand in the only proper manner, I hope they have secured to our country the honor of breaking up the whole of that nest of pirates on the shores of Africa, which have so long been the annoyance and disgrace of the maritime powers of Europe.

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TO WILLIAM EUSTIS ¹

LONDON, 25 July, 1815.

DEAR SIR:

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It was Mr. Bayard's opinion that the operation of the peace would be to promote the triumph of the Federal party in our country generally, and in particular at the next presidential election. I had myself no distant foresight of its effect upon our parties. Hitherto the appearances indicate only that it has calmed their effervescence, without approximating their views or much affecting their relative

¹ Minister to The Hague. He arrived in the *Congress* on July 12 at Flushing, and on the 15th at The Hague.

strength. Perhaps this is precisely the best effect that could have been produced. When both parties shall have cooled down to a temperate condition, the proper time will come for both to review their principles, and for the wise and honest men of both to discard their prejudices and turn the experience of the war to the benefit of their common country. The greatest vice of our leading men on both sides is their load of prejudices against each other. The war has not in truth answered the expectations or the hopes of either. The peace has not disgraced our country, but it has not secured the objects of the war. The events of the last three years have been marked with the ordinary vicissitudes of war. They have covered sometimes our nation with shame and sometimes with glory. On the ocean our cause has been brilliant almost without exception. But its highest honor is but the promise of future greatness. On the land, but for Plattsburg and New Orleans, what would be our military fame? Erie, Chippewa, and Bridgewater would not have redeemed it. If we judge ourselves with salutary rigor, is it yet redeemed? As to our beloved native New England, I blush to think of the part she has performed, for her shame is still the disgrace of the nation—faction for patriotism, a whining hypocrisy for political morals, dismemberment for union, and prostitution to the enemy for state sovereignty. You tell me they are ashamed of it themselves. I rejoice to hear it. As a true New England man and American I feel the infection of their shame, while I abhor the acts by which they have brought it upon us.

I am etc.

TO ALEXANDER HILL EVERETT

LONDON, 27 July, 1815.

DEAR SIR:

Your favors by Mr. Dana, by the two Mr. Whites, and by your brother, had been received by me since my arrival here, and I had been apprehensive that your voyage would still be postponed, so that yours of the 17 from the Hague would have been an unexpected pleasure, but for the previous arrival at Liverpool of the *Panther*, one of whose passengers informed me that she had sailed from Boston the same day with the *Congress*.

I congratulate you upon your introduction to the regular diplomatic career.¹ When Mr. Smith had concluded last summer to return to the United States, I wrote to the Secretary of State requesting that, if I was to return to Russia, you might be appointed secretary to that legation. As there was then no prospect that the negotiation at Ghent would terminate in peace, and consequently none of a mission to this country, I merely added that if such a mission had been the result of the negotiation, and confided to me, as I had received notice was the President's intention, I should still have requested that you might have been the secretary to the legation. That my recommendation of you was earnest I now the more readily avow, because I gave by it a large pledge to the government of our country, which it is for you to redeem, and I assured the Secretary of State that in presenting you to the President's consideration, I was governed more by motives of zeal for the public service than of personal friendship for you. My sentiments are still the same. For my own satisfaction and for the pleasure of your society I wish that you had received the appoint-

¹ Secretary of legation at The Hague.

ment as secretary to this legation. I shall write to the Secretary of State and renew the request that you may be appointed to it. But for the public service and for your own advantage, you are for the present at least, perhaps as well, perhaps better, situated than you would be here. My own residence here will very probably be short; every American who has resided so long as five or six years in Europe ought to go home to be *new tempered*. I recommend this to your future practice, as during my whole life I have found the benefit and necessity of it for my own. At an earlier and more perilous age you have once passed unhurt through the ordeal of European seductions and corruptions. I have the confident hope that one victory will be the earnest of another. But you will not deem it impertinent if I entreat you "to keep your heart with all diligence." The fascinations of Europe to Americans, situated as you are and may hereafter be, present themselves in various and most dissimilar forms—sensuality, dissipation, indolence, pride, and, last and most despicable but not least, avarice. This tho' not so common as the rest is not less dangerous and not less to be avoided. It appears in temptations to trading, speculation, or stock-jobbing upon the basis of information to which your public station only gives you access. Perhaps you may not be exposed to this species of allurements, and if you should, I am sure you need no warning voice to preserve you from it. I have many very pleasing recollections of the country and particularly of the spot where you reside. I inhabited The Hague at several different, and always at interesting periods of my life. You will find it necessary to be particularly attentive to your health, as foreigners who reside some time in Holland are often subject to attacks of intermittent fevers. The Hague is however more favorably situated than Amsterdam.

You will oblige me by inquiring if a family by the name of *Veerman Saint Serf* now reside at The Hague, and if they do, by calling on them with my compliments and kind remembrance. The lady is a daughter of a Mr. Dumas, who during the war of our Revolution was agent for the United States at The Hague, and after the war was for some time chargé d'affaires when I was last at The Hague from 1794 to 1797. She was married to this Mr. Veerman and had two or three children. I passed through The Hague last summer on my way to Ghent, but could not stop even to alight from the carriage. I have not heard from this family for many years, but it would give me great pleasure to be informed of them and especially of their welfare.

Mr. Buchanan ¹ does me the favor to take charge of this letter. He is strongly recommended to me by several highly respected friends, and I am persuaded you will find him an agreeable associate. Let me hear often from you and believe me etc.

TO LEVETT HARRIS

LONDON, 28 July, 1815.

DEAR SIR:

I have received a letter from Mr. William Cutting of New York, as the executor of the will of the late Mr. Fulton, and written at the particular request of his widow, expressing the hope that the privilege granted by the Emperor of Russia to him for the construction of steamboats in the Russian Empire may be confirmed for the benefit of his family. They had received after the decease of Mr. Fulton my letter to him of the 25 December last, written in conse-

¹ William Boyd Buchanan.

quence of one that I had received from you and stating the danger that the privilege might be forfeited, if the model and specification should not be forwarded in time to prevent it. Mr. Cutting says that Mrs. Fulton is quite sure that her husband must have sent out the necessary drawings and specification; but that from the embarrassments then attending the intercourse between the two countries and the circuitous route of communication, it was more than probable that those documents had miscarried. That Mr. Fulton had, however, prepared duplicates which were doubtless intended to be transmitted by the first opportunity, and which Mr. Cutting promises would be forwarded by the next vessel that should sail from New York to Russia after the date of his letter, which was the 18 April.

I hope that they will have been received by the Minister of the Interior before this letter reaches you, and that these circumstances will acquit altogether Mr. Fulton of any neglect on his part in the performance of anything required of him by the Emperor's ukase. I also hope that the privilege (which by the words of the ukase *was a complete and positive grant*) will without difficulty be confirmed for the benefit of his family. Mr. Fulton was a man who deserved so well of our country and of mankind that I should feel a regret, if this misfortune of his death should be aggravated to his family by the loss of that reward which the munificent spirit of the Emperor Alexander had secured to him. Mr. Cutting says that on the confirmation of the ukase immediate measures will be taken to send out an engineer and workmen to construct a boat, and that he may perhaps go himself to superintend the whole, until the system shall be properly organized. I have written to Mr. Cutting urging him at all events to go, and I am persuaded it will yet be in his power to get the first boat in operation within the three years al-

lowed to Mr. Fulton by the Emperor's ukase. Should he arrive at St. Petersburg I pray you to give him every assistance in your power to promote his success, and particularly to obtain the interest of Count Romanzoff in his favor. It was through the Count's means that the privilege was obtained, and he knows that it could not without injustice be taken away. . . .

TO LORD CASTLEREAGH

9 August, 1815.¹

MY LORD:

In two several conferences with your Lordship I have had the honor of mentioning the refusal of His Majesty's naval commanders, who at the restoration of peace between the United States and Great Britain were stationed on the American coast, to restore the slaves taken by them from their owners in the United States during the war and then in their possession, notwithstanding the stipulation in the first article of the treaty of Ghent that such slaves should not be carried away.

Presuming that you are in possession of the correspondence on this subject which has passed between the Secretary of State of the United States and Mr. Baker, it will be unnecessary for me to repeat the demonstration that the carrying away of these slaves is incompatible with the terms of the treaty. But as a reference to the documents of the negotiation at Ghent may serve to elucidate the intentions of the contracting parties, I am induced to present them to your consideration, in the hope that the Minister of His Majesty now about to depart for the United States may be authorized

¹ See Adams, *Memoirs*, August 8, 1814.

to direct the restitution of the slaves conformably to the treaty, or to provide for the payment of the value of those carried away contrary to that stipulation which, in the event of their not being restored, I am instructed by my government to claim. The first projet of the treaty of Ghent was offered by the American plenipotentiaries, and that part of the first article relating to slaves was therein expressed in the following manner:

All territory, places, and possessions, without exception, taken by either party from the other during the war, or which may be taken after the signing of this treaty, shall be restored without delay, and without causing any destruction or carrying away any artillery, or other public property, or any slaves or other private property.

This projet was returned by the British plenipotentiaries with the proposal of several alterations, and among the rest in this part of the first article, which they proposed should be so changed as to read thus:

All territory, places, and possessions, without exception, belonging to either party and taken by the other during the war, or which may be taken after the signing of this treaty, shall be restored without delay, and without causing any destruction, or carrying away any of the artillery, or other public property, or any slaves or other private property, originally captured in the said forts or places, and which shall remain therein upon the exchange of the ratification of this treaty.

It will be observed that in this proposal the words "originally captured in the said forts or places, and which shall remain therein upon the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty" operated as a modification of the article as originally

proposed in the American projet. Instead of stipulating that no property, public or private, artillery or slaves, should be carried away, they limited the prohibition of removal to all such property as had been originally captured in the forts and places, and should remain there at the exchange of the ratifications. They included within the limitation private as well as public property, and had the article been assented to in this form by the American plenipotentiaries and ratified by their government, it would have warranted the construction which the British commanders have given to the article as it was ultimately agreed to, and which it cannot admit.

For, by reference to the protocol of conference held on the 1 December, 1814, there will be found among the alterations to the amended projet proposed by the American plenipotentiaries the following:

Transpose alteration consisting of the words *originally captured in the said forts or places, and which shall remain therein upon the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty*, after the words *public property*.

Agreed to by the British plenipotentiaries.

It thus appears that the American plenipotentiaries admitted with regard to artillery and public property the limitation which was proposed by the British amended projet, but that they did not assent to it with regard to slaves and private property; that on the contrary they asked such a transposition of the words of limitation as would leave them applicable only to artillery and public property, and would except slaves and private property from their operation altogether. That the British plenipotentiaries and government, by this proposed transposition of the words, had full notice of the views of the other contracting party in adhering to the generality of the prohibition to carry

away slaves and private property, while acquiescing in a limitation with respect to artillery and public property. With this notice the British government agreed to the transposition of the words, and accordingly that part of the article as ratified by both governments now stands thus:

All territory, places and possessions whatsoever, taken by either party from the other during the war, or which may be taken after the signing of this treaty, excepting only the islands hereinafter mentioned, shall be restored without delay, and without causing any destruction or carrying away any of the artillery or other public property originally captured in the said forts or places, and which shall remain therein upon the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty, or any slaves or other private property.

From this review of the stipulation as originally proposed at the negotiation of Ghent, as subsequently modified by the proposals of the respective plenipotentiaries, and as finally agreed to by both the contracting parties, I trust it will remain evident that in evacuating all places within the jurisdiction of the United States, and in departing from their waters, the British commanders were bound not to carry away any slaves or other private property of the citizens of the United States which had been taken upon their shores. Had the construction of the article itself been in any degree equivocal, this statement of the manner in which it was drawn up would have sufficed to solve every doubt of its meaning. It would also show that the British plenipotentiaries were not unaware of its purport as understood by those of the United States.

I deem it also my duty, previous to the departure of Mr. Bagot, to request the attention of His Majesty's government to another point, upon which the execution of the same article of the treaty of Ghent had suffered a delay on many

accounts to be regretted. From the moment of the ratification of the treaty it became an object of earnest solicitude to the American government, to carry into execution with the most entire good faith every engagement contracted on the part of the United States by the treaty. Orders were immediately given for the restoration of that part of Upper Canada which was in the occupation of the American troops; proper steps were taken for concluding treaties of peace with the Indian tribes with whom the United States were then at war, and other measures were adopted corresponding with the pacific relations happily restored between the two countries. At the date of the latest dispatches which I have received from the government of the United States, the fort of Michillimackinac had not been evacuated by the British troops. The consequences of the delay which had occurred in the delivery of that place were of no small importance to the United States. Independent of the loss of the trade with the Indians within the limits of the United States for the present year, the detention of that place had a tendency to induce the Indians inhabiting the country on the Mississippi and the Missouri to persevere in hostility against the United States. This result was apprehended by the American government, and early in the month of May communicated to Mr. Baker with an offer to facilitate the removal of the British garrison to Malden. Although Mr. Baker did not think himself authorized to accept this offer, I indulge the persuasion that means have ere this been found to effect that removal; though by public accounts in the American gazettes I lament to see that the dangers anticipated from the continued atrocious warfare of the savages have been too painfully realized. Under these circumstances I must earnestly renew the expression of the hope that orders have been, or will be immediately issued for the restoration of

that post without further delay. I pray your lordship to accept etc.

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE

No. 9.

[JAMES MONROE]

LONDON, 15 August, 1815.

SIR:

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I have received a letter from Mr. Robert Montgomery of Alicant, dated 11th July, stating that on the 4th of that month a treaty of peace was concluded between the United States and the Dey and Regency of Algiers. Other accounts have been received confirmative of this and of the conditions of the treaty specified in Mr. Montgomery's letter. Their general impression upon the Americans here has not been equal to the hopes which the splendid victory of Commodore Decatur upon his entrance into the Mediterranean had excited. The restoration of the Algerine ships of war and prisoners is thought to be far more than a compensation for the American vessels and prisoners to be restored in return; and although the entire liberation from all future tribute is acknowledged to be highly honorable to the United States, it is apprehended that it will render the continuance of the peace more precarious even than it has been, when the Dey had at least a motive for abiding by his engagements. Having no official information of this event I am not prepared to encounter the objections suggested against the measure; but I can not forbear to express the hope that if the peace should be ratified, it will be followed by some more effectual security for the protection of the American commerce in

the Mediterranean than the faith of a Dey of Algiers to observe a treaty without a tribute.

I am etc.

TO FRANCIS FREELING ¹

LITTLE EALING, 15 August, 1815.

SIR:

I have the honor to inclose herewith a paper this day received by me bearing your printed signature and covering two letters from me which had been broken open.

I request you to return it to me, with information whether it was by you, or by your authority, directed to me with the addition of *American Consul*.

I am etc.

TO G. H. FREELING ²

LITTLE EALING, 17 August, 1815.

SIR:

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of yesterday, returning the paper which had been improperly directed to me by the clerk in the "Returned Letter Office." I am willing to accept the apology which you are pleased to offer for him, of having been ignorant of my public station, and from the three et ceteras, both in the direction and superscription of your letter to me, I also infer that you are also uninformed of it. I am, therefore, under the necessity of acquainting you that the character in which I have had the honor of being received by His Royal Highness The Prince Regent and announced in the *Gazette*, is that of "Envoy

¹ Secretary to the General Post Office.

² Assistant Secretary to the General Post Office.

Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary from the United States of America." With a view to secure to my correspondence, which might pass at the British post offices, the protection and rights to which it is entitled by the usages of civilised nations, I gave notice of my public character personally at the general post office, and in a letter to Francis Freeling, Esqr., the Secretary, dated on the 31st ultimo, designated myself as Minister from the United States. But having perceived, not only by the manner in which my letters, broken open at the Post Office, were returned to me, but on another occasion upon which I have spoken to Lord Liverpool, that it was necessary to renew this notice of my official station, I now do it, adding only the remark that the ignorance of the clerk in the Returned Letter Office was the more extraordinary, as it happened that in one of the two letters of mine which he returned to me broken open, my public character was stated at full length.

I am etc.

TO R. G. BEASLEY

EALING, 20th August, 1815.

DEAR SIR:

Thomas Nelson, a black American seaman in distress, to whom at my request you gave a protection, after repeated and unavailing attempts to obtain a passage from London to the United States, made an effort to go to Liverpool in the hopes of being there more successful. I inclose you a letter from him, by which you will see he is in jail at St. Albans on the suspicion that his papers are forged and that they have been taken from him. If you can relieve him from this situation, I pray you to do it. I have the fullest conviction that this man is no impostor, and that he was

improperly left by his captain at Havre. He is one of many Americans by whom my doors are incessantly besieged, who can neither obtain passages home nor the means of subsistence by employment here. I have no doubt that the paying off and reduction of the fleet in this country will bring multitudes more of these unfortunate people upon us. I do not mean of impostors (whom I have seldom found it difficult upon examination to detect), but of real Americans more sinned against than sinning. I can neither turn them from my doors, nor afford them the relief which they so eminently need. Numbers of them were prisoners of war and have been sent here from the East and West Indies, Quebec, Halifax, etc.; some impressed into the British service, though prisoners, and now discharged as invalids, as unserviceable, and even as Americans; some of them have invalid pensions of six or seven pounds, which for want of more formal papers they are unable to sell as they would wish even for two years purchase, for the sake of getting home again to their country. Are there American vessels enough at the port of London by which they can legally be sent home? And if not is there no other means of relieving them? To return to poor Nelson, I suppose a certificate to the Mayor of St. Albans that he has a protection from you will obtain his release from prison. As to asking relief for him, I believe it would be better to send it.

I am etc.¹

¹ "The maritime war, which has rather been threatened than actually renewed, presented a few other cases of impressment by British officers of American seamen, besides that of which you so justly complain. At present the inconvenience experienced by this government is of having more sailors upon their hands than they wish to employ, and many Americans obtain their discharge, who had been for years before asking for it in vain. Numbers of them are without protections, or any positive evidence upon which they could demand them, and in such cases I have found it necessary to relax from the rigor of the rule which you have observed.

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE

No. 10.

[JAMES MONROE]

LONDON, 22 August, 1815.

SIR:

The subjects upon which I was induced to request an interview with the Earl of Liverpool were not confined to those upon which I had been favored with your instructions. I was desirous of ascertaining the intentions of the British government with regard to the period of time when the mutual abolition of the discriminating duties would take place. I had been informed by American merchants here that the extra duty of two pence sterling per pound upon cotton imported in American vessels, mentioned in the joint dispatch to you of 3 July last, had been and continued to be levied, although the act of Parliament by which it was raised as an extra duty had begun to operate only from two days after the signature of the convention. I took with me and left with Lord Liverpool copies of the act of Congress of 3 March last, concerning the repeal of the discriminating duties, and of the fifth article of the commercial convention. It was my opinion, and I told him I had so given it to the merchants who had asked me when the convention would take effect, that when ratified by both parties and the ratifications exchanged, its

I have had applications both from real Americans and from impostors under these circumstances, and I have found no difficulty in discerning the genuine from the spurious. Whenever I am satisfied by personal examination and inquiry that they are my countrymen, I ask of Mr. Beasley without hesitation a protection for them. The evils to which a true American sailor is exposed for the want of a mere official document are too numerous to leave him destitute of the document when there is *bona fide* no reasonable doubt of his being entitled to it." To Samuel Hazard, 10 August, 1815. Ms.

operation would be from the date of the signature, and that the government would be bound to refund any extra duties collected in the interval. He said that was unusual, which I admitted, observing that it was the unequivocal import of the words in which the article was drawn up. They deviated from the usual form of such articles, and the deviation was made at the proposal of the British plenipotentiaries, our projet having proposed that the convention should take effect as usual from the exchange of the ratifications. They had chosen to say that though binding only when the ratifications should be exchanged, yet it should then be binding for four years *from the date of the signature*. We had agreed to this alteration, and when the convention should be once ratified in the United States, any individual affected by it would be entitled to the benefit of a construction of its purport by the judicial authorities. He said it was the same here, and asked me if I had spoken on the subject to Mr. Robinson, the Vice President of the Board of Trade. I answered that I had, some weeks since, but Mr. Robinson had not then formed a decisive opinion upon the purport of the article. I added that when the convention was signed, we had understood from the British plenipotentiaries, and particularly from Mr. Robinson, that this extra duty upon cotton imported in our vessels would not be permitted to commence; that it would have been immediately removed by an Order in Council, which until the exchange of ratifications would stand instead of the convention. At all events, however, it was material to know what the construction of the article by this government would be as the operation in either case must be reciprocal. If it was understood here that the revocation of the discriminating duties would commence only from the exchange of the ratifications, the same principle must be observed in the United States, with which he fully agreed. He

said they had taken an act of Parliament to enable the king in Council to regulate the trade with America, as had been done for some years after the peace of 1783. An Order of Council was to have been made out in consequence of the treaty. It had been for some time accidentally delayed, but might perhaps be ready to be signed at the Council to be held the next day. It was the disposition here to put all the amicable and conciliatory arrangements into operation as soon as possible, and the discriminating duties might be immediately removed, in the confidence that the same measures would be adopted on the part of the United States. I told him that Great Britain had already a pledge of that reciprocity by the act of Congress of the last session, so that the revocation might be accomplished at the pleasure of this government, even independent of the stipulation in the treaty.

Before we passed to another subject Lord Liverpool said that he thought it proper to mention to me that a note would be sent to Mr. Baker previous to the ratification of the convention respecting the island of St. Helena. That by a general agreement among the allies Bonaparte was to be transferred to be kept under custody in that island, and by a general regulation the ships of all nations, excepting those of their own East India Company, would be excluded from it. The circumstance which had led to the necessity of this measure had not been in contemplation when the convention was signed, and the measure itself would not be extended beyond the necessity by which it was occasioned. That it was authorized by the precedent of the convention which had been signed by Mr. King and himself in 1803, and which the American government had proposed to modify on the consideration that a subsequent treaty, containing the cession of Louisiana to the United States, had altered

the situation of the parties, although unknown both to Mr. King and to him when they signed the convention. And that as the Cape of Good Hope would still be left for American vessels to touch at, he presumed the island of St. Helena would not be necessary to them for that purpose. I said I did not know that the stipulation with regard to the island of St. Helena was in itself of very material importance, but the American government might consider the principle as important. The stipulation was in express and positive terms and the island of St. Helena was identically named. The case referred to by him did not appear to me to apply as a precedent for two reasons. One was that the Louisiana convention had been signed before, and not as he thought after that signed by him and Mr. King, though it was true that neither he nor Mr. King knew that it has been signed. The other was that Great Britain had declined ratifying that convention upon the ground of the modification to it proposed by the American government in consequence of the change produced by the Louisiana convention. He said that at all events Mr. Baker would be instructed to present such a note, previous to the ratification by the American government. He had thought best to give me notice of it.

Referring then to the contents of my letter of the 9th instant to Lord Castlereagh which he had seen, I told him that having expected Mr. Bagot was on the eve of his departure, I had been anxious that he might go provided with instructions which might give satisfaction to the government of the United States with regard to the execution of two very important stipulations in the treaty of Ghent. He said that as to the surrender of Michillimackinac there could be no sort of difficulty. The orders for its evacuation had been long since given. It was merely the want of barracks for their troops that had occasioned a momentary delay, and he had

no doubt the fort had been before this delivered up. There never had been for a moment the intention on the part of the British government to retain any place which they had stipulated to restore. But with respect to the slaves they certainly construed very differently from the American government the stipulation relating to them. They thought that applied only to the slaves in the forts and places, which having been taken during the war were to be restored at the peace. I said that independent of the construction of the sentence which so strongly marked the distinction between the artillery and public property, and slaves and private property, the process by which the article had been [framed] demonstrated beyond all question that a distinction between them was intended and understood by both parties. The first projet of the treaty had been presented by us. This had been required and even insisted upon by the British plenipotentiaries. The article was therefore drawn up by us, and our intention certainly was to secure the restoration both of the public and private property, including slaves which had been in any manner captured on shore during the war. The projet was returned to us with a limitation upon the restoration of property, whether public or private, to such as had been in the places when captured, and should remain there at the time of the evacuation. We assented to this so far as artillery and public property, which by the usages of war is liable to be taken and removed, but not with regard to private property and slaves, which we thought should at all events be restored because they ought never to be taken. We therefore proposed the transposition of the words as stated in my letter to Lord Castlereagh. The construction upon which the British commanders have carried away the slaves would annul the whole effect of the transposition of the words. Artillery and public property

had of course been found, and could therefore be restored almost or quite exclusively in the *forts* or places occupied by troops. But there was not perhaps a slave to carry away in all those which were occupied by the British when the treaty was concluded, and to confine the stipulation relating to slaves within the same limits as those agreed to with regard to public property would reduce them to a dead letter. He said that perhaps the British plenipotentiaries had agreed to the transposition of the words there at Ghent without referring to the government here, and that although the intentions of the parties might be developed by reference to the course of the negotiations, yet the ultimate construction must be upon the words of the treaty as they stood. He would see Mr. Goulburn and inquire of him how they understood this transposition; but certainly for himself, and he could speak for the whole government here, he had considered them as only promising not to carry slaves from the places which were occupied by their forces and which they were to evacuate. There were perhaps few or no slaves in the places then occupied by them, but there was a probability at the time when the treaty was signed that New Orleans and other parts of the Southern States might be in their possession at the time of the exchange of the ratifications. If they had understood the words to imply that persons who from whatever motive had taken refuge under the protection of the British forces should be delivered up to those who, to say the least, must feel unkindly towards them and might treat them harshly, they should have objected to it. Something also, he could not say what, would have been proposed. I said I had referred to the progress of the negotiation and the protocol of conferences only as confirming what I thought the evident purport of the words of the treaty. To speak in perfect candor I would not undertake

to say that the British plenipotentiaries had taken a view of the subject different from that of their government. But certainly we had drawn up the article without any anticipation that New Orleans, or southern ports not then in their possession, would at the ratification of the treaty be occupied by them. Our intentions were to provide that no slaves should be carried away. We had no thought of disguising or concealing those intentions. Had the British plenipotentiaries asked of us an explanation of our proposal to transpose the words, we should instantly have given it. We evidently had an object in making the proposal, and we thought the words themselves fully disclosed it. Our object was the restoration of all property, including slaves, which by the usages of war among civilized nations ought not to have been taken. All private property on shore was of that description. It was entitled by the laws of war to exemption from capture. Slaves were private property. Lord Liverpool said that he thought they could not be considered precisely under the general denomination of private property. A table or chair for instance might be taken and restored without changing its condition; but a living and a human being was entitled to other considerations. I replied that the treaty had marked no such distinction. The words implicitly recognized slaves as private property—in the article alluded to, “slaves or *other* private property.” Not that I meant to deny the principle assumed by him. Most certainly a living sentient being, and still more a human being, was to be regarded in a different light from the inanimate matter of which other private property might consist, and if on the ground of that difference the British plenipotentiaries had objected to restore the one while consenting to restore the other, we should readily have discussed the subject. We might have accepted or objected to the proposal they would

have made. But what could that proposal have been? Upon what ground could Great Britain have refused to restore them? Was it because they had been seduced away from their masters by the promises of British officers? But had they taken New Orleans, or any other Southern city, would not all the slaves in it have had as much claim to the benefit of such promises, as the fugitives from their masters elsewhere? How then could the place, if it had been taken, have been evacuated according to the treaty, without carrying away any slaves, if the pledge of such promises was to protect them from being restored to their owners? It was true, proclamations inviting slaves to desert from their masters had been issued by British officers. We considered them as deviations from the usage of war. We believed that the British government itself would, when the hostile passions arising from the state of war should subside, consider them in the same light; that Great Britain would then be willing to restore the property, or to indemnify the sufferers by its loss. If she felt bound to make good the promises of her officers to the slaves, she might still be willing to do an act of justice by compensating the owners of the slaves for the property which had been irregularly taken from them. Without entering into a discussion which might have been at once unprofitable and irritating, she might consider this engagement only as a promise to pay to the owners of the slaves the value of those of them which might be carried away. Lord Liverpool manifested no dissatisfaction at these remarks, nor did he attempt to justify the proclamation to which I particularly alluded. I added that there was a branch of the same subject upon which I had not written to Lord Castlereagh, because involving considerations of a very delicate nature. I had thought it might be treated more confidentially by verbal conferences than by written

communications which would be liable to publication. During the war it had been stated in a letter of instructions from the American Secretary of State to the negotiators of the Ghent treaty, that some of the slaves enticed from their masters by promises of freedom from British officers had afterwards been sold in the West Indies. This letter of instructions had afterwards been published. "Yes," said Lord Liverpool, "and I believe some explanation of it has been asked." I said there had; first by the British plenipotentiaries at Ghent, and afterwards by Admiral Cochrane of the American Secretary of State. He had answered this last application by a letter to Mr. Baker, which His Lordship had doubtless seen. But I had been authorized to say that in making this charge in the midst of the war, the American government had not expected, and was not desirous, that it should lead to discussions to be protracted to a time and in a state of peace. They believed that evidence to substantiate in some degree the charge was obtainable, but would prefer if the British government wished to obtain it, they should seek it from other sources, many of which were more accessible to them than to the government of the United States. The sales, if made, had been in British possessions and from British ships. These were of course entirely open to the investigation of inquiries under British authority. The proclamations had promised employment in the military service of Great Britain (which could apply only to men), or *free* settlement in the West Indies. But in fact numbers of women and children had been received and carried away as well as of men. The numbers of them, and in a very great degree the identical individuals that had been taken, might easily be ascertained in the United States, and I expected to be enabled to furnish accurate lists of them. If not sold, some provision must have been made for them at the charge

of the British government itself. It could not be at a loss to know those whom it had to maintain. And as the whole subject had a tendency rather to irritation than to the conciliatory spirit which it was the wish of the American government to cultivate exclusively, they would prefer superseding the search and exhibition of evidence through them, and dropping any further communications as between the governments relating to it. I concluded, however, by observing that with this explanation I was directed to say that if the British government still desired evidence from that of the United States, they would furnish such as they could collect. He said that was certainly all that could be asked. The British officers had universally and very strenuously denied the charge, which, if true, deserved severe animadversion and punishment. The British government had believed, and still believed, the charge to have been without foundation, and in the deficiency of evidence could come to no other conclusion. . . .

There is little prospect, as it would seem, of our obtaining any satisfaction with regard to the carrying away of the slaves. Lord Liverpool did not indeed attempt to support the construction upon which the naval commanders had acted in removing those that were on board their ships, but he insisted that they had never intended to stipulate for the restoration of those who had sought refuge under their protection. I therefore thought it indispensable to recur to the unjustifiable nature of the invitations by which the slaves had been induced to seek that refuge, and to infer from it the obligation of Great Britain to restore them or to indemnify their owners; to show that she was bound to know the extent of the stipulation to which she had agreed, and that she could not have proposed an exception founded upon any promises of her officers to the slaves, when those

very promises were violations of the laws of war. I also took the opportunity to propose that with regard to the sale of some of those people by British officers in the West Indies, no further discussion might be had as between the governments. This proposal will, I am convinced, be accepted, if the evidence mentioned in your dispatch as to be hereafter transmitted should be conclusive to ascertain the fact. But the charge has been repeatedly made a subject of Parliamentary inquiry. It has touched a sinew in which the nation is peculiarly sensitive at this time. You will observe that Lord Liverpool strongly expressed the disbelief of the fact of this government, and that disbelief will continue until the existence of evidence possessed by us to prove it shall be known. I think it will not then be called for.

I am etc.

TO BENJAMIN WATERHOUSE

BOSTON HOUSE, EALING, 8 Miles from
Hyde Park corner,
27 August, 1815.

DEAR SIR:

In the month of February last, about six weeks after the signature of the treaty of peace at Ghent, I received at Paris a letter from you, dated 13 October, 1814, inclosing a slip from the Boston *Patriot* of 12 October, and by its purport stated to have been forwarded by the Dutch sloop of war which had taken out to America the minister of that country. And very lately I have again enjoyed the pleasure of receiving from you a letter, dated 2 June last, transmitted to me from The Hague by Dr. Eustis. The parcel of newspapers to which in the last of these favors you refer as having been

sent by the former never came to my hands; whether intercepted by the charitable caution of withholding from me those evil communications which might corrupt my good manners, as you surmise, or whether accidentally lost upon their passage, may now be mere harmless matter of conjecture. How it happened, too, that a letter sent by the corvette which arrived in Holland in November should have failed entirely at that time to reach me at Ghent, and have been from that time until February in travelling from the Texel to Paris, I never knew, and probably never shall know. Certain it is, that when the corvette arrived direct from Boston after a short passage, I was greatly disappointed after waiting a week or ten days to remain without a line by her from any one of my friends or correspondents. Equally certain is it that your letter, had it then been delivered to me, would have been a cordial to my own spirits and to those of all my then colleagues. When I did receive it, I need not say that it was what your letters can never fail to be to me, highly acceptable; but the peace was made, the just and encouraging view of the state of our affairs in relation to the war was still pleasing, but could no longer serve the valuable purpose of stimulating us to the same firm and honorable adherence to the rights of our country in the cabinet with which they had been maintained in the field and upon the deep. Among the vices of the party which still passes among us under the denomination, now insignificant, of federalists, I have always considered the littleness of their means and the shortness of their foresight as forming the most striking contrast to their pretensions of superior and exclusive talents. To suppose that the men who were charged with the duty of negotiating peace with Great Britain would take the *Centinel* or *Evening Post* for counselors in the discharge of their trust, or that they would sub-

scribe to terms disgraceful to their country, if newspapers of a different political complexion should be prevented from reaching them, was to assume a disproportion too great between the object and the scale by which it was measured. And when, after the first *sine qua non* of the British plenipotentiaries was rejected at Ghent, the wiseacres of the Boston school loaded the columns of their precious newspapers with reproach upon the American negotiators for rejecting those fair and generous terms, and with prophecies that we should be finally compelled to subscribe to them, I do not ask where the sense of honor and the feeling of patriotism was seated in the hearts of those who could work up an argument that such terms could have been submitted to without heavy sacrifices of national interest and national honor; but I ask where were their glasses, when they could not look far enough before them to see the turn, when the cause of their party might require them to criminate the government for agreeing to a peace without any of those degrading conditions.

What a falling off, from an urgent exhortation to an infamous peace to a bitter invective upon an honorable one. Such changes are not indeed too great for your Westphalian [] of party; but they only lead them into the mire.

Governor Strong, I perceive in one of his late speeches, with his usual force of logic has concluded that because we did not succeed in the last year in compelling Great Britain to renounce the practice of impressment from our merchant vessels on the high seas, therefore we shall have no pretence for ever attempting to compel her to renounce it hereafter. Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof.

The British government have now more sailors upon their hands than they know how to employ. They talk of sending all the foreigners home to their own countries. And bodies of British seamen starving in the port of London have been

in procession to the Admiralty and to the Lord Mayor, to demand that the foreigners should be excluded from the privilege of shipping on board of English vessels. There is no danger of impressments for the present, and before the appearance of a new naval war in Europe I hope the British government will become sensible of the expediency of abandoning, if not of renouncing the practice of impressment from our vessels altogether. That it must sooner or later be abandoned I am fully convinced. I hope that Governor Strong will live to see the time, and as I am not his enemy, I wish him and all his Bulwarkites ¹ no worse fortune than the enjoyment of their reflections, when they shall see the object obtained and look back upon their part during the struggles for obtaining it.

They, whom you describe as looking across the Atlantic to know what they must *think* of the recent events in Europe, have ere this received their instructions and made up their mind accordingly. As Bonaparte is disposed of at St. Helena, they must now think that the dismemberment and ruin of France are indispensable for the security of the world against universal monarchy. They must think that the divine right of the Bourbons requires in confirmation of its legitimacy the permanent presence and establishment of half a million of Russian, Austrian, Prussian, Bavarian, British and Spanish bayonets. And they must think that to consummate the holy triumph of lawful monarchy, religion, and social order, rivers of Jacobin blood must be poured forth from the scaffold. All this is the orthodox doctrine consecrated by the victory of *La Belle Alliance*. I do not think there is an immediate prospect of tranquillity in Europe. What the allies will do with France is yet very uncertain. Their

¹ The extreme federalist papers had referred to Great Britain as the "bulwark of our holy religion."

alternatives are all of a nature which will require the rod of iron (the sharp pointed rod) to carry them into effect—twenty-five millions of people to be governed by the armed rabble of all Europe. I must for once imitate in part the faction. I must wait to know what to think of it.

I am etc.

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE

No. II.

[JAMES MONROE]

LONDON, 29th August, 1815.

SIR:

The inclosed papers marked Nos. 1 and 2 are copies of an official circular note which I received from Lord Bathurst the day before yesterday, and of my answer to it which was sent to him yesterday.

The Order in Council concerning the discriminating duties was signed on the 17th, the day after my interview with Lord Liverpool, though published only in the *Gazette* of the 26th. It is conformable to the arrangements settled by the Convention, and to be in force only from the 17th instant until six weeks after the meeting of Parliament. It leaves the question upon the extra duties levied between the 3rd July and the 17th August as it was.

The papers marked 3, 4, and 5 are copies of a correspondence relative to the impressment at Antwerp of an American seaman by the captain of a British armed brig. I received early in July a letter from Mr. Hazard with information of the fact, and requested Mr. Beasley to apply immediately to the Admiralty here for the release of the man. I transmit these papers chiefly for the sake of Captain Nixon's letter.

I have hesitated some time whether I ought not to make an immediate demand that he should be punished for the conduct stated in his own report. Had the continuance of the war left a prospect that any more impressments would take place, I certainly should not have felt myself justified in overlooking this transaction. But our points of collision with this country are so continually presenting themselves, and my instructions so strongly urge upon me the observance of a conciliatory course, that I seek rather to escape from occasions for remonstrance than to find them. For the present not only is all impressment at an end, but the inconvenience experienced is of having multitudes of sailors for whom there is no employment. Instances now occur of Americans discharged as such who had been year after year endeavoring in vain to obtain it before. Whole bodies of British seamen have been in processions to the Admiralty and to the Lord Mayor, to complain that they are starving for want of employment, and to demand that foreigners may be *excluded* from the British sea and merchant service. The whole fleet is paying off, and it is said that the number of seamen to be retained in active service in the navy is to be reduced to twelve thousand. One infallible consequence of this will be to crowd into our merchant service multitudes of these British seamen, and if the laws of Congress passed during the late war for excluding foreign seamen from our vessels after the peace are to be executed, I am persuaded it will require extraordinary vigilance and further enforcing laws to carry it into effect.

The great numbers of sailors so suddenly dismissed from the public service here have already brought many of ours to Mr. Beasley, and even to me with applications for relief. Among them are prisoners of war sent here from the East and West Indies, who continue to arrive with the fleets and

in many single vessels—foreigners who had been taken serving in our armies sent here from Canada and Nova Scotia, and liberated here or sent back to Germany and Switzerland, their native countries. They find their way back here with the purpose of returning to the United States, and often without the means of paying for their passage; men discharged from impressment as unserviceable, with or without pensions, who come not only for passages but for protections. A great portion of my time is occupied in listening to the applications of these men, whom I cannot turn from my doors, because their cases are almost all of peculiar hardship, and whom I can not always refer to the agent for seamen, because they do not come precisely within the descriptions for which the laws have provided.

Since beginning this letter I have had the honor of receiving yours of the 21st ultimo, with a new copy of the instructions of 13th March and several other inclosures relating to objects of high importance, to which I shall pay immediate and due attention. By my two last letters you will perceive that I have recently made application in writing to Lord Castlereagh, and in a personal interview to Lord Liverpool, respecting the delay to restore the post of Michillimackinac, and the removal of slaves that had been taken, notwithstanding the stipulation in the first article of the treaty of Ghent, that none should be carried away. With regard to the fort, nothing could be stronger and more explicit than the assurances of Lord Liverpool, that the orders for the restoration had long since been given and there was no intention on the part of this government to retain any portion of the territory stipulated to be restored. I must add, that in the whole of that conference Lord Liverpool's manner and deportment were not only temperate and calm, but even amicable and conciliatory. But you will

observe in the newspapers which I have inclosed that the cabinet have determined, not only to maintain, but to increase, the British naval armament upon the lakes of Canada. I do not apprehend that an immediate rupture with the United States is intended. France as yet gives ample occupation both to the military and diplomatic departments. You must be prepared for the time when the fate of France will be settled.

I am etc.

TO JOHN ADAMS

BOSTON HOUSE, EALING, 31 August, 1815.

MY DEAR SIR:

Many of these communications and of the papers inclosed with them relate to the subject of the fisheries, upon which I have had as yet no discussion with the government of this country, though it may probably be one of those upon which it will be difficult for the two countries to come to an understanding. You are acquainted with what has taken place upon our coast. Some evidence of the light in which it is viewed by the British government was disclosed by several incidents towards the close of the last session of Parliament. I am now called upon to present our view of it for the consideration of this cabinet. The result may probably be known in the United States soon after the commencement of the next session of Congress. I shall only say to you that if the fisheries are to be maintained, New England which has the deepest interest in them will be called upon not only to feel, but to manifest the determination to do her share in maintaining them. If she is as ready to resign them to the bulwark of our holy religion as she was to resign her own

children to the worse than Helot-servitude of the press-gang, you may rely upon it they are gone. The Union will not (it is at least my belief that they will not) again be kicked into a war for New England interests, with New England hanging as a dead weight upon all their exertions, or unblushingly siding with the enemy in the contest. You have impressed upon me, with the energy peculiar to yourself, and with the wisdom in my situation so essential to me, the duty of supporting our rights on this important question. "It is not in man that walketh to direct his steps." May mine be guided in the right path! but let me say to you, I am only the watchman at the gate. Will you or will you not resign the fisheries? And I ask this question not of you, my father, for you have answered me already; but of you, NEW ENGLAND? And I tell you without reserve, that whether you will or not, this question will be brought home to you. It is not by folding up your arms and lamenting that there was no article about it in the treaty of Ghent, that you will escape from that question. If you mean to maintain the right, no article in the peace of Ghent was or will be necessary to preserve it. If you mean to give it up, no article there would have preserved it. If I am not mistaken, in the first war for our independence there were resolutions passed by the legislature of Massachusetts, insisting that peace should not be made by any sacrifice of the right to the fisheries. If the same spirit had animated the legislature of Massachusetts in the second war for our independence, that is, the late war, no question about the fisheries would ever have arisen. But when the bulwark found New England binding her children hand and foot and yielding them up to the press-gang, surrendering her territory without resistance or effort to recover it, and plotting Hartford Conventions to break off from the Union, she naturally concluded

that a mere fishery could not be hard to snatch from those who valued neither the personal security of their people, nor their territorial sovereignty, nor their national union; but in the midst of a formidable and desolating war were conspiring against them all. And now let me add, if the legislature of Massachusetts will once more be animated by the spirit to which I have referred; if they will pass resolutions that the fisheries must not be sacrificed, and shall be maintained; and if they and their constituents will act up to the spirit of such resolutions, be the consequences what they may; then, sir, I will not pledge myself that we shall escape a third war for our independence. But I do pledge myself, and would stake my own life and the lives of my children upon it, that at the close of that war no part of our fishing right will be contested. So let New England, and especially Massachusetts, look to it; the maintenance or the loss of this privilege depends entirely upon herself.

I have received from you, or from my mother, or from some other friend, for I cannot always tell from whom they come, two or three political, and two or three religious party pamphlets. I perceive that the Trinitarians and Unitarians in Boston are sparring together. The bias of my mind is towards the doctrine of the Trinitarians and Calvinists; but I do not approve their intolerance. Most of the Boston Unitarians are my particular friends; but I never thought much of the eloquence or of the theology of Priestley. His *Socrates and Jesus compared* ¹ is a wretched performance. Socrates and Jesus! a farthing candle and the Sun! I pray you to read Masillon's sermon upon the divinity of Christ, and then the whole New Testament; after which be a Socinian if you can.

Religion occasionally mingles with the affairs of Europe.

¹ Printed in Philadelphia, 1803.

You know that the Pope has restored the order of the Jesuits, and that Ferdinand the Beloved has restored the Inquisition. But you do not know, perhaps, that since the second restoration of Louis the Desired, his nephew, the Duke d'Angoulême, has declared that it will never be well with France until they are all of the same religion. In consequence of which many hundreds of *Protestants* have been butchered in the south of France by the sword and dagger; others have been burned to ashes with their habitations; others driven to seek refuge in the mountains of the Cévennes. A new St. Bartholomew has been loudly and openly called for; the number of victims in the city of Nismes alone exceeds six hundred. The magnanimous allies, including the bulwark of our holy religion, witness all this with composure and even with complacency. All the Protestants of France are set down for Jacobins.

There was a foolish book printed in Philadelphia four or five years ago, called *Inchiquin's Letters*.¹ Last summer some loyal pensioner of the *Quarterly Review* took it up, and made it the canvas for a scurrilous and false invective upon America and the whole American people. It suited the prejudices and passions of this people, who delight to see those vilified whom they cordially hate. I have seen two large American pamphlets in reply to the quarterly reviewer, one from New York by Mr. Paulding,² another from New England by some long winded junto-parson.³ Both of them, I know not why, assume it for granted that the quarterly reviewer was the Poet Laureate Southey, and they mingle with their defence of their own country a large portion of personal invective upon him. Southey, who began

¹ Printed at New York, 1810. The author was Charles Jared Ingersoll.

² James Kirke Paulding. The pamphlet appeared in 1815.

³ Timothy Dwight, *Remarks on a Review*, etc., 1815.

the world with songs of glory to Joan of Arc, Brissot, Roland and Clavière, is ending with royal cantos of contemned love for the magnanimous allies and twofold conquerors of France. But he was not the writer of the obnoxious review of *Inchiquin*, and has published his denial in the *Courier*. And having with his hundred marks, or pounds, and his butt of sack by the year, become of course a very courtly gentleman, his delicacy is quite shocked at the rudeness of Mr. Paulding's pushes. The Yankee parson pleads only for British mercy upon the pure federal-republicans of New England. All the rest of the country he freely gives up to reprobation; and even for them he rests their claim of exemption from the ribaldry of the reviewer only upon their admiration of British transcendent virtue. That pamphlet and the *Review* are about upon a level with each other; but I have regretted that Mr. Paulding should have wasted his time and talent upon such a despicable adversary as the lampooner of the *Quarterly Review*.¹

I have said few words about the present condition of France. I have no doubt she is destined to go through the process which Poland has suffered. The first partition stripped her of all her conquests and acquisitions since 1792. The second, now consummating, will tear from her those of Louis 14 and Louis 15, with the whole of her barrier. The Bourbons will be set up like Zedekiah of Judah by Nebuchadnezzar, or the Poniatowskis of Catherine. In some unlucky moment the puppets will forget their strings and attempt to go alone. Then will come the third and final partition and France, like Poland, will vanish from the map of Europe. What can avert this catastrophe? Nothing less than the revival of a national energy now palsied, perhaps extinct. I must leave them to the mercy of Heaven. I am etc.

¹ Sir James Barrow was the author of the review.

TO WILLIAM EUSTIS

BOSTON HOUSE, EALING, 31 August, 1815.

DEAR SIR:

Your favors of the 25th instant were left at my office in London by Mr. Langdon, whom I had hoped to have the pleasure of seeing here, where I have taken my summer and perhaps winter residence. It is seven miles out of town, and had the name by which I date before I took it. Mr. Langdon is so much pressed for time that he cannot at present come out. If he comes back here I hope to be more fortunate. He does me the favor to take this letter.

The newspapers give us accounts from France almost every day, and some of our countrymen are coming from that country almost every week. As the allied sovereigns came to an agreement together in the distribution at Vienna, I see no reason for doubting that they will agree equally well upon the distributions of the present day. Now probably, as then, the principal difficulty will be to make up the Russian portion. But as to France the case is plain enough, though there has been some mincing in stating it. France is a conquest and as a conquest will be treated. I am sorely disappointed at the gratuitous compliment to the Dey of Algiers. Will it always be our destiny to end with shame what we begin with glory? Never was there such an opportunity for putting down those pirates as we have had. The work was half done, and instead of completing it, we restore to the reptile the very sting we had extracted from him. And what will the peace be worth when he has got back his ships and men? A snare to the unwary! ¹

¹ On September 21 he received a letter from Commodore Decatur stating the terms of the treaty: the cessation of tribute, compensation for American property captured during the war, and the liberation of American captives.

Mr. Changuion has been here and is gone home. I had not the pleasure of seeing him, but he speaks well of our country and of the reception and treatment which he met with there. I see no occasion for us to be more solicitous for a new commercial treaty with the Netherlands than their government. The old treaty, if recognized by both governments, will do no harm; I know not that it will do much good. I am surprised to hear that they have no commerce, though it is evident the policy of their great ally will be to allow them as little of that as possible. The present price at London of all our six per cent stocks, the interest of which is payable in the United States, is 90. The Hague never was, and never will be, a place of commerce; and even at Amsterdam you will find great difficulty in disposing of any American securities. The price there always depends upon that of the London market combined with the course of exchange. The exchange between this country and Holland is about five per cent below par, though in exchange of papers for specie before the battle of Waterloo it was 20 per cent below par.

I have received dispatches from our government of 21 July. The horizon between the two hemispheres is yet dark, and what is worse, darkening. The British naval commanders, in defiance of the treaty of Ghent, have carried away from the United States all the slaves they had taken. There was no certainty that Michillimackinac had been restored. The agents and traders were instigating the Indians in the north, and a British officer posted in Florida was doing the same thing with the Creeks. Our fishing vessels had been turned away and warned to twenty leagues of the coast. The British packet had been seized at New York for an attempt to smuggle goods. At the same time the Cabinet here have determined to increase their naval

armaments on the lakes of Canada; and the ministerial gazettes are marked with strong symptoms of hostility. The language held here is temperate and full of conciliatory professions. But when the affairs of France shall be settled to their satisfaction (which I think will be soon), I expect a change of tone. It is said they have met with some new difficulties in India, where there is a call for additional troops from Europe. This, too, I presume will come to nothing. The fleet, however, is reducing to a peace establishment. Mr. Everett was good enough to send me a copy of the new constitution for the Netherlands. Paper constitutions are something in the United States, but they are something like the Baltimore schooners, which they say European sailors can not manage to navigate. Mr. Peder-son has just embarked at Liverpool for Philadelphia. He goes out as Minister from His Danish Majesty to the United States.

I am etc.

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE

No. 12.

[JAMES MONROE]

LONDON, 5 September, 1815.

SIR:

In compliance with your instructions of the 21 July I have this day addressed Lord Castlereagh, claiming payment from the British government for the slaves carried away from Cumberland Island and the adjoining waters, after the ratification of the treaty of peace, and in contravention to one of the express stipulations of that treaty.

My preceding dispatches Nos. 9 and 10 will have informed

you of the steps I had taken by an official letter to Lord Castlereagh, and by a personal interview with the Earl of Liverpool, in relation to this subject, previous to the receipt of your last instructions. The letter to Lord Castlereagh has hitherto remained unanswered, and Lord Liverpool made no attempt to answer either the reasoning of your letter on the subject to Mr. Baker, or the statement of the proof with regard to the meaning of the article, resulting from the manner in which it had been drawn up and agreed to.¹ The substance of what he said was, that in agreeing to the article as it stands they had not been aware that it would bind them to restore the slaves whom their officers had enticed away by promises of freedom. The case of those slaves carried away from Cumberland seems not even to admit of the distinction to which Mr. Baker and Lord Liverpool resorted. Yet the prospect of obtaining either restoration or indemnity appears to me not more favorable in this case than in any others of the same class. If there were any probability that this government would admit the principle of making indemnity, it would become necessary for me to remark that the list of slaves transmitted to me, and of which I have sent to Lord Castlereagh a copy, is not an authenticated document. It is itself merely a copy of a paper under the simple signature of two persons, one of them an officer in the service of the United States, and the other apparently a private individual. It can scarcely be expected that the British government, or indeed any other, would grant a large sum of indemnities upon evidence of this description. Neither could I feel myself prepared to bargain for the value of these slaves according to a general conjectural estimate of their value. I have made the offer under the full conviction that it will not be accepted. But if in-

¹ See Adams, *Memoirs*, August 16, 1815.

demnity should ever be consented to by this government to be made, the claims are of a nature to be settled only by a board of commissioners, authorized to scrutinize in judicial forms the evidence in support of them. I have also thought it would give a further sanction to the claim to advance it, while offering still to this government the alternative of restoring the slaves themselves. With regard to the other subjects noticed in your instructions, I propose in the course of a few days to make a further written communication to Lord Castlereagh or Lord Bathurst. I am induced by various considerations to delay it for a short time. One of them is a hope that the account of the delivery of the post of Michillimackinac may be received and remove the necessity of further remonstrances on one of our causes of complaint. Another, that the documents tending to show the improper interference of British agents with the Indians of the Mississippi, and those respecting the extraordinary conduct of Colonel Nicolls which you transmitted to Mr. Baker, have not been sent to me with your dispatch. I have only a copy of your letter to Mr. Baker, without the paper referred to in it as marked A and B. I am, therefore, not possessed of the facts upon which the representation must be made. They undoubtedly have received or will receive them from Mr. Baker, and also the reports from their own officers. With the duplicate of your instructions which I presume will soon come to hand, I flatter myself there will be copies of the documents omitted in the dispatch that I have received.

I cannot persuade myself that there has been, or is, a formal determination to withhold the post of Michillimackinac, or that an immediate renewal of war with the United States is contemplated by the British Cabinet. An opinion, however, that the peace will not be of long duration is very generally prevalent both here and upon the European conti-

ment. The nation in general is dissatisfied with the issue of the late war, and at the same time elated to the highest pitch of exultation at the situation which they have attained in this hemisphere. Their great and only dreaded rival is chained and prostrate at their feet. The continent of Europe is spellbound by their policy and so completely bought by their subsidies as, however occasionally restive, to have ultimately no will but theirs. Their intention is to dismember France, as the only effectual means of securing themselves by perpetuating her impotence. They have hitherto experienced a feeble opposition to this project on the part of Austria, and a resistance rather more firm on the part of Russia. It is highly probable that they will ultimately prevail and obtain the consent of both. The situation of the allies in France is said to be critical, and their conduct can scarcely be explained on any other ground than the design to goad the people of the country to some disjointed effort of insurrection, for a pretext to carve them out and distribute them like Poland among their neighbors. Such according to all present appearance is destined to be the fate of France. Upon the degree of facility with which it may be accomplished we may consider the hostile disposition of this cabinet towards the United States to depend. While they have full occupation in Europe we shall have frequent and unequivocal manifestations of ill will, but no resort to the extremities of war. The reduction of the navy to the peace establishment is one of the indications that they do not propose an immediate renewal of hostilities with America. They retain thirteen line of battleships—six of fifty guns—forty-three frigates and corvettes to the rate of twenty guns, and thirty-nine smaller sloops of war.

Among the considerations which ought not to be neglected in estimating the prospects of our future relations with

Great Britain are the dispositions entertained by the other European powers and by the party in opposition to the ministry here. The continental sovereigns, while continually bending to the policy of Great Britain, are yet willing to see her involved in a quarrel with America. You are doubtless aware of the advantage which Russia took of that circumstance at Vienna the last autumn, and of the effect which it had in producing the peace of Ghent. And Mr. Harris has informed you how unwelcome that peace was to the Russian Cabinet. The temper of France at the same time bore the same character, though not so strongly marked. During the last session of Parliament it was a member of the opposition, Sir John Newport, who discovered the most earnest zeal for the exclusion of the American people from the American fisheries. The importance of that subject has been elucidated by many incidents which preceded and attended the negotiation at Ghent, as well as by what has since occurred in Parliament. I shall prepare a letter founded upon your instructions of 21 July relating to this interest; but it is impossible for me to express in terms too strong or explicit my conviction that nothing can maintain the right of the people of the United States in the American fisheries, but the determined and inflexible resolution of themselves and of their government to maintain them at every hazard.¹

I am etc.

¹ A line in cypher followed, for which a key was not found.

TO JOSEPH HALL

BOSTON HOUSE, EALING, near London,
9 September, 1815.

DEAR SIR:

Our old friend Dr. Eustis upon his arrival at the Hague forwarded to me your favor of 8th June last, which I received with great satisfaction. You have estimated too favorably the services of the American negotiators of the treaty of Ghent: and if the party to which you refer had not ruined its own credit by snapping like gulls at the British *sine qua non*: could they have seen, to use a vulgar expression, far enough before their noses to perceive that they would soon have to thrust their stings, not against the war but against the peace, they would have been adversaries far more formidable than they have proved themselves. After abusing us for not accepting the *sine qua non*, they to be sure had left themselves nothing to say when the peace came, and accordingly their arguments against the peace have proved nothing but their own inconsistency. It is something too despicable for ridicule itself to pretend, like Governor Strong, that because we have failed in one struggle to shake off forever the galling yoke of the press-gang, we are therefore precluded from ever struggling to shake it off again. But true, and lamentably true, it is that in the late war our struggle to shake it off did fail. True it is that the peace of Ghent was in its nature and character a truce rather than a peace. Neither party gave up anything; all the points of collision between them which had subsisted before the war were left open. New ones opened by the war itself were left to close again after the peace. Nothing was adjusted, nothing was settled—nothing in substance but an indefinite

suspension of hostilities was agreed to. For my own part, far from claiming any credit for the conclusion of the peace, my own deliberate opinion was, and is, that the American plenipotentiaries needed all candor and all the indulgence of their country for having put their signatures to such a treaty. That the very peculiar circumstances of the times, the commanding attitude which Great Britain had acquired in Europe, the removal of the principal cause of war by the general European pacification, the disordered and almost desperate situation of our finances, and, above all, our intestine divisions imminently threatening the complication of a civil with the foreign war, with a formal and avowed confederacy of five states to dissolve the union; that all this was in candor to be taken into consideration when the conduct was to be estimated of the American negotiators in signing the treaty. I believed that with all these things duly weighed, they would stand acquitted in the face of their country and of the world. And when all the particulars of the negotiation should be known I believed they would deserve the credit of having faithfully done their duty. When the wise men of the east were loading the Boston newspapers with dissertations to prove that the *sine qua non* was a fair and honorable and acceptable proposition, and with insults upon the ex-professor for rejecting it with disdain, they little thought that they were laboring with the most painful and ignominious industry to give to the ex-professor and his associates more credit than they deserved. It was lucky for us that the wise men in their simplicity so conspicuously divulged what they were willing to take for a fair and honorable peace. The misery of the wise men is that there is yet too much colonial blood flowing in their veins. The late Chief Justice,¹ the progenitor of the Boston rebel,

¹ Theophilus Parsons.

and even our magnanimous governor, you know were late and lukewarm *converts* in the first and great war for our national independence. They were willing enough to fall into "pursue the triumph and partake the gale;" but if such men had been the favorites and leaders of our country at the trying period of our Revolution, the studies of our children at the university might have terminated in loyal epithalamiums upon the marriage of the Princess Charlotte of Wales. When the American plenipotentiaries at Ghent rejected the *sine qua non*, there was not one of them who thought himself entitled to any credit for it as for an act of individual firmness; all knew that we could not accept it. We all knew that if we should accept it, we should only cover ourselves with infamy, and that the treaty would be rejected by our own government. The path was too plain to be mistaken. Not one of us hesitated an instant, nor would it have been possible for any other men representing the United States in the same situation to have done otherwise. The Boston rebel in our situation would have done as we did. And as to any advantage in argument which we may have had over the British plenipotentiaries in that negotiation, we could in truth as little pretend to merit in that as for spurning at the *sine qua non*. They were men of sound understanding, but they were little more than a medium of communication between us and the British Privy Council. Now that body, like all the other governments of Europe, is accustomed to reason so little and so much to force, that a victory over them of mere logic is as easy as it is insignificant. The weakness of the intellectual weapons with which American public ministers have to contend is almost as mortifying as the utter inefficacy of the most irrefragable arguments advanced by them. The statesmen of Europe seldom take the trouble to use reasoning, and when they do the success of their cause

may be generally considered as desperate. If the notes of the British plenipotentiaries at Ghent were scarcely worthy of refutation, it was because reason had been sacrificed for a supposed expediency at the laying of the basis of the negotiation. That basis was laid not upon reason or argument, but upon the expeditions to Plattsburg and New Orleans. It was not to Lord Gambier, H. Goulburn and Dr. Adams that they looked for success, but to Sir George Prevost, and Sir James Yeo, and Ross, and Cockburn, to Cochrane and Pakenham.

The result of the late war has been to raise the American character in the estimation of Europe. But let us not be elated by it; let us look back to it, not with an eye of vain and idle exultation at the successes with which it was checked, but with a regard anxiously provident of the future. Let us inquire how much we suffered by want of adequate preparation for war before it was undertaken; how much for the want of a more efficient naval force; how much by the miserable composition of our army; how much by an unreasonable reliance upon militia soldiers and militia officers; how much by an undigested and unsuitable system of finances; and, above all, how much by disaffection, by disunion, by an inveterate and unprincipled spirit of faction. Let us not be afraid or ashamed to look at our disasters—at sea we had our full share of misfortunes, but I think not a single instance of disgrace. Our triumphs there were the more precious, because they were all hardly and dearly bought. But on the land, if we might boast of some glorious, and be grateful for some fortunate achievements, for how many defects should we be called to confess, and for how many disgraces should we blush? It is true that our enemies were teaching us the practical art of which they themselves had learnt from the French. They found our

countrymen apt scholars, and in two or more campaigns I have no doubt we should have swept them off from the continent of North America. But at the period when the war closed our improvement had manifested itself only in defensive warfare; and without detracting from the merit of our officers or men, we must attribute much of our success at Plattsburg to the victory on the lake, and something of that at New Orleans to good fortune—to the errors of the enemy, and to the casualty of their general's being killed. If the war had done us no other good than to disclose the talents and energy of such men as Jackson, Brown, Scott, Macomb and Gaines, it would still have been great. It was winnowing the grain from the chaff; but should we ever again be involved in war I hope the appointments will be made with the solemn consideration that for the field of blood important military command is not to be committed to superannuated, shallow, intemperate and worthless characters with impunity. A more cheering if not more confident hope is that we shall yet enjoy many years of peace. But the general peace about to be restored in Europe may increase the difficulty of preserving ours. The state of Europe is indeed yet, and for some time will remain unsettled. France is to experience the fate of Poland, and thus terminates the revolution which began with liberty, equality, and fraternity, and which for a long time scared the nations of Europe and the children of America with the bugbear of universal monarchy.

The disciples of the Socrates, of whom Fisher Ames was the Plato, may go to bed and sleep in quiet. Their children will not be taken for the St. Domingo conscription. Let them not believe, however, that the revolutionary flame is extinct. Europe still consists only of victors and vanquished, between whom no permanent state of social repose can exist. May we persevere in the system of keeping aloof

from all their broils, and in that of consolidating and perpetuating our own Union. I am, etc.

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE

No. 14.

[JAMES MONROE]

LONDON, 19 September, 1815.

SIR:

The transactions to which your instructions of 21 July have reference were of a character to excite in the highest degree the attention of the government of the United States. So many simultaneous acts of British officers at various stations and upon both elements, indicating a marked spirit of hostility, were calculated to inspire serious doubts with regard to the pacific, not to say the amicable, dispositions of the British government; and the latter part of your dispatch made it incumbent on me, under certain contingencies, to take measures of which nothing that had occurred here had induced me even to think as precautions which the course of events might render expedient. The commercial convention had shown how excessively difficult it was for British and American plenipotentiaries to agree upon any one point in which the mutual interests of the two countries were involved. It had shown how very few points there were upon which any agreement could be made, and it was evident from everything, excepting the personal courtesies of the Prince and his Cabinet, that the animosities of the condition from which the two nations had lately emerged had very little subsided. I had, however, before the receipt of your dispatch not a suspicion that an immediate renewal of hostilities was contemplated, and even now, although I per-

ceive no reasons for flattering myself that any satisfaction will be given us upon any one of our causes of complaint, yet I do not apprehend that any act of open and avowed hostility will be sanctioned by the British government at the present moment. It must, however, be added that the most, perhaps the only, unequivocal pledge of pacific intentions is the reduction of the fleet, not only to a peace establishment but to an unusually small one. Your dispatch and the several procedures to which it related awakened an anxiety that nothing should be omitted which could be of any possible utility to our interests in this quarter, and above all that no hazards should be incurred upon the naval station in this hemisphere which might be warded by a timely notice of danger. Having formally renewed the claim for the restitution of the slaves carried away contrary to the engagements of the treaty of peace, or for payment of their value as the alternative, there were other objects which I deemed it necessary to present again to the consideration of this government. In the first instance it seemed advisable to open them by verbal communications, and I requested of Lord Bathurst an interview for which he appointed the 14th instant, when I called at his office in Downing street. I said that having lately received dispatches from you respecting several objects of some importance to the relations between the two countries, my first object in asking to see him had been to inquire, whether he had received from Mr. Baker a communication of the correspondence between you and him relative to the surrender of Michillimackinac, to the proceedings of Col. Nicholls in the southern part of the United States, and to the warning given by the captain of the British armed vessel *Jaseur* to certain American fishing vessels, to withdraw from the fishing grounds to the distance of sixty miles from the coast. He answered that

he had received all these papers from Mr. Baker about four days ago; that an answer with regard to the warning of the fishing vessels had immediately been sent; but on the other subjects there had not been time to examine the papers and prepare the answers. I asked him if he could without inconvenience state the substance of the answer that had been sent; he said, certainly. It had been that, as on the one hand Great Britain could not permit the vessels of the United States to fish within the creeks and close upon the shores of the British territories, so on the other hand it was by no means her intention to interrupt them in fishing anywhere in the open sea, or without the territorial jurisdiction—a marine league from the shore. And therefore that the warning given at the place stated in the case referred to was altogether unauthorized. I replied that the particular act of the British commander in this instance being disavowed, I trusted that the British government, before adopting any final determination upon this subject, would estimate in candor and in that spirit of amity which my own government was anxiously desirous of maintaining in our relations with this country, the considerations which I was instructed to present in support of the right of the people of the United States to fish on the whole coast of North America, which they have uniformly enjoyed from the first settlement of the country. That it was my intention to address in the course of a few days a letter to him on the subject. He said that they would give due attention to the letter that I should send him, but that Great Britain had explicitly manifested her intention concerning it. That this subject, as I doubtless knew, had excited a great deal of feeling in this country, perhaps much more than its importance deserved; but their own fishermen considered it as an excessive hardship to be supplanted by American fishermen, even upon the very

shores of the British dominions. I said that those whose sensibilities had been thus excited had probably not considered the question of right in the point of view in which it had been regarded by us; that they were the sensibilities of a partial and individual interest stimulated by the passions of competition, and considering the right of the Americans as if it had been a privilege granted to them by the British government. If this interest was to have weight in determining the policy of the cabinet, there was another interest liable to be affected in the opposite manner which would be entitled equally to consideration—the manufacturing.

The question of right had not been discussed at the negotiation of Ghent. The British plenipotentiaries had given a notice that the British government did not intend hereafter to grant to the people of the United States the right to fish, and to cure and dry fish, within the exclusive British jurisdictions in America without an equivalent, as it had been granted by the treaty of peace in 1783. The American plenipotentiaries had given notice in return that the American government considered all the rights and liberties in and to the fisheries on the whole coast of North America as sufficiently secured by the possession of them, which had always been enjoyed previous to the revolution, and by the recognition of them in the treaty of peace in 1783. That they did not think any new stipulation necessary for a further confirmation of the right, no part of which did they consider as having been forfeited by the war. It was obvious that the treaty of peace of 1783 was not one of those ordinary treaties which by the usages of nations were held to be annulled by a subsequent war between the same parties. It was not simply a treaty of peace, it was a treaty of partition between two parts of one nation, agreeing thenceforth to be separated into two distinct sovereignties. The condi-

tions upon which this was done constituted essentially the independence of the United States, and the preservation of all fishing rights which they had constantly enjoyed over the whole coast of North America was among the most important of them. This was no concession, no grant on the part of Great Britain, which could be annulled by a war. There had been in the same treaty of 1783 a right recognized in British subjects to navigate the Mississippi. This right the British plenipotentiaries at Ghent had considered as still a just claim on the part of Great Britain, notwithstanding the war that had intervened.

The American plenipotentiaries, to remove all future discussion upon both points, had offered to agree to an article expressly confirming both the rights. In declining this, an offer had been made on the part of Great Britain of an article stipulating to negotiate in future for the renewal of both the rights for *equivalents*, which was declined by the American plenipotentiaries, on the express ground that its effect would have been an implied admission that the rights had been annulled. There was therefore no article concerning them in the treaty, and the question as to the right was not discussed. I now stated the ground upon which the government of the United States considered the right as subsisting and unimpaired. The treaty of 1783 was in its essential nature not liable to be annulled by a subsequent war. It acknowledged the United States as a sovereign and independent power. It would be an absurdity inconsistent with the acknowledgment itself to suppose it liable to be forfeited by a war. The whole treaty of Ghent did constantly refer to it as existing and in full force, nor was an intimation given that any further confirmation of it was supposed to be necessary. It would be for the British government ultimately to determine how far this reasoning was to be ad-

mitted as correct. There were also considerations of policy and expediency to which I hoped they would give suitable attention before they should come to a final decision upon this point. I thought it my duty to suggest them, that they might not be overlooked. The subject was viewed by my countrymen as highly important, and I was anxious to omit no effort which might possibly have an influence in promoting friendly sentiments between the two nations, or in guarding against the excitement of others. These fisheries afforded the means of subsistence to multitudes of people who were destitute of any other. They also afforded the means of remittance to Great Britain in payment for articles of her manufactures exported to America. It was well understood to be the policy of Great Britain that no unnecessary stimulus should be given to the manufactures in the United States which would diminish the importation of those from Great Britain. But by depriving the fishermen of the United States of this source of subsistence, the result must be to throw them back upon the country, and drive them to the resort of manufacturing for themselves, while on the other hand it would cut off the means of making remittances in payment for the manufactures of Great Britain. I must add that the people in America, whose interests would be most immediately and severely affected by this exclusion, were the inhabitants of that country which had of late years manifested the most friendly dispositions towards this country. This might perhaps be less proper for me to suggest, than for a British Cabinet to consider. To me the interests of all my countrymen in every part of the United States were the same. To the government of the United States they were the same. We could know no distinction between them. But upon a point where, as an American, I was contending for what we conceived to be a strict right,

I thought best, speaking to him, to urge every consideration which might influence a party having other views in that respect to avoid coming to a collision upon it. I would even urge considerations of humanity. I would say that fisheries, the nature of which was to multiply the means of subsistence to mankind, were usually considered by civilized nations as under a sort of special sanction. It was a common practice to leave them uninterrupted even in time of war. He knew for instance that the Dutch had been for centuries in the practice of fishing upon the coasts of this island, and that they were not interrupted in this occupation even in ordinary times of war. It was to be inferred from this that to interdict a fishery which had been enjoyed for ages, far from being an usual act in the peaceable relations between nations, was an indication of animosity, transcending even the ordinary course of hostility in war. He said that no such disposition was entertained by the British government. That to show the liberality which they had determined to exercise in this case, he would assure me that the instructions which he had given to the officers on that station had been, not even to interrupt the American fishermen who might have proceeded to those coasts within the British jurisdiction for the present year; to allow them to complete their fares, but to give them notice that this privilege could no longer be allowed by Great Britain, and that they must not return the next year. It was not so much the fishing, as the drying and curing on the shores, that had been followed by bad consequences. It happened that our fishermen by their proximity could get to the fishing stations sooner in the season than the British, who were obliged to go from Europe, and who upon arriving there found all the best fishing places, and drying and curing places preoccupied. This had often given rise to disputes and quarrels

between them, which in some instances had proceeded to blows. It had disturbed the peace among the inhabitants on the shores, and for several years before the war the complaints to this government had been so great and so frequent that it had been impossible not to pay regard to them. I said that I had not heard of any such complaints before; but as to the disputes arising from the competition of the fishermen a remedy could surely with ease be found for them by suitable regulations of the government; and with regard to the peace of the inhabitants, there could be little difficulty in securing it, as the liberty enjoyed by the American fishermen was limited to unsettled and uninhabited places, unless they could in the others obtain the consent and agreement of the inhabitants.

I then adverted to the other topics—Michillimackinac, Bois Blanc, and Colonel Nicholls. I asked him if he had any account of the surrender of the post. He said he had no doubt whatever but that it had long since been delivered up. But he had no late dispatches from the Canadian government. Some delay had occurred by the change of the Governor General, by Sir George Prevost's leaving Quebec to come to Europe, and consequently by General Drummond's coming from Upper Canada to Quebec. As to the indisposition manifested by the Indians to accept the peace offered by the United States, he regretted it very much. It had been the sincere wish and intention of the British government that the peace with the Indians should immediately follow that agreed to by this country. The British officers there had been formally instructed to make known to them the peace which had been concluded, and to advise them to take the benefit of it. If there had been conduct of a different tendency on the part of British officers or subjects, it was unauthorized and contrary to the instructions which

had been given. I said that the American government had been peculiarly concerned at the proceedings of Col. Nicholls, because they appeared to be marked with unequivocal and extraordinary marks of hostility. "Why," said Lord Bathurst, "to tell you the truth Colonel Nicholls is, I believe, a man of activity and spirit, but a very wild fellow. He did make and send over to me a treaty, offensive and defensive, with some Indians, and he is now come over here and has brought over some of those Indians. I sent for answer that he had no authority whatever to make a treaty, offensive and defensive, with Indians, and that this government would make no such treaty. I have sent him word that I could not see him upon any such project. The Indians are here in great distress indeed, but we shall only furnish them the means of returning home and advise them to make their terms with the United States as well as they can." Perceiving that I had particularly noticed his declaration that he had declined seeing Colonel Nicholls, he said that he should perhaps see him upon the general subject of his transactions, but that he had declined seeing him in regard to his treaty with the Indians. I then observed that you had also sent me a copy of your letter to Mr. Baker concerning the island of Bois Blanc. He said it seemed merely a question of fact, whether the island had been in the possession of the British before the commencement of the late war or not. He did not know how that was, but he thought it could not be difficult to ascertain, and it was altogether of very little importance.¹ I asked him if he could tell me when Mr. Bagot would probably embark for the United States. He answered that it depended altogether upon the particular circumstances of his family. He expected himself to be able to embark only in October. I was no doubt aware of the cause

¹ To this point the dispatch is given in the *Memoirs*, September 14, 1815.

of the delay of his departure. I replied that I asked the question now, because by a late letter from Mr. Baker to you it appeared that his powers in relation to the execution of the treaty of peace were less extensive than the government of the United States had understood them to be, which circumstance had made it more solicitous for the departure of Mr. Bagot. He assured me that there should be no delay which could possibly be avoided. In this conversation Lord Bathurst's manner, like that of Lord Liverpool in the conference which I had about a month before with him, was altogether good humored and conciliatory. The conduct of all the officers and persons complained of was explicitly disavowed; and I understood at first the observation of Lord Bathurst that he had declined seeing Colonel Nicholls as an intimation that it was intended to exhibit towards that officer unequivocal marks of displeasure. But the subsequent explanation left me to conclude that, although the disapprobation of his proceedings was strongly expressed to me, the utmost extent of it that would be shown to him would be the refusal to ratify his treaty, offensive and defensive, with the Indians. The answer, that was so promptly sent to the complaint relative to the warning of the fishing vessels by the captain of the *Jaseur*, will probably be communicated to you before you will receive this letter. You will see whether it is so precise as to the limits within which they are determined to adhere to the exclusion of our fishing vessels as Lord Bathurst's verbal statement of it to me, namely, to the extent of one marine league from their shores. Indeed it is to the curing and drying upon the shore that they appear to have the strongest objection. But that, perhaps, is, because they know the immediate curing and drying of the fish as soon as they are taken are essential to the value, if not to the very prosecution of the fishery. I

have no expectation that the arguments used by me, either in support of our right, or as to the policy of Great Britain upon this question, will have any weight here. Though satisfied of their validity myself, I am persuaded it will be upon the determination of the American government and people to maintain the right that the continuance of its enjoyment will alone depend. Two days after this conference with Lord Bathurst I had occasion to see Mr. Morier, the under secretary of state in the department of Lord Castlereagh, and repeated the question to him relative to the departure of Mr. Bagot, to which I was induced by the event of Mrs. Bagot's confinement, which happened on the 12th instant. Mr. Morier was still unable to say when they would embark, from which there is some reason to suppose that their departure will be still procrastinated. I asked Mr. Morier if he had received my letter to Lord Castlereagh with the list of the negroes carried away by Admiral Cockburn. He said he had, but made no further observation concerning it. I asked him whether they were likely soon to settle their affairs in France. He said that they had made considerable progress towards it; that among so many parties there had naturally arisen some different shades of opinion with regard to what was best to be done; but it was probable that they would all be smoothed down. It does not appear that the Emperor of Russia's objections to the dismemberment of France have been wholly removed, and England appears not to have entered into all the views of Prussia in this respect. In the Prussian army, and especially among its principal generals, there has been formed an association which undertakes to control even the policy of their sovereign. They denominate themselves the *Friends of virtue*, and this virtue is understood to consist of every measure that can contribute to the debasement, humilia-

tion, and spoliation of France. They are connected with a herd of speculative and political fanatics dispersed all over Germany, and their project has been to distribute between Austria, Prussia, and the kingdom of the Netherlands, all the northern provinces of France. They have constantly been encouraged and instigated in this system by all the ministerial prints of this country, while the Cabinet, either to conciliate the Emperor of Russia, or to prepare itself ultimately for the part of an umpire to distribute the spoils, has held up the appearance of opposition to them. The King of France has been kept in a state of entire uncertainty what his allies intend to do with his country, but they have lent him the operation of their armies to secure the election of a legislative assembly of representatives entirely devoted to the royal cause. They are to assemble on the 25th instant, and from the characters of the persons elected the tendency of their measures, it is anticipated, will be to the excess of royalism and the restoration of the ancient absolute government. This is suitable to the views of the allies, because it will rivet the dependence of the French government upon them, and confirm the necessity of maintaining it by the support of foreign armies. The French army has been disbanded and a new one formed, at the head of which generals almost exclusively selected from the old emigrants have been placed. On the whole the only shades of opinion in which there appears to be any difference among the allies appear to be, *how* France is to be most effectually kept in a state of impotence. And there is no reason to doubt that whatever they may finally agree upon will sufficiently insure that result. She can never rise again but through some new and real source of discord between her conquerors. I am etc.

TO JOHN ADAMS

BOSTON HOUSE, EALING, 20 September, 1815.

MY DEAR SIR:

Since I have got settled here in the country, eight miles distant from Hyde Park corner, I can find or make leisure about once a week to write a letter, short or long, to you, to my mother, or to my brother, and to inclose with it to you a weekly newspaper. They will not reach you with equal regularity, for winds and waves will always be capricious. And thus after having received in three months after my arrival here sixteen letters from you, and ten from my mother, I have now been nearly a full month without receiving one either from her or you. There are particularly none since my last letter to you, which was dated the 31st of August. Much of that was on the subject of the fisheries, one of many upon which I am destined to perform here the *vox in eremo*—to complain, to expostulate, to remonstrate without effect, and hitherto without answer. I read over time after time all your letters on this subject, and all their inclosures. The letter of my victorious rival,¹ as you are pleased to call him, is full of the most important information, and what I most sincerely regret to find in it is an argument on the side of our adversaries, certainly as strong and I believe more ingenious than any they will advance of themselves. The newspaper essay signed Richelieu was more congenial to my own sentiments, and I think it perfectly conclusive with regard to the right. You have repeatedly enjoined it upon me never to surrender a tittle of the right. After having been once brought to the test in that respect by the deliberate resolution which I had formed to refuse

¹ James Lloyd. The letter is printed in *Mass. Hist. Soc. Proceedings*, XLV. 380.

my signature to the peace at Ghent, if an article proposed by the British plenipotentiaries, and which involved an admission that the right was annulled, should be persisted in, I do not apprehend that I shall be so lost to the sense of what I owe my country as to subscribe to any such concession hereafter. I hope there is no danger that anything will be abandoned by me. But you are aware that the case now stands thus: that while we assert the right, Great Britain denies it; and that she has already given her practical exposition of her principle by instructions to her naval officers, under which our fishing vessels have been warned to withdraw to sixty miles distance from the coast; and you know that by this measure our countrymen have been entirely deprived of the whole coast fishery for the present year. Now this sweep of sixty miles is an *experiment*. The act of the captain who gave the warning has been disavowed, and I am assured not only that it was unauthorized, but that the instructions given were not even to interrupt our fishermen at all, the present year, but to give them notice that they must not expect the same indulgence the next year. The sixty miles are disclaimed in the most explicit terms, and I have been verbally told that the intended exclusion is to be only to the extent of the territorial jurisdiction—*one marine league from the shore*. Thus you see it is not on the point of impressment alone that our Mother Britain knows how to make a pigmy theory swell into a giant practice. And after our fishermen have, by virtue of instructions not to interrupt them at all, been driven to the distance of sixty miles from the coast, that is, from the fishery altogether, we are left for another year to see how they will be treated under instructions not to permit them to approach within one marine league of the coast.

I have in a conference with one of the British Ministers

of State represented to him the principles and, as far as I was able, the arguments upon which the people and government of the United States claim and assert their rights and liberties to and in fisheries, as they have always been enjoyed, and as they were recognized by the treaties of 1782 and 1783. I shall very shortly repeat in substance the same in writing. In the conversation I adduced several other considerations, subsidiary to the claim of right, with the view to convince this government that its own interest would best be promoted by leaving us in the uninterrupted enjoyment of these rights and liberties. I was listened to with sufficient attention, but evidently without the smallest effect. My report of the conversation has been prepared for the government and will, I trust, be received before the meeting of Congress.

Mr. Lloyd's argument on our side (for he follows Cicero's precept of arguing both sides), that the treaty stipulation in our favor of 1783 was not forfeited by the late war, and could not be forfeited but by an express renunciation on our part, is admirable as far as it goes; but he seems to consider that its validity may depend upon the degree of formality, more or less, with which the British plenipotentiaries gave notice at Ghent that our fishing liberties within the British jurisdiction would not in future be allowed without an equivalent. There was no want of *formality, decision, or determination* in the notice. It was given in the first conference on the 8th of August, immediately after their statement of the points upon which they were authorized to negotiate, and the demands of their government. It was recorded in the protocol of conference of that day, which was published in the United States and which Mr. Lloyd had certainly seen. It was in these words: "that the British government did not intend to grant to the United States gratuitously the

privileges formerly granted by treaty to them, of fishing within the limits of the British sovereignty and of using the shores of the British territories for purposes connected with the fisheries.”

The answer first given by the American plenipotentiaries to this declaration was, that they were not instructed to treat at all upon the subject of the fisheries; but they expressed their willingness to discuss all the points which had been suggested by the British plenipotentiaries, including this.

When afterwards the first projet of the treaty was sent to the British plenipotentiaries by us, it was accompanied by a note, in which was the following paragraph:

In answer to the declaration made by the British plenipotentiaries respecting the fisheries the undersigned referring to what passed in the conference of the 9th August can only state that they are not authorized to bring into discussion any of the rights or liberties which the United States have heretofore enjoyed in relation thereto. From their nature and from the peculiar character of the Treaty of 1783 by which they were recognized no further stipulation has been deemed necessary by the government of the United States to entitle them to the full enjoyment of all of them.

When the British plenipotentiaries came to demand a new stipulation for the right to navigate the Mississippi, we objected to them that by our view of the treaty of 1783 it was unnecessary, and by theirs they were asking a very important privilege for their subjects within our jurisdiction, and *without an equivalent*. Then it was that we proposed to remove all future dispute by an article confirming both the rights, and they in return offered an article stipulating to negotiate after the peace for a renewal of both the rights, for *equivalents*. The object of this was, not *insidiously*, as Mr. Lloyd inferred from my letter of 26th Decem-

ber last to you, that I supposed it, but *avowedly*, to obtain from us an admission that the rights were both annulled by the war. Indeed we were for the space of ten days in expectation that this article would have been made a *sine qua non* for that very purpose of making us renounce the claim which we had so explicitly asserted. And then it was that I had resolved to withhold my signature from the treaty, if the article should be accepted by my colleagues. The article was finally withdrawn by the British plenipotentiaries, with a new reference to their original declaration of the 8th of August. It was therefore fully and unequivocally understood by them that we considered all our fishing liberties within their jurisdiction as in full force, and by us that they considered them as at an end. They have now supported their view of the question by force of arms, and then disavowed the particular act of force, recurring at the same time again to their principle. Mr. Lloyd's letter to you plainly shows, that with regard to the principle, *much may be said on both sides*; but while one side is backed with force, what becomes of the other if it is maintained only by words? Let me say again, my dear Sir, that *Massachusetts* must look to it. The Massachusetts legislature must pass resolutions, declaratory of the right and pledging their constituents to maintain it, and calling upon the government of the Union to maintain it. If they do not; if they will listen to the warning of *sixty miles from the coast* without making their voice be heard about it, or if in the paltry spirit of faction they will sacrifice the rights of their country for the sake of making their loss a subject of reproach against the government of the Union, my belief is that you will have a warning not only of sixty miles, but from the Banks themselves. *Obsta principiis.*

I am etc.

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE

No. 16.

[JAMES MONROE]

LONDON, 30 September, 1815.

SIR:

The quarterly account which I now have the honor to inclose contains two charges among the contingencies which may require some explanation. One of £4 Sterling per week to Mr. Grubb,¹ for services as my secretary, and the other of one guinea per week for office rent. The papers which you will receive written by Mr. Grubb will I trust suffice to show the necessity that I was under of employing some person to give me that assistance, particularly when it is observed that, in addition to all the papers resulting from the correspondence of the ordinary legation, repeated copies have been required of those proceedings from the negotiation of the commercial convention. An office was equally necessary from the multitudes of American citizens and foreigners going to the United States who, in consequence of the regulations respecting aliens, are continually applying to me for passports. Some of these restrictions are now removed, but the demand for passports continues as frequent as before.

Mr. Grubb is a citizen of Virginia and, I believe, personally known to you. As my employment of him will be transient, and only until the arrival of a secretary to the legation, I have promised to recommend him for a more permanent situation on the arrival of the consul and agent for seamen. His assiduity, integrity, and facility in business are such that I wish it were in my power to recommend him

¹ James Grubb.

to better and more profitable service. . . . At the request of Mr. Sumter, I now transmit to you duplicates of a letter from him to Mr. Crawford, together with a note from Mr. Canning to the Regency at Lisbon, and Lord Strangford's valedictory note at Rio Janeiro. The Count de Funchal, the Portuguese *Ambassador*, has at last taken leave at this court, and the Chevalier de Freire a minister of the second order, remains as the only representative here of the Portuguese Prince Regent. The Ambassador and the Envoy have long been here at once, the one accredited by the Regency at Lisbon, and the other by the Regent at Rio. Mr. Sumter has very fully disclosed the real views of the British government and their longings for the recolonization of the Spanish and Portuguese possessions in America. It is here said that they have obtained a cession of the Floridas from Spain, and have stipulated in return to prohibit British subjects from furnishing any supplies to the independents of South America. They must, however, have known that they could not prevent their merchants from furnishing such supplies. But the British Cabinet now presents the rare spectacle of a free government, laboring to rebuild the shattered fabric of social order upon the mouldering ruins of colonial feudal, jesuitical, and papal institutions.

The Austrian chargé d'affaires has addressed a note to me requesting that the government of the United States would take measures to arrest a man by the name of Auguste Annoni, charged with having robbed Count Wallenstein of money and papers. I shall send you copies of this note and of the description of the man's person inclosed in it. I can hardly suppose the Austrian government will expect an answer to the application.

I am etc.

TO THOMAS REILLY

BOSTON HOUSE, EALING, 2 October, 1815.

SIR:

In the month of June, 1812, the crew of the *Monticello*, Captain Salt, were discharged from that ship, which had been seized and confiscated by the Russian government for having entered the port of Cronstadt under false papers, pretended American.

The crew were partly Americans who had shipped in her under the assurance and belief that she was really American and partly of other nations. They wrote to me, and several of them applied to me personally, claiming my intervention to obtain the payment of their wages. I was authorized to interfere only on behalf of those who were Americans. The business was transacted by Mr. Sparrow, the American consular agent at Cronstadt, under the orders of Mr. Harris, the consul of the United States. I was informed by them and by letters from Charles Drew, one of the American seamen of the ship, that a settlement was made with the crew by payment of a part of the wages due them to discharge the expenses which had been incurred for their subsistence during a detention of nearly a year there after the vessel was seized, and while Captain Salt refused to discharge them; and by Captain Salt giving them drafts or orders upon his owners for the rest. This arrangement was acquiesced in to avoid the measure of imprisoning Captain Salt, whose health was bad and who stated that he had no other means of making payment. The wages were due for two voyages. The first from London to Lisbon and Cork, and the second to St. Petersburg. The names of those sailors who applied to me were Charles Drew, Thomas Powell, James Robert-

son, Thomas Wilkson, Adam Forsyth and John English. Besides whom I find among my papers the names of Alexis Maupertuis, J. Minder, J. Morris and J. Francis. *Wilkson* may be the same named in your letter Wilkinson, but I think neither Repets nor Griffin applied to me. If they belonged to the ship, their claim for wages until June, 1812, when they were discharged, was just.

I am etc.

TO MITCHEL KING

EALING, 4th October, 1815.

SIR:

One of my objects in calling at your lodgings was to inquire, whether you had received a definitive answer upon the application for copies of the papers desired for the use of the Literary and Philosophical Society of South Carolina, and to renew the offer of my services when it may be hereafter in my power to render, either for the attainment of that object, or for the projected publication of Dr. Ramsay's posthumous work. You are acquainted with the reasons which induced me to think that the chance of obtaining the papers would be more favorable without than with my intervention, and I have taken the liberty of referring Mr. Elliott ¹ to you for an explanation upon that subject. At the

¹ Stephen Elliott, of Charleston, S. C. "The public offices from which the Society are desirous of obtaining copies of ancient documents are those with which I am occasionally required by my public duties to transact business. Any application at those offices for copies of official papers, even of ancient dates, in which I should participate might be liable to suspicion that the papers might be wanted not for historical purposes alone. I doubt whether such papers would be granted at all. But I was confident that an application through me would be less likely to succeed than through private channels; and independent of the refusal which I was per-

same time I shall not lose sight of the wishes of the Society, and if while I remain here any opportunity shall occur in which I can promote their accomplishment, I shall be happy to take advantage of it. And if Dr. Ramsay's executors should take further measures for obtaining the copyright here of his work, and I can in any manner be of service to him in the design, it will give me the highest satisfaction.

I am etc.

TO WILLIAM PLUMER

EALING near London, 5 October, 1815.

MY DEAR SIR:

Your favor of the 26 July last has been very recently received by me with so much pleasure that I indulge more fresh the hope of hearing frequently from you in future, while I remain in this country. The changes which have taken place both in Europe and America in the course of the last year have indeed been great and extraordinary, but the mine of extraordinary events seems now to be exhausted. The wars of the French Revolution would seem to be just closed. France, after having been twenty years the terror and the oppressor of Europe, has now become the victim of oppression in her turn. As she has treated others, she is now treated herself. In this, whatever may be our opinion of the means or of the instruments on either side, we can at least perceive the distributive justice of providence. There is, indeed, yet one nation upon which the punishment of heaven has not fallen in the same proportion as upon the rest, and that is precisely the nation in the opinion of many

sued it would meet, it was not impossible that the request itself might excite a jealousy which would operate unfavorably upon the public interests with which I am charged." *To Elliott*, October 4, 1815. Ms.

more heavily chargeable with the guilt of all the wretchedness and misery under which the world has been groaning than all the rest. But the whole field is not yet before us. The glory and prosperity which that nation has acquired in war will be brought perhaps to a severer test. The danger is, and it is a danger by no means immaterial to us, that she may soon discover that she cannot exist in peace without ruin; that war is indispensable to maintain her universal monopoly, and that universal monopoly is no less indispensable to support her under the load of her debt.

It is not easy to foresee what will be the next turn in the course of European policy. The fear of France can henceforth no longer operate as a center of union to all the rest of Europe. There is no common interest which can still combine them in the league by which they have been these two years associated. Differences of interest, as well as of opinion, have already arisen among them, and will in all probability before long widen to a total separation. Whether they will long remain at peace among themselves it is for time to discover.

It can also scarcely be foreseen how far the affairs of Europe will in future influence the policy of our own country. From the period when the British government undertook to restore what was called the rule of the war of 1756, until the ratification of the treaty of Ghent, our political parties have found objects of contention in the state of our foreign relations. The system pursued by the government of the United States, though supported by the sentiments of the great majority of the people, has been opposed by a small but powerful party throughout the Union, and by a much larger one in New England, constituting occasionally the majority in the state legislatures, and combining with a shallow and short-sighted project for dissolving the Union, to which

many unfortunate events have given a portentous importance. This project, I am apprehensive, will survive the agitations occasioned by the war; but I hope it will ever terminate with as little credit and success as it did in the Hartford Convention. I earnestly wish and fondly hope that we may be indulged with some years of peace, and that during this interval we shall seek and devise remedies for the evils which we have experienced in the late war. Shall we for example be radically and forever cured of the reliance upon embargoes, non-intercourse, and restrictions, as weapons either defensive or offensive against Great Britain? I would fain hope that we shall, though I am not without my fears that the event has left that question unsettled. Shall we perceive that our only effectual defence is a naval force? This appears to me to have been so clearly demonstrated that I scarcely know how it can be hereafter questioned. And yet, who will assure me that at the end of seven years another war will not break out upon us, and find us as unprepared as the last? Shall we organize a system of finance which will not bring us in two years into the jaws of bankruptcy? What our resources would have been had the war continued during the present year, I can scarcely imagine. In two years of war we had been perfectly brought to our wits end, and that with the example of this country before us, which for twenty years successively has raised almost without an effort whatever sums she wanted, and among all the evils of war has never for a moment suffered the want of a shilling or of fifty millions to carry it on. When I expressed the hope that we may be favored with several years of peace, it was because I think it may be expected from the general aspect of affairs. But the surest pledge that we can have of peace will be to be prepared for war. The peace of Ghent did not settle any of the contests for which the war

had been waged, because the peace in Europe had removed the causes of the contest. Nothing was yielded on either side; it was a drawn game. But the war had opened other sources of contention which the peace has not closed. The general peace now taking place, if it continues any length of time, will open others. The British spirit of commercial monopoly will be as ardent and rapacious in time of peace as it has been in the time of war. Now is the moment when the rivalry of commerce and navigation will display itself to the utmost extent. They have already formally assumed the principle of excluding us totally from all their West India possessions, and even from their provinces in North America. They have also excluded us altogether from the coast fisheries for the present year, and they have instigated the Indians, northern and southern, to war against us. We have brought the Algerines to terms of peace at the mouth of our cannon; but if we expect to enjoy unmolested any portion of the valuable trade of the Mediterranean, we must not rely upon the permanency of a peace without the guaranty of a tribute, or without an armed force upon that sea, always ready to protect the right and avenge the wrong. The late war has embittered the animosities of the two nations against each other. It had many of the characters of a civil war. It seemed to be a war not only of nations but of individuals. It consisted not merely of battles won and lost, but every incident on one side or the other wounded the pride and mortified the feelings of the nation. Our naval victories sting the British nation to the quick, while the ineffable disgrace of our military discomfitures in Canada, and the shameful disaster at Washington, still grate upon every national fibre that we possess. With all those combustible materials we shall be favored in full measure by heaven, if we succeed in preserving peace for a series of years;

and I should consider it as a case altogether desperate, if I did not flatter myself that we shall be convinced of the expediency of maintaining an adequate naval force to baffle every pretence of blockading the whole American coast. I learn with great satisfaction the progress which you have made in your historical work, and the extensiveness of the plan upon which you intend to pursue it. Several other publications on the same subject are intended in different parts of the United States, and I understand the late Dr. Ramsay of Charleston, South Carolina, had completed a history of America, which will be shortly published in two octavo volumes by his executors.

I have seen one number of Mr. Tudor's *North American Review*, and Mr. Spafford ¹ of Albany has sent me the first and second numbers of the *American Magazine* conducted by him. There are new literary and philosophical societies forming in various parts of our country, and there is every possible demonstration of the increased and increasing interest in the pursuits of literature and science taken by the people of the United States. The war I am persuaded has not a little contributed to give this new impulse, and it is one of the benefits which we have derived from it. I lament that since my arrival in this country, my occupations have so absorbed my time as to leave me none for improving the advantages which in that respect it affords.

The situation in Europe is at this time one of almost perfect tranquillity. Since the transportation of Napoleon to the island of St. Helena, one would suppose that all the sources of discord were drained. The tranquillity of France is preserved by the bayonets of near one million of foreigners, and her fate has for the present been probably decided by the conclave of Emperors and Kings, who have been sitting

¹ Horatio Gates Spafford.

these three months at Paris to pronounce upon it. The second dismemberment of France has been accomplished. The Emperors and Kings are returning home, but two or three hundred thousand foreign troops are to remain in France, to keep Louis the Desired steady upon his throne. An insurrection is said to have broken out against Ferdinand the Beloved in Spain, but probably by the help of the Inquisition it will soon be suppressed and social order restored. There is also a proclamation of martial law in Ireland, to put down some refractory peasants who object to paying tithes to the Bulwark of our Holy Religion. But these things are scarcely sufficient to fill the pages of the newspapers. Perhaps something more interesting may soon occur. In the meantime I remain etc.

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE

No. 17.

[JAMES MONROE]

LONDON, 7th October, 1815.

SIR:

The Envoy of Würtemberg ¹ at this court has addressed to me a letter, requesting information concerning a person named Guber,² a native of that country, stated to have settled and died in the state of Virginia. I have the honor to inclose copies of these papers, together with those mentioned in my last from the Austrian chargé d'affaires, and of my answers to both these applications. I likewise transmit a copy of the letter that I have written to Lord Bathurst concerning the slaves taken from Mr. Downman.

¹ Count Beroldingen.

² G. F. Guber.

Mr. Elias Van der Horst, heretofore Consul of the United States at Bristol, has written to inform me that in consideration of his advanced age and the infirm state of health he has determined to decline a reappointment to that office. Mr. Robert W. Fox, formerly Consul at Falmouth, informs me that he has been appointed as consul at that port and its dependencies, and that agreeably to directions from the United States he has appointed his nephew, Thomas Were Fox, to be consular agent at Plymouth.

I have heard nothing yet from Mr. Bagot concerning the period of his departure, but it is stated that the *Niger* frigate has been ordered to be fitted up to take him and his family to the United States. Perhaps his final instructions may not be made up until after the return of Lord Castlereagh from Paris. This cannot be much longer delayed, as the treaty which settles for the present the fate of France has been completed, and the allied sovereigns have all left Paris. That this treaty is equally burdensome and humiliating to France is universally understood. The meeting of the legislative assemblies has been protracted from the 25 of last month to this day. It appears that a new embassy from this country to China is in contemplation. You have doubtless been made fully acquainted with the displeasure given to the Chinese government by the outrageous proceedings of some of the British ships of war against American vessels within that jurisdiction.

The newspapers state that very recent instructions have been sent to Lord Exmouth, to remain in the Mediterranean until entire tranquillity shall be established in that quarter, and then to return leaving the command with Admiral Penrose. A packet from Malta just arrived left Admiral Penrose in the *Queen*, and also the American squadron about the middle of September at Messina. I have heretofore in-

timated to you certain indications of the turn which the political opinions of the party in opposition to the ministry are taking in regard to the relations between this country and America. In the numbers of the *Morning Chronicle* which I send with this letter there is an elaborate discussion of the commercial convention lately concluded, with an attempt to prove that it is in every part disadvantageous to Great Britain and favorable to the United States. It not only censures the two articles which are in the treaty, but arguing upon an erroneous statement that it contains another article excluding the British from all trade with the Indians within the jurisdiction of the United States, it comments with much severity upon that. I am persuaded that the same sentiments on the subject of this convention will be maintained by the opposition party at the next session of Parliament. Their motives cannot be mistaken. For notwithstanding their own policy towards America has generally been more liberal than that of the present ministers, they would upon party principle be glad to see the ministers embroiled in a new quarrel with America, and at the same time they wish to recommend themselves to that feeling of antipathy against the Americans which prevails throughout this nation, and which their dissatisfaction, both with the conduct and the termination of the late war, has greatly aggravated. Their exclusion from the Indian trade, though not formally stipulated in the convention, must be admitted by the ministry, because they advanced no pretension to it but by an article for authorizing it, which they could not obtain. The opposition, like the writer in the *Morning Chronicle*, will expatiate upon the immense importance of the fur trade, and I suppose the ministers will defend themselves by opposing to it our exclusion from the coast fisheries. There is on the other hand in the *Morning Chronicle* of

21 September an article respecting the Floridas, certainly not from the same pen as the commentaries upon the convention, but proceeding nevertheless from the same party. No notice of either of them has been taken by the ministerial daily journals, excepting a short article in the *Courier* of last evening; nor of the *exposition* of which I inclose you a copy of the seventh edition, printed in London. You are well aware that silence is one of the expedients of all the party newspapers in this country, and that there may be a strong sensation operating upon the public without any symptom of it appearing in them.

I am etc.

TO EARL BATHURST

25 CHARLES STREET, WESTMINSTER,

7 October, 1815.

MY LORD:

The documents of which I have the honor of inclosing to your Lordship copies have been transmitted to me from the government of the United States, with instructions to apply to that of His Majesty for the restitution of the slaves referred to in them, or for indemnity to their proprietor, Raleigh W. Downman, for the loss of them.

In the cases which I have heretofore presented to the consideration of His Majesty's government, and concerning which I am yet waiting for the honor of an answer, I have deemed it sufficient to state in support of the documents furnished the simple fact of taking and carrying away of the slaves, and the appeal to the plain and explicit stipulation in the treaty of Ghent which has been thereby violated. But in addition to these grounds of claim it cannot escape

your Lordship's discernment that in the present case there are circumstances which entitle it to peculiar regard, independent of the engagement in the treaty—these slaves having been taken and carried away by a British officer, while himself under the special and solemn protection of a flag of truce. The transaction therefore was in the nature of a breach of parole, marked not only with the exceptional characters of depredation upon private property, but with the disregard of that sacred pledge of peace which is tacitly universally understood to be given by the assumption of a flag of truce. To prescribe the restitution of property thus captured, no express stipulation could be necessary. Yet the stipulation of the treaty applies likewise to the present claim in all its force. I am induced to hope it will meet with the immediate attention of His Majesty's government.

I am etc.

TO JOHN ADAMS

BOSTON HOUSE, EALING, 9 October, 1815.

MY DEAR SIR:

Your favors of 27, 28, and 30 August, were all received together. They as well as your preceding letters express so much uneasiness for me, and on my account, that I wish it were in my power to tranquillize your feelings. Aware as I am of the heavy responsibility of my present situation, and diffident as I ought to be of my own fitness for it, I have certainly seen times and gone through emergencies, more painful and more distressing than any of those which now embarrass and perplex me. Now, indeed, *incedo per ignes suppositos cineri doloso*. I am well aware that the most formidable dangers are those that I cannot see. But my vigilance is not asleep, neither has that portion of industry to which

I have been long habituated deserted me. That there is nothing to be obtained here, I am fully convinced. That they now strongly grudge what they have conceded, is likewise evident. The commercial convention as you remark was a "temporary expedient to keep the world along;" and I fear the sentence is too prophetic, that "this tranquillity will be of short duration." I must be content to say, like Hezekiah, "Is it not good, if peace be in my days"? Our country now enjoys the blessing of peace, and although the period may be not far distant when she will again be called to defend her rights by force of arms, there is yet reason to hope that she will enter upon the field under more favorable auspices than she was compelled to do in the late war. So far as human foresight can anticipate, there is no danger of a new war from the causes which produced the last. With a navy reduced to the peace establishment, and with a hundred thousand sailors upon her hands more than she can employ, Britain is not likely to have any occasion very soon for the services of a press-gang for a European war. As little will she need Orders in Council and paper blockades to destroy neutral commerce. But the Canadian boundary, the fur trade, the fisheries, the commercial intercourse with the East and West Indies, the Floridas, and a general commercial competition all over the world, are already producing collisions, which in the temper of the two nations towards each other, it is not to be expected will leave them long at peace. But as the interests for which it will be necessary for us to contend will be almost exclusively those of the northern and eastern sections of the Union, I hope and trust that the government of the United States will take special care, not to get involved in a new war, without being certain of the support and coöperation of those for whom it must be waged. Upon the question concerning the right to the

coast fisheries, the two governments are already at issue. You know that our fishermen have been excluded the present season, and the British government has formally notified to ours their determination to exclude us from them in future. I have, under instructions from the Secretary of State, addressed a letter on the subject to Lord Bathurst, asserting our right and supporting it to the utmost of my power. As yet I have received no answer to it; but from the conversation which I previously had with Lord Bathurst I know that the determination here upon that point is irrevocable. Nothing therefore will remain for us, but to maintain the right as it is contested—by force; but I have purposely written the letter in such a manner as to leave the American government and nation the choice of the time when they may deem it expedient to apply force to the support of their right. The commercial convention contains only two articles of any importance; one mutually abolishing what were called the discriminating duties; and the other stipulating the admission of American commercial vessels at the four principal British settlements in the East Indies. The duration of the convention is to be only four years from the time of the signature; but at this very moment an attempt is making to excite a clamor against the ministers for having assented even to those two articles. You will not be surprised that this attempt proceeds from the opposition, and that the *Morning Chronicle* is the vehicle by which it is made. The loss by the British of the privilege of trading with the Indians within our jurisdiction, and the loss of the fur trade which they foresee as the consequence that must result from it, is another source of heartburning and of discontent which will breed much ill blood here. It has already been the cause of the Indian war which we are now obliged to sustain, and which I hope our government will

see the necessity of terminating in the most effectual manner.

On the subject of our intercourse with the West Indies the British plenipotentiaries, with whom we negotiated the commercial convention, would not even listen to us. From the first moment they declined all discussion about it. The system of universal exclusion was already established, and not one particle from it would they swerve. They extended it likewise in all its rigor to their provinces in North America, and refused to allow us even the privilege of carrying in boats down to the St. Lawrence and to Montreal our own produce, for exportation thence in their ships to Europe. One consequence of this rigor you will find in the newspaper inclosed. The council and assembly of the island of Antigua are deliberating upon the distressed state of the colony, and their joint committee report that it is all owing to this total exclusion of American vessels from the island. Other colonies will undoubtedly suffer in like manner from the same cause. But the sufferings of the colonies are the gain of the West India merchants, whose influence with the government will always overpower that of the planters, and the more certainly, because combining with the jealousies and fears and prejudices always operating against the United States.

Nothing can however be more clear in my mind than our interest and policy to avoid as long as possible a new war with England. How long it will be possible I know not; for the problem is now to be decided whether this country can exist in peace, and if, as is very possible, their government should find that it cannot, the danger is that they will plunge the nation headlong into a war with us, because it is against us only that they will be able to stimulate the national passions to the tone of war. It is a singular symptom that the state of peace has brought a very oppressive burden upon

the farmers and landholders of the country. The price of wheat, and consequently of bread, has fallen within these two years more than one-third. The value of land has fallen at least in the same proportion. Rents are coming down in the same manner, but the taxes are not reduced. The farmers, however, become more and more unable to pay them, and unless something should occur to restore the prices to the level of the former years, the landed and the funded interests of the kingdom will be brought into such a state of opposition against each other, as to threaten the tranquillity of the nation.

On the side of France they have henceforth forward nothing to fear. The elements of civil society in that country are dissolved. For the price of two or three provinces, and of all her important fortresses, the Bourbons are to be saddled upon the remnant of that wretched people, and to be maintained by an army of two or three hundred thousand foreign soldiers, fed upon their vitals. Partial insurrections must inevitably be the consequence of this state of things; but the internal war of interests and passions will render any general and united effort impossible. Every struggle for deliverance will be smothered in blood, and be made the pretext for new spoliations and partitions. France is irretrievably lost, unless she can produce another Joan of Arc. You will have more reason than ever to say that the wars of the Reformation still continue, when you learn the late massacres of the Protestants, under the auspices of the Duke and Duchess of Angoulême. You will have many of the miserable fugitives from that persecution in America, and may they find there a country where St. Bartholomew butcheries are not in honor and in fashion.

Let me hope that in our country religious controversy will not extend beyond the consumption of paper. I think the

first time I ever saw Dr. Morse was in a pulpit at an ordination, addressing a prayer to the *triune God*. It seems he is steady to the faith. As he and the Boston rebel are both members of the corporation, I wish they would agree to hold a forensic dissertation on a commencement day, upon the question which of the two, Athanasius or Socinus, was the greater man. I wrote you some time ago how my belief inclined upon this question. But I have no desire to make converts, because I believe that a sincere Socinian may be saved, and that a very honest and intelligent man may be a Socinian. There is something of this dispute rumbling also here; but the Unitarians are losing ground. They will never, probably, become the prevailing sect of Christians, for the plain reason that when you are going down a steep hill, the nearer you are to the bottom the harder it is to stop.

I will send you Tucker's *Light of Nature* by the first opportunity, but they ask *nine guineas* for the six volumes of Brucker. If you wish to have it at that price, be kind enough to let me know. I have hesitation, because I was not certain that you meant to order it.

I am etc.

TO JONATHAN RUSSELL

BOSTON HOUSE, EALING near London,

10 October, 1815.

MY DEAR SIR:

I ought to begin by apologizing to you for the length of time that I have suffered to elapse since our parting at the door of the Gobelins, where we had seen them so busy weaving the glories of Napoleon, without writing to you. But our visit to the Catacombs cost me a cold and cough which was for some weeks in a fair way of making me a candidate for

permanent admission to them; and the interruptions of the communications between France and Germany from the time of your departure until my own made it impossible to transmit a letter to you.

I waited at Paris until the 10th May for orders from home, and then received a letter from the Secretary of State directing me to come to London, with information that I should find a commission here. I left Paris on the 16th and, meeting some days detention at Havre, only reached London the 25th of May. Here I found my two eldest sons who had just arrived from the United States, and with them an accumulated correspondence from America of nearly a whole year. I also found Messrs. Clay and Gallatin somewhat advanced in the negotiation of a treaty of commerce with this government. They were doubtful whether it would eventually come to anything, and were proposing from day to day to leave London and embark in the *Neptune* which was at Plymouth, with Mr. Bayard on board, too ill to be landed, and whither Mr. Crawford was already gone when I arrived in England. The *Neptune* finally sailed on the 18th June, leaving Messrs. Clay and Gallatin behind, and Todd also, who got the information of her departure as he was stepping into the coach to go and join her at Plymouth. He had lost his passage in her from Havre to Plymouth in the same manner. As to the commercial treaty the Ministers here seemed to proceed reluctantly, and to have consented to a negotiation only to avoid the discourteous alternative of a flat refusal. In the preliminary conferences held before my arrival they had manifested a strong disinclination to treat upon any of the political articles, such as impressment and blockade; they had closed the door against all discussion about trade to their possessions in the West Indies, but they were willing to stipulate for a mutual abolition of discriminat-

ing duties, and they had been more liberal in their professions relative to the East India trade than we found them when we came to sign and seal—at least so they had been understood by Mr. Clay and Mr. Gallatin. For they had agreed to admit us to the trade to their possessions in India direct and indirect without any equivalent. They had, however, said loosely something about expecting some reciprocal accommodation from the United States in another part of the treaty—"for instance *in the fur trade*." But they had named that only as an example, without apparently caring much about it, and they had immediately been told, that if by that they meant the trade with the Indians within our jurisdiction, we were expressly instructed against that, and that the instructions were given not upon commercial but political considerations. The British plenipotentiaries appointed were the Vice President of the Board of Trade, with Mr. Goulburn and Dr. Adams. When we entered formally upon the business with them, we found them less complying than their previous conversation had led my colleagues to expect. All the political articles were at once discarded, for it was foreseen that if an ultimate agreement upon any of them could have been accomplished, it was impossible without a length and latitude of discussion which the time of Messrs. Clay and Gallatin would not allow. With respect to the abolition of discriminating duties we had little difficulty. But upon that point no treaty was necessary. The principle had been offered on our part by an act of Congress passed at the last session. An act of Parliament would have made it the law of both countries as effectually as a treaty. We offered an article respecting our intercourse with the British colonies on the continent of North America, but we found we could not agree upon that point; for they wanted a free and unlimited intercourse by land with our territories, and would

not allow us in return to carry our own produce in our own boats even to Montreal. Thus we split upon that point. It was a miracle that we did not split upon the East India article. For they insisted most pertinaciously upon their equivalent, or rather upon *an* equivalent; for they abandoned completely and formally all pretension to a right of trading with the Indians within our jurisdiction. On our part we resisted all claim to an equivalent for a trade which, we said, carried its own equivalent with it. I was for my own part perfectly willing to leave it as it stood, being fully convinced that they would not prohibit a trade so beneficial and, indeed, so necessary to themselves. They at first refused to agree to the article without the equivalent. We then proposed an article putting us merely on the footing of the most favored nation. But this they refused, because they said they did allow the nations having possessions in India themselves to trade with theirs. We at last put the bargain into their own hands, offering to sign the convention upon the single article about discriminating duties, or to take it with the East India trade for four years. Even in accepting this they shortened the term of four years, by making them run from the time of the signature instead of that of the ratifications. Now the only thing of any value that we obtained by this convention, as I thought, was a formality. I had received a rap on the knuckles from home about the Ghent treaty, for that the American plenipotentiaries had signed their names under those of the British, and for that the King of Great Britain was named before the United States in all the copies of the treaty. So we determined it should not be so again. The alternative was therefore strictly maintained in naming the parties. In our copy the United States were constantly named first, as his Britannic Majesty was in their copy. The signatures were in parallel lines, and those

of each party at the left hand in his own copy. There was some little manœuvring on the other side to avoid all this, but the usage among all the European powers in all their treaties was too universal and too notorious to be contested; and when we stated the necessity of conforming to it, the British plenipotentiaries acquiesced without more objection than barely to show that they yielded even that with reluctance. Two or three commonplace articles about consuls, and universal peace, and the like, were added and the convention in five articles for four years was signed on the 3rd July. But as if it was decreed that the British were never to make a bargain with us but with a formal and avowed determination to break it, Lord Bathurst has sent me an official circular notification that the allies have determined that "*General Napoleon Bonaparte*" shall be kept in custody at the island of St. Helena, and that all foreign vessels are to be excluded from the island while he shall be so kept. In the convention St. Helena had been named as a place where our vessels should be allowed to touch for refreshment. These details respecting the convention are already so tedious that I will not trouble you with my own separate discussions here since it was completed. The negroes, the Indians, and the fisheries are all breeding subjects, and what they may finally breed I shall leave for your conjecture. I sent you nearly a month since a letter from Commodore Decatur, which I concluded was a copy of his circular of 11 July. My first impression of the peace with Algiers was unfavorable. I was something of Sir John Falstaff's mind, "I did not like that *paying back*." The gallant Commodore says nothing of it in his circular, and he has in a great measure reconciled me to his treaty. Last evening I received a letter from Mr. Jackson ¹ at Paris, inclosing a copy of one dated 31 August

¹ Henry Jackson, American chargé d'affaires.

from Mr. Jones, our Consul at Tripoli, to Mr. Cathalan at Marseilles. Bainbridge was then in the Mediterranean in the *Independence*, with upwards of 20 sail under his command, and they have carried it with as high a hand with Tunis and Tripoli as with Algiers. Half the squadron is to remain in the Mediterranean to preserve the good faith of the Barbary powers, which without some such guaranty the total abolition of tribute and presents might be apt to stagger.

They are settling the affairs of France much to the satisfaction of the people here. They say that Louis le Désiré has taken a Russian ministry, but notwithstanding the protection of Alexander, they have dismembered the kingdom of his protégé. Alexander proclaimed principles, but he finished by listening to expedients. The poor *Musée Napoléon*. It was a pitiful robbery in the French to take these baubles, and now it is pitiful robbery in the magnanimous allies to take them in their turn. I speak it with due submission to all the heroic robbers of all parties. It is all a bagatelle, though I dare say the French had rather part with Alsace than with the Apollo, and will disgorge Lorraine more readily than the Laocoön.

I have barely space left to request you to present my kind remembrance to Mr. Lawrence ¹ and to believe me ever your friend, etc.²

¹ John L. Lawrence, secretary of legation at Stockholm.

² Russell's reply is in *Mass. Hist. Soc. Proceedings*, XLIV. 327.

TO JOHN ADAMS ¹

BOSTON HOUSE, EALING, 24 November, 1815.

MY DEAR SIR:

Colonel Aspinwall,² who arrived here a few days since and delivered to me your two kind favors of October 13th, informs me that he had the pleasure of seeing you at that time, and that you were then suffering with an inflammation of the eyes. Nearly at the same time my own eyes, which have long been very weak, were afflicted with so violent an inflammation as to threaten little less than a total extinction of the sight. It has now partially subsided, but has left them still so weak that I am in a great degree yet unable either to read or write without assistance. I am therefore obliged to employ the eyes and hands of my best friend to answer your letter.

Mr. John C. Gray and Mr. Reynolds, who were fellow passengers with Colonel Aspinwall in the *Galen*, have also delivered the letters which you entrusted to them. Since our removal to this distance from the city, and more particularly since I have been so much confined by my indisposition, I have been still more unable to see and to pay proper attention to my countrymen who bring letters of introduction to me from my friends than before.

As to the economical system of our government, which proves so strong a bar to the hospitality of their ministers abroad, I have never been disposed to complain of it when I have known the terms upon which they chose to be served, and have had the option of accepting or declining them; but from the time when I was ordered to repair from Russia

¹ The letter is in the writing of Mrs. Adams.

² Thomas Aspinwall (1786-1876), United States Consul at London, 1815-1853.

to Gothenburg upon the pacific negotiation until this day, I have not enjoyed even that privilege. I am left in uncertainty whether the extraordinary and very heavy expenses forced upon me by the necessary duties of that service will be allowed me, and even whether an outfit upon this present mission will be denied me. Under these circumstances I have been compelled to ask a decision which may relieve me from the embarrassment brought upon me by this extraordinary course of proceeding. I am waiting for an answer to my repeated solicitations upon this subject, and unless the allowances are made to which I consider myself in rigorous justice entitled, I hope at an early period to be replaced in this mission, and to return to my native country the ensuing spring.

Your account of the review of the first division of Massachusetts militia has given me pleasure. I wish for the credit of my beloved country that the Massachusetts militia had shown itself to more advantage at the time, when there was something more to be gone through than the operations of a review. The navy proved itself the friend in need; but the militia, with a commander-in-chief who looked across the Atlantic for the bulwark of our holy religion, hardly made good its title to wear an American uniform.

I will write you again as soon as I shall have the use of my eyes. The boys are all at school, and George studies Greek to your heart's content.

Yours etc.

TO SILVANUS BOURNE

LONDON, 28 November, 1815.

DEAR SIR:

I have recently received your favor of the 10th instant. The annual expense of educating a youth at Harvard University cannot, I think, be estimated at less than three hundred dollars, and with proper economy will not much exceed that sum. The character of the establishment is at this time very high, and the number of the students greater than it has ever been before. The foundations of several new professorships have been recently added to the previous institutions, and several important benefactions have contributed to enlarge the sphere of usefulness of that seminary.

I am not certain that I perfectly understand the object of your request for a list of the authors in various branches of literature to which I might think it would be advisable to your son to give his attention, whether you were desirous of having a list of the books which are studied at the college, or of those which may be used as subsidiary to the exercises of the class. The students at Harvard are now so closely plied with exercises that those of them who enter heartily into the pursuit are sufficiently occupied with the books that are put into their hands, and have not much leisure left for further other voluntary and excursive studies. The choice of authors whom I should recommend to the perusal of a young man would depend very much upon his own turn of mind, upon his taste and inclination. If he be of a studious turn I should say, with the adviser of such a young gentleman in Shakespeare, "study what you most affect." If his taste were my own, I would refer him to the advice of Horace:

Vos exemplaria Graeca
Nocturna versate manu, versate diurna.¹

The classics, Greek and Roman, would absorb so great a portion of his leisure that for the remainder he might freely follow his own inclination in the selection of the writers in the modern languages whom he might choose to place in company with them. For the studies of mathematics, natural and experimental philosophy, metaphysics and polite literature, the best books are the school books. A student in the law school should, indeed, have a broad foundation laid in the principles of moral philosophy. Watts' *Logic* and Locke's *Treatise on the Human Understanding* are class books at Harvard University. After they have been properly mastered I should advise the perusal of all the writings of Plato and of the philosophical treatises of Cicero. His rhetorical writings and all his orations are no less essential to form that combination of reasoning, of persuasion, and of elegant composition, which alone can constitute an accomplished lawyer. I say nothing of the black-letter sages which must fill their places in the head as well as upon the shelves of the practical counsellor and attorney, characters which in our country are usually combined in the same person. The common and the statute law present of themselves a library to the examination and meditation of the student capable of appalling the student heart and of extinguishing the most ardent thirst for science. These, however, are not to be encountered until after the collegiate career is concluded, and are neither necessary nor useful, except to persons destined to the law as a practical profession. The principal writers on the subject of general and national law are Grotius, Puffendorff, Cumberland, Barbeyrac, and Montes-

¹ *De Arte Poetica*.

quieu, Burlamaqui, Vattel, Ward, and Martens. The subject is more comprehensively and more scientifically treated by Wolf than by any of them, but his work has never been translated from the Latin in which it was written, and although perhaps the most valuable of them all to be consulted for the clear and systematic deduction of principles, yet from the abstruse and almost mathematical form which he has adopted, it has been consigned to almost total oblivion; while his plagiary, Vattel, has become in a manner a manual for statesmen and diplomatists. The collections of treaties, ancient and modern, are so numerous and so voluminous that I scarcely know how to distinguish any of them by a special recommendation. The modern collections can alone be of much use for a man of business in any practical line of life. There is one in French by Martens, and two English ones, which go by the names of Jenkinson and Chalmers. They contain only a few treaties to which Great Britain was a party, but they are remarkable by a discourse upon the conduct of Great Britain towards neutral powers, written by the Lord Liverpool, and endeavoring to justify some of the numerous injustices in which the varying policy of the British government has involved this nation in its relations with the rest of the world. A more particular answer to your inquiries might run this letter into a bookseller's catalogue; but there is one book which I would recommend to your son, and which may serve as a substitute for any further detail from me; it is *Tablettes Chronologiques* of Lenglet-Dufresnoy¹ in two volumes. It contains among other things a list of the books necessary for the study of history and in the preliminary discourse, a very precise calculation of the number of days necessary to be devoted to the perusal of them.

¹ Nicolas Lenglet du Fresnoy.

The collection of books recommended by him relates only to history, and if your son in reading it over should be alarmed at the multitude of authors which it brings to view, and in utter consternation in reflecting that these innumerable volumes form but a small part of the writers of a single branch of polite literature, he may perhaps derive from it the useful and consolatory lesson of circumscribing his desires and limiting his ambition even in the pursuit of science. I am etc.

TO WILLIAM EUSTIS

LONDON, 29 November, 1815.

DEAR SIR:

I duly received your obliging favor of the 8th September by Mr. Langdon, a reply to which was at first delayed by the information of your expedition to Bruxelles to attend the inauguration, and afterwards by an inflammation in my eyes which seriously threatened me with the loss of one of them, and from which I am not yet entirely recovered. Nothing, however, of material importance has occurred in the interval. A number of very ridiculous reports are from time to time circulated here to keep up the impression of a speedy renewal of hostilities between the United States and this country; but although the disposition on both sides is nothing else than friendly, and by no means so pacific as I could wish; and although occurrences of an irritating nature have taken place and others may be yet expected, I willingly persuade myself that the prospects of peace between the two countries are more favorable than they were when I wrote you last. Colonel Nicholls' treaty, offensive and defensive, with the Creek Indians has been explicitly, though only

verbally, disavowed. Captain Lock's warning to our coast fishermen not to approach within sixty miles of the shores of the British possessions has also been disavowed, but the determination to deprive us of the coast fishery is asserted in a manner so peremptory that I think no other resource will be left for maintaining our right to it than that to which you say that New England will resort, and is of herself competent. It has been stated not to have been the intention to disturb our fishermen the present year, and excepting in the case of the warning in which the officer so far transcended his authority, as I am assured, they have, I believe, not been interrupted; but we are to beware of the next summer, and hereafter, if we intend to hold our right as valid, we must be prepared to maintain it by force. Early in the course of the summer the British government determined to maintain and to increase their naval armaments on the Canadian lakes. This very significant measure appears to have been understood by our government, who have properly taken the hint and determined upon corresponding armaments on our side. I have no official notice from this quarter that any umbrage has been taken at this course of proceeding, but the ministerial papers have expressed great dissatisfaction with it, and are highly incensed that the Americans should presume to have armed merely because the British had begun to arm before them; since it must be self-evident that the British armaments could be destined to no other purposes than those of defence. I hope nevertheless that we shall be permitted to enjoy a few years of tranquillity, as the state of our finances most particularly requires. The extent of the disorder in which they were unhappily involved is but too fully disclosed by the length of time which has already elapsed since the peace, without affording them the relief which it was expected they would derive from that

event. I dare say you have had from the managers of our money concerns at Amsterdam more than one serious admonition of the heavy pressure upon them there. It is only within these few days that I have been gratified with the information that remittances are making from the Treasury sufficient to cover all the arrears, and to provide for the demands which will accrue at the commencement of the year for the interest of the Louisiana loan, both here and in Holland. The Secretary of the Treasury expresses the fullest confidence that no further arrears will arise, and no further embarrassments be experienced to provide in ample time for the future payments; but I am concerned to see that our six per cent stocks have been very recently sold here for eighty-four per cent, and I have observed in a Boston newspaper of the 13 October, that Treasury bills had been sold there the day before at public auction for eighty-seven and five-eighths. One great cause of the difficulties of the government has been the very improper protracted suspension of specie payments by all the southern banks, an evil of which I am afraid the termination is not yet at hand. Colonel Aspinwall arrived here a few days ago with a commission of consul for the port of London, which will be much more likely to ruin than to make his fortune. I cannot but hope the government will make some other provision for him.

I am etc.

TO WILLIAM SHALER ¹

LONDON, 29 November, 1815.

DEAR SIR:

I have had the pleasure of receiving your favors of 28 July and of 26 September last, the latter of which mentions that you had twice written me before from Algiers. One of those letters, therefore, has not reached me. I feel myself greatly obliged to you for the valuable information in those which I have received, which would both have been earlier answered had I known through what channel a letter could be safely conveyed to you. Your letters have given me a confidence in the permanency of our peace with Algiers, of which the very honorable terms of the treaty which you had concluded had left me somewhat distrustful. I was apprehensive that a treaty expressly founded on the principle of exemption from tribute in every shape would require some sanction more powerful than the mere signature or promise of a Barbary chieftain. The presents stipulated in our former treaty served at least as a guaranty for its continuance, laid in the interest of the other party; and after the formal exclusion of this motive for good faith, it seemed important that some other sanction should be discovered as substitute for it, and this, I thought, could be found only in our energy or in their weakness. From the very particular statement you have given of the force with which in the event of a renewed contest we should have to cope, I strongly flatter myself that the interest of fear will operate as a sanction still more durable for the faithful observance of your treaty, than the interest of cupidity proved to be for that of the compact negotiated by Colonel Humphreys and Mr. Bar-

¹ United States Consul at Algiers.

low. At all events I hope and trust that the great and memorable example given by our transactions in the Mediterranean during the present year will serve as the fundamental law for all our relations with the Barbary powers hereafter.

I have been informed by a letter from Mr. McCall that Commodores Bainbridge and Decatur, with the squadron under their respective commands, have returned to the United States, and that only two frigates and two sloops of war commanded by Captain Shaw, have been left in the Mediterranean. There is reason to apprehend that the dispatch vessel by which you sent the treaty with Algiers to America has been lost. It is stated in the last accounts which we have from the United States, at the latter end of October, that she had passed the Straits of Gibraltar on the 12 July and had not since then been heard of. Whatever rumors you may have heard of or seen in European papers, and whatever the conversation of the consuls at Algiers may be about speculations of the European powers relative to the Barbary states, you may be confidently assured that if anything is ever done resulting from such speculations, it will be in consequence of what the United States have done of the system now first adopted by them, of refusing all further payment of tribute. Should we persevere in this policy and inflexibly maintain it as we ought, I do not despair of witnessing as virtuous an indignation against the oppressions and cruelty of the Barbary pirates, and as earnest and evident a zeal for their abolition in this land of liberty, humanity, and generosity, as we now see operating against the slave trade, and I do not doubt that the same spirit will then be equally eager in urging all other nations to join in the extirpation of this shameful tyranny, and equally ready to arrogate all the merit of exploding it. In this case, as in that of the slave trade, the remarkable feature which will char-

acterize British exertion will be disinterestedness, and if it be discovered that the American commerce can be freely carried on in the Mediterranean without being subject to the tax of tribute to the pirates, a sudden spasm of philanthropy will immediately seize the British bosom for imparting the same benefits to itself, and perhaps even to the traders of other nations. Let us then hold the Bashaws and the Divans, the Beys and the Deys, stubbornly to the execution of their treaties, and let us hear no more of tribute in any shape. But it is sufficient for us to exempt ourselves from these humiliations, and to leave the commerce of Europe to the protection and policy of its own governments. The final treaties of peace between the allies and France were signed on the 20th instant. Europe is once more in profound and universal peace. How long this state of things is destined to continue is not easily to be foreseen. It is a tranquillity reposing altogether upon the establishment in substance of martial law throughout France, and the armies of all Europe are the conservators of the peace.

I am, etc.

TO JOHN THORNTON KIRKLAND

EALING near London, 30 November, 1815.

DEAR SIR:

Mr. W. C. Bond,¹ sometime in the month of September, delivered to me your obliging favor of the 23 of June, immediately after which I accompanied him to Greenwich with the purpose of introducing him to the Astronomer Royal, Mr. Pond.² It happened, however, unfortunately

¹ William Cranch Bond (1789-1859), astronomer.

² John Pond (1767-1836).

that this gentleman when we called at the observatory was not at home. I was obliged to return myself the same evening to my own house, and Mr. Bond remained at Greenwich with the intention of calling on the Astronomer Royal the same evening, or the next morning, to deliver to him your letter and that of Professor Farrar.¹ I have not since that time had the pleasure of seeing or of hearing from Mr. Bond, but I have no doubt but he obtained from Mr. Pond all the information concerning the object of his visit which he could desire. I should have been happy to have given him every other assistance in my power, not only because he came furnished with your recommendation, but because I felt high gratification at the purpose which you have now undertaken of erecting an observatory at Cambridge. If in this, or any other object connected with the venerable institution over which you preside, I can during my residence in this country render you any service whatever, I flatter myself that you will not only freely require it, but that I shall receive every command from you to that effect as a favor. It gave me pleasure to learn that the small parcel of books which I transmitted from St. Petersburg in the year 1810 and presented for the use of the University were duly received. Count John Potocki's dissertation on chronology is little more than an index to a large and important work which he has not yet published. It contains some new and interesting observations, but I am afraid that his professed object of reducing ancient chronology within principles which may include it in the class of the exact sciences must be considered as a desperate undertaking.

I very cordially unite with you in the hope that the peace which has been restored between the land of our nativity and

¹ John Farrar (1779-1853), Hollis professor of mathematics and natural philosophy in Harvard University.

the land of our forefathers may be equally beneficial and lasting.

After an unexpected and violent convulsion, all Europe is once more restored to peace. It is, however, hardly to be expected that this will for any length of time be universal. The controversy between ancient establishments and modern opinions, between prejudice and innovation, is far from being settled. At the present moment the struggle of Europe is to return to the politics and the religion of the 15th century. The divine right of kings is reëstablished in France under the name of legitimacy and under the guaranty of all the monarchies, and all the armies of Europe; and one of its first and most natural effects has been the renewal of a St. Bartholomew massacre of Protestants under the auspices of His Most Christian Majesty's authority. The temporal dominion of the Pope, the tender mercies of the Inquisition, and the meek simplicity of the Jesuits, have been restored for the benefit of social order and are flourishing in all their pristine glory. They are protected by the combinations of sovereigns which has at length triumphed over the revolutionary principle, and by upwards of a million of soldiers, whose bayonets have dictated the political settlement of European affairs which is now denominated the general peace. But the revolutionary principle, though vanquished, is not subdued; all the arrangements of the present time are to be supported by a military force alone. In the laws now given to France all the principles of civil liberty and of national independence are equally trampled under foot. If in these transactions the allies have meted out to France only the same measure which she had dealt to them, if they have only taken an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth, they may, perhaps, have some color for pleading the law of retaliation; but in glutting their vengeance for the wrongs

which they have received, can it be doubted that they are laying up stores of wrath for the day of wrath in revenge for those which they are inflicting? In truth the foundation upon which the present peace of Europe is professedly laid is in its nature weak and treacherous. I cannot persuade myself that it will be durable; but whatever may be its fate, I cherish the hope that our own country will not be involved in the vicissitudes of its fortunes. I learn with the highest satisfaction the flourishing condition of our Alma Mater, and remain with great respect and attachment, dear Sir, etc.

TO ABIGAIL ADAMS

EALING near London, 5 December, 1815.

MY DEAR MOTHER:

The only letters that I have had the pleasure of receiving from you since I wrote you last are those of the 6th and 12th of October, both of which came by the *Galen*. The latest preceding one was dated on the 30th of August, so that I am still waiting for your September letters. Although I have not yet entirely recovered the use of my eyes, and must still write you by the hand of my wife, I have nevertheless perused Mr. Channing's remarks on Dr. Worcester's second letter to him.¹ There is at least this advantage attending upon the evils of controversy, that it sharpens the weapons of the combatants and improves their skill. The third pamphlet of Mr. Channing appears to me much superior to anything that I have read of his before, and although I think that both his logic and his learning upon the subject in discussion are yet susceptible of great improvement, yet I am inclined to believe that the continuance of the contest would

¹ Printed in Boston, 1815.

be the most effectual means of raising him as far above his present publications as this surpasses his letter to Mr. Thacher.¹ The charge brought forward in the review of American Unitarianism against the clergymen styling themselves liberal in Boston and its vicinity, was not simply of not deviating from the doctrines of the Trinity, but of withholding and in some degree dissembling their real opinions upon the subject. Against this charge Mr. Channing was in his first publication indignant perhaps to excess. That there was some foundation for it is not only proved by the indisputable testimony produced in the *Panoplist*, but has long been well known personally to me. Mr. Channing very forcibly and somewhat angrily disclaims the Unitarianism of Mr. Belsham and Dr. Priestley. This I have no doubt he could very honestly do for himself, but certain it is that this very Unitarianism had infected others more than they were ever willing to avow, and more than I believe compatible with any system of real Christianity.

That the Athanasian Trinity is clearly contained in the Scriptures I have not been able to convince my own mind beyond a question; but if I must choose between that and the belief that Christ was a mere man, to be compared with Socrates, and must mutilate the New Testament to suit the critical scruples of Dr. Priestley in order to maintain this creed, I have no hesitation in making my choice. I find in the New Testament Jesus Christ accosted in his own presence by one of His disciples as God without disclaiming the appellation. I see him explicitly declared by at least two other of the Apostles to be God, expressly and repeatedly announced, not only as having existed before the worlds, but as the Creator of the worlds without beginning of days

¹ Letter to S. C. Thacher, on the *Aspersions* in a late Number of the *Panoplist*, on the Ministers of Boston. 1815.

or end of years. I see him named in the great prophecy of Isaiah concerning him the mighty God! and I cannot be entirely satisfied to be told that one of the expressions is merely a figure, that another may be an interpolation, and a third is not perhaps correctly translated; nor yet, as I am told by Mr. Channing, that solitary texts collected here and there may be found in the Bible to support any doctrine whatsoever. The texts are too numerous, they are from parts of the Scriptures too diversified, they are sometimes connected by too strong a chain of argument, and the inferences from them are to my mind too direct and irresistible, to admit of the explanations which the Unitarians sometimes attempt to give them, or of the evasions by which at others they endeavor to escape from them. It is true the Scriptures do not use the term *persons* where they countenance the doctrine of the Trinity, and perhaps it may be difficult, perhaps impossible, to give a definition of the term *person* which shall solve the mystery, or save to human reason the apparent inconsistency of an identity in three and one. But can the Unitarian give a more intelligible definition of the term *one* as applied to the Deity? Is his God infinite? Is he omnipresent? Is he eternal? And if so what precise idea can he form of unity, without bounds or dimensions? For my part the term *one* necessarily implies to me the limits or bounds within which that one is included, and beyond which it is not. How then can number be applicable to the idea of God any more than time or space? It is therefore as difficult for me to conceive that God should be one, as that he should be three, or three in one. How it can be, I know not; but in either hypothesis the idea of God is to me equally incomprehensible. The question, therefore, is not whether the doctrines of the Trinity be incomprehensible, but whether it be contained in the Scriptures. You say that you are an

Unitarian according to the creed of Dr. Clarke, and Mr. Channing intimates the same of himself, and of our liberal Christians in general; now, although I have read the Bible I have not read Dr. Clarke, and therefore will take the substance of his creed as stated by Mr. Channing. He says that "Doctor Clarke believed that the Father alone is the Supreme God, and that Jesus Christ is not the supreme God, but derived his being and all power and honor from the Father, even from an act of the Father's power and will. He maintains that as the Scriptures have not taught us the manner in which the son derived his existence from the Father, it is presumptuous to affirm that the son was created, or that there was a time when he did not exist." Now this creed contains as complete an inconsistency as trinity in unity. How could Jesus Christ derive his being from the Father without being created? And if he existed before all time, how could he *derive* his being at all? According to this creed Jesus Christ might exist before he had his being, and Dr. Clarke escapes from the Trinity, only to plunge himself into a contradiction in terms equally unintelligible.

I hope that if this controversy is to be continued, the discussion will turn more upon the doctrine and run less into personalities. Mr. Channing's great fear seems to be, that the craft is in danger, that the reputation of the liberal clergymen will be impaired, and even that they may perhaps be driven from their pulpits. There is on the Trinitarian side of this contest rather too much acrimony, but in the proposition of a separation of communions between the adherents of the two creeds, I do not perceive the danger to our religious liberties which Mr. Channing and the laymen so vehemently dread, nor the advancement of the views of the church philosophic, which my father intimates in his letter to Dr. Morse. I am rather inclined to expect that our

liberal clergymen, as they choose to style themselves, will find it necessary to be more explicit in the full avowal of their opinions, and for that purpose to be better prepared to give a reason for the faith that is in them. That above all, they will universally shake off the Unitarianism of Socinus and Priestley, and settle their belief concerning the person and character of Jesus Christ on a firmer and more solid basis than the clod of human mortality.

I trust that neither you nor my father will think that I am presuming to offer you anything new in support of Athanasianism. My own opinions on this subject have resulted solely from the impression of the Scriptures upon my own mind; the very little of controversy that I have read relating to it has rather tended to confirm than weaken that impression. In the management of this controversy I have not had occasion to admire the Christian temper of the opponents on either side; if the Trinitarians have always abused of their strength, their adversaries have always been too ready to resort to the artifices of weakness. You will see in the memoirs of the life of Dr. Price ¹ that that worthy man was offended with the affectation with which Dr. Priestley and his sectaries arrogated to themselves exclusively the appellation of Unitarians. There is certainly something disingenuous in it, inasmuch as it implies that the Trinitarians are not Unitarians, and insinuates that they believe in a plurality of gods. There is something of a similar spirit in the epithet of liberal clergymen which our anti-Trinitarians appear disposed to appropriate to themselves. The same misuse of the term orthodoxy must perhaps be charged upon their antagonists.

Why is it not possible that Dr. Morse, and Dr. Worcester, Mr. Channing, and Dr. Kirkland, the laymen, and Dr. Free-

¹ By William Morgan.

man, should hold a conversation together, in which the nature of the Deity and of the person and character of Jesus Christ should be discussed, with as much calmness and good humor as the Stoic, the Academic, and the Epicurean converse upon the nature of the gods in Cicero?

But enough of theological disputes. Our political dissensions, if they are as angry and violent in words as were those of Cicero's time, they are thank Heaven not so sanguinary. It gives me great pleasure to observe that the spirit of party, which during the war had become so virulent and dangerous, has already in so great a degree subsided. In the general character of the elections throughout the country since the peace, there appears to have been little material change; but as the objects of contention which threatened the very existence of the union have passed away, I flatter myself that the spirit of party, however it may continue to feel the necessity of lashing itself into fury, will at least have no attainable objects that can be materially detrimental to our country. . . .

TO ALEXANDER HILL EVERETT

LONDON, 6 December, 1815.

DEAR SIR:

I have been much edified by the philosophical and benevolent reflections which your visit to Bruxelles and the inauguration, or coronation, combined with the field of Waterloo excited in your mind. They appear to me to be far preferable to the poetical inspiration which Mr. Walter Scott found, or at least went to seek, upon the aforesaid field. I have heard and read something before about a week at

Bruxelles, and a famous tree where the hero who was then *bankrupting* a nation's gratitude is said to have remained, though not to have reposed, during a part of the first day's action. The ancient sage philosopher in Hudibras could prove, you know, that the world was made of fighting and of love, and I cannot imagine any means so effectual for promoting your project of perpetual peace as an enactment of an universal law, that the shelter of the tree of Waterloo shall henceforth be exclusively reserved for the Belle Alliance which was sheltered by the tree of Nivelle.

There was nearly a century ago a poor French abbé named St. Pierre who published in three volumes a project for perpetual peace between the powers of Europe, which he sent to Cardinal Fleury, whose dear delight was peace. The Cardinal's answer to him was, "Vous avez oublié, Monsieur, pour article préliminaire de commencer par envoyer une troupe de missionnaires pour disposer le cœur et l'esprit des princes." This little difficulty suggested by the Cardinal still subsists, and if in the pursuit of your plan you should avoid committing the Abbé's error and send your troop of missionaries, there would still be the chance whether they might be all gifted with the power of persuasion sufficient to insure their success; besides the possibility that the missionaries themselves might require a second band of pacific apostles to keep them faithful to their duty. But not to trifle upon so serious a subject: peace on earth and good will to men was proclaimed nearly two thousand years since by one with whose authority no human power is to be compared. It was not only proclaimed, but the means of maintaining it were fully and most explicitly furnished to mankind. This authority is acknowledged and its precepts are recognized as obligatory by all those who exhibited the practical comment upon it in the field of Waterloo. It is most em-

phatically acknowledged by the most Christian personages who are yet commenting on it in the dungeons of the Spanish Inquisition and in the butcheries of Nismes.

With these results of the Holy War for the preservation of social order and religion yet glaring before me I cannot promise you very speedy success in the laudable purpose of eradicating the seeds of discord from the human heart. But if in your disappointment you stand in need of consolation, I recommend to your meditations the theory of the ingenious Mr. Malthus. He, perhaps, may prove to your satisfaction that the real misfortune of Europe is to be overburdened with population, or if he should fail in that, he may at least convince you that the population of Europe is neither more nor less for such fields as that of Waterloo. The number of officers who gloriously fell upon that memorable day made no chasm in the military establishment of the conquerors. The *London Gazette* within ten days afterwards filled up all the vacancies which that day had made in the British army, and Mr. Malthus insists that it is precisely the same with the process of population; that where one mouth is removed, another will immediately be produced to take its place. If this theory be just, you might perhaps find occasion to reconsider the project of perpetual peace, even if it should be practicable; for it would be necessary to take into the account the mass of glory which you would deprive so many heroes of acquiring in exchange for their worthless lives, and also the immense multitudes of little candidates for existence whom you would cruelly debar from the possibility of coming into life. It would be a sort of murder of the innocents that would out-Herod Herod.

I am informed that in this letter there is a mixture of solidity and levity which makes it proper to bring it to a conclusion. I have as yet no answer from the government

to the proposal which I made for an exchange which would give me the benefit of your assistance,¹ but I have intimations from a private source that a different arrangement has been made. I shall regret the circumstance on my own account, though in the present condition of my eyes it will probably be an advantageous one to you. I wrote last week to Mr. Eustis and beg to be remembered kindly to him now, being with the highest regard and esteem, etc.

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE

No. 23.

[JAMES MONROE]

LONDON, 14th December, 1815.

SIR:

Mr. John A. Smith ² arrived here on the 9th instant, with a commission as secretary of the legation of the United States at this court. I had not the pleasure of receiving any dispatches from you by him; but the day after his arrival Messrs. Alexander Glennie, Son and Company sent me a letter from Mr. Pleasanton, dated on the 26th of July last, inclosing the protest of the master of the schooner *Baltimore*, a vessel taken during the late war by the boats of several British men-of-war within the jurisdiction of Spain. Mr. Pleasanton adds an instruction by your order to apply directly to the British government for redress to the sufferers. This will accordingly be done; but I beg leave to observe that during my residence here I have had numerous applications from citizens of the United States for my official interposition to obtain from the British government restitu-

¹ As secretary of legation.

² John Adams Smith.

tion or indemnity for losses or injuries sustained during the late war upon various occasions, and several of them precisely of the same nature as the case of the *Baltimore*, in so far as relates to the violation of the neutral jurisdiction. In one instance, the case of the *William and Mary*, taken last February within the harbor of Cadiz and condemned at Gibraltar, I have applied to the Spanish Ambassador, requesting his authority to the correspondents of the American owners here to enter an appeal from the sentence of the Admiralty Court at Gibraltar. Upon this the Ambassador has written for instructions to his court and is now waiting for their answer. Another case is that of the *Nanina*, Captain Barnard, belonging to the House of John B. Murray and Son of New York, in which I have approved of the entry of an appeal from the sentence of the Admiralty Court at this place. A third case was that of the Brig *Hope*, Obed Chase master, taken at Buenos Ayres. The Spanish Ambassador declined authorizing an appeal in this case, upon the principle that the colony was in a state of insurrection at the time of the capture, and that according to the Spanish laws no foreign vessel would have been admitted at Buenos Ayres or consequently liable to capture there. I have in none of these cases thought it advisable or proper without special instructions from you to make application for satisfaction to the sufferers to this government. The positive and peremptory refusal by the British government at the negotiations of Ghent to make reparation for any of the wrongs committed by their officers during the war, however contrary to the laws of war, had fully convinced me that every diplomatic application for any such reparation would not only be utterly hopeless of success, but rather tend to make the refusal of redress certain in cases when a private application from the individual interested might have some

chance of standing alone, and addressed merely to the sense of equity or of humanity of this government, of being listened to more favorably. The cases of capture by British armed ships of American vessels under the shelter of neutral jurisdiction were very numerous and occurred I believe in every quarter of the globe. I have to request therefore your instructions whether, after making application in the case of the *Baltimore*, it is to be renewed in others of a similar nature upon which the parties interested have already solicited or may hereafter solicit my interference. The inclosed letter for Captain Trenchard¹ of the United States Navy was sent me with a particular request that it might be safely transmitted to him. It is from a person supposing himself to be his relative and desirous of ascertaining the fact.

I have the honor, etc.

TO JONATHAN RUSSELL

EALING near London, 14 December, 1815.

DEAR SIR:

Your favor of the 31st October has been some days received, but the course of my correspondence has been for several weeks obstructed by a severe inflammation of the eyes, from which I am just now recovering. The commercial convention between the United States and this country, signed on the 3rd of July last, has been received in America, where no small impatience has been manifested for its publication. Party spirit appears very anxious to lay hold of it; but when it comes out, it will be found a bone too bare and dry to be gnawed with any sort of satisfaction. The

¹ Edward Trenchard (1784-1824).

occlusion of the island of St. Helena, so cavalierly announced in the face of the stipulation of free access to it, may afford some materials for declamation; but in my own opinion the best answer to it is, that if from nothing you take nothing, there remains as much after the operation as there was before it. Admission at the Cape of Good Hope is also stipulated in the convention and therefore cannot be granted as an equivalent for it. Although I am not inclined to set any more value upon this convention than I was when it was signed, yet it is here represented as containing enormous and most impolitic concessions by the British government to the United States, and what may appear to you a little singular is that these representations come from the quarter of the opposition. There has been for nearly three months a series of papers published in the *Morning Chronicle* written, with very considerable ability and a knowledge of the subject sufficient for an artful and elaborate misrepresentation of facts and an insidious perversion of argument, to prove that this most innocent convention has made many highly important and unwarrantable sacrifices of the British commercial interests to the Americans. These articles serve at least to show the prevailing current of opinions and sentiments in this country towards America. On the ministerial side scarcely any attempt at a defence has been made, and a few occasional paragraphs, which have in a manner [been] forced from the journalists, have been either unblushing denials that any such convention had been made, or untoward assertions in general terms, that it contained no concessions whatsoever. I told you that from the first beginning of the negotiation there was a flat and dry refusal to treat upon the subject of the admission of our vessels to any of their possessions in the West Indies, and I have since seen in the newspapers a letter from Lord Bathurst to the governor of

one of the islands, dated 22nd of May, three days before my arrival in London, and while Mr. Clay and Mr. Gallatin were negotiating, in which the governor was censured for having admitted American vessels, and notified that the navigation laws were to be carried into rigorous execution. As we did not agree upon any article concerning our intercourse with their northern possessions on the American continent, it was also understood that they reckoned upon carrying it all on in the British vessels. This however will depend altogether upon ourselves. If Congress are of my mind, they will try a little the effect of exclusion on our side too.

But the fur trade! the fur trade! Mr. Clay and Mr. Gallatin had been told that as an equivalent for the trade to the East Indies some accommodation would be expected on the part of the United States, such as for instance in the fur trade. Not that the British government took much interest particularly in that, but it was mentioned merely by way of illustration. The refusal on our part was as flat and dry in this case as theirs was about the West India trade. It was said that if by the fur trade it was meant to imply an intercourse with the Indians within our territory, we were expressly prohibited by our instructions from assenting to it, and that this prohibition was founded not upon commercial but upon political considerations. We were not pressed upon this subject, and the refusal was taken apparently with better grace than I should have expected. I am nevertheless convinced that it closed the door against everything in the spirit of accommodation upon the other side, and this is the very point upon which the opposition written in the *Morning Chronicle* casts the bitterest reproaches upon the ministers. I think we shall have more of this matter hereafter, and that whenever we may have an object of any importance upon which we shall expect compliance on their

part, it will be given us to understand that a fair way of obtaining it will be by some reciprocal compliance in the relation to the fur trade.

The lakes of Canada may be considered as having in the late war made their début upon the political scene. They are, if I mistake not, destined at no distant period to perform upon that theatre a still more conspicuous part. Very early in the summer the British government determined to maintain and increase in the midst of peace their naval armaments upon them. It appears that our government thought it necessary to follow the example. It is possible, that if the peace should continue for some years, both parties may become weary of the expense which it will entail upon them, and gradually reduce the force which they now propose to keep up; but should there be an early renewal of hostilities, as a general presentiment on both sides the Atlantic appears to anticipate, those lakes will probably be the theatre of still more desperate conflicts, and, God grant, of as heroic achievements as they have been during the late war.

The affairs of France as you see are settled. The execution of Ney and a second project of an amnesty are the most recent acts of Bourbon legitimacy. Here all is triumph and exultation; opposition itself has nothing to murmur at but the convention with America, and the ruinous cheapness of the necessaries of life. Nay! do not laugh; for the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Lords of the Treasury find this a most serious subject. There is even danger that it may prematurely break down the property tax. If you see Cobbett's *Register* you may be amused with his comments upon it; but I think his alarms are as exaggerated as his remedies are desperate. . . .

TO JOHN ADAMS

BOSTON HOUSE, EALING, 16 December, 1815.

MY DEAR SIR:

Mr. John A. Smith, Secretary to the Legation of the United States at the Court of Great Britain, arrived here last week and delivered to me your favor of 22nd October. I sincerely wish he may find his new situation as agreeable and as profitable to himself as he anticipates.

The construction which the British court put upon the treaties as they relate to the fisheries will be well known to the government of the United States before you will receive this letter. They hold that by the laws of nations war dissolves all obligations of previous treaties between the parties, without exception, although they admit that treaties may and often do contain stipulations irrevocable in their nature, and therefore not to be affected by a subsequent war. The acknowledgment of the independence of the United States contained in the treaties of 1782 and 1783 they consider as one of these irrevocable concessions; but the liberties connected with the fisheries within the British jurisdiction, stipulated in the same treaties in favor of the people of the United States, they view as grants temporary and experimental, entirely cancelled by the war which has intervened between the two countries, and no longer to be conceded without an equivalent, or at least without modifications under which they profess in general terms to be willing to negotiate for their renewal.

I have seen an able and elaborate argument leading to the same conclusion in an American newspaper, the author of which, professing to be an American, considers and labors with no small subtlety, and a great display of black letter

lore, to prove that these liberties are irretrievably extinguished and lost to us forever. His reasoning, like that of many of our lawyers who apply their country court logic to the controversies of nations, is founded almost entirely upon the principles of British common law and the decisions of cases reported from the courts of Westminster Hall. The main hinge of her argument is, that we have forfeited the right, in consequence of our having been ousted of the possession of this incorporeal hereditament during the war. I must do the British government the justice to say that in their view of the subject they have resorted to no such pretence as this: their ground is, that the article in the treaty was abrogated by the mere fact of the war, and if it is in justice not a whit more untenable than that of their Yankee advocate, it is at least more suitable to their character as statesmen ruling the councils of an empire.

But this subject must ultimately be settled either by negotiation, or by force. I have already told you that the maintenance or the recovery of these liberties will depend upon ourselves alone; if we are content to abandon the right, it will certainly be taken from us. If we are firm and inflexible in the assertion of it, we may yet secure it, perhaps without the resort to the *ultima ratio*. From the temper which prevailed in New England during the late war, and for several years preceding it, and which now seems to prevail even in relation to this question, I am strongly apprehensive that it will be a right to be recovered, rather than a right uninterruptedly maintained. New England has yet no consciousness of rights, when they are contested by Great Britain.

I have not been informed when Louis the Desired is to be consecrated with the miraculous oil from the Sainte Ampoule. But in the meantime he is making processions in

honor of the Holy Virgin to the Church of Notre Dame, and his nephew, the pious Duke of Angoulême, is walking bare foot with the monks and instigating the butchery of Protestants in the south of France. Such authority is assuredly not derived from a pigeon. It is much to be regretted that, in the decay of the monastic orders, the practice of turning Les Rois Fainéants into monks has gone out of fashion. The house of Bourbon would of itself people a convent, and be placed in a condition much more suitable to their characters and capacities, than upon the thrones to which they have been nailed by the royal hammersmiths of social order and religion. They have been fixing the fate of Europe again by treaties of peace in the name of the holy and undivided Trinity. They have stripped, and robbed, and plundered France *ad libitum* for about half a year, as they had already done once before, and as she had been doing for a number of years to most of them. In return for the sacrifices of everything that could give strength, credit, and dignity to the nation, they have bound themselves to keep the nation under the blessed yoke of the Bourbons, as fixed and immoveable as 150,000 bayonets at the throats of the French people, and a million more within a whistling distance, can keep them. This arrangement may last six months, but I think not three years. Government, whether founded upon the will of the people, or upon the will of God, never yet had a durable foundation upon the basis of a foreign and hostile soldiery.

To call the puppet show now displayed at Paris a legitimate government, is an insult upon human speech, and an outrage upon the laws of God. It cannot last. France must be conquered again. France must be dismembered and scattered to the winds of heaven—or else, Sampson is bound, his eyes are extinguished, his locks are shorn. But the day

may come when his returning vigor will yet shake the pillars of the temple of Dagon, and if he perish in its fall, will bury with him all the lords of the Philistines, the worshippers of the senseless idols in the ruins.

You assure me that I have neither profits nor laurels to expect, and in sooth my profits here are of the negative kind; but the garden of Boston House is bordered round with laurels, and I hope my boys will yet give you proof that classics and mathematics, as well as a deportment, are assiduously taught at Ealing school. They are now coming home to a vacation for six weeks, and I am happy to assure you that the Yankee boys have done no dishonor to the reputation of their country.

I have got Mr. Abraham Tucker's seven volumes of the *Light of Nature* ready to send you by the first opportunity from London, and I hope they will not make you blind, as they have almost made me. I can get Brucker¹ if you think him worth nine guineas; but for my part I think all the philosophy worth having is to be obtained at a cheaper rate—the philosophy that will never spend a sigh for a laurel, or a wish for profits, beyond the old Boston Town Clerk Cooper's modicum of bread and turnips. I am etc.

TO LORD CASTLEREAGH

The undersigned Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary from the United States of America has had the honor of receiving Lord Castlereagh's note of the 29th ultimo, informing him that a representation has been made by the Lord Mayor of London to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for the Home Department, stating that a

¹ Johann Jakob Brucker, *Historia critica Philosophia*, Leipsig, 1767.

number of American seamen have been found wandering about the streets of London in a most wretched and distressed condition, and that several are now supported in the police establishments and hospitals of the city at a very considerable expense. His Lordship, therefore, requests the undersigned to take measures in order that these seamen may be conveyed to their native country with the least possible delay. The undersigned has the honor to inform Lord Castle-reagh that provision is made by the laws of the United States for the support and reconveyance to their native country of destitute and distressed American seamen in foreign ports, that this provision has been found sufficient for the purposes for which it was intended in other countries, and in ordinary circumstances in this; but that within these few months the number of persons in this condition has been multiplied beyond all former example, and that this increase has been principally occasioned by the measures of the British government; that by far the greatest proportion of distressed American seamen who have made application for relief at the consulate of the United States have consisted of persons discharged from the naval service of Great Britain. Considerable numbers of these had been compelled to enter the British service by the process of impressment, others had been induced to enter it by the encouragement held out to them by the British laws and proclamations. It is confidently presumed by the undersigned that all, or nearly all, those whose wretched situation has been represented by the Lord Mayor of London to His Majesty's government are persons precisely in this predicament. The undersigned is informed that several hundreds of them have already been conveyed to the United States at the expense of the American government, and that about eighty are at the time receiving their daily subsistence from the American

consular office. The undersigned would be deficient in his duty to his country were he to forbear on this occasion to submit to the consideration of His Majesty's government that the burden of supporting these men until they can be restored to their country, and that of conveying them thither, ought in justice to be borne, not by the American, but by the British government; and he will add that there are others whose claim to the equity and humanity of Great Britain are no less deserving of consideration. He refers to seamen not perhaps in absolute distress, but who from their long services, or from wounds received in the British service, are entitled to small pensions. By the existing regulations of the navy the undersigned understands that every such American seaman who returns to his own country is reduced to the necessity of alienating his annuity for the inadequate compensation of two or at most three years purchase. The undersigned flatters himself that the knowledge of these circumstances being thus communicated, His Majesty's government will not hesitate to make provision for the reconveyance to the United States of all the American seamen who have been discharged from the British naval service by the late general paying off of the navy, and for affording the means to pensioners disabled in their service of receiving after their return to the United States during their lives the pensions which have been assigned to them. The undersigned observes that the representations of the Lord Mayor, being in terms very general and containing specifically the name only of one American seaman, he is unable to ascertain the individual Americans represented to be in distress. The means of designating them are doubtless in possession of the British government; but it is probable there may be cases of seamen in a distressed condition who alleged themselves to be Americans, when they are not really such.

Should every person presenting himself at the American consulate as an American seaman be received as such, and conveyed to the United States at their expense, a charge heretofore made, though utterly without foundation, against the American government, of inviting British seamen into the service of the United States might recur with an appearance of plausibility. The undersigned deems it, therefore, proper to express the expectation that when he is required by the British government to provide for the reconveyance to their country of American seamen, the individuals will be pointed out to him in such a manner as to satisfy him of their right to that provision. He is, however, fully persuaded that the measures he has herein suggested will render every other unnecessary, and entirely remove the ground of a complaint upon which the representation of the Lord Mayor was founded. The Undersigned begs Lord Castlereagh to accept, etc.

TO JAMES MADISON

EALING near London, 24 December, 1815.

SIR:

The pamphlet which I do myself the honor of transmitting to you with this letter was some time since sent me by its author with the request that I would forward it to you. This gentleman¹ who resides at Berlin and is librarian to the King of Prussia is by birth a Spaniard. His father was formerly in high diplomatic office as Minister of Spain successively at several European courts. Nearly two years since he wrote me a letter, relating to me some of the particulars of his life, and expressing an earnest wish to remove to the

¹ Alvar-Augustin de Liagno.

United States and settle there for the remainder of his days. His opinions and the course of life which he had adopted were so much at variance with the predominating prejudices and establishments of his country, that he had voluntarily quitted it, and in seeking a condition congenial to his own temper and disposition had somehow or other alighted upon that in which he was then and yet is situated. It was not, however, adapted to give him contentment, and he was anxious to go to America; but it was necessary that he should find some situation which would furnish him the means of subsistence, and although he was a man of letters and of science, I knew of none which would secure to him the comfortable station which he expected to find, particularly as among the multitude of his acquirements he was not master of our language. In my answer to his letter I therefore dissuaded him from his project of going to the United States, and I have not heard from him directly upon that subject again. From the manuscript additions to the copy of the pamphlet which he has addressed to you, and from some intimations in his letter to me which accompanied it, I think it probable that he has not altogether abandoned the design; but in the meantime he has employed his leisure in attacking the writings of an author who has recently acquired great celebrity in France. I have not felt obliged to decline complying with his request of forwarding to you the inclosed copy of his work, but I thought it proper at the same time to mention to you these particulars relating to him that you may be apprised of his situation and purposes in case you should think proper to take any notice of his offering.

I have the honor etc.

TO ABIGAIL ADAMS

BOSTON HOUSE, 27 December, 1815.

MY DEAR MOTHER:

This new political connection will, however, probably not be of long continuance. My Father's opinion that I can do here no good for my country so far coincides with my own, that combining with the terms upon which it has pleased my country to impose upon me the duty of representing her here, it has induced me repeatedly to request to be relieved from the burden which upon those terms will from day to day become more insupportable. If it be possible for me to do any good, the same service may be equally performed by many others to whom it would be more agreeable, and whose circumstances in life may enable them to perform it without injustice to themselves and their families.

As Congress are now in session, I suppose your enigma about the commercial treaty or convention has before this time found a solution. The British government, who were very unwilling to make any commercial treaty at all, appeared to be actuated by the principle when they did consent to treat, of making as little of a treaty as possible. From the anxious expectation which it appears to have excited in the United States there cannot fail to result much disappointment, and not a little derision when it comes to be known. Little however as it is, it has excited some discontent among the commercial monopolists of this country, and has been attacked with as much bitterness, and probably far more ability, for what it contains, as I have no doubt it will be in America for what it omits.

Our naval campaign in the Mediterranean has been per-

haps as splendid as anything that has occurred in our annals since our existence as a nation. It has excited little attention in Europe, because a more extensive scene and more powerful interests have absorbed all the attention of the European nations at the same time; but it has manifested an American influence upon the Barbary powers which, if not much noticed by the people of the Christian nations, will sink deep enough into the memory of the cabinets by which they are governed. While we remain entirely disconnected with the political arrangements of Europe, our affairs and our achievements will be but little noticed by them, and when noticed, we must expect to discover the impression which it produces upon them, not by their approbation, but by their jealousy. Europe, which has already felt us far more than she or we ourselves are aware, is destined yet to feel us perhaps more than she or we expect. It is for us to remember that during the last year of our late war with Great Britain, there was a virtual combination of all Europe with her against us, and although it is to be hoped that the ascendancy which Great Britain has acquired is already waning, and will rapidly decline, we must still be always prepared for self-defence against the aggressions which her interests or her passions may point or excite to effect if possible our ruin. Her language at the present time is pacific, but the situation of her people is so far from being easy or contented, that it is a prevailing sentiment here that a foreign war is indispensably necessary to save the nation from internal convulsions. Their animosities against France have been almost satiated by the condition to which they have reduced her, but their feelings against America are keener, more jealous, more envious, more angry than ever. The government is making the experiment of peace; but peace already ruins the agricultural interest of the country,

and as they must soon find the absolute necessity of making new loans and issuing new floods of Bank paper, it is to be feared that their only expedient for reconciling the people to these measures will be to involve them in a war which will furnish the pretext for resorting to them. I hope, however, that it will at least not arise until I shall have been released from the station of sentinel at this post. . . .

TO RUFUS KING

EALING near London, 29 December, 1815.

MY DEAR SIR:

Very shortly after my arrival in this country I had the pleasure of meeting in London your son, and Mr. Robert Ray delivered to me the letter of introduction which you had given him for me. Mr. Ray's residence in London was only for a few days, and your son has been there so little that I have not had the happiness of meeting either of them so often as I should have desired. Mr. J. A. Smith who arrived here a few days since informs me that he had the pleasure of seeing you just before his departure from New York, and that you were kind enough to express to him the remembrance of that friendly correspondence which formerly subsisted between us so much to my benefit and satisfaction and which I hope accident alone has interrupted. Of your kindness and good offices to me I trust you will believe that I shall never lose the recollection, and although of late years considerable shades of difference between our political opinions upon objects of high concernment to our country have arisen, yet I flatter myself that they have in no respect impaired in the mind of either of us the confidence in the other's integrity or the sentiments of personal friendship.

I now take the liberty of introducing to your acquaintance the bearer of this letter, Mr. Frederic Pursh. He is a naturalized citizen of the United States, author of a flora of North America considered as a very valuable botanical work and is now upon his return to that country with the purpose of pursuing his researches of the same nature in a manner which may be highly useful to the public and in which your aid and encouragement may be essentially serviceable to him. I beg leave to recommend him to them and to assure you at the same time of the high respect with which I am etc.

TO GEORGE JOY

BOSTON HOUSE, 1 January, 1816.

SIR:

Many returns of a happy New Year to you and many thanks for the perusal of the inclosed letters, which I hope you will receive in time for tomorrow's post. I have received last week a letter from Mr. Bourne on the subject of consular compensation. I had received many from him on the same subject before. I have repeatedly stated his case at his request to the government, and have as often recommended a revision of our consular establishment as to convince myself that it is labor in vain. There is weight in the observation of the captain quoted by our friend at the Hague, but what is more important to the point is that both Houses of Congress are precisely of the captain's opinion. Our Yankee countrymen will argue that a man is not a dollar's worth the better for the governor of a state because he can draw down thunder from Heaven. They would be apt shrewdly to suspect him not so good for it. They have no relish for a government of thunderbolts. Jonathan chooses

to live snug and at small cost. He chooses to have no useless servants at great expense, and if now and then any of his men tells him it is impossible to live upon the wages he gives and asks for his discharge, Jonathan gives it, and the next day he finds an hundred solicitors storming his doors to get the place at the same wages that he gave before, aye, and the thunderbolt man as eager as any of the rest. When you talk to Jonathan about the necessity of maintaining his dignity, he laughs, casts a sly look across the waters at Brother John and says, there's dignity enough for both of us. Who is the best served? For Jonathan after all is sometimes vain of his servants and esteems them much, though he pays them little. To be sure all his servants, when they have got their places, tell him that he is a stingy master. Alas! I tell him so myself! but I think he will not believe me, but prove to me that he can be served quite as well by another. To say the truth I do not know that Jonathan ever lost any important service, though he has lost many good servants, by the smallness of his wages. Money is not the only inducement or reward to important service. Men of spirit and of honor serve their country for fame, for glory, for patriotism; and believe me, my dear sir, whatever Jonathan may pay for his servants he is and will be well served. I do not ask you to burn this, though I have more reason than your other correspondent. Adieu!

TO GEORGE JOY

BOSTON HOUSE, 5 January, 1816.

DEAR SIR:

More thanks for the perusal of President Kirkland's letter. No man has a more clear and lucid style than he generally writes with. But I did not understand the first part of his letter until I was told it meant, that federalists when in Europe were good Americans and in America good federalists—*ubicunque* good as Bonaparte was *ubicunque felix*. I am like you waiting for the reasons why the proclamation of the President for equalizing duties was postponed, and to see whether the convention will or will not be ratified. The *Chronicle* indignantly arraigns the Ministry for a superabundance of generosity to America. President K. thinks the anti-Britannic feeling is kept up for mere electioneering purposes. The *Chronicle* and the President are both mistaken. The message is brought to me while I am waiting. There is nothing in it which looks like non-ratification of the Convention, but the Senate are to decide upon it. . . .

TO JOHN ADAMS

BOSTON HOUSE, EALING, 5 January, 1816.

MY DEAR SIR:

I plainly perceive that you are not to be converted, even by the eloquence of Massillon, to the Athanasian creed. But when you recommend to me Carlostad, and Scheffmacher, and Priestley, and Waterland, and Clerk, and Beausobre—Mercy! mercy! what can a blind man do to be saved by unitarianism, if he must read all this to understand

his Bible? I went last Christmas day to Ealing Church, and heard the Reverend Colston Carr, the vicar, *declare and pronounce*, among other things, that whosoever doth not keep the catholic faith whole and undefiled, without doubt *he shall perish everlastingly*. And the catholic faith is THIS: That we worship one God in Trinity, and Trinity in *Unity*, etc.—in short the creed of Saint Athanasius; which, as you know, the eighth article of the English Church says, may be proved by most certain warrants of Holy Scripture. Now I have had many doubts about the Athanasian Creed; but if I read much more controversy about it, I shall finish by faithfully believing it. Mr. Channing says he does not believe, because he cannot comprehend it. Does he comprehend how the omnipotent, omnipresent, omniscient, infinite, eternal spirit, can be the *father* of a mortal man, conceived and born of a *Virgin*? Does he comprehend his own meaning when he speaks of God as the Father, and Christ as the Son? Does he comprehend the possibility according to human reason, of one page in the Bible from the first verse in Genesis to the last verse of the Apocalypse? If he does, I give him joy of his discovery, and wish he would impart it to his fellow Christians. If the Bible is a moral tale, there is no believing in the Trinity. But if it is the rule of faith—

I hope you will not think me in danger of perishing everlastingly, for believing too much, and when you know all, with your aversion to thinking of the Jesuits, you may think I have made a lucky escape, if I do not believe in transubstantiation. During almost the whole period of my late residence in Russia, I had the pleasure of a social and very friendly acquaintance with the Right Reverend Father in God, Thaddeus Brozowsky, then and now Father General of the Jesuits, one of the most respectable, amiable, and venerable men that I have ever known. As I was the medium

of communication between him and his correspondents in the United States, he used frequently to call upon me, and I had often occasion to return his visits. We used to converse upon all sorts of topics, and among the rest upon religion. He occasionally manifested a compassionate wish for my conversion to the true Catholic faith, and one day undertook to give me a demonstration of the real presence in the Eucharist. He said it was ingeniously proved in a copper-plate print which he had seen, representing Jesus Christ sitting between Luther and Calvin, each of them bearing the wafer of the communion. Each of them had also a label issuing from his lips, and, pointing with the finger to the bread, Christ was saying, "This is my body," while Luther said, "This *represents* my body," and Calvin, "This *signifies* my body." At the bottom of the whole was the question, "Which of them speaks the truth?" It was not the worthy Father's fault if I did not consider this demonstration as conclusive as he did. Another day—and it will give you an idea of the simplicity of this good man's heart—we were discussing together the celibacy of the clergy, which he deemed indispensable, that they might be altogether devoted to the service of their Lord and master, and not liable to the avocations of this world's concerns. I did not think it would be generous to remind him of the manner in which the experience of the world had shown that the vows of religious chastity usually resulted, but rather resorted to authority with regard to the principle. I observed to him that not only all the Protestant communities, but the Greek Church also, allowed the clergy to marry. Upon which, after a moment of reflection, he said, "Oui, c'est vrai. Il n'y a que l'église romaine qui soit encore vierge!" Indeed, you must give me some credit for firmness of character, for withstanding the persuasion of such a patriarch as this.

We have, in the newspapers of last evening and this morning, the President's message at the opening of the session of Congress. It gives upon the whole a pleasing view of the state of our public affairs, but not quite so fair an aspect of the finances as were to be wished. Peace, however, will be the most healing of all medicines to them, and the complexion of the message is entirely pacific. The *present intentions* of the British government, I believe, are of a corresponding spirit; but it is an opinion widely circulated here, that peace itself, instead of healing their finances, will prove their inevitable destruction. That nothing but a new war can save them, and that the most convenient and least burdensome war would be with America. The distrust in the continuance of the peace is so universal, and I am beset by so many and so frequent anxious inquiries from some quarters, and mysterious hints from others, that although the official professions have been invariably pacific and friendly, I am sometimes not without uneasiness, lest a want of sufficient vigilance should leave undiscovered a lurking danger, which might break upon us unawares. A war, however, even with America, could not be undertaken without preparations and armaments of which there is not the slightest indication. A war must be preceded by complaints well or ill founded, of which there are indeed some on our part sufficient, perhaps, ultimately to result in hostilities, but which neither require nor would justify them at this time. On their part I have heard of none, nor have I reason to suppose that Mr. Bagot, who is about embarking for America as the British minister, goes with any particular load of grievances. He has been anxiously waiting, as I am gravely assured, upwards of three months for his passage, because men could not be obtained by enlistment to navigate the frigate in which he is to go.

The effect of the peace here which proves so distressing

is the depreciation in the value of grain, and of the other productions of the soil.¹ The natural and inevitable consequence of which has been the inability of the farmers to pay their rents; the fall in the value of all landed estates, a partial defalcation of the revenue, and an aggravated soreness under the burdens of tythes and taxation. There is doubtless much exaggeration in some of the accounts that are published of this state of things; but on all sides it is admitted that the suffering of the agricultural interest is very severe. That peace should be followed by plenty, is of very old experience. But that plenty should operate as a great national calamity, requires a public debt of a thousand millions sterling, and a banking system to be accounted for. At the meeting of Parliament, which is to be on the first of February, the extent of the evil, and the remedies to be provided for it, will be more fully ascertained. Some put their trust in war, and some in famine, to relieve the people from their burdens. Others look for salvation by the flooding of paper from the Bank. That institution has called in so much of its paper that there is now scarcely any advance upon silver and gold. The project of resuming specie payments is to be attempted, and whether it can be accomplished with forty millions of annual interest upon the public debt to be paid, is the problem now about to receive the solution of experience. Whatever the result may be, the lesson may be profitable to us. If a nation can prosper in peace or war with a debt of a thousand millions sterling, it will be useful to us to make ourselves perfect masters of the mode in which such a marvellous paradox is converted into practical truth. If the paper castle be really built upon a rock impregnable and immovable, let us learn the art of building it. If the same course of conduct which leads to inevitable and irre-

¹ This subject is treated in Tooke, *History of Prices*, II. 2.

coverable private ruin is the sure and only path that will conduct a nation to the pinnacle of human greatness and power, let us trace it to its utmost bounds. But if a day of reckoning for extravagance and profusion must come for nations as well as individuals, if the wisdom of ages will ultimately vindicate its own maxims, and if prudence is not to yield forever her place as one of the cardinal virtues to prodigality, then will the catastrophe of paper credit, which cannot now longer be delayed in this country, place before us the whole system of artificial circulation in all its good and all its evil, and while disclosing all the uses of this tremendous machine as an engine of power, teach us at the same time the caution necessary to guard ourselves from the irreparable ruin of its explosion. . . .

TO LORD CASTLEREAGH

The undersigned Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary from the United States of America, in reply to the note which he has had the honor of receiving from Lord Castlereagh of the 5th instant, observes that besides the *reciprocal* liberty of commerce between the territories of the United States and all the British territories in Europe, stipulated in the first article of the commercial convention concluded in July last, there is in the second article of the same convention a provision that “no higher or other duties or *charges* shall be imposed in any of the ports of the United States on British vessels than those payable in the same ports by vessels of the United States, nor in the ports of any of His Britannic Majesty’s territories in Europe on the vessels of the United States than shall be payable in the same ports on British vessels.

It appears to the undersigned that a restriction which permits vessels of the United States to take from the ports of Ireland only one passenger for every five tons register of the vessel, while it allows British vessels to take one passenger for every two tons, does not comply with the engagement for a reciprocal liberty of commerce. It likewise appears to him to subject in its operation the vessels of the United States to higher charges in the ports of Ireland than those imposed in the same ports on British vessels. The undersigned is informed that in the commercial intercourse between the United States and Ireland the greatest proportion of the freight of vessels going to America consists of passengers, and that a limitation of the number of them to one person for every five tons is nearly equivalent to an exclusion of the vessels subject to it, while other vessels are not liable to the same limitation. So that while one of the principal objects of the contracting parties to the commercial convention was to place the vessels of the two nations upon a footing of equal burdens and advantages in the ports of both, this regulation will confine the commerce between Ireland and the United States exclusively to British vessels, unless the restriction be removed, or unless countervailing regulations should be resorted to by the American government. If it be said that the regulation in question does not directly violate the letter of the stipulation to which the undersigned refers, he requests His Lordship to suppose the case that by a regulation of the government of the United States British vessels in the ports of the United States should be permitted to take a lading of only two-fifths of their tonnage of the articles of export from that country, while American vessels should possess exclusively the privilege of shipping cargoes to the full extent of their tonnage. Would not the inevitable effect of such a measure be to subject

British vessels to heavier charges than those imposed upon American vessels? Would it not be more effectual to deprive British vessels of the equality contemplated by the commercial convention than any discrimination of tonnage duties ever established between the vessels of the two countries? Assuredly such a regulation, applied in the ports of this island to the vessels of the United States with respect to the export of manufactured articles which constitute their cargoes, would be tantamount to a prohibition of the American merchant flag in the ports of Great Britain. In the trade with America from Ireland passengers form the principal article of export, and to allow them to be exported only in British vessels is in its result the same as if a prohibitory tonnage duty was laid upon American vessels in the Irish ports. The undersigned indulges the hope that in the execution of that article of the convention, the object of which was to abolish on both sides the discriminating burdens, and to impart on both sides the benefit of equal privileges to the shipping of each nation in ports of the other, both governments will give it a construction corresponding with the liberal and conciliatory spirit in which it was formed—a construction which will give full effect to the mutual intentions of the high contracting parties. It was on this principle that he had the honor of addressing Lord Castlereagh his former note upon the subject, and it is with this sentiment that he now requests His Lordship to accept the renewed assurance of his high consideration.

13 Craven street,¹ 8th January, 1816.

¹ The office of the legation had been removed from No. 25 Charles Street, Westminster, to No. 13 Craven Street, in the Strand, on December 30, 1815. Craven Street is a narrow street next west of Charing Cross railway station, and runs from No. 10 Strand to the Thames Embankment. Franklin lodged in No. 7 (now No. 36) Craven Street, during his residence in London, 1757–1775.

TO ABIGAIL ADAMS

EALING, 9 January, 1816.

MY DEAR MOTHER:

Mr. Bagot, or to speak in the style and after the fashion of this country, the Right Honorable Charles Bagot, was immediately after my arrival in this country appointed by the Prince Regent Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the United States of America. He is a young man, I conjecture about thirty, brother of Lord Bagot, and his lady is a daughter of Mr. Wellesley Pole, the Master of the Mint, and a niece of the Duke of Wellington and the Marquis of Wellesley. . . . As I have received personal civilities from Mr. Bagot, and from his lady's family, I am naturally the more disposed to wish that their residence in America may be made agreeable to them. They have six children, four of whom they leave in England, taking only two with them.

By the arrival of the *Milo* at Liverpool I have received your kind letter of 2 December, inclosing the copy of my father's letter to Dr. Price, of which Mr. Morgan has made such improper use.¹ I am waiting for the letters by Mr. and Mrs. Tarbell. You may well incline to ask Mr. Morgan who was the dupe? Dr. Price was duped by the goodness and simplicity of his heart, by the enthusiasm of his love for liberty, and by his ignorance of the world in which he lived. His ardent zeal in favor of the French Revolution has shed a sort of ridicule upon his reputation, and his opinions upon that and some other subjects have been so completely falsified by events which have happened since his death, that his very name is sinking into oblivion. Indeed the Dissenters in this country have fallen much into contempt since his

¹ *Works of John Adams*, X. 175.

time. Their political and religious doctrines have a tide equally strong running against them; and their conduct, which at one time swelled into seditious insolence, and at another sunk into fawning servility, has thrown them into such discredit, that the church may now, if they please, persecute them with impunity. They attempted here a few weeks since to make a stir about the real persecution under which the Protestants are suffering in the south of France. They held meetings, and passed high sounding resolutions, and opened subscriptions, and sent deputations to his Majesty's ministers, and buzzed about their importance, as busily and intrusively as so many horse-flies in dog-days. His Majesty's ministers put off their deputation with general, insignificant civilities, which they met again, and resolved to give highly satisfactory assurances of support and interference in behalf of French Protestants. His Majesty's ministers then set their daily newspapers to circulate the report that Protestants in France were all Jacobins, and that if they were massacred, and had their churches burnt, their houses pulled down over their heads, it was not for their *religion* but for their *politics*. From that moment Master Bull has had neither compassion nor compunction for the French Protestants. The Dissenters by a rare notion of stupidity and Jesuitism (for there are Jesuits of all denominations) have denied the fact, and vainly attempted to suppress the evidence that proved it; of stupidity for not perceiving that this must ultimately be proved against them, and of Jesuitism for contesting the fact against their better knowledge, because they could produce Protestant invectives against Bonaparte after his fall, and Protestant adulation to Louis 18 after his restoration. The French Protestants, like the English Dissenters, have been throughout the course of the French Revolution generally time-servers.

Like the mongrel brood of Babylonians and Samaritans after the Assyrian captivity, their political worship has been after "the manner of the God of the land." They have feared the Lord and served their graven images. They hated Bonaparte, no doubt, in proportion as they found themselves galled by his yoke, and they had no gratitude for the protection and security which his authority gave them for the free exercise of their religion and the quiet enjoyment of their property. But the Protestants had unquestionably been from the first ardent supporters and exaggerated friends of the revolution. It was indeed natural enough that they should be, for the revolution had redeemed them from a worse than Egyptian thralldom. My father well remembers from personal knowledge what was the condition of the Protestants in France before the revolution, and in what sort of sentiments concerning them and their religion all the Bourbons were educated. The revolution gave them equal religious and political rights with those of the rest of their countrymen. They had been twenty years freely and eagerly purchasing the national property, and among the rest, it appears, had purchased two of the old convents at Nismes, and used them for churches. Yet they joined in the hue and cry against Napoleon after he was down. Yet they fawned upon the Bourbons, when from the shoulders of the enemies of France they were turned off upon them, and licked the dust at the feet of Louis le Désiré. As if tythes, and monks, and barefoot processions, and legends, and relics, and religious bigotry, had not been the darling and only consolations of Louis and his Bourbons in their exile, and would not inevitably bring back religious intolerance with them. Now, this is the foundation upon which the Dissenters here have relied, to deny that the present persecution of the French Protestants has been for

politics. But now comes a letter from the Duke of Wellington, formally announcing that it was for *politics*, and henceforth, instead of whining, and resolving, and subscribing for the French Protestants, the churchmen here, if the coal of the Angoulême fires were extinguished, would lend him a fagot to kindle them again. The Duke of Wellington says, too, that he is convinced the French government have done all in their power to protect the Protestants. This is not so certain. But whether they have or not, is held to be perfectly immaterial. The French Protestants were Jacobins or Bonapartists—nothing more just and proper than that they should be hunted down as wild beasts. At the same time, the ministerial prints are teeming with reproaches upon two of the king's sons for having lately attended at a charity sermon preached in a Methodist chapel, and giving broad hints that the church must be strengthened against the Dissenters.

Since I began this letter yours of 10 March, 1815, has been put into my hands, together with one of 11 March from my father. Letters from him and you can never come out of season, but if Mr. Copeland, who was the bearer of these, had delivered them to me when I saw him last April in Paris, they would have been still more welcome and afforded me at least fresher intelligence. Instead of that they were left in a drawer at the New England Coffee House, where they have just now been discovered and sent to me by the master of that house. I had never known of the origin of the correspondence between Mr. Lloyd and my father, though I have seen in this country the effusion, "half froth and half venom," spit abroad against my father by the reptile Randolph in his letter to Lloyd.¹ The letter from Mr. Lloyd to

¹ John Randolph had, in 1814, written an appeal to Lloyd against the Hartford Convention. It is printed in Niles, *Register*, VII. 258.

my father upon the fisheries I had long since received and have derived much information from its contents.

I learnt with much concern the decease of that amiable and excellent woman, Mrs. Waterhouse—a heavy and incomparable loss to the doctor and her daughters. I am very sorry also to hear of the illness and infirm state of health of Mr. Boylston. His brother, Sir Benjamin Hallowell,¹ has a house at Ealing, within a mile of us. His family resided there since we have been here, and we dined with him and his lady at Mr. William Vaughan's² in September. Mr. Vaughan resides with his sisters at East Hill, Wandsworth, about six miles from us. Admiral Hallowell has the command at Cork on the navy peace establishment, and is now there with his lady. Their sister, Mrs. Elmsley, now resides at their house in Ealing, and I propose shortly to call and see her. Our boys are in the midst of their Christmas vacation. . . .

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE

No. 26.

[JAMES MONROE]

LONDON, 9 January, 1816.

SIR:

With my last dispatch I had the honor of inclosing a copy of a note which I had addressed to Lord Castlereagh, concerning a discrimination between vessels of the United States and British vessels in the number of passengers which

¹ Sir Benjamin Hallowell Carew (1760–1834), son of Benjamin Hallowell, a royal Commissioner of the American Board of Customs before the War for Independence. He took the name Carew in 1828.

² William Vaughan (1752–1850), son of Samuel and Sarah (Hallowell) Vaughan.

they are permitted to take in the ports of Ireland for conveyance to America. I now inclose copies of his Lordship's answer and of my reply.

I have not yet addressed to him an official note upon the subject of the *Baltimore*, taken within the Spanish jurisdiction at St. Andrew, because the only evidence of the fact contained in the papers is the protest of the master and mate of the vessel. This protest states that there was at the time of the capture a Spanish pilot on board. The owner's nephew, Mr. Karthaws, has been here, and I have advised him of the necessity of obtaining the testimony of the pilot, or of other impartial witnesses at St. Andrew. For otherwise, as soon as my note shall be presented to this government, they will refer it to the captain of the ship which took the *Baltimore*, and will consider his report as a satisfactory answer to the claim. I have formerly mentioned to you another and a similar case, that of the *William and Mary*, captured last February at Cadiz, sent to Gibraltar, and there condemned by the Vice Admiralty Court. The violation of the Spanish jurisdiction was in that case established upon indisputable evidence. It was reported to the Spanish government by the Governor of Cadiz himself, who made a fruitless demand for the restitution of the captured vessel by the Court at Gibraltar. Messrs. Dickason and Nevell, the agents of the American owners here, had applied to Count Fernan Nuñez, the Spanish Ambassador, for authority to enter an appeal of territory before the Admiralty Court of Appeal, which he had declined to do without orders from his court. On October last I wrote to the Ambassador, stating the circumstances of the case and requesting him to apply to his government for instructions to authorize the appeal. He readily complied, and on the 14th of last month wrote me that he had received orders to demand the

restitution of the vessel and cargo or their equivalent. That he had sent in a note to the British government accordingly, and would communicate to me their answer when he should receive it. A few days since he sent me a copy of Lord Castlereagh's answer to his note which was, that as the case was pending in the Admiralty Court of Appeal, the Ambassador was authorized to authorize the agents of the claimants to enter the appeal of territory. The Count informed me that he was ready to give the authority, it being understood that all the expenses of the appeal were to be at the charge of the claimants. I have given notice of this to the agents, and I trust the cause will terminate in the restitution of the property. I mentioned the case in a letter to Mr. Morris ¹ at Madrid, requesting him if he should have the opportunity, to urge an early answer to the Ambassador's demand for instructions. Mr. Morris answers me on the 10th ultimo, that he had in May last made to Mr. Cevallos two applications in this same case, to which he had received in July only a verbal and offensive answer that it was under advisement. It is yet remarkable that even when he wrote to me, he was not informed of the orders which had been transmitted to Count Fernan Nuñez. . . .

TO LORD CASTLEREAGH

The undersigned Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary from the United States of America has received and communicated to the government of the United States the answer of Lord Bathurst to a letter which he had the honor of addressing to His Lordship on the 25th of September last, representing the grounds upon which the Amer-

¹ Anthony Morris.

ican government considers the people of the United States entitled to all the rights and liberties in and connected with the fisheries on the coasts of North America, which had been enjoyed by them previously to the American Revolution, and which by the third article of the treaty of peace of 1783 were recognized by Great Britain as rights and liberties belonging to them. The reply to Lord Bathurst's note has been delayed by circumstances which it is unnecessary to detail. It is for the government of the United States alone to decide upon the proposal of a negotiation upon the subject. That they will at all times be ready to agree upon arrangements which may obviate and prevent the recurrence of those inconveniences stated to have resulted from the exercise by the people of the United States of these rights and liberties, is not to be doubted; but as Lord Bathurst appears to have understood some of the observations in the letters of the undersigned as importing inferences not intended by him, and as some of his Lordship's remarks particularly require a reply, it is presumed that since Lord Castlereagh's return it will with propriety be addressed to him. It had been stated in the letter to Lord Bathurst that the treaty of peace of 1783 between Great Britain and the United States was of a peculiar nature, and bore in that nature a character of permanency not subject, like many of the ordinary contracts between independent nations, to abrogation by a subsequent war between the same parties. His Lordship not only considers this as a position of a novel nature, to which Great Britain cannot accede, but as claiming for the diplomatic relations of the United States with her, a different degree of permanency from that on which her connections with all other states depends. He denies the right of *any one state* to assign to a treaty made with her such a peculiarity of character as to make it in duration an

exception to all other treaties, in order to found on a peculiarity thus assumed an irrevocable title to all indulgences, which (he alleges) has all the features of temporary concessions, and he adds in unqualified terms that "*Great Britain knows of no exception* to the rule that all treaties are *put an end to* by a subsequent war between the parties."

The undersigned explicitly disavows every pretence of claiming for the diplomatic relations between the United States and Great Britain a degree of permanency different from that of the same relation between either of the parties and all other powers. He disclaims all pretence of assigning to any treaty between the two nations any peculiarity not founded in the nature of the treaty itself. But he submits to the candor of his Majesty's government, whether the treaty of 1783 was not from the very nature of its subject-matter, and from the relations previously existing between the parties to it, peculiar? Whether it was a treaty which could have been made between Great Britain and any other nation? And if not, whether the whole scope and objects of the stipulations were not expressly intended to constitute a new and permanent state of diplomatic relations between the two countries, which would not and could not be annulled by the mere fact of a subsequent war between them? And he makes this appeal with the more confidence, because another part of Lord Bathurst's note admits treaties often contain recognitions and acknowledgments in nature of perpetual obligations, and because it impliedly admits that the whole treaty of 1783 is of this character, with the exception of the article concerning the navigation of the Mississippi, and a small part of the article concerning the fisheries. The position that "*Great Britain knows no exception* to the rule that all treaties are *put an end to* by a subsequent war between the same parties," appears to the undersigned

not only novel, but unwarranted by any of the received authorities upon the laws of nations, unsanctioned by the practice and usages of sovereign states, suited in its tendency to multiply the incitements to war, and to weaken the ties to peace between independent nations, and not easily reconciled with the admission that treaties, not unusually, contain together with articles of a temporary character, liable to revocation, recognitions and acknowledgments in *nature of perpetual obligation*. A recognition or acknowledgment of title stipulated by convention is as much a part of the treaty as any other article, and if all treaties are abrogated by war, the recognitions and acknowledgments contained in them must necessarily be null and void, as much as any other part of the treaty. If there be no exception to the rule that war puts an end to all treaties between the parties to it, what can be the purpose or meaning of those articles which in almost all treaties of commerce are provided, expressly for the contingency of war, and which during the peace are without operation? On this point the undersigned would refer Lord Castlereagh to the 10th article of the treaty of 1794 between the United States and Great Britain, where it is thus stipulated: "neither the debts due from the individuals of one nation to the individuals of the other, nor shares, nor moneys, which they may have in the public funds or in the public or private banks, *shall ever, in any event of war* or national differences, be sequestered or confiscated." If war puts an end to all treaties, what could the parties to this engagement intend by making it formally an article of the treaty? According to the principle laid down, excluding all exception by Lord Bathurst's note, the moment a war broke out between the two countries this stipulation became a dead letter, and either state might have sequestered or confiscated those specified properties without any violation of

compact between the nations. The undersigned believes there are many exceptions to the rule by which the treaties between nations are mutually considered terminated by the intervention of a war; that these exceptions extend to all engagements contracted with the understanding that they are to operate equally in war and peace, or exclusively during war; to all engagements by which the parties superadd the sanction of a formal compact to principles dictated by the eternal laws of morality and humanity; and finally, to all engagements which, according to the expressions of Lord Bathurst's note, are *in the nature of perpetual obligation*. To the first and second of these classes may be referred the tenth article of the treaty of 1794, and all treaties or articles of treaties stipulating the abolition of the slave trade. The treaty of peace of 1783 belongs to the third. The reasoning of Lord Bathurst's note seems to confine this perpetuity of obligation to *recognitions* and acknowledgments of title, to consider its perpetual nature as resulting from the subject-matter of the contract, and not from the engagements of the contractor. While Great Britain leaves the United States unmolested in the enjoyment of all the advantages, rights, and liberties, stipulated in their behalf in the treaty of 1783, it is immaterial to them whether she founds her conduct upon the mere fact that the United States are in possession of such rights, or whether she is governed by good faith and respect for her own engagements. But if she contested any one of them, it is to her engagements only that the United States can appeal as the rule for settling the question of right. If this appeal be rejected, it ceases to be a discussion of right, and this observation applies as strongly to the recognition of independence and to the boundary line in the treaty of 1783, as to the fisheries. It is truly observed by Lord Bathurst's note, that in that treaty the independence

of the United States was not granted but acknowledged. He adds, that it might have been acknowledged without any treaty, and that the acknowledgment, in whatever mode made, would have been irrevocable. But the independence of the United States was precisely the question upon which a previous war between them and Great Britain had been waged. Other nations might acknowledge their independence without a treaty, because they had no right, or claim of right, to contest it; but this acknowledgment, to be binding upon Great Britain, could have been only by treaty, because it included the dissolution of one social compact between the parties, as well as the formation of another. Peace could exist between the two nations only by the mutual pledge of faith to the new social relations established between them, and hence it was that the stipulations of that treaty were in the nature of perpetual obligation, and not liable to be forfeited by a subsequent war, or by any declaration of the will of either party without the assent of the other. In this view it certainly was supposed by the undersigned that Great Britain considered her *obligation* to hold and treat with the United States as a sovereign and independent power, as derived *only* from the preliminary articles of 1782, as converted into the definitive treaty of 1783. The boundary line could obviously rest upon no other foundation. The boundaries were neither recognitions nor acknowledgments of title. They could have been fixed and settled only by treaty, and it is to the treaty alone that both parties have always referred in all discussions concerning them. Lord Bathurst's note denies that there is in any one of the articles of the treaty of Ghent any express or implied reference to the treaty of 1783 as still in force. It says that by the stipulation for a mutual restoration of territory, each party necessarily "reverted to their boundaries as before the war, without reference to the

title by which their possessions were acquired, or to the mode in which their boundaries had been previously fixed."

There are four several articles of the treaty of Ghent, in every one of which the treaty of 1783 is not only named, but its stipulations form the basis of the new engagements between the parties for carrying its provisions into execution. These articles are the 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th. The undersigned refers particularly to the fourth article, where the boundaries described are not adverted to without reference to the title by which they were acquired, but where the *stipulation* of the treaty of 1783 is expressly assigned as the basis of the claims, both of the United States and of Great Britain, to the islands mentioned in the article. The words with which the article begins are, "*Whereas it was stipulated* by the second article in the treaty of peace of one thousand seven hundred and eighty-three, between his Britannic Majesty and the United States of America, that the boundary of the United States should comprehend all islands, etc." It proceeds to describe the boundaries as there stipulated, then alleges the claim of the United States to certain islands as founded upon one part of the stipulation, and the claim of Great Britain as derived from another part of the stipulation, and agrees upon the appointment of two commissioners to decide to which of the two contracting parties the islands belong, "*in conformity with the true intent of the said* treaty of peace of 1783." The same expressions are repeated in the fifth, sixth and seventh articles, and the undersigned is unable to conceive by what construction of language one of the parties to these articles can allege that at the time when they were signed, the treaty of 1783 was, or could be considered, at an end.

When in the letter of the undersigned to Lord Bathurst the treaty of 1783 was stated to be a compact of a peculiar

character, importing in its own nature a permanence not liable to be annulled by the fact of a subsequent war between the parties, the recognition of the sovereignty of the United States and the boundary line were adduced as illustrations to support the principle. The language of the above mentioned articles in the treaty of Ghent, and the claim brought forward by Great Britain at the negotiation of it for the free navigation of the Mississippi, were alleged as proofs that Great Britain herself so considered it, except with regard to a small part of the single article relative to the fisheries, and the right of Great Britain was denied thus to select one particular stipulation in such a treaty and declare it to have been abrogated by the war. The answer of Lord Bathurst denies that Great Britain has made such a selection, and affirms that the whole treaty of 1783 was annulled by the late war. It admits, however, that the recognition of independence and the boundaries were in the nature of perpetual obligation, and that with the single exception of the liberties in and connected with the fisheries within British jurisdiction on the coasts of North America, the United States are entitled to all the benefits of all the stipulations in their favor contained in the treaty of 1783, although the stipulations themselves are supposed to be annulled. The fishing liberties within British jurisdiction alone are considered as a temporary grant, liable not only to abrogation by war, but as it would seem from the tenor of the argument revocable at the pleasure of Great Britain, whenever she might consider the revocation suitable to her interest. The note affirms "that the liberty to fish within British limits, or to use British territory, is essentially different from the right to independence, in all that can reasonably be supposed to regard its intended duration. That the grant of this liberty has all the aspect of a policy, *temporary* and *ex-*

perimental, depending on the use that might be made of it on the condition of the islands and places where it was to be exercised, and the more general conveniences or inconveniences in a military, naval, or commercial point of view, resulting from the access of an independent nation to such islands and places." The undersigned is induced on this occasion to repeat his Lordship's own words, because on a careful and deliberate review of the article in question he is unable to discover in it a single expression indicating even in the most distant manner a policy temporary and experimental, or having the remotest connection with military, naval, or commercial conveniences or inconveniences to Great Britain. He has not been inattentive to the variation in the terms by which the enjoyment of the fisheries on the main ocean, the common possession of both nations, and the same enjoyment in a small portion of the special jurisdiction of Great Britain, are stipulated in the article and recognized as belonging to the people of the United States. He considers the term *right* as importing an advantage to be enjoyed in a place of common jurisdiction, and the term *liberty* as referring to the same advantage incidentally leading to the borders of a special jurisdiction. But evidently neither of them imports any limitation of time. Both were expressions no less familiar to the understanding than dear to the hearts of both the nations parties to the treaty. The undersigned is persuaded it will be readily admitted that, wherever the English language is the mother tongue, the term *liberty*, far from including in itself either limitation of time or precariousness of tenure, is essentially as permanent as that of *right*, and can with justice be understood only as a modification of the same thing. And as no limitation of time is implied in the term itself, so there is none expressed in any part of the article to which it belongs. The restric-

tion at the close of the article is itself a confirmation of the permanency which the undersigned contends belongs to every part of the article. The intention was that the people of the United States should continue to enjoy all the benefits of the fisheries which they had enjoyed theretofore. And with the exception of drying and curing fish on the island of Newfoundland, all that American subjects should enjoy thereafter among them was the liberty of drying and curing fish on the shores then uninhabited adjoining certain bays, harbors and creeks. But when those shores should become settled, and thereby become private and individual property, it was obvious that the liberty of drying and curing fish upon them must be conciliated with the proprietary rights of the owners of the soil. The same restriction would apply to British fishermen, and it was precisely because no grant of a new right was intended, but merely the continuance of what had been previously enjoyed that the restriction must have been assented to on the part of the United States. But upon the common and equitable rule of construction for treaties, the expression of one restriction implies the exclusion of all others not expressed, and thus the very limitation which looks forward to the time when the unsettled deserts should become inhabited to modify the enjoyment of the same liberty, conformably to the change of circumstances, corroborates the conclusion that the whole purport of the compact was permanent and not temporary, not experimental, but definitive. That the term *right* was used as applicable to what the United States were to enjoy in virtue of a recognized independence, and the word *liberty*, to what they were to enjoy as *concessions* strictly dependent on the treaty itself. The undersigned not only cannot admit, but considers this as a construction altogether unfounded. If the United States would have been entitled *in virtue of a recognized in-*

dependence to enjoy the fisheries to which the word rights is applied, no article upon the subject would have been required in the treaty. Whatever their right might have been, Great Britain would not have felt herself bound, without a specific article to that effect, to acknowledge it as included among the appendages to their independence. Had she not acknowledged it, the United States must have been reduced to the alternative of resigning it, or of maintaining it by force, the result of which must have been *war*, the very state from which the treaty was to redeem the parties. That Great Britain would not have acknowledged these rights as belonging to the United States in virtue of their independence, is evident. For in the cession of Nova Scotia by France to Great Britain in the twelfth article of the treaty of Utrecht, it was expressly stipulated that as a consequence of that cession, French subjects should be thenceforth "excluded from all kind of fishing in the said seas, bays, and other places, on the coasts of Nova Scotia, that is to say, on those which lie towards the east within 30 leagues, beginning from the island commonly called Sable inclusively, and thence stretching along towards the southwest." The same exclusion was repeated with some slight variation in the treaty of peace of 1763, and in the 18th article of the same treaty, Spain explicitly renounced all pretensions to the right of fishing, "in the neighborhood of the island of Newfoundland." It was not, therefore, as a necessary result of their independence that Great Britain recognized the *right* of the people of the United States "to fish on the Banks of Newfoundland, in the gulf of St. Lawrence," and at all other places in the sea where the inhabitants of "both countries used at any time theretofore to fish." She recognized it by a special stipulation as a right which they had theretofore enjoyed as a part of the British nation, and which as an in-

dependent nation they were to continue to enjoy *unmolested*. And it is well known that, so far from considering it as recognized by virtue of her acknowledgment of independence, her objections to admitting it at all formed one of the most prominent difficulties in the negotiation of the peace of 1783. It was not asserted by the undersigned, as Lord Bathurst's note appears to suppose, that either the right or the liberty of the people of the United States in their fisheries was indefeasible. It was maintained that after the recognition of them by Great Britain in the treaty of 1783, neither the right nor the liberty could be forfeited by the United States but by their own consent; that no act or declaration of Great Britain alone could divest the United States of them; and that no exclusion of them from the enjoyment of either could be valid, unless expressly stipulated by themselves, as was done by France in the treaty of Utrecht, and by France and Spain in the peace of 1763.

The undersigned is apprehensive, from the earnestness with which Lord Bathurst's note argues to refute inferences which he disclaims, from the principles asserted in his letters to his Lordship, that he has not expressed her meaning in terms sufficiently clear. He affirmed that previous to the independence of the United States their people, as British subjects, had enjoyed all the rights and liberties in the fisheries which form the subject of the present discussion, and that when the separation of the two parts of the nation was consummated by a mutual compact, the treaty of peace defined the rights and liberties which by the stipulation of both parties the United States in their new character were to enjoy. By the acknowledgment of the independence of the United States Great Britain bound herself to treat them thenceforward as a nation possessed of all the prerogatives and attributes of sovereign power. The people of the United

States were thenceforward neither bound in allegiance to the sovereign of Great Britain, nor entitled to his protection in the enjoyment of any of their rights as his subjects. Their rights and their duties as members of a state were defined and regulated by their own constitutions and forms of government. But there were certain rights and liberties which had been enjoyed by both parts of the nation while subjects of the same sovereign, which it was mutually agreed they should continue to enjoy *unmolested*, and among them were the rights and liberties in these fisheries. The fisheries on the Banks of Newfoundland, as well in the open seas as in the neighboring bays, gulfs, and along the coasts of Nova Scotia and Labrador, were by the dispensations and the laws of nature in substance only different parts of one fishery. Those of the open sea were enjoyed, not as a common and universal right of all nations, since the exclusion from them of France and Spain, in whole or in part, had been expressly stipulated by those nations, and no other nation had in fact participated in them. It was, with some exceptions, an exclusive possession of the British nation, and in the treaty of separation it was agreed that the rights and liberties in them should continue to be enjoyed by that part of the nation which constituted the United States; that it should not be a several, but as between Great Britain and the United States, a common fishery. It was necessary for the enjoyment of this fishery to exercise it in conformity to the habits of the species of game of which it consisted. The places frequented by the fish were those to which the fishermen were obliged to resort, and these occasionally brought them to the borders of the British territorial jurisdiction. It was also necessary for the prosecution of a part of this fishery that the fish, when caught, should be immediately cured and dried, which could only be done on the rocks or shores ad-

joining the places where they were caught. The access to those rocks and shores for these purposes was secured to the people of the United States as incidental and necessary to the enjoyment of the fishery. It was little more than an access to naked rocks and desolate sands; but it was as permanently secured as the right to the fishery itself. No limitation was assigned of time. Provision was made for the proprietary rights which might at a distant and future period arise by the settlement of places then uninhabited, but no other limitation was expressed or indicated by the terms of the treaty, and no other can either from the letter or spirit of the article be inferred. Far then from claiming the general rights and privileges belonging to British subjects within the British dominions, as resulting from the treaty of peace of 1783, while at the same time asserting their exemption from the duties of a British allegiance, the article in question is itself a proof that the people of the United States have renounced all such claims. Could they have pretended generally to the privileges of British subjects, such an article as that relating to the fisheries would have been absurd. There was in the treaty of 1783 no express renunciation of their rights to the protection of a British sovereign. This renunciation they had made by their Declaration of Independence on the Fourth of July, 1776, and it was implied in their acceptance of the counter renunciation of sovereignty in the treaty of 1783. It was precisely because they might have lost their portion of this joint national property, to the acquisition of which they had contributed more than their share, unless a formal article of the treaty should secure it to them, that the article was introduced. By the British municipal laws, which were the laws of both nations, the property of a fishery is not necessarily in the proprietor of the soil where it is situated. The soil

may belong to one individual and the fishery to another. The right to the soil may be exclusive, while the fishery may be free or held in common. And thus, while in the partition of the national possessions in North America stipulated by the treaty of 1783, the jurisdiction over the shores washed by the waters where this fishery was placed was reserved to Great Britain, the fisheries themselves and the accommodations essential to their prosecution were by mutual compact agreed to be continued in common.

In submitting these reflections to the consideration of His Majesty's government the undersigned is duly sensible to the amiable and conciliatory sentiments and dispositions towards the United States manifested at the conclusion of Lord Bathurst's note, which will be met by reciprocal and corresponding sentiments and dispositions on the part of the American government. It will be highly satisfactory to them to be assured that the conduciveness of the object to the national and individual prosperity of the inhabitants of the United States operates with His Majesty's government as a forcible motive to concession; undoubtedly the participation in the liberties to which their right is now maintained is far more important to the interests of the people of the United States, than the exclusive enjoyment can be to the interests of Great Britain. The real, general and ultimate interests of both the nations on this object, he is fully convinced, are the same. The collisions of particular interests which heretofore may have produced altercations between the fishermen of the two nations, and the clandestine introduction of prohibited goods by means of American fishing vessels, may be obviated by arrangements duly concerted between the two governments. That of the United States, he is persuaded, will readily coöperate in any measure to secure those ends, compatible with the enjoyment by the

people of the United States of the liberties to which they consider their title as unimpaired, inasmuch as it has never been renounced by themselves. The undersigned prays Lord Castlereagh to accept the renewed assurance of his high consideration.

13 Craven street, 22 January, 1816.

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE

No. 28.

[JAMES MONROE]

LONDON, 22 January, 1816.

SIR:

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It is to be hoped that the restoration of the ordinary diplomatic relations between the United States and Spain will be followed by a more conciliatory policy on the part of the latter power than she has hitherto pursued. The internal administration of Spain has given so much disgust to the public feeling of Europe, and particularly of this country, that the British Cabinet has in some sort partaken of it. The national sentiment in England is likewise strong in favor of the South Americans, and the prevailing opinion is that their independence would be highly advantageous to the interests of this country. A different and directly opposite sentiment is entertained by the government. Their disposition is decided against the South Americans, but by a political obliquity not without example, it is not so unequivocally in favor of the mother country. In the year 1776, that wise and honest minister, Mr. Turgot, reported to the King of France, that it was for the interest of his kingdom that the insurrection in North America should be suppressed,

because the insurgents, when subdued, would still be such turbulent and mutinous subjects that it would employ all the force of Great Britain to keep them down, and her weakness would make her a peaceable or at least a harmless neighbor. In the month of February, 1778, France concluded a treaty of commerce and an eventual treaty of alliance with the United States, because they were *de facto* independent. In the interval between those two periods France was wavering and temporizing, with one hand seizing American privateers in her ports, and with the other sending supplies of arms and ammunition to America. This is precisely the present situation of Great Britain towards Spain. The Cabinet have many other reasons besides that of Mr. Turgot to secure the good neighborhood of impotence, for wishing that the insurrection should be suppressed:

1. They have a deep rooted inveterate prejudice, fortified by all the painful recollections of their own unfortunate contest against any revolution by which colonies were emancipated and become independent states.
2. They have a forcible *moral* impression, like that of their antipathy to the slave trade, that it is *wrong* to assist or encourage colonies in the attempt to throw off the yoke of their mother country.
3. They dread the influence of example, and always remember how many colonies they themselves still possess.
4. They fear the consequences of South American independence upon the whole system of European colonial policy. Their attachment to this has been amply displayed in their anxious and persevering efforts to draw the Braganza family back to Lisbon, efforts well known to you, and which will probably not be successful.
5. The mystic virtue of legitimacy. It is impossible to write with proper gravity upon this subject, but it has no small operation against the South American independents.
6. And last, but not least, they look with no

propitious eye to the relation which will naturally arise between independent governments on the two American continents. They foresee less direct advantage to themselves from a free commercial intercourse with South America, than indirect injury by its tendency to promote the interests of the United States. Perhaps they think a period may arise, when one of the parties to this struggle will offer exclusive advantages and privileges to them as the price of their assistance. Hitherto they have professed to be neutral, and at one time offered their mediation between the parties. But they have assisted Ferdinand at least with money, without which Morillo's ¹ armament never could have sailed from Cadiz, and they have suffered all sorts of supplies to be sent to the insurgents from Jamaica. For as, notwithstanding their inclinations, they are aware the South Americans may ultimately prove *de facto* independent, they hold themselves ready to take advantage of the proper moment to acknowledge them, if it should occur. This is one of the points upon which the opposition are continually urging the ministry, but hitherto without effect.

Should the United States be involved in a war with Spain, whether by acknowledging the South Americans, or from any other cause, we must take it for granted that all the propensities of the British government will be against us. Those of the nation will be so perhaps in equal degree, for we must not disguise to ourselves that the national feeling against the United States is more strong and more universal than it ever has been. The state of peace, instead of being attended by general prosperity, is found only to have aggravated the burden of taxation which presses upon the country. There is considerable distress weighing chiefly upon the landed interest, although the accounts which you will

¹ Pablo Morillo.

see of it are excessively exaggerated. Enough however is felt to prompt a strong wish for a new war in a great portion of the community, and there is no nation with which a war would be so popular as with America. But I have no hesitation in stating my conviction that the present policy of the ministry towards America is more pacific than that of the nation. They are aware of the responsibility that such a war would bring upon them, and are not at this time prepared to encounter it. Of the cession of Florida I have not lately heard, but I think there is no considerable armed force prepared or preparing to be sent there, either from England or Ireland. The navy, as I have informed you, is reduced to a peace establishment unusually small, and even the ships that are recommissioned cannot be manned without bounties and impressment. There is a Colonel Stapleton, Secretary of the Commissioners of the barrack office, going out in the frigate with Mr. Bagot. He goes to Charleston, South Carolina, as he says, on private business of his own. This is the only symptom I have yet perceived of a large military expedition to Florida. I have the honor to inclose my reply to Lord Bathurst's note concerning the fisheries. It has been delayed by an illness which for several weeks disabled me from writing. I am with great respect, etc.

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE

No. 29.

[JAMES MONROE]

LONDON, 31 January, 1816.

SIR:

In my interview with Lord Castlereagh on the 25th instant we had much conversation, as well upon the topics which have formed the subjects of discussion with this government during his absence, as upon those concerning which I have recently been honored with your instructions. As propositions for a formal negotiation had been made on both sides, I thought it necessary to ascertain whether this government would consider the full power under which I had acted jointly with my late colleagues as yet sufficient for concluding with me any further conventional arrangements. At the time when we signed the commercial convention of 3 July last, we had given notice that the objects upon which we had been instructed to treat under that full power were much more extensive than those upon which we found it then practicable to come to an agreement; but as the British plenipotentiaries informed us that their powers would terminate in the conclusion of that convention, I told them that I should make no further propositions unless by virtue of subsequent instructions from my own government, and in that case should address them in the ordinary channel of the Foreign Department. I now inquired of Lord Castlereagh, whether this government were disposed now to enter upon a further negotiation, and if they were, whether they would expect me to produce a new full power. With regard to the latter point Lord Castlereagh said that if I should declare the government of the United States still

considered the joint power under which I had treated heretofore as in force to authorize me to treat separately, and that the proposals which I should make were by the instructions of my government, he thought it would not be necessary for me to produce a new power. As this answer, however, is not perfectly explicit, and as it requires of me a declaration of what I must rather infer than positively know, I would request as the safest course that a new full power may be transmitted to me.

Lord Castlereagh inquired what were the subjects upon which we should be desirous of treating. I mentioned as the first and most important that which relates to *seamen*, observing the great anxiety which was felt in the United States on this subject, the principal source of the late contest between the two countries, and that from which the greatest danger of future dissensions was to be apprehended, unless some provision should be made during the peace to prevent the recurrence of the same evils whenever a new war may take place. I noticed the new recommendation in the President's message to Congress of the law for confining the navigation of American vessels to American seamen, and the solicitude manifested by the President that it may lead to the total discontinuance of the practice of impressment in our vessels. Lord Castlereagh expressed his satisfaction at what he termed this change of policy on the part of the United States, but far from appearing to think it a motive for Great Britain to stipulate by treaty to forbear the practice of impressment, he intimated the opinion that this measure of the United States, if fairly adopted and properly carried into execution, would rather make any arrangement between the two nations unnecessary. He said that its consequence must be that there would be no British seamen on board of American vessels *to take*, and, if so, the practice of

taking them would cease *of course*. He remarked that as the inconvenience did not exist during the peace, it might be doubted whether it was the most seasonable time for a discussion upon which there was such a different and opposite view in point of principle entertained by the two governments. And although I argued that the time of peace, when there was no immediate interest of either party at stake, and when the feelings on both sides would be cool and composed, might be peculiarly adapted to a mutual effort for closing this fruitful source of dissensions, he was not inclined to that opinion. He intimated that there was still in England a very strong and highly irritable feeling on this subject; that the government *could not* incur the responsibility of concession in relation to it; that it would be expedient to wait until the new policy of the United States for encouraging their own native seamen should fully have been developed, and by its consequences have proved that Great Britain would not need impressment to preserve herself from the loss of her own seamen. He added, nevertheless, that the British government would always be ready to hear proposals on this subject, and to adopt arrangements which might guard against abuses in the exercise of their rights.

As connected with this subject, I spoke to Lord Castlereagh of the notes which I have lately received from him requiring me upon representations made by the Lord Mayor of London and the Mayor of Liverpool to send to the United States a number of distressed American seamen. As the second requisition had been made to me without any reply to the answer which I had given to the first, I concluded that Lord Castlereagh had not seen my answer, and he confirmed me in the correctness of that conjecture. He said my answer must have been received while he was in the country, which had been the cause of his not having seen it. I then men-

tioned to him the substance of its contents, the claim of far the greater portion of the American seamen represented by the Lord Mayor of London to be in so great distress to the consideration of the British government, as having been recently discharged from their service, into which most of them had been impressed, and the propriety of indicating to me by name those whom I should be required to take measures for sending to America. I added that immediately after receiving his note concerning the seamen at Liverpool for whom I was called upon to provide, I had written to the consul of the United States at that port requesting him to ascertain who they were, and what claim they had to relief from the American government. The Mayor of Liverpool had stated their number to be twenty-six. The consul was informed that they would all attend at his office; only nineteen presented themselves, and the consul had no means of compelling the attendance of the others. Of the nineteen only five had any document or proof whatsoever to prove them Americans. He must be aware that if the American consuls were required to provide for and send to the United States every man who should present himself to them as a distressed seaman, and call himself an American, it would open a door to many a British seaman to find his way to America, and would tend to defeat the intentions of the American government, however earnestly intent upon closing it against them by law. There were now great multitudes of British seamen without employment. It was matter of public notoriety that numbers of them had already gone into the service of other countries; the newspapers asserted that many had already found employment in American vessels. I hoped, therefore, that this government would take into consideration the propriety, 1. Of making provision themselves for defraying the expense of maintaining and

of sending to the United States all the destitute American seamen recently discharged from the British naval service. 2. Of enabling those of them who were entitled to small pensions, the reward of long service or of mutilation by wounds, to receive those annuities in America, without compelling them at once to go there and to renounce their claim to this little stipend for the mere amount of two or three years purchase. 3. Of specifying by name the persons whom they consider me or the American consul bound to provide for and send as destitute American seamen to the United States. Lord Castlereagh said that certainly these were very fair subjects of representation, and that he would pay proper attention to them; but he thought the inconveniences which had unavoidably resulted from the reduction of the navy were now nearly done away. Sixty or seventy thousand men had been in the course of two or three months dismissed from the service. It was impossible that such numbers of men of the same occupation should be thus suddenly brought upon the public without becoming for a time more or less burdensome. London and Liverpool being the two principal seaports of this country, an unusual proportion of the discharged seamen had naturally resorted to them. The representation from the Lord Mayor of London referred to foreign seamen of various nations, and the note from Lord Castlereagh which I had received on that occasion was a circular. But as commerce was now in a very flourishing situation, the seamen were gradually finding employment, and as the incumbrance which they have occasioned was merely temporary it has nearly passed over.

I shall give you in my next the sequel of this conference, the result of which has confirmed all the opinions with regard to the policy of this government which I gave you in my last dispatch. There appears to me no prospect that

under the present ministry any constitutional arrangement for renouncing the practice of impressment will be attainable, and you will observe the new argument which Lord Castlereagh derives *against* such a stipulation from the measures recommended by the President for excluding foreign seamen from our service. There is no immediate prospect of any maritime war, nor indeed any remote discernible prospect of such a war with the United States neutral to it. As the occurrence, however, is not impossible, and as the outrage of that practice can never be tolerated by a nation of the strength and resources to which the United States are rising, it cannot too forcibly be urged upon their conviction, that the only means of protecting their seafaring citizens in the enjoyment of their right will consist in the *energy* with which they shall be asserted.

With regard to the other topics embraced in the conference, I can only now state in a summary manner that I think the proposal for mutually disarming on the lakes of Canada which I made conformably to your instructions will not be accepted; that no cession of Florida by Spain to Great Britain has been made; that the British policy is *neutrality* between Spain and the South Americans, and that she considers the non acknowledgment of their independence as essential to this system of neutrality; that the British government adhere to their doctrine respecting the fisheries, but are willing to negotiate, and do not wish to prevent our people from fishing; that they will give no satisfaction for the slaves carried away in violation of the treaty of Ghent, and that they are not pleased at the emigrations from Ireland to the United States. I am etc.

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE

No. 30.

[JAMES MONROE]

LONDON, 8 February, 1816.

SIR:

By way of introduction to the proposals which I was instructed to make to this government, in relation to the naval armaments on the Canadian lakes, I observed to Lord Castlereagh at the conference with him on the 25th ultimo, that next to the subject of seamen and impressment the most dangerous source of disagreement between the two countries arose in Canada. It had occasioned much mutual ill will heretofore and might give rise to great and frequent animosities hereafter, unless guarded against by the vigilance, firmness and decidedly pacific dispositions of the two governments. That there were continual tendencies to bad neighborhood and even to acts of hostility in that quarter proceeding from three distinct causes: the Indians, the temper of the British local authorities, and the British armaments on the lakes. The post of Michillimackinac had been surrendered not immediately after the ratification of the peace, nor until late in the last summer, and some of the British officers in Upper Canada had been so far from entering into the spirit of their government, which had so anxiously provided for securing a peace for the Indians, that they took no small pains to instigate the Indians to a continuance of hostilities against the United States. The detention of the post had also contributed to lead the Indians to expect further aid from Great Britain in the prosecution of war, and the consequences had been that it remained long very doubtful, whether the Indians in that quarter would accept the

peace, the option of which had been secured to them. You had represented these circumstances in a letter to Mr. Baker. I had under your instructions repeated these representations to Lord Liverpool and Lord Bathurst, both of whom had given the strongest assurances that the intentions of this government were sincerely pacific, and that its earnest wish had been that the Indians should agree to the peace. That no detention of Michillimackinac had been authorized by its orders, and no instigation of the Indians against the United States had been warranted by it. The fort was surrendered in July, and as soon as the Indians found they would not be supported by Great Britain in the war they had manifested a readiness for peace, which I believe had been concluded with all or most of the tribes in that direction. Other and more recent incidents had however occurred of an unpleasant nature. A British officer had pursued into the territory of the United States a deserter, had taken him there, and carried him away. The officer himself had afterwards been arrested within the American jurisdiction, tried and, owing to the absence of a principal witness, convicted only of a riot, and moderately fined. An Indian with a party, trespassing on the property of an American citizen at Gross Isle, had been killed in a boat while in the act of levelling his musket at the American, and although this had happened on the American territory the British Commandant at Malden had offered a reward of four hundred dollars for the apprehension of the person who had killed the Indian. An American vessel upon Lake Erie had also been fired upon by a British armed vessel. But the most important circumstance was the increase of the British armaments upon the Canadian lakes since the peace. Such armaments on one side rendered similar and counter armaments on the other indispensable. Both governments would

thus be subjected to heavy, and in time of peace useless expenses, and every additional armament would create new and very dangerous incitements to mutual irritation and acts of hostility. That the American government, anxious above all for the preservation of peace, had authorized me to propose a reduction of the armaments upon the lakes upon both sides. The extent of this reduction the President left at the pleasure of Great Britain, observing that the greater it would be the more it would conform to his preference, and that it would best of all suit the United States if the armaments should be confined to what is necessary for the protection of the revenue. Lord Castlereagh admitted that the proposal was perfectly fair, and assured me that so far as it manifested pacific and amicable dispositions it would meet with the sincerest reciprocal dispositions on the part of this government. He inquired if it was meant to include in this proposition the destruction of the armed vessels already existing there? I answered that it was not so expressed in my instructions. I did not understand them to include that, but if the principle should be acceptable to Great Britain there would be ample time to consult the American government with regard to the details. The immediate agreement which I was directed to propose was that there should be no *new* armament on either side. He replied that as to keeping a number of armed vessels parading about upon the lakes in time of peace, it would be ridiculous and absurd. There could be no motive for it, and everything beyond what should be necessary to guard against smuggling would be calculated only to produce mischief. That he would submit the proposal to the consideration of His Majesty's government, but we were aware that Great Britain was on that point the weaker party. And therefore it was that she had proposed at the negotiation of Ghent that

the whole of the lakes including the shores should belong to one party. In that case there would have been a large and wide natural separation between the two territories, and there would have been no necessity for armaments. He expressed a strong predilection in favor of such broad natural boundaries, and appeared to consider the necessity for Great Britain to keep up considerable naval force on her side of the lakes as resulting from the objections made on the part of the United States to the expedient for preserving the future peace between the two countries by Great Britain upon that occasion. He said that just before the conclusion of the peace Great Britain had been under the necessity of making extraordinary exertions, and to build a number of new vessels upon the lakes to enable her to maintain her footing there. And when I remarked that this was not what had drawn the animadversion of the American government but the new armaments, vessels of war begun and built since the peace, he replied that we had so much the advantage over them there by our position that a mutual stipulation against arming during the peace would be unequal and disadvantageous in its operation to Great Britain. For as the hands of both parties would by such an engagement be tied until war should have commenced, the Americans by their proximity would be able to prepare armaments for attack much sooner than those of the British could be prepared for defence. I urged that, as at all events the state of the armaments during peace on one side must be the measure of those on the other, this advantage of proximity must be nearly the same, whether they are great or small; that the agreements to forbear arming in time of peace would rather diminish than add to it; and that a war could not break out on the part of the United States suddenly, or without such a previous state of the relations between the two na-

tions as would give the British government warning to be prepared for the event, to take such measures as might enable them to arm on the lakes when the war commenced, quite as rapidly and effectually as the United States could do on their side. But although Lord Castlereagh promised to submit the proposal to the Cabinet, his own disinclination to accede to it was so strongly marked that I cannot flatter myself it will be accepted. The utmost that he may be induced to consent to may be an arrangement to limit the force which either party shall keep in actual service upon the lakes. I next observed that at the other extremity of the United States the Indians again appeared in the shape of disturbers of the peace between our countries. I recapitulated your remonstrances to Mr. Baker and mine by your order to Lord Bathurst against the conduct of Colonel Nicholls; that officer's pretended treaties of alliance, offensive and defensive, and of commerce and navigation, with certain runaway Indians whom he had seen fit to style the Creek nation; and the very exceptionable manner in which he had notified his transactions to the agent of the United States with the Creeks, with an intimation that we were to hear more about these treaties when they should be ratified in England. I mentioned that Lord Bathurst had in the most candid and explicit manner *verbally* disavowed to me those proceedings of Colonel Nicholls; had told me that the pretended treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, had been indeed transmitted by the Colonel for ratification, but this government had refused to ratify it, and informed Colonel Nicholls that they would agree to no such treaty; that the Colonel had even brought over some of his Indians here, who would be sent back with advice to make their terms with the United States as they could. These *verbal* assurances I had reported to my government and presumed

they had been received with much satisfaction. Whether they had been repeated in a more formal manner and in any written communication I had not been informed. I had noticed the conduct of Colonel Nicholls in one of my notes to Lord Bathurst, and to that part of the note had received no answer. As the complaint had also been made through Mr. Baker, a written answer might perhaps have been returned through that channel. My motive for referring to the subject now was that by the President's message to Congress at the opening of the session I perceived that the conduct of the Indians in that part of the United States still threatened hostilities, and because there, as in the more northern parts, the Indians would certainly be disposed to tranquillity and peace with the United States, unless they should have encouragement to rely upon the support of Great Britain. Lord Castlereagh said with a smile that he had a good many treaties to lay before Parliament, but none such as those I described were among them. I observed that this affair had given more concern to the government of the United States, because they had received from various quarters strong and confident intimations that there had been a cession of Florida by Spain to Great Britain. "As to that (said Lord Castlereagh with a little apparent emotion) I can set you at ease at once. There is not and never has been the slightest foundation for it whatever. It never has been mentioned." I replied that he must be aware that such rumors had long been in circulation, and that the fact had been positively and most circumstantially asserted in their own public journals. "Yes (said he) but our journals are so addicted to *lying*! No! If it is supposed that we have any little trickish policy of thrusting ourselves in there between you and Spain, we are very much misunderstood indeed. You shall find nothing little or shabby in our policy. We

have no desire to add an inch of ground to our territories in any part of the world. We have as much as we want or wish to manage. There is not a spot of ground on the globe that I would annex to our territories, if it were offered to us tomorrow." I remarked that the United States, without inquiring what might in that respect be the views of Great Britain generally, did think that with dominions so extensive and various as hers, she could not wish for such an acquisition as Florida, unless for purposes unfriendly to the United States, and hence it was that these rumors had given concern to the American government, who I was sure would receive with pleasure the assurance given by him that no such cession had been made. "None whatever (I quote his words as accurately as I can recollect them). It has never been mentioned, and if it had, it would have been decisively declined by us. Military positions may have been taken by us during the war of places which you had previously taken from Spain, but we never intended to keep them. Do you only observe the same moderation. If we shall find you hereafter pursuing a system of encroachment upon your neighbors, what we might do *defensively* is another consideration."

The tone of struggling irritation and complacency with which this was said induced me to observe, that I did not precisely understand what he intended by this advice of moderation. That the United States had no design of encroachment upon their neighbors, or of exercising any injustice towards Spain. Instead of an explanation he replied only by recurring to the British policy with regard to Spain. "You may be sure (said he) that Great Britain has no design of acquiring any addition to her possessions there. Great Britain has done everything for Spain. We have saved, we have delivered her. We have restored her govern-

ment to her, and we had hoped that the result would have proved more advantageous to herself as well as more useful to the world than it has been. We are sorry that the event has not altogether answered our expectations. We lament the unfortunate situation of her internal circumstances, owing to which we are afraid that she can neither exercise her own faculties for the comfort and happiness of the nation, nor avail herself of her resources for the effectual exertion of her power. We regret this, but we have no disposition to take advantage of this state of things to obtain from it any exclusive privilege for ourselves. In the unfortunate troubles of her colonies in South America we have not only avoided to seek, but we have declined even exclusive indulgence or privilege to ourselves. We went even so far as to offer to take upon us that most unpleasant and thankless of all offices, that of mediating between the parties to those differences. We appointed a formal mission for that purpose, who proceeded to Madrid, but there the Court of Spain declined accepting our offer, and we have had the usual fortune of impartiality, we have displeased both parties—the Spanish government for not taking part with them against their colonies, and the South Americans for not countenancing their resistance.” I told him that the policy of the American government towards Spain had in this particular been the same. They had not, indeed, made any offer of their mediation. The state of their relations with the Spanish government would neither have warranted nor admitted of such an offer. But they have observed the same system of impartial neutrality between the parties. They have sought no peculiar or exclusive advantage for the United States, and I was happy to hear from him that such was the policy of Great Britain for it might have an influence upon the views of my own government to coöperate with it. “I

have always (resumed he) avowed it to be our policy in Parliament. We have never acknowledged the governments put up by the South Americans, because that would not have comported with *our* views of neutrality. But we have not consented to prohibit the commerce of our people with them, because that was what Spain had no right to require of us. Our plan in offering the mediation which Spain rejected was, that the South Americans should submit themselves to the government of Spain as colonies, because we thought she had the right to authority over them as the mother country, but that she should allow them commerce with other nations. Nothing exclusive to us. We neither asked, nor would have accepted, any exclusive privileges for ourselves. We have no little or contracted policy. But we propose that Spain should allow a *liberal* commercial intercourse between her colonies and other nations, similar to that which we allow in our possessions in India." I then asked him what he thought would be the ultimate issue of this struggle in South America? Whether Spain would subdue them, or that they would maintain their independence? He answered that everything was so fluctuating in the councils of Spain, and generally everything was so dependent upon events not to be calculated, that it was not possible to say what the result might be. The actual state of things was the only safe foundation for present policy which must be shaped to events as they may happen. In closing this part of our conversation Lord Castlereagh desired me to consider all that he had said with regard to Spain, the situation of her internal affairs, and the conduct of her government as *confidential*, it having been spoken with the most perfect freedom and openness, and that if I should report it to my government I would so state it. I have therefore to request that it may be so received.

In adverting to the subject of the slaves I reminded him that there were three distinct points relating to them which had been under discussion between the two governments. The first, regarding the slaves carried away by the British commanders from the United States contrary, as the American government holds, to the express stipulation of the treaty of Ghent. After referring to the correspondence which has taken place on this topic at Washington and here, I observe that the last note concerning it which I had received from Lord Bathurst seemed to intimate that this government had taken its final determination on the matter. That I hoped it was not so. I hoped they would give it further consideration. It had been the cause of so much anxiety to my government; it was urged so constantly and so earnestly in my instructions; the language of the treaty appeared to us so clear and unequivocal, the violation of it in carrying away the slaves so manifest, and the losses of property occasioned by it to our citizens were so considerable and so serious, that I could not abandon the hope that further consideration would be given to it here, and ultimately that satisfaction would be made to the United States on this cause of complaint. Lord Castlereagh said that he had not seen the correspondence to which I referred, but that he would have it looked up and examine it. There was I told him a special representation concerning eleven slaves taken from Mr. Downman by the violation of a flag of truce sent ashore by Captain Barrie. I also had received from Lord Bathurst an answer relative to this complaint, stating that it had been referred to Captain Barrie for a report and giving the substance of that which he had made. It did not disprove any of the facts alleged by Mr. Downman. But I must remark that Captain Barrie was himself the officer who had sent the flag of truce, and who was responsible for the

violation of it, and that as a general principle it was scarcely to be expected that satisfaction for an injustice could ever be obtained if the report of the person upon whom it was charged should be received as a conclusive answer to the complaint. He said he supposed the complaint itself was only the allegation of an individual, and that naturally reference must be made to the officer complained of for his answer to the charge. I replied that the documents of which I had furnished copies in Mr. Downman's case did not consist merely of his allegations. There were affidavits of several other persons, taken indeed *ex parte*, because they could not be taken otherwise; but they were full and strong to the points both of the violation of the flag and of the carrying away of the slaves. He said he did not know how they could proceed otherwise, unless the affair were of sufficient importance for the appointment of commissioners by the two governments. But he had not seen the papers and would look into them. The third point relating to slaves I said was the allegation made during the war that some of those seduced from their masters in the United States by the British officers were afterwards sold in the West Indies. He said he thought it was not possible, because it was expressly forbidden by law. I replied that I was not referring to the fact but to the allegation. As this had been made in the midst of the war, it had not been expected by the government of the United States that it would be a subject of discussion between the governments after the peace; and as it involved many circumstances of an unpleasant nature and irritating tendency, they would have preferred that it should be by mutual consent laid aside and nothing further said about it. At the same time they were ready to communicate such evidence of the fact as they could collect, if that course should be preferred by this government. I had made the proposal

of either alternative to the Earl of Liverpool last summer, and he had appeared to prefer that the evidence should be produced. I had now received a considerable mass of it, and although preferring to repeat the proposal of dropping the subject altogether, I would, if he should desire it, furnish him with copies of it all. He said that so far as it might contain matter of irritation, they had no wish to pursue the inquiry any further. If the American government, in the heat of war and under the feelings of that state, had advanced against the British officers a charge beyond what the proof of facts would bear out, there was no wish here to carry the discussion of it into the state of peace, and in that point of view it would be readily dismissed. But with regard to the fact they were obliged to ask for the evidence, because, if established, it affected the character of their officers and the observance of their laws. In that case the officers who have been guilty should be punished and, if otherwise, it should be known for the vindication of the character of individuals. I remarked that in the charge as originally made no individual had been named, but that in the documents that I had secured there were several and that from one of the papers it appeared that slaves taken as prize were actually sold. He said that by the last act of Parliament those that were taken, for example, on the vessels which carry on the slave trade by contraband, were committed to the care of certain conservators appointed by royal authority, but they were not slaves. I suggested that the documents in my possession would probably induce this government to pursue the investigation further. That the proof which the American government could obtain in the places where the sales were alleged to have been made must be imperfect. It had no control over the local authorities, but for a full and satisfactory investigation the coöperation of

both governments would be necessary. The mode suggested to me, and which had already been proposed by you to Mr. Baker, was that the American government would furnish lists of the slaves taken during the war, and in most instances the names of the vessels into which they had been taken, and that the British government should show what disposal had been made of them. Lord Castlereagh expressed his approbation of this course of proceeding and thought it would have the assent of this government. In relation to the fisheries little was said. He told me that he had the evening before read my note to him concerning them. That the British government would adhere to their principle respecting the treaty and to the exclusive rights of their territorial jurisdiction. But that they had no wish to prevent us from fishing, and would readily enter into a negotiation for an arrangement on this subject. Copies have been transmitted to you of the note I have addressed to Lord Castlereagh, concerning a discrimination made in the ports of Ireland between British and American vessels in regard to the number of passengers which they are allowed to take in proportion to their tonnage upon voyages to the United States, of his answer and of my reply. As no answer to this had been returned, and no determination of the government upon my application had been known to me, I spoke of these papers, but he avoided any explicit assurance concerning it. He said that the regulation had perhaps been made before the convention had been concluded. "But (said he) we might question the application of it to the case, as the convention was not intended to interfere in any restrictions under which we may think proper to prevent emigration from Ireland." I assured him that my intention had not been to object to the regulation as a restriction upon emigration; *that*, I was aware, must be exclusively the consideration of this government.

We had nothing to say about it. It was the discrimination between the shipping of the two countries of which I had complained. I presumed that an order to the port office would remove the distinction. He said he did not know that. It might be by act of Parliament, and they might question our right to consider passengers as articles of merchandize. They might regard the discrimination itself as a mode of restriction upon emigration. "You do not want our people" (said he), to which I readily assented, observing that our increase of native population was sufficiently rapid so far as mere public policy was concerned. We *invited* no foreigners. We left all to individual option. "No (he repeated), our people and our seamen—you really do not want them." I observed that if that were the case, this country should rather be under obligation to us for relieving it of such unprofitable subjects.¹ He did not assent to this conclusion, and left me uncertain whether the regulation in question would be removed or retained. The great length into which this report has already run precludes any comment of mine upon the substance of this conference, in which Lord Castlereagh's manner was uniformly courteous, and his assurances of the friendly disposition of this government towards the United States were earnest and repeated. I am etc.

¹ "The propensity to emigration is one of the most uncomfortable considerations of this government, and their endeavors to prevent it are the strongest proofs of the embarrassment which it gives them. The present state of Ireland likewise occasions an extraordinary degree of jealousy, of which various symptoms have recently disclosed themselves. It appears that American citizens are not permitted to go from this country to Ireland without special passports from the Alien Office, and that those passports are not obtained without difficulty." *To the Secretary of State*, February 17, 1816. Ms.

TO ABIGAIL ADAMS

EALING, 8 February, 1816.

MY DEAR MOTHER

I called a few days since upon Mrs. Copley and saw the portrait of my dear sister ¹ which she has agreed to let me have. The likeness is excellent, but the drapery part of the picture was never finished. Mr. Copley himself died last September.² I had seen him shortly after my arrival in England. Even then he had little to resign but breath. Mrs. Copley ³ bears her age much better, but an interval of twenty years makes a mighty change in us all. Their son is well settled in the practice of the law.⁴ The second daughter is yet unmarried and lives with her mother, still in the house where you knew them, No. 25 George street, Hanover Square. Mr. West also still resides in the house where we have always known him, No. 14 Newman street. I have called twice to see him, but he was both times absent in the country. . . .

TO LORD CASTLEREAGH

The undersigned Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary from the United States of America requests the attention of Lord Castlereagh to the letter which he had the honor of addressing to his Lordship on the 9th of August

¹ Abigail (Adams) Smith. The portrait was destroyed by fire.

² September 9, 1815.

³ Susannah Farnum Clarke, daughter of Richard Clarke of Boston.

⁴ John Singleton Copley, Lord Lyndhurst (1772-1863).

and 5th of September last, in relation to the slaves belonging to citizens of the United States carried away by the naval commanders of the British forces from places within the United States subsequently to the peace between the two countries and in violation of the engagement in the first article of the treaty of Ghent.

In pressing this subject once more upon the consideration of His Majesty's government the undersigned deems it necessary to state the terms of the stipulation in the treaty, and the facts in breach of it constituting the injury for which he is instructed to ask redress from the justice and good faith of the British government.

The stipulation of the treaty is as follows:

All territory, places and possessions whatsoever, taken by either party from the other during the war, or which may be taken after the signing the treaty, excepting only the islands hereinafter mentioned, shall be restored without delay, and without causing any destruction or carrying away any of the artillery or other public property originally captured in the said forts or places, and which shall remain therein upon the exchange of the ratification of this treaty, or any slaves or other private property.

The facts in violation of this stipulation are, that in evacuating sundry places within the United States which had been taken by the British forces during the war, the British naval commanders did carry away great numbers of slaves belonging to citizens of the United States. In his letter of the 5th of September the undersigned had the honor of inclosing a list of seven hundred and two slaves carried away, after the ratification of the treaty of peace, from Cumberland Island and the waters adjacent in the state of Georgia, by the forces under the command of Rear Admiral Cockburn, with the names of the slaves and those of their owners, citi-

zens of the United States. A number perhaps still greater was carried away from Tangier Island in the state of Virginia, and from other places, lists of whom and of the proprietors the undersigned expects to be enabled in like manner to produce. The only foundation which these naval commanders have alleged for this procedure was a construction of the paragraph containing this stipulation, so contrary to its grammatical sense and obvious purport, that the undersigned is well assured, if the same phrase had occurred in any municipal contract between individuals, no judicial tribunal in this kingdom would entertain for a moment a question upon it—a construction under which the whole operation of the words “slaves or other private property” was annihilated, by extending to them the limitation confined by the words of the treaty to artillery and public property.

In addition to the unequivocal import of the words, the undersigned in his letter of the 9th of August adduced the manner in which the article had been drawn up, discussed, and finally agreed upon, at the negotiation of the treaty, to prove that the intention of the parties had been conformable to the plain letter of the article. It was intimated in the answer to his two letters which he had the honor of receiving from Earl Bathurst, that some inconvenience might result if the parties upon whom treaties are binding were to recur to the intentions of the negotiators of such treaty, instead of taking as their guide the context of the treaty itself, on any point of controversy respecting it. In reply to which the undersigned observes, that his letter did not recur to the intentions of the negotiators, but the intentions of the *parties* to the treaty as manifested in the process of drawing up and agreeing to the article; and not even to them instead of the context of the treaty itself, but to support and main-

tain the context of the treaty against what he deemed a misconstruction, equally at variance with the rules of grammar and the intentions of the parties.

It is observed in Lord Bathurst's answer that in this instance the article as it stands was agreed to by "a verbal amendment suggested by the American plenipotentiaries to the original article proposed by the British Commissioners." Far otherwise. The original article was proposed by the American and not by the British plenipotentiaries. The original article proposed that in evacuating the places to be restored no property public or private, artillery or slaves should be carried away. An alteration was proposed by the British plenipotentiaries, and its object was to limit the property to be *restored* with the places to such as had been originally captured in the places and should be remaining there at the time of the exchange of the ratifications. The reason alleged for the alteration applied only to public property. It might be impracticable to restore property which, though originally captured in the place, might have been removed from it before the exchange of the ratifications. But private property, not having been subject to legitimate capture with the place, was not liable to the reason of the limitation, to which the American plenipotentiaries therefore assented only so far as related to artillery and public property. They did not assent to it as related to slaves and other private property. It was not a mere verbal alteration which they proposed; they adhered in relation to slaves and other private property to their original draft of the article, while they consented to the proposed alteration with regard to artillery and public property. To this qualified acceptance the British plenipotentiaries agreed, nor need the undersigned remind Lord Castlereagh that the British commissioners did not sign the treaty of Ghent until this article,

as finally agreed to, and every other important part of the treaty had been submitted to the British government itself and received their sanction and approbation.

If Lord Bathurst had taken this which is presented as the true view of the circumstances under which the article in question was drawn up and adopted, the undersigned is persuaded that he would have been spared the necessity of adverting to the following passage of his Lordship's answer, in which the undersigned trusts that some error of a copyist has left its meaning imperfectly expressed:

"It is certainly possible that one party may propose an alteration with a mental reservation of some construction of his own, and that he may assent to it on a firm persuasion that the construction continues to be the same, and that therefore he may conciliate and yet concede nothing by giving his assent." The only sense which the undersigned can discover in this sentence as it stands is, that a party may conciliate and yet concede nothing by assenting to an alteration insidiously proposed by himself. Impossible as it is that such would have been Lord Bathurst's real meaning, the undersigned is equally unwilling to believe that his Lordship intended to insinuate that in the case of the stipulation now in question an alteration was on the part of the United States proposed with a mental reservation of a construction not there avowed, which was assented to by Great Britain with the firm persuasion that under the alteration the construction would remain the same. The undersigned must be allowed to say that there was nothing in the transaction referred to which could justify such an insinuation. That the article originally drawn by the American plenipotentiaries and presented to the British government was plain and clear. That it admitted of no other construction than that for which the American government now con-

tends. That it avowedly and openly contained a stipulation that in the evacuation of all the territories, places and possessions to be restored, *no slaves should be carried away*. That an alteration was proposed by the British plenipotentiaries which was accepted only in part, that in this partial acceptance the British government acquiesced, the undersigned will certainly not say with a mental reservation to make up by a subsequent construction of their own for the part to which the United States did not assent; but he does deem it his duty to say that when Great Britain proposed an alteration to that, of the meaning of which there could be no doubt, and when the alteration was accepted conditionally and under a modification to which she agreed, she was bound to perceive that the modification thus insisted upon by the other party was not a mere verbal change in the phraseology of her proposal, but so far as it extended a substantial adherence to the original draft of the article. It is further urged in Lord Bathurst's answer that the construction contended for by the American government is inconsistent with another article of the treaty, for that it would require the restoration of all merchant vessels and their effects captured on the high seas, even if they should not be within the limits of the United States at the time of the exchange of the ratifications. The undersigned is not aware how such an inference can be drawn from anything that has passed between the two governments on the subject. Merchant vessels and effects captured on the high seas are by the laws of war between civilized nations lawful prize, and by the capture become the property of the captors. It was never asserted by the American government that the stipulation in question could mean that in evacuating the places taken within the territorial jurisdiction of either party the other should be precluded from carrying away his own property. But as by

the same usages of civilized nations private property is not the subject of lawful capture in war upon the land, it is perfectly clear that in every stipulation that private property shall be respected, or that upon the restoration of places taken during the war it shall not be carried away, the meaning of the expressions is defined by the subject-matter to which they relate, and extends only to the property of the party from whom the place was taken or of persons under his allegiance. But in the present case it will not be pretended that the slaves whose removal is complained of as a breach of the compact were the property either of his Majesty, of the naval officers in her service who carried them away, or of any of his subjects. They were the property of citizens of the United States, precisely the species of property which it was expressly stipulated should not be carried away; and far from setting up now, as is suggested in Lord Bathurst's note, a construction not thought of when the treaty was formed, the American government do but claim the performance of the stipulation in the only sense which could be applied to it at that time. That the British government gave it then any other construction was not only never communicated to the government of the United States, but was impossible to be foreseen by them. When Great Britain had solemnly agreed without hinting an objection to the principle of restoring captured slaves, it could not be foreseen that the engagement would be narrowed down to nothing by a strained extension to them of a condition limited by the words of the treaty to another species of property. It was impossible to anticipate a construction of an important stipulation which should annihilate its operation. It was impossible to anticipate that a stipulation not to carry away *any slaves* would by the British government be considered as faithfully executed by British officers in

carrying away *all the slaves* in their possession. The undersigned concludes with the earnest hope that His Majesty's government, reviewing the subject in the spirit of candor and of justice, will accede to the proposal which he had been instructed to offer, and make provision to indemnify the owners of the slaves which were carried away in contravention to the engagement of the treaty. He is happy to avail himself of the occasion to renew to Lord Castlereagh the assurance of his high consideration.

13 Craven street, 17 February, 1816.

TO WILLIAM PLUMER

EALING near London, 27 February, 1816.

MY DEAR FRIEND:

Several of my friends have given me accounts of your hurricane in September and of the subsequent influenza; but I am certainly not proficient enough either in physics or in philosophy to form an opinion whether they were totally distinct or associated phenomena of nature. In general I distrust the system of connecting together in the relation of cause and effect extraordinary things merely because they happen at or near the same time. It savors of judicial astrology. It is the comet which from its horrid hair shakes pestilence and war. Mr. Noah Webster published a book about the yellow fever,¹ where he pushed this concatenating humor to such a length that I have been looking over the advertisements in the late American newspapers to see if he had not come out with a volume to prove that both the hurricane and influenza were direct consequences of the Hartford Convention. . . .

¹ *A Brief History of Epidemic and Pestilential Diseases*, Hartford, 1799.

The present situation of this country is singular and worthy of very attentive observation. The issue of the long and bloody wars in which they have been engaged for upwards of twenty years has been (with the exception of the American war, upon which they are sore precisely because it was a *drawn game*) in their view prosperous and glorious beyond their most sanguine hopes and beyond all former example. Their naval and military fame surpasses in their own eyes everything that the world ever saw or ever will see. They have a legitimate King of France reigning under the protection of the Duke of Wellington, and a King of Spain of whose legitimacy whatever may be the doubts, at least, as Lord Castlereagh has boasted in Parliament, dependent, literally dependent upon them for his daily bread. They are (so again they boast) in close alliance and unsuspecting undissembled friendship with all the other great powers on the continent of Europe, irresistible in Africa, triumphant in Asia, distributing crowns and sceptres with one hand and dispensing freedom to slaves with the other. Yet all this availeth them nothing owing to the depreciation of the necessities of life. They are perishing by plethora, staggering under a political apoplexy.

The Regent in his speech to Parliament earnestly recommends economy, and his ministers propose a *peace* establishment of thirty millions sterling of expenditure for the year, besides the interest upon the debt—an army of 150,000 men and a navy of 33,000. To defray all this they are obliged to continue almost all the burdensome war taxes which the faith of Parliament was pledged to discontinue immediately after the peace. And all this while the whole agricultural interest is suffering under a depression of the prices of their produce of nearly one-half. The distress is indeed much exaggerated, as is proved by the produce of the revenue and

especially of the excise, which has been this year more abundant than it has ever been before; but there has been greater difficulty in collecting the taxes, and that of rents has very considerably failed. The petitions against the large peace establishment and the war taxes are numerous, but the ministerial majority in Parliament is overwhelming and they will probably carry through their plan. It will however be followed by great discontent, and if the pressure should continue, with important consequences. I am etc.

TO JOHN ADAMS

EALING, 29 February, 1816.

DEAR SIR:

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You have doubtless seen what Alexander *the Blessed* (a title which his Imperial Senate at the instigation of the Archbishop Metropolitan of the Empire sent a solemn deputation of three Alexanders to offer him, but which he has the good sense and modesty to decline) has been doing with my old friends the Jesuits. When I gave you the account of the pains which the venerable Father General took to convert so obstinate a heretic as myself, I did not know that he and his associates had so far overreached their own wisdom as to venture upon the same experiment with the religious creed of the country, where they themselves, as I very clearly saw, were but indulged with a jealous and reluctant toleration. Yet I had other indications of their proselyting zeal besides the worthy Father's obliging solicitude for my salvation; for they did actually convert, receive into the bosom of the church, and baptize with much public solemnity, two negro men, who were successively my servants, and one of whom

I had taken with me from America. Still the Father General, who gave me an account of their college and of their system of education at it, repeatedly told me that they never interfered with the religious principles of those of their pupils who were not of their own church, but left them altogether to the teachers in that particular of their respective denominations; and the jealousy with which they were regarded by the national priesthood of the Greek church I could easily discern. That they may have been indiscreet in their restless anxiety for the propagation of their faith, I think very probable. Mr. Harris, our chargé d'affaires, writes me that the decree against them has given universal satisfaction; but that is neither proof of their guilt, nor justification of the manner in which they have been punished. I have felt much compassion for them. Their learning was of a much better kind than that of the Greek clergy, and their college was the only good school for classical education in the country. They have been expelled, turned adrift upon the world, and deprived of their property without a trial, by the mere will of the Emperor, upon secret investigations and accusations of enemies and rivals, to all appearance without having been allowed even a hearing to defend themselves.¹ Such are the forms of *autocracy* even in the hands of the mild, the magnanimous, the pious Alexander, immediately after publishing his holy autograph league and covenant with his imperial and royal brethren of Austria and Prussia.²

The Temple of Janus will not be long closed; but oh! may we not be the first to open it. From rumors circulating here it would seem as if we were getting seriously into a quarrel

¹ On the suppression of the Jesuits in 1773 by Clement XIV, members of the order sought refuge in Russia and received recognition from the Czar; but in 1816 the order was driven from Moscow and St. Petersburg, mainly on the charge of attempted proselytizing in the imperial army.

² The Holy Alliance.

with Spain. It is much to be deprecated. From Spain we have nothing to fear, but let us keep at peace with all the world, until something foreign or domestic shall seriously employ the energies of this nation. Long we shall certainly not need to wait. A crisis approaches here, more formidable than any that they have yet encountered. Let their debt, and taxes, and overweening pride, have its own natural and inevitable course, and they will soon prey too deeply upon their vitals to be dangerous to us. Their establishment for the present year is avowedly calculated upon an engagement to maintain by force the Bourbons on the throne of France and upon the chance of a war with America. Upon those two pillars they have raised a necessity for a standing army of a hundred and fifty thousand men, and for an expenditure of thirty millions, besides the interest of their debt. Let us not give them the chance of war, and they will soon be obliged to discard their system for one of real peace, or it will sink them. I am etc.

TO ABIGAIL ADAMS

EALING, 4 March, 1816.

MY DEAR MOTHER:

In one of your former letters you have expressed some curiosity for further particulars respecting my last winter's visit to Paris. It was in many respects the most agreeable interlude, if I may so call it, of my life. It was after an interval of thirty years that I revisited that great city, where all the fascinations of a luxurious metropolis had first charmed the senses of my childhood, and dazzled the imagination of my youth. I was at an age when the hey-day of

the blood is tame, and waits upon the judgment. I had seen much of the world during the interval between the two periods, and was capable of estimating more nearly at their real worth the enchantments of that fairy land. I had entire leisure, and a mind, not merely at ease, but enjoying relief from a weight of anxiety almost insupportable for the situation and prospects of my country—a relief which had been equally complete and unexpected. I arrived at Paris in the midst of a carnival week, to which the partisans of the restored Bourbons were ostentatiously and painfully striving to give an air of revival to the festivities which had been peculiar to that season in ancient times. I saw the gloomy court of Louis 18, and the splendid circles of the Duke of Orleans. I frequented the unparalleled assemblage of the masterpieces of art in the Museum of Napoleon and in that of the French monuments, the meetings of the National Institute, the Courts of Law, the theatres, the collections of mechanical models, the Gobelin tapestry manufacture, and even the deserted churches and the subterraneous catacombs. Although the king's ministers were singularly shy, and avoided all notice whatsoever of the American diplomats from Ghent, I found society as much as I could desire, until the landing of Napoleon. I visited and dined at Madame de Staël's, and at our very old friend's, Mr. Marbois. I visited the Duke de la Vauguyon, but though he sent me a very civil message, he neither received me nor returned my visit. From the time of Napoleon's appearance at Cannes all that sort of society was at an end. Most of my acquaintance were dispersed, but I was indemnified for the loss by the safe arrival of my wife and Charles, safe from the long and not unperilous winter journey from Russia. After that time, however, the situation of Paris and of France became far less agreeable for the abode of a travelling visitor. The com-

munications with the rest of Europe were immediately cut off. The prospects of the country were from day to day growing darker and more threatening. The combination of all Europe against them, as it became continually more apparent, kindled afresh all the flames of their civil discord; a fearful foreboding of the fate that awaited them took possession of the public mind and, before we left France, I was strongly impressed with the expectation of the issue which so shortly afterwards ensued. Napoleon himself had no doubt presentiments of the same kind. I saw him only at the windows of the Tuileries, and once at Mass; and I was present the only evening that he attended at the Théâtre Français. The performance was by his direction the tragedy of *Hector*, one of the best that has been brought upon the French stage since the death of Voltaire. It was written by a professor at the university of Paris, named Luce de Lancival, now dead, and from its first appearance had been a favorite with the Emperor. It turns of course upon the interest of a heroic character, who deliberately sacrifices his life to the defence of his country, and its principal merit consists in the adaptation to the drama of some of the most affecting scenes and sublimest sentiments of Homer, translated into such French verse as Racine himself might have owned. The house was so crowded that the very musicians of the orchestra were obliged to give up their seats, and retire to perform their symphonies behind the scenes. And never at any public theatre did I witness such marks of public veneration, and such bursts of enthusiasm for any crowned head, as that evening exhibited for Napoleon. I certainly was not among his admirers when he was in the plenitude of his power, and I remember that David, the man after God's own heart, was forbidden to build a temple to his God, because he had "shed blood abundantly and made

great wars." Napoleon is no fit person to built a temple to the name of the Lord. But "neither do the spirits reprobate *all* virtue base." Had the name of Napoleon Bonaparte *remained* among those of the conquerors of the earth, it would not have been the blackest upon the list; and as to the mob of legitimates, who by his fall have been cast again upon their tottering and degraded thrones, where is the head or the heart among them capable of rising to the admiration of such a character as Hector? Their Hector belongs not to tragedy but to comedy; not the champion of Troy, but the knave of diamonds.

My visits to the National Museum were frequent, but such was the magnificence, and such the variety of its treasures, that daily visits for many months would have been necessary to give distinct ideas of the individual merit of almost every work of art in the collection. The antique statues were very numerous, but those from which I derived the least satisfaction, were precisely those from which I had anticipated the most. The Apollo, the Venus de Medicis, and the Laocoön,—I had seen so many and such excellent copies of these that I was unable to discover any new excellence in the originals. And the Venus in particular was so much mutilated, and so much restored, that she too strongly displayed the perishable attribute of beauty, even in marble. Those which gave me the greatest pleasure were originals of which I had seen no copies, and they were for the most part busts. Among them was a small *Hippocrates*, of great antiquity, and bearing in the face so strong a resemblance to our late excellent friend, Dr. Rush, that had I seen it in a copy of modern marble, I should have pronounced without hesitation that it had been taken from him.

The gallery of pictures was immense, but so much accumulation of excellence is rather unfavorable to the proper

estimation of every separate masterpiece. I had seen before at Antwerp, at the Hague, and at Potsdam, many of the most admirable pictures in the collection, and I had seen at Dresden one picture of Raphael which had so absorbed my whole stock of enthusiasm, that I had little ardor of ecstasy left even for the unrivalled beauties of the Transfiguration. I could have returned and spent two or three hours every day for a twelvemonth with new delight in this paradise of human art, but limited as I was in time, the pleasure which I enjoyed was not unmixed with confusion, like that which obscures the vision immediately after looking at the sun. The Museum is now no more, and as I shall never again have the opportunity of beholding such a collection of the wonders of human genius, the remembrance of the hours that I passed in contemplating affords me a satisfaction almost as lively as that which I took in the enjoyment itself. . . .

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE

No. 34.

[JAMES MONROE]

LONDON, 6th March, 1816.

SIR:

On the 1st instant I called upon Lord Castlereagh at his house to which he was then confined by a slight indisposition. I had received a letter from Mr. Luke, the Consul at Belfast, inclosing one from several masters of American vessels at Londonderry to Mr. Thomas Davenport, Vice Consul at that place, complaining of the discrimination between British and American vessels with regard to the number of passengers which they are allowed to take from the Irish ports. Lord Castlereagh apologized for not having replied

to the several notes which he had received from me, alleging his indisposition and the great pressure of business at this time in Parliament. I told him there was only one of the subjects upon which I was anxious for an immediate decision, and that was this discrimination in Ireland. There were a number of American vessels now at Londonderry whose masters were waiting only for this decision, and if it should be against them would be obliged to return home in ballast, or come in search of freights to English ports. He said if there had not been an earlier decision, it was not from any indisposition here to meet us in giving the fullest effect to the principle of equalizing the duties upon the vessels of both nations, and they were desirous of arranging this difference in Ireland to our satisfaction, and without at the same time touching upon the question of their policy in the existing restriction as a check upon emigration. But he inquired how it was with regard to the execution of the convention of 3rd July, 1815, in America? Observing that he had seen that a bill for carrying it into execution which had passed in the House of Representatives of the United States had been rejected by the Senate, I told him that I had no communication from the government relating to the convention since its ratification, but that by the Constitution of the United States as soon as the ratifications were exchanged it became the law of the land. It must and would of course be executed, and by the public accounts in the gazettes with respect to the bill to which he referred, it appeared that the difference of opinion between the two houses of Congress arose, not from any disposition in either to oppose the execution of the convention, but from a question whether an act of Congress was or was not necessary to give it effect. He then intimated that he had information that there had been some difficulty as to its actual execution, and asked me if I

could state the time from which it had been understood to commence in favor of British vessels in America? I said that was a matter about which I believed it would be necessary to come to a mutual understanding. It was usual to consider treaties as commencing to operate from the time of the exchange of the ratifications. In this case, at the proposal of the British plenipotentiaries, the convention was expressly made binding upon the parties for four years from the day of the signature. For some time after it was signed an extra duty had been levied here upon cotton imported in American vessels. I had conversed upon the subject with Mr. Robinson, one of the British plenipotentiaries who signed the convention, and afterwards with the Earl of Liverpool last summer. An Order in Council had issued in August removing this duty upon cotton. Of all this you had been informed. I had received a letter from you, written shortly after the ratification of the convention, expressing the expectation that it would be ratified, observing that the President had not previously issued a proclamation revoking the discriminating duties, because the Order in Council of August had never been officially communicated, and because it did not extend to tonnage duties. My own opinion had been that the obligations of the convention commenced from the day of its signature, and that whatever extra duties contrary to it had been since then levied by either government must be refunded. He said it was then evident that there was yet something to be done to give the convention its full effect; that as Mr. Robinson had been one of the British plenipotentiaries who had signed it, he would ask him to appoint a day to meet me and agree upon some arrangement, adding that there would be some inconvenience refunding duties already collected. As to the duties collected at the Trinity House, light money for the maintenance

of light houses, they were levied by the particular charter of that corporation; he thought the government could not remove them, and that they were not included among the duties and charges contemplated by the convention. I observed that if that was the understanding, it was necessary that we should know it, similar charges of light money and for the same purpose of maintaining light houses being levied in the United States; and if the principle of equalization should not be applied to them here, it would of course not be applicable to them there. He renewed the assurance that they were cordially disposed to give the fullest practicable effect to it, and said that as to the case of the passengers from Ireland they would put the ships of the two countries on the same footing, either by reducing the restriction upon American vessels to the same scale as that upon British vessels, or by increasing that upon the British to the standard of that upon the American. . . .

The ministers are very hard pressed in Parliament and by petitions from all parts of the country against the renewal of the property tax. It is said even to be doubtful whether they can carry it by a majority in the House of Commons. But they are determined to have a vote there for or against it. It is not impossible that they may be more willing to lose the question than to carry it, but the question they must have. They will undoubtedly carry all their establishments and their expenditure of twenty-nine millions for the year. The precarious state of the pacific relations with America has been distinctly stated by Lord Castlereagh and others of the ministers as reasons among others for maintaining the army of 150,000 men, and even the opposition have admitted the necessity of the 9,500 men for Canada and Nova Scotia.

I am etc.

TO JONATHAN RUSSELL

EALING near London, 8th March, 1816.

DEAR SIR:

My residence at this distance from the capital has deprived me of the pleasure of seeing Mr. Lawrence during the short time that he was in this country. I received however your friendly letter of the 11th January of which he was the bearer. He came with the intention of visiting France before his return home but while here changed his mind and went a few days since to embark directly for New York at Liverpool.

You are regularly supplied with the *Morning Chronicle* but do not see Cobbett's *Register*. His paper however, from the turn that he has taken and the turn that the affairs of the world are likely to take, has become so interesting not only to Americans but in regard to the condition of this country, that I wish you could see all his present publications. His representation of the state of England is colored with all the exaggerations that belong to his character, and yet there are facts disclosing themselves from day to day which indicate that his picture, caricature as it is, bears a stronger resemblance to the original than those of any other painter of the British periodical press. He is now in the execution of a project which, if not baffled by legal interpositions against which he appears to think himself secure, is to publish his *Register* contemporaneously both at London and at New York, but the New York edition is to contain all the matter that he deems it not expedient to publish in England. His influence upon the public mind in America will be much greater than it is here, where he is so much out of credit with all the political parties that they scarcely take any more notice of his paper than if it had no existence. It was how-

ever in his paper that the first indications were given of what is now called the general distress of the country. It was so much kept out of sight from all other quarters until the meeting of Parliament that his papers appeared to me as if they contained the imaginary description of another world. The proposition to continue the property tax reduced to five per cent and otherwise modified, together with that of maintaining an army of 149,000 men, and of providing for an expenditure of 29 millions for the present year, has drawn forth grievous complaints and earnest petitions from all parts of the country, and they all state that the people, particularly the farmers, are in great distress. But although this has tended to confirm the representations of Cobbett in some degree, there are strong facts to show that the distress is by no means general, and that in the only particular which would render it formidable to the government it does not even exist. Among his other predictions Cobbett foretold a falling off in the revenue of at least one third. But the revenue of 1815 yielded upwards of sixty-six millions, an excess of a million and a half beyond that of any preceding year. And almost the same excess appears in the single article of *excise*, a duty upon consumption, which if there was any general failure of prosperity in the country would be the first to show a deficiency. Cobbett prophesies like Joanna Southcott. When the time for the accomplishment of his prediction arrives without fulfilling it, he adjourns it to another day. He now says the deficiencies will appear next July. But if one portion of the people are obliged to diminish the amount of their voluntary taxes, another portion acquire the means of indulging themselves by the increase of theirs, and July, like January, will probably bring an undiminished and perhaps augmented tribute to the revenue. It is evident that no material falling off is

anticipated by the government, and their security upon a point of such infinite importance to them is more truly prophetic than the loose speculations of Cobbett. I do nevertheless perceive that when the farmer pays two bushels of wheat during peace for the same taxes which in war time he discharged with one, the unavoidable consequence must be individual distress and it may be to a great extent. There are indeed two things towards which the state of this country would seem to tend irresistibly, should it continue at peace, and which in any other country would have a most ominous and terrifying aspect. The one is a deadly collision of interest between the landowners and the fundholders; and the other an intestine war of debtors and creditors. But this country has so long and so triumphantly given the lie to every sober calculation and every prudent maxim of political economy, that all foresight is put to the blush, and the natural connection between sound reasoning and just conclusion is dissolved. The fact of every day bears down the unanswerable argument of every yesterday. Far be it then from me to say that the Bank of England will not be able to resume payments in cash and yet pay forty millions a year of interest upon the national debt, or that a debt of a thousand millions sterling may not admit of further and indefinite accumulation without ever becoming insupportable. Abstractly speaking such assertion might safely be made. We are still to see whether they will ever prove true in England. There are accounts from the United States to the 5th of last month. Congress had been two months in session, but appear to have *done* nothing of importance. There seems to be something like an explosion with Spain which I am afraid could not be avoided, but which at this time is greatly to be regretted. Our finances are still in great confusion and a new war so soon will much increase the diffi-

culty of bringing them again into order. Mr. Dallas has again proposed a national bank, a measure about which both parties have trifled like children. While our whole military peace establishment is ten thousand men, all parties are agreed here to keep within 500 of the same number in Canada and Nova Scotia. Lord Castlereagh says the United States have become a great *military power*, and Lord Palmerston declares that in the event of a new war Britain must be prepared to defend her West India islands against a naval expedition from the United States. See what the five fair frigates and the bits of striped bunting have come to.

I shall send you by Mr. Connell a small packet of letters from America which came under cover to me by one of the last vessels that has arrived. Our lively Ghent Secretary,¹ who makes laws and speeches and puns in the Maryland House of Assembly, writes me now and then a pleasant letter. Shaler is comfortably settled at Algiers and I have the advantage also of a correspondence with him, not of puns, but grave, solemn, and statistical. He has given me very useful information about the barbarians. Believe me etc.

TO LORD CASTLEREAGH

The Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary from the United States of America has the honor of inviting the attention of Lord Castlereagh to a letter which, on the 7th of October last, the undersigned addressed to Earl Bathurst, in relation to eleven slaves the property of Raleigh W. Downman, a citizen of the United States, alleged to have been taken and carried away by the violation of a flag of truce sent by Captain Barrie, commander of His Majesty's

¹ Christopher Hughes.

ship *Dragon*. With this letter were inclosed copies of Mr. Downman's memorial to the President of the United States representing the facts, and of several other documents to substantiate them, to all which the undersigned now begs leave to refer Lord Castlereagh.

The undersigned had the honor of receiving from Lord Bathurst an answer to this letter acquainting him that Captain Barrie himself had been immediately referred to for such particulars as he might be enabled to give upon this subject, and communicating the substance of his report upon this reference.

There are many particulars in this statement of Captain Barrie which, appearing to have no bearing upon the special object of inquiry and tending rather to draw the attention from it to other points of discussion, might with propriety be left unnoticed but for the insinuations that they convey. He remarks, for instance, that at the period in question the violation of a flag of truce was a very tender subject with him, and he refers to a previous correspondence in which he had been engaged with the commanding officer of the United States forces at Norfolk, on want of respect paid to British flags of truce upon occasion of one of his own having been fired upon. The undersigned might deem it sufficient to say that this was not the subject upon which Captain Barrie was called for information. As the Captain does not recollect the violation by his own people of the flag sent by himself, he did not mean to allege it was a retaliation upon that of which another flag sent by himself had been the sufferer. Yet he avows that if slaves fugitives from their masters had been received on board a flag sent by himself, he would not have restored them to their owners without an express order from his commander in chief—a tenderness for a flag of truce upon which the undersigned forbears to comment.

Of the particular incident asserted by Captain Barrie the undersigned has no cognizance. But so far as this part of that officer's narrative may be understood as intending an imputation upon American officers, or the American government, of disrespect to the sacred character of a flag, the undersigned will only remind Lord Castlereagh of the repeated offers made by the government of the United States during the war, and by the American plenipotentiaries at the negotiation of the peace, to punish every infraction of the most liberal laws of war on their part, and to indemnify as far as possible every sufferer under them. It was in the power of Great Britain to have accepted these offers on the single condition of reciprocity. The correctness of two of the documents transmitted by the undersigned to Lord Bathurst and marked A and B is admitted by Captain Barrie. He declares that he never received the document marked D, a circumstance acknowledged in Mr. Downman's memorial, and accounted for by the statement that before a vessel could be procured to bear the flag with this letter the British vessels had left the Chesapeake.

With regard to the violation of the flag of truce and the taking and carrying away of the slaves, Captain Barrie states in general terms that he has no recollection of any slaves ever having been received on board *any* flag of truce during the time he was intrusted with the command of the Chesapeake squadron, and that if such a circumstance did occur, it was without his knowledge or authority. The fact of the violation of the flag and of the taking and carrying away of the slaves is testified in the papers transmitted to Earl Bathurst, by the depositions upon oath of four witnesses, and His Majesty's government did not consider the transaction as duly investigated, or that justice had been done to the complaining party, merely because Captain Bar-

rie had stated the fact not to be within his recollection or knowledge. It was mentioned in Lord Bathurst's note that a communication would forthwith be made to Admiral Cockburn, for the purpose of obtaining further information upon the subject with which, it is added, he must have been acquainted, as it appears he had arrived in the Chesapeake before the surgeon's mate was restored.

The undersigned can urge no objection to any source of information to which His Majesty's government may deem it expedient to resort for ascertaining the facts to their own satisfaction. But he thinks it proper to suggest that there are other sources which might also tend to the elucidation of the facts. Perhaps Captain Barrie could indicate the name of the officer by whom he sent the flag. Mr. Jeffery, the surgeon's mate, whose restoration was the object of the flag and who actually returned with it, might give some light upon the subject. The captain and officers of the *Havanna* must be supposed to have known something of the affair. But independently of the recollection of all officers themselves, so materially and so pointedly interested in the result of the inquiry, from the documents transmitted by the undersigned it appears that one of the slaves *made his escape* from the island of Bermuda and returned to his master. Information respecting the others might then be easily obtained by the British government from Bermuda. That the slaves were taken the undersigned believes cannot admit of a doubt. How they were disposed of is a question interesting to the solicitude which His Majesty's government have felt upon an allegation which has been considered as implicating the character of British officers. The violation of a flag constitutes in this instance an aggravation which seems to call with peculiar energy for a complete and unequivocal investigation.

The undersigned is persuaded that His Majesty's government will feel it to be due to the complaint of the individual, to the honor of their officers, and to their own sense of justice.

He has the honor of renewing to Lord Castlereagh the assurances of his high consideration.

13 Craven street, 12th March, 1816.

TO ALEXANDER HILL EVERETT

EALING near London, 16 March, 1816.

DEAR SIR:

Your letter of 11th March, 1815, principally relates to two subjects, now obsolete enough; but one of which, the victory at New Orleans, will always be in season to the memory of Americans; and the other, the peace of Ghent, will I hope prove to be likewise composed of durable materials. Judging as the character of all political measures should be judged from the existing circumstances of the time, the peace was undoubtedly seasonable and was probably as good a one as could have been obtained; but all who, like you, have devoted their lives to the honor and welfare of their country, will remember that the peace did not obtain the objects for which the war was waged. From which every mind not besotted by the spirit of faction may draw two conclusions: one of caution against commencing war without a fair prospect of attaining its objects, as well as a good cause; the other, that the object of the last war must perhaps, and not improbably, be fought for again. In an enlarged point of view the war was much more beneficial than injurious to our country. It has raised our national character in the eyes of

all Europe. It has demonstrated that the United States are both a military and a naval power, with capacities which may hereafter place them in both these respects on the first line among the nations of the earth. It has given us generals, and admirals, and subordinate officers, by land and sea, to whom we may hereafter look with confidence for the support of our national rights and interests in war, if the necessity should recur. It has partly removed the prejudice against that best and safest of national defences, an efficient navy. And it has shown us many secrets of our own strength and weakness, until then not sufficiently known to ourselves, and to which it is to be hoped we shall not hereafter wilfully shut our eyes. But some of the worst features in our composition that it has disclosed are deformities which, if not inherent in the very nature of our constitution, will require great, anxious and unremitting care to enable us to outgrow them. The most disgusting of them all is the rancorous spirit of faction which drove one part of the country headlong towards the dissolution of the union, and towards a treacherous and servile adherence to the enemies of the country. This desertion from the standard of the nation weakened all its exertions to such a degree that it required little less than a special interposition of Providence to save us from utter disgrace and dismemberment; and although the projects of severing the Union were signally disconcerted by the unexpected conclusion of the peace, they were too deeply seated in the political systems, as well as in the views of personal ambition of the most leading men in our native state, to be yet abandoned. They will require to be watched, exposed, and inflexibly resisted, probably for many years.

You have doubtless been informed that a few days after I last wrote you, Mr. J. A. Smith arrived here as secretary of legation to this court, and since the meeting of Congress his

appointment has been confirmed by the Senate. Whether the government inferred from his personal relation to me this appointment would of course be agreeable to me, or whether it was made upon distinct considerations, and without reference to my wishes at all, I think it necessary, from what had previously passed between you and me, to state that your name is the only one that I ever recommended to the government for the office, and that although I knew he had been recommended for it by others, his appointment to it was altogether unexpected by me, until I was informed it had actually taken place.

It is natural that you should entertain some solicitude with regard to your future prospects, and your idea is just that the situation of secretary to an American legation in Europe is no permanent prospect for a condition in life. The government of the United States have no system of diplomatic gradation, and the instances of persons who have commenced as secretaries of legation and afterwards received higher appointments have been very few. But the reason of this has been, because most of the secretaries have been young men, who obtained their appointments by the influence and solicitations of their friends, and who after obtaining it think more of their own pleasure than of the public service. They come to Europe not to toil, but to enjoy; to dangle about courts and solace themselves for the rest of their lives, with the delightful reflection that kings or princes have looked at them, to see sights, to frequent theatres, balls, masquerades, and fashionable society. I speak not of those who have sunk into baser and more vicious pursuits; nor of those who come to make themselves scientific, or virtuosi. Scarcely one in fifty ever came to his duty, and nothing but his duty, or to devote his leisure to the acquisition of the proper diplomatic knowledge. The habits

of life into which they fall relax their industry into indolence, and turn their activity to dissipation. They go home with heads as empty, and with hearts fuller of vanity, than they came; generally with a hankering to return to Europe, and almost always with a distaste to the manners and institutions of their own country, disdaining or disqualified to take a part in its public affairs, and incapable of making themselves necessary, either to the general government, or to any of the political parties in the country.

Nothing of all this applies to you. Had your station been assigned to the mission here, you would have found that the mere drudgery of the office would have absorbed all, and more than all your time. At The Hague you have much leisure, and I am quite sure you are making good use of it. You will never for an instant forget that you are responsible to your country for the employment of every hour; that every moment not devoted to the discharge of present duty must be given to the acquisition of future capability. You will never adopt the fancy of the school boy, who left school and went home because he had *learnt out*. But as you have asked my advice, I cannot in candor recommend it to you to remain long in your present station under the idea that it will lead to something better. After a suitable period, properly employed, I should say return home, and resume your station at the Bar. Take an interest and exercise an influence in the public affairs. You must steel your heart and prepare your mind to encounter multitudes of political enemies, and to endure all the buffetings without which there is no rising to distinction in the American world. When the knaves and fools open upon you in full pack, take little or no notice of them, and be careful not to lose your temper. Preserve your private character and reputation unsullied, and confine your speculations upon public concerns to ob-

jects of high and national importance. You will certainly be favored with no patronage, political or professional, by the prevailing party at Boston; but you must make your way in opposition to and in defiance of them. Their system is rotten to the core, and you may render essential service to the nation by persevering exertions against it. I will give you one word which you may lay down as the foundation of the whole political system to which you may boldly and safely devote from this moment all the energies of your character, all your talents, and all your genius—that word is *Union*. Let that be the center from which all your future exertions emanate, and to which all your motives tend. Let your conduct be at once bold, resolute, and wary; preserve inflexibly your personal independence, even while acting in concurrence with any party, and take my word for it, you will not need to go in search for public office, at home or abroad. For public office, at home or abroad, at your option will soon come in search of you.

Be good enough to present my best remembrance to Mr. Eustis, to whom I am yet indebted for a letter, and propose shortly to write. Apthorp did not bring Turreau's book upon America.¹ That illustrious Vendean general told me last spring that he intended to publish a book against us. I did not think the worse of him or ourselves for that. *Laudari a laudato* has a counterpart which will easily reconcile me to his vituperation.

Our accounts from the United States do not appear propitious to your projects of perpetual peace. Once the Spaniard,² they say, has sprung a mine at Washington and gone off. But I have not room to expatiate, and must remain ever faithfully yours.

¹ *Aperçu sur la Situation Politique des États-Unis d'Amérique*, Paris, 1815.

² Don Luis de Onís.

TO ABIGAIL ADAMS

EALING, 25th March, 1816.

MY DEAR MOTHER:

The climate here is a paradise compared with that of St. Petersburg, where life itself scarcely deserves to be called existence. I left that country a skeleton, and verily believe that before the end of another winter I should have left the skeleton there. Since the day that I quitted the banks of the frozen Neva I have been steadily redeeming flesh, until, notwithstanding the drawback of the last autumn, my greatest apprehension now is of becoming unwieldy and lazy. My eyes are not much worse than they were before the violent attack which for several weeks deprived me of their services; but it is in the right hand that I most seriously feel the effect of declining years. You cannot fail to have perceived it in my handwriting. It was just perceptible to myself in the second winter of my residence in Prussia, and has been gradually and regularly increasing ever since. It is now painful to me to hold a pen, and I write so slowly that if my necessary correspondence should much increase, I should be obliged to employ habitually an amanuensis and write altogether by the hand of another. How soon I may be reduced to that expedient depends upon a wiser will than mine. The secretary of legation at this court is, I believe, of opinion that I yet write quite rapidly enough. None of the gentlemen who have ever assisted me in that capacity, from my brother in 1794, to Mr. J. A. Smith in 1816, has had cause to complain for want of employment; but the indispensable correspondence here is incessant, and the month

during which I was confined threw it into such arrears that they are scarcely yet recovered. Besides the public business with the British government, and the official reports to be made to our own, the mission here is in correspondence with ministers, agents, or consuls of the United States in Russia, Sweden, Holland, France, Spain, Italy, the Barbary coast and Brazil; with the commanders of the American squadron in the Mediterranean, and particularly with the American consuls in the ports of Great Britain, Ireland, Gibraltar and Malta; with the bankers and navy agents of the United States in the Mediterranean, at London, and at Amsterdam. It has occasionally corresponded with the ambassadors and ministers at this court of Austria, Prussia, Bavaria, Würtemberg, France, Spain and Portugal, and Denmark. Every American who has a claim of any kind upon the British government calls for the interposition of influence in some shape or other of his minister. Every projector of absurd projects, every inventor of impossible inventions, whose wonder-working genius is *not* duly esteemed and encouraged by this government, calls for patronage upon the minister of the republic, where freedom reigns and talents are justly appreciated. Newgate and Bedlam sometimes relieve me from correspondents of this class, but the succession of them is as uninterrupted as that of the See of Rome from St. Peter to Pius the 7th. I have made it throughout my public life a general rule to be accessible to all persons, and to answer all letters of solicitation or otherwise requiring answers. Some exceptions to this rule are unavoidable. I have hitherto invariably acted upon it, excepting when there were special reasons for departing from it. But the multitudes of people, who in person or in writing apply for what cannot be granted, and often for what is improper, are so importunate, so unreasonable, sometimes so insolent, and consume

so much time, that I really know not how to blame persons as much or still more exposed to such interruptions, who act upon a different rule and shut their doors, their ears, and their eyes, against intruders of every kind.

One would imagine that the American legation at London was the moon of Ariosto, or Milton's Paradise of Fools, the place where things lost upon earth were to be found. We have sometimes applications for estates that once were granted to British subjects, and sometimes for payment of the paper money of the revolutionary war. One comes in search of a suspected inheritance, and another of a conjectural genealogy. One gentleman has written to ascertain whether he is not a kinsman of Captain Trenchard of the American navy, and another, both personally and by letter, has applied to know whether Mr. Jared Ingersoll of Philadelphia is not his cousin? An English father intreats me to find his son, a sailor, who he hears entered the American service after having been taken in the *Macedonian*, and the friends of a beautiful young lady in America ask my assistance to hunt up her father in England. Good offices of this kind it is impossible to refuse, but the applications which have been most painful to me were those of women, Americans themselves, or connected with Americans, and in circumstances of distress which it was utterly out of my power to relieve. Not long since an English lady who has a husband of very respectable standing at New York wrote to ask me the means of maintaining herself and a sick daughter, and of finishing the education of her son whom she proposed to present afterwards to my patronage—all this to be at the expense of the public. When I answered that this was impossible, she requested a supply of money, offering some fine table linen in pawn for it. At last she wrote me asking my interposition with the treasurer of his majesty's navy to obtain immediate

payment of wages due to one of her sons, deceased. Her son, an American and a gentleman, in the midst of the late war between the United States and Great Britain had entered the *British* naval service, and distinguished himself in fighting against his country in the battle on Lake Champlain. It was for the wages of this service she requested my intercession for the payment of them to her. I now thought it time to ask her not to favor me with any more of her letters.

I have at last had my private audience of the Queen and my wife has been presented at the Drawing Room, both, of course, "most graciously received."¹ The Prince Regent has been confined with the gout at Brighton, but is to return this week to London.

I am etc.

TO JOSEPH PITCAIRN

LONDON, 27th March, 1816.

DEAR SIR:

Your favor of 12th February came to hand on the 5th instant, and the day before yesterday I received the package containing Bode's *Uranographia*, with the volume and papers belonging to it all in good condition. In returning you my thanks for your kindness in executing this commission I now beg leave to trouble you with another. It is to procure another copy of the same work equally complete. To have it packed in the same manner, to send it by any trusty captain or passenger of any vessel going from Hamburg direct to Boston, who will take charge of it and have it addressed: "To the Rev. John Thornton Kirkland, President of Harvard University, Cambridge near Boston, for the use of the

¹ See Adams, *Memoirs*, March 21, 1816.

observatory. To be delivered at Boston to the Hon. John Davis, Treasurer of the University, or to John Lowell Esq., a member of the corporation," either of whom is requested to forward it to President Kirkland. And with it I will thank you to write a line to Doctor Kirkland, informing him that it comes from me as a small token of filial attachment to the University. The cost and charges please to deduct from the balance in your hands.

It gives me pleasure to learn that the trade from the United States with Hamburg during the last year has been so profitable to the concerned. The merchants here complain that theirs has not been of late so beneficial. But complaint is one of the articles of an English merchant's stock. The exchange with all the world is in their favor, while they are bewailing the unparalleled distress and utter ruin of their trade. . . .

TO WILLIAM EUSTIS

EALING, 29 March, 1816.

DEAR SIR:

The latest news we have from home came down to the 20th of last month. There is a correspondence between the Secretary of State and the Spanish Minister Onis, which looks as old O'Brien, sometime prisoner and sometime consul at Algiers, used to write, *squally*. It was said that Onis had left Washington in high dudgeon and that all communication between our government and him was broken off. This is since contradicted, but the federal papers say that he complains, and *justly complains*, that the government have not published all the correspondence. The European diplomats in America always take a foolish fancy to negotiate

with the *people*. Genêt, Yrujo, Jackson, all had an uncontrollable itching to play the demagogue in the garb of an ambassador. Onís has not learnt to be wise from others' harm. He is repeating the same experiment, and I trust will meet with the same success; but you and I know full well that if Beelzebub had a plenipotentiary at Washington who should complain of ill treatment from the American government, the federalists of the Hartford Convention crew would cheer him and cry encore to his complaints. Mr. Erving was, on the 9th of February, at Boston, about to embark I believe for France: at least he has directed a correspondent here to send letters for him to the care of Hottinguer at Paris. From thence I suppose he means to go to Madrid by land.¹ I most earnestly hope that we shall not get involved in a war with Spain; for although it might not immediately, I am persuaded it would in the end, plunge us into a new contest with this country. I have reason to believe that no cession of Florida to Great Britain has been, or is, in contemplation. The finances of this country now labor to such a degree, and they are settling such an enormous peace establishment, that it is of inexpressible importance to us to gain time for introducing some order into

¹ "The vivacity of the Chevalier Onís at Washington has by some of our accounts been such that I have not been without fears an explosion would again arrest you on your way. I have no official intelligence, but the latest news is not quite so threatening as they had been before. Pray save us from a rupture, if possible. As to any dishonorable concession, I know that is out of the question, and God forbid I should propose it; but keep the peace, if you possibly can. Indeed we must not look with contempt to a war with Spain; nor must we expect it will be a quarrel with Spain alone. A little patience, a little time, is important to us beyond expression. You see we have no finances, and with more real means and greater potential resources than any other nation upon the globe, how near have we been to a shameful bankruptcy. A year of peace has scarcely brought us any perceptible relief, and to go to war again without ways and means provided, would be stark staring madness." *To George W. Erving*, March 28, 1816. Ms.

our finances, and obtaining some command of our resources. Mr. Dallas's annual report on the finances shows them in a more unfavorable light than I had anticipated. He proposes a bank, and a bill for that purpose was brought in; but I hear nothing of its progress, and recollecting that in the extremity of need last winter before the peace was known this measure could not be carried through, I cannot be very sanguine in the expectation that the present attempt will be more successful. A doubt has been suggested to me whether the subscription will be filled, even if the bill should pass. It is said that the control given to the government over the bank is too great, and the conditions prescribed to the corporation are too burdensome; but I think myself that if the bill passes, the subscription will not fail. Your prediction that our six per cent stock would rise to par after January may be realized, if the bank should be established; but as yet there are no symptoms of it. They have indeed risen at Boston to 87, and are here at 85; but as there is to be a new loan here, and the stocks of this country will probably not rise, there will be a corresponding check upon the rise of ours in this market. The noise and clamors about the agricultural and commercial distresses of this country, and above all about the property tax, which have been excited here since the meeting of Parliament, have certainly reached you, but you have not been the dupe of their exaggeration. The distress is in a very great degree imaginary. As to commerce the balance of exchange with all the world is at this very moment largely in favor of England. The farmers, to be sure, whose corn and flour have fallen to half the price they bore in time of war, find an increased difficulty in paying their rent, their tithes, and their taxes. The rents of course have been lowered, and that has touched the interest of the landlords and made them clamorous. But

to talk of their distress is a burlesque upon the word. The tithes which cannot be reduced press harder in proportion to the diminished means of the farmer, and here and there you hear a half suppressed groan under them. But the frenzy of churchism is indissolubly bound up with the frenzy of loyalty, and is indeed by far the strongest portion of the compound. The tithes cannot be touched, without infringing upon the rights of property, and they are not prepared for that yet. Nor if they should be, would they dare to begin with the property of the church. As to the taxes, John Bull has made up his account to be relieved from a part of them, and the only mistake of the ministers has been in the *amount* to which it became necessary to indulge him in this humor. They attempted to retain a part of the property tax, more I imagine for the sake of the principle than for the sum they expected now to raise by it. But John insisted upon having it all given up, and the popular outcry has overawed the House of Commons, and produced to the universal astonishment a majority upon that one question against the ministers. John shouts and chuckles prodigiously at his victory, but it amounts to nothing. The House of Commons is already frightened at its own success. It has a compunctious terror of having turned Jacobin. The peace establishment of 150,000 men, the annual expenditure of 30 millions, pass in spite of all opposition; they suffer the ministers to tell them that by refusing the property tax they have made the debt of 800 millions eternal. All their answer is, "Borrow more money, borrow on; only don't tax, and don't touch the sinking fund. The sinking fund pays off twelve millions of debt a year. Borrow fifteen, but don't touch the sinking fund." And so for this year will it end—an immense war establishment under the name of peace; an increase instead of a diminution of the public debt; and

preachments without end on all sides about retrenchment and economy. While such a system *can* be maintained, I shall hold the outcry about distress to be a fable.

I am etc.

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE

[JAMES MONROE]

LONDON, 30 March, 1816.

SIR:

A few days since Mr. Del Real, residing here as a deputy from New Granada, called upon me and inquired if I had any knowledge of the arrival at Washington of Mr. Peter Qual in a similar capacity from that country. I told him that I had heard generally that there were at Washington deputies from the South American Provinces but not particularly the name of that gentleman. Mr. Del Real said he knew of his arrival at New York but had not heard from him at Washington. He then inquired what foundation there was for a rumor generally circulating here of a rupture between the United States and Spain. I knew nothing further than had appeared in the English newspapers. I had heard of a correspondence in December and January between the Secretary of State and the Spanish Minister which had been communicated by the President to Congress and the supposed substance of which had been published here. It had further been said that about the 12th of last month Mr. Onis had left Washington and that all communication between the American government had been broken off. Later accounts equally unauthenticated contradicted this last circumstance but repeated that Mr. Onis had left Wash-

ington much dissatisfied. It was impossible for me to say what the real state of relations between the United States and Spain were but as to the question of peace or war I was persuaded it would depend upon Spain herself. If the demands of Mr. Onís had been such as they were represented the American government neither would nor could comply with them. The present course of Spanish policy was incomprehensible. If such demands were made, it could not but be with a knowledge that they must and would be refused. In ordinary cases the very making of such demands would imply a settled determination of the power advancing them to follow up the refusal of them by immediate war. If such was the intention of Spain the United States would have no alternative left but to defend themselves. But they had no desire for a war with Spain. As to the South American Provinces struggling for their independence the general sentiment in the United States was certainly in their favor. But the policy of the government, a policy dictated equally by their duty to their own country, by their state of amity with Spain and by their good will to the South Americans themselves, was a strict and impartial neutrality between them and Spain. I said by their good will for the South Americans themselves, because the neutrality of the United States was more advantageous to them, by securing to them the neutrality also of Great Britain, than any support which the United States could give them by declaring in their favor and making common cause with them, the effect of which probably would be to make Great Britain declare against both. He was aware that the popular feeling in this country was now favorable to the South Americans, more so than the dispositions of the present ministry. They complied so far with the prevailing opinion as to observe a neutrality. But the same popular sentiment here, he knew,

was very strong against the North Americans, and if the United States were openly to join the cause of South America, and consequently be engaged in a war with Spain, the British people would immediately consider them as the principals in the contest, all their jealousies and national antipathies would be enlisted against the common American cause; and as they were even now tormented with an uneasy hankering for war which they think would relieve them from their embarrassments, then ministers would take advantage of these passions and engage this nation upon the side of Spain, merely because the United States would be on the other side. He said he was perfectly convinced of the justice of these observations. I asked him if he had any knowledge of an Order in Council lately issued here, prohibiting all British subjects from supplying arms, ammunition and warlike stores to the South Americans. He said he had not. That the professed system of this government had always been and continued to be neutrality. That they allowed a free intercourse between Jamaica and the South American continent, and had given orders to their Admiral on the station not to molest the independent flag, and had refused to deliver up vessels bearing it which had entered their ports. But whenever applied to for an acknowledgment of the independent governments, they had declined upon the ground of their engagements with Spain. I had shortly before had some conversation upon these subjects with Count Fernan Nuñez, the Spanish Ambassador at this court, who spoke to me with some courteous expressions of concern of this abrupt departure of Mr. Onis from Washington, which he said was altogether unexpected to him, though he supposed Onis could not have acted without orders. He then referred to the points which had been mentioned in the summary published here of your correspondence with Onis. He thought

the expeditions from Kentucky and Tennessee might justly be considered by the Spanish as offensive, and that after the surrender of Carthagená there was no insurgent government, and that all vessels under its pretended flag were to be considered and treated as pirates. I said that I had no knowledge what the alleged expeditions from Kentucky and Tennessee were, but was very sure that they had no countenance from the government of the United States. The President's proclamation had on the contrary warned all the citizens of the United States against engaging in any enterprise hostile to Spain. He said that the proceedings complained of were subsequent to the proclamation. I replied that if any illegal combination for such a purpose had been formed at a distance from the seat of government, it was to be considered that the government of the United States had not the same means of immediate or of complete control over them as in similar cases were possessed by European governments. They had an open country. No barrier of fortified cities to stop persons intending to pass the frontier. No army or corps of gendarmerie to support and give efficacy to measures of police, and no authority to arrest individuals or disperse assemblages, until possessed of proof that they have committed acts, or are in the process of committing acts in violation of the law. With these considerations I was very sure that if any such expeditions had been undertaken, they had neither been sanctioned nor connived at by the American government. That they would on the contrary in the manner and according to the forms allowed by our Constitutions be ultimately and effectually prevented, unless this impatience and heat of Mr. Onís should precipitate the two countries into a state of hostility which we sincerely deprecated. That as to commercial intercourse with the independents and the admission of their flags into our ports,

this he knew was conformable to the received usages of nations. It was practised in this case by Great Britain, the closest ally of Spain, and no one knew better than he that she had refused either to interdict the commerce with the insurgents to her subjects, or to exclude their flag from her ports. He at first nodded assent to these remarks, and I observed that if his colleague, Onís, was ordered to demand his passports for causes such as these, I should expect to hear that he, Fernan Nuñez, had also left this court without taking leave, as the causes of offence to Spain were the same here as had been alleged by him at Washington. The Count said he did not know what Onís' orders were, and in truth it was not his concern; but for himself he was pretty well satisfied with what he had *lately* obtained here against the insurgents. By which I understood him to allude to the recent Order in Council which I mentioned to Mr. Del Real, but of which he had not heard. Fernan Nuñez is a man of great softness of manners and politeness of demeanor, and throughout the whole of this conversation preserved the most perfect good humor.

I have the honor to inclose copies of a note which I have received from Lord Castlereagh with a report from Sir George Cockburn to the Secretary of the Admiralty, Mr. Croker, concerning the taking and carrying away of Mr. Downman's slaves. You will not fail to perceive that the admiral, like Captain Barrie, disclaims all knowledge of the transaction whatever, and that the effort and tendency of both their letters is to excite doubts with regard to the truth of Mr. Downman's statement in his memorial to the President. I have no doubt it will be easy and beg leave to suggest it may be very important for Mr. Downman to furnish additional evidence of the facts and particulars which may lead to the disclosure how and why the transportation in broad

day of eleven slaves to the British squadron, and by them to Bermuda, could be effected without the knowledge of either of the British commanding officers. Lord Castlereagh has not yet replied to any other of my late notes. You may however consider it as certain that the proposal to disarm upon the lakes will not be accepted. In all the late debates in Parliament upon what they call their military and naval *peace* establishments, the prospect of a new war with the United States has been distinctly held up by the ministers and admitted by the opposition as a solid reason for enormous and unparalleled expenditure and preparation in Canada and Nova Scotia. We hear nothing now about the five frigates and the bits of striped bunting. The strain is in a higher mood. Lord Castlereagh talks of the great and growing military power of the United States. The Marquis of Lansdowne, an opposition leader and one of the loudest trumpets for retrenchment and economy, still commends the ministers for having been *beaten* into the policy of having a naval superiority upon the lakes. And one of the Lords of the Admiralty told the House of Commons last Monday, that bumboat expeditions and pinchback administrations would no longer do for Canada. That Englishmen must lay their account for fighting battles in fleets of three deckers on the North American lakes. All this is upon the principle of preserving peace by being prepared for war. But it shows to demonstration what will be the fate of the proposal for disarming. I had last week my first private audience of the Queen. I beg leave to observe that in the case of a new appointment to this court it would be expedient to furnish the minister with a letter to her Majesty. It is a usual compliment, to the omission of which she is not insensible. I am etc.

TO HENRY JACKSON

EALING, 31st March, 1816.

MY DEAR SIR:

I have received your obliging favor of the 22nd instant, inclosing Massena's pamphlet,¹ for which I pray you to accept my thanks. I regret to learn that Mr. Lee has got involved in such unpleasant contests at Bordeaux. The situation of all the consuls of the United States in France must undoubtedly be such, as to require the exercise on their part of the greatest prudence and forbearance. Their own official rights, and the rights of our countrymen as foreigners of a friendly nation, must doubtless be maintained with temperate firmness. But in asserting them, the real situation of the French government must be duly considered in the way of allowance, while every offensive allusion to it should be avoided in the way of discussion. If any of our countrymen suffer wrong, the remonstrances against it should be made in a tone of calmness, of moderation, and of respect, at least as strongly marked as would have been suitable in the most triumphant period of the reign of Napoleon. That your own situation should be disagreeable I lament, though readily perceiving that it cannot be otherwise.

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¹ *Mémoire sur les Événements en Provence, Mars et Avril, 1815.* Paris, 1816.

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